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This analysis of the policy for, and the operations of, the dispute resolution 
institutions established successively by the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the 
Employment Relations Act 2000, examined the relationship between dispute 
resolution system design and success in meeting government employment policy 
objectives.   
The grounded theory research method was utilised to first gather archived material 
from the Department of Labour (now the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment) about policy for, and the operations of, the institutions of each period 
under review.  This material was organised for each period under review by 
commencing with a narrative of the policy that established the institutions, and 
following with a description of the operations of those institutions, policy changes, 
and the outcomes (in terms of policy objectives) that resulted.  Each institution 
created by statute is described separately.  
From these narratives common themes emerged as subjects of further analysis and 
this formed a concluding part of each operational chapter. The final chapter draws 
from this theme analysis. 
The dominant themes concerned the transition from collectivised to individualised 
approaches to dispute resolution, the arrival of lawyers to a jurisdiction that had 
historically excluded or restricted them, the speed with which individual disputes 
(personal grievances) dominated the work of the institutions, and the emergence of 
two distinct and different advocacy and resolution cultures: a collectivist culture of 
union and employer association advocates and mediators; and an individualist culture 
of lawyers, employment advocates and adjudicators. The individualist culture 
imposed the norms, practices, costs and outcomes of the civil courts on the 
employment institutions, notwithstanding specific policy prescription (in both 
statutes) against that form of resolution.  
This study concludes that the relationship of advocacy culture to institutional structure 
is key to predicting effects on policy objectives.  It is furthermore possible that 
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This grounded-theory study of the specialist dispute resolution institutions of the New 
Zealand employment jurisdiction in the period 1990-2008 argues that the connection 
between dispute resolution system design 1  and success in meeting government 
employment policy objectives may be more dependent on advocacy culture than 
institutional structure. Whether or not that is so, the interdependence of culture and 
structure in facilitating policy outcomes is key to predicting their effects. 
The impetus behind the study was my interest in process issues arising from advocacy 
in low-level statutory bodies created to provide specialist forums as a means of 
relieving congestion in the civil court system.  Of the specialist jurisdictions with 
which I am familiar (including membership of the Employment Relations Authority 
2000-02) the employment jurisdiction offered bases for policy comparison not 
available from others. 
The institutions created by the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) and the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) were each based on policy goals for low-
level, quick, effective and inexpensive institutional approaches to dispute resolution 
as a means of achieving broader social policy outcomes, greater labour market 
flexibility in the case of the ECA period and more pluralist 2  approaches to 
employment in the ERA period.  
For comparative purposes the two periods represented policy from the competing 
interests of this jurisdiction (i.e capital and labour) that, until 1991, relied on 
collectivist approaches to the management of individual disputes via employer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The phrase ‘dispute system design’ appears to have a specific meaning that is not intended here.  In 
United States of America academia it refers to workplace management systems: Todd Dickey,  
Integrating Unions in Integrated Conflict Management Systems (2015) 33(S1) Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly, 45.	  
2	  For descriptions of the terms ‘pluralism’ and its corollary ‘unitarism’: see Margaret Wilson, A 
struggle between competing ideologies in Rasmussen (ed) Employment Relationships, Workers, Unions 
and Employers in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2010), 15; John Deeks, New 
tracks, old maps: continuity and change in New Zealand labour relations 1984-1990 (1990) 15(2) New 
Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 99; Alan Geare, Ideology in Industrial Relations (1994) 19(2) 
New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 117, defines the unitarist ideological position as an 
acceptance of managerial authority and prerogatives which views conflict as pathological and the 
pluralist position as accepting the existence of different sectoral groups with objectives that sometimes 
coincide and sometimes clash so that conflict is accepted as inevitable; Gordon Anderson, The 
Capability Approach and the Legal Regulation of Employment:  A Comment on Deakin (2009) 34(1):  
New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 27 at 31, describes the Employment Contracts Act as 
abolishing “the pre-existing pluralistic industrial relations system that provided for a high degree of 
joint regulation of working conditions and replaced it with one of employer dominated, individualised, 
regulation of the employment relationship.”  
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associations and unions.  This changed with the enactment of the ECA, a policy 
recognition that labour market flexibility would depend on a transition from 
collectivist to individualist approaches3 to industrial relations, and the introduction of 
lawyers (en masse) to a jurisdiction that had previously limited their involvement. 
This meant there were two advocacy cultures (collectivist and individualist) in both 
periods under review.  This study charts the dominance of lawyers as advocates in 
both periods and their role in facilitating ECA and undermining ERA policy goals for 
labour relations.  
A major focus is the personal grievance jurisdiction introduced in 1973 as a means of 
averting collective action arising from disputes confined to individuals.4  It assumed a 
particular significance after 1991 because it dominated the work of the institutions 
and became the means by which the transition from collectivist/pluralist to 
individualist/unitarist approaches to dispute resolution was established.  Description 
of this transition (and both eras) is based on the perception, position and experience of 
the government department charged with both policy and operational responsibility 
for labour/employment issues.  The study contains analyses of the Department of 
Labour’s positions and responses to Cabinet policy about dispute resolution and the 
operational issues that resulted, with the obvious caveat that, while institutional and 
organisational factors may play an important role in shaping policy outcomes, they 
are not the only thing that matter.5  The flexibility outcome sought by the National 
Government in 1991 had both been met prior to 2000 and remained undisturbed by 
the era that followed. The rapidity with which the transition to individualist/unitarist 
labour relations was effected in the 1990s and the absence of a return to pluralism in 
the 2000s established a basis for the inquiry about what it was about the way that the 
institutions operated in each era that influenced this result.   
For these reasons this study contains detailed descriptions of the two policy processes 
that resulted in the legislation at issue and similarly detailed accounts of the way the 
two sets of institutions operated in each era.  These are descriptions from (or of) the 
Department’s perspective, for the purpose of making the observations and drawing 
the conclusions in each chapter, but also for revealing what appeared not to be 
considered during policy processes.  These are the omissions that form the basis of the 
theory about advocacy culture. 
Research Method 
Grounded Theory 
This research method relies on the development of theory as research proceeds, rather 
than testing hypotheses posited in advance.6  It is regarded as providing a framework 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The term individualist, throughout this paper, refers to non-unionised employees.  The transition 
applies, therefore, to de-collectivised employees. Employers, particularly those composed of groups of 
shareholders, or reliant on other collective forms of capital, under which many employees in New 
Zealand are employed, have not been required, incentivised or cajoled into de-collectivising. 
4	  Gordon Anderson with John Hughes, Employment Law in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 
2014).   
5	  Michael Barry and Nick Wailes, Revisiting the Australia-New Zealand Comparison (2005) 30(3) 
New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 1 at 7. 
6	  Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research (Aldine, Chicago, Ill.,1967). 
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for the whole research process – data collection, mode of analysis and theory 
generation. In its classification and explication of succeeding levels of the analytical 
thinking required of such research – coding, axial coding and theory development - it 
provides a useful structure for ordering and connecting apparently disparate data.  
Use of the grounded theory method relies on the researcher having ideas or 
experience of their own: 
[T]he theories that we carry within our heads inform our research in multiple ways, even if we 
use them quite unselfconsciously…to analyse data, we need to use accumulated knowledge, not 
dispense with it. The issue is not whether to use existing knowledge but how.7 
Primary source material from the Department of Labour was first gathered and 
selected for its relevance to policy for and operation of the institutions, not for its 
connection to any hypothesis because it had not been determined at that stage.  
However, my interest in and experience of institutional process and advocacy cultures 
may well have influenced the selection of material regarded as relevant.  The 
selection process constituted the first stage of the grounded theory approach 
(memoing/tagging phenomena that appear to be significant).   
Committing the material gathered to narrative form (chapters 2-8) constituted the 
second, open coding, stage. It formed the basis for determining what themes emerged 
that were common to each narrative.  Once those themes were established and the 
connections between them across both eras emerged, the observations and 
conclusions that form the second half of each chapter were formulated. These were 
the issues relevant to institutional process (labelled quality of process). 8   The 
penultimate step required the assessments labelled quality of outcome, in large part 
dependent on secondary source material.  The theory concerning the role of advocacy 
culture in facilitating policy objectives did not emerge until after several iterations of 
this process. 
Sources 
The Department of Labour files recorded correspondence to and from the Department 
– from members of the public, Government Ministers, other Government 
departments, Members of Parliament, Parliamentary Select Committees, Judges, 
Tribunal members, lawyers, unions, employer organisations, litigants. Press releases, 
newspaper, magazine, journal and academic articles, theses, and reported research 
were also collected and archived, as were records of policy advice tendered to 
Ministers, from preliminary drafts to instructions to the Parliamentary Draftsmen, 
advice tendered to and by other Departments, policy, statistical and qualitative 
research sought from both inside and outside the Department.  Additionally the files 
contained information about the operation of the institutions administered by the 
Department:  the Mediation Service (prior to 1991 and post 2000), the Employment 
Tribunal, the Employment Relations Authority, the Labour and Employment Courts; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research, Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory, (2nd ed, Sage, Los Angeles, 1998) at 47; My particular theories, 
prejudices and perspectives can be found in the Case Comment sections of post 2005 editions of the 
Employment Law Bulletin, Lexis Nexis Wellington and in its online Employment Law Service.	  
8	  The terms ‘quality of process’ and ‘quality of outcome’ categorise content in chapters 2-7: ‘outcome’ 
refers to the result of policy goals and ‘process’ refers to institutional processes of the dispute 
resolution institutions established in both eras. 
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personnel appointments; employment terms and conditions of judicial and other 
dispute resolution personnel; statistical data about case processing; reports (weekly, 
monthly, quarterly, annual) about institutional performance. 
These files proved to be the rich source of data suggested by May as the 
…sedimentations of social practices, [which] have the potential to inform and structure the 
decisions which people make on a daily and longer-term basis; they also constitute particular 
readings of social events. They tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the period to which 
they refer and describe places and social relationships at a time when we may not have been 
born, or were simply not present.9 
However, as the list above reveals, the documents contained within the files were a 
mix of primary and secondary sources.   
Primary source documents on the policy construction exercise for both statutes were 
relied on for their descriptions of the advice proffered to the Government.  
Comparison of those documents over time (from initial policy explorations to what 
was finally expressed in legislation) revealed what changes of position and advice by 
the Department occurred and (sometimes) why.  Documents emanating from other 
Government departments in 1991 fulfilled three functions: they formed the basis for 
elucidating competing policy approaches to the issue of de-regulation; they revealed 
the means by which opposing political constituencies were served by public officials 
at that time; and they articulated the competing policy positions – quality of outcome 
versus quality of process - that formed the basis for comparative analysis of their 
operational efficacy in the institutions that emerged from the two policy processes 
under review. 
Other primary source documents were the reports generated by the Department on the 
operation of the institutions.  They included statistics on applications or claims and 
their disposition.   This numerical data formed the basis of analysis of the operation of 
the institutions.  By the process of comparing sets or classes of data, or the 
interrogation of connections within those sets or classes, the first stage phenomena on 
which the grounded theory method relies were revealed.   
The search for explanation of phenomena was dependent, in large part, on secondary 
source documents – correspondence, submissions, press releases, newspaper articles, 
research and conference papers.  They were the source of complaints, opinions, and 
comment about issues concerning the operation of the institutions and thus assisted in 
the identification of concepts or theoretical categories necessary for open and axial 
coding analysis.  The content of these documents was relied on for the fact of the 
complaint or opinion expressed, rather than the truth of the matters canvassed, within 
them.  Reliance on this type of material was not envisaged when this research began, 
but complaint, opinion and comment is, as the Department’s files reveal, both a 
function or outcome of a policy process (during and afterwards) and a component of 
the measurement of operational impact. Since the labour jurisdiction depends for its 
existence on the fundamental policy conflict between the interests of labour and 
capital the function of criticism and complaint has a particular significance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Tim	  May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Practices (2nd ed, Open University Press, 
Buckingham, 2001) at 157.	  
	   6	  
A third category of file documents, qualitative research (including research about 
public perceptions of the institutions commissioned by the Department after 1999) 
fulfilled the functions of both primary and secondary source material, in that the 
research revealed both the existence of first level phenomena, and the means of 
classification and explanation. 
As will become apparent from the narratives of both eras the process of policy-
making about the institutions changed significantly after 2000.  In 1991 policy advice 
was informed by the perspective and experience of public servants with long histories 
within the Department of Labour.  After 2000 (and the retirement of the official with 
the greatest involvement in policy advice over the previous decades) the emphasis 
shifted to the collection of research and data by specialists contracted specifically for 
each research project.10  Departmental policy analysts came and went.  Lost was any 
sense of history or continuity.   
Literature Review 
The need to stimulate thinking about the properties or dimensions of the research data 
depends upon multiple views of the phenomena thus revealed.  This was the purpose 
of the literature review. It offered bases for comparison, explanations of the data and 
theories for testing.  Strauss and Corbin recommend use of the literature review to 
access a variety of meanings and interpretations of events, interactions and objects so 
that variations can be incorporated into the theory that is the consequence of third 
stage selective coding. 11  
Thus the literature review for this research did not begin until much of the primary 
resource material had been gathered and narrativised because it was only at that point 
that its potential themes emerged.  This type of literature review forms the basis for 
the formulation of theoretical categories once other data gathering processes have 
occurred, rather than beforehand as a basis for hypothesising.   
Theoretical perspective 
The following broad theoretical issues form the basis of the perspective adopted for 
both the narratives and the analysis contained in this study. 
The term juridification describes the process by which the state uses the law to steer 
its social and economic conditions in particular directions to suit prevailing political 
objectives.12 Labour law has become a larger more juridified subject13 with the decline 
in trade union density across developed economies, and the parallel expansion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Meenakshi Sankar and Roberta Hill, Connecting Policy, Research and Practice: What does it mean 
in practice? Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand Conference, Industrial Relations Centre, 
Victoria University of Wellington, (2002): This discussion of the challenges of case-study based 
methodology for evaluation and policy development in the Department of Labour illustrates the 
limitations of such research for research based policy approaches. 
11	  Strauss and Corbin, note 6.	  
12	  Spiros Simitis cited in Jon Clark The Juridification of Industrial Relations: A Review Article, (1985) 
14(1) Industrial Law Journal, 69.	  
13 Lord Wedderburn Labour Law 2008: 40 Years On, (2007) 36(4) Industrial Law Journal 397. 
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employment protection legislation dealing with individual rights (in some of them).14 
This study proceeds on the basis that the policies that underpinned each statute, the 
desire to abandon the “enforced collectivism” of an over-regulated labour market,15 
and the wish to replace the unitary system that resulted with a more pluralist statutory 
framework, 16  each aspects of juridification, were particularly dependent on the 
institutions created to facilitate the social and economic changes sought.  The policies 
called for radically different institutions, so that the broad similarity in the ERA of the 
dispute resolution institutions that facilitated the policies of the ECA, contributed to 
the means by which the policy goals of the ERA were frustrated. 
These institutions substituted stakeholder involvement in grievance resolution for 
reliance on the judiciary and the judicial formulation of social policy in the labour law 
sphere,17 best suited to a unitarist than a pluralist model of labour regulation.18 The 
focus on common law contractual rights, and restrictive interpretations of statutory 
protections limited the scope of any protective role that the courts might have adopted 
for employees but expanded protections for employer property rights in labour 
resources.19   
The shared policy view (underlying both statutes), that institutional informality could 
overcome the problems of more formal dispute resolution institutions, failed to take 
account of 1980s theories about the lure of informality, the replication by such 
institutions of the courts they were designed to replace, and the centrality of the role 
of institutions for the legal profession.20 
The international context in which these changes occurred, the growth of 
individualisation in employment relations during a period of rapid global economic 
restructuring and “a more aggressive assertion of managerial rights” has been 
attributed to a number of interrelated factors: more competitive product markets, less 
buoyant labour market conditions; a “more facilitative political climate” (for the 
adoption of free-market deregulatory approaches to policy-making in industrialised 
states arising from perceived needs to provide for greater business investment and 
economic growth); and the dominance of human resource management cultures that 
demand unitarist approaches to labour relations.21 
Thesis Scheme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Susan Corby and Pete Burgess, Adjudicating Employment Rights: A Cross-National Approach, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014): They argue that as a result of these trends, another is 
necessary: analysis of the institutions that adjudicate individual employment rights.   
15	  Penelope Brook, Freedom at Work, The Case for Reforming Labour Law in New Zealand,  (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1990).  
16	  Margaret Wilson, note 2.	  
17	  Donald Horowitz The Courts and Social Policy (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1977); 
Gordon Anderson Reconstructing New Zealand’s Labour Law, Consensus or Divergence? (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 2011).	  
18 	  Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism, The American Way of Law (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 2001).	  
19	  Gordon Anderson,	  notes 17, and 2. 
20	  Richard Abel (ed) The Politics of Informal Justice (Academic Press, New York, 1982).	  
21	  Stephen Deery and Richard Mitchell (eds) Employment Relations, Individualisation and Union 
Exclusion, An International Study (The Federation Press, Leichardt, NSW, 1999) at 2. 
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Adoption of the narrative approach to describe policy and institutional operations 
mandated a chronological organisation of the data relied on to generate the theory 
about the influence of advocacy culture in this jurisdiction.  Thus chapter 2 describes 
the policy debates that resulted in the ECA.  They contain the arguments for the then 
existing collectivist model of dispute resolution and the points of difference between 
its advocates and those for ‘justice’, the unitarist model favoured by the proponents of 
change.  The explication of these points of difference begins the argument about the 
effects of advocacy culture on dispute resolution system design and employment 
policy objectives. 
The two advocacy cultures that operated in the jurisdiction are introduced in the 
Chapter 3 description of the operation of the Employment Tribunal.  The dominant 
theme of this chapter, the means by which the intention for informality of dispute 
process for the Employment Tribunal was subverted whilst desired policy outcomes 
were advanced, represents an attempt to demonstrate the connection between choice 
of system design, policy outcomes, and advocacy culture. Its focus on the role of the 
legal profession in the success of the transition from collectivised to individualised 
dispute resolution advances the argument about the influence of advocacy culture on 
system design and policy objectives. 
Chapter 4 concerns the Employment Court in the ECA era, its resort to common law 
ideas of process as a means of establishing a central role in dispute resolution in this 
jurisdiction, and the political reaction.  This is intended to reveal the breadth of legal 
advocacy culture, and the means by which that culture was asserted. 
Chapter 5 mirrors Chapter 2, in that it describes ERA policy debates. The descriptions 
of policy advice from the Department of Labour reveal a significantly changed focus 
from that delivered 9 years earlier.  Its advice favoured improving the operation of the 
individualist model.  The corresponding absence of advice about collectivist 
resolution models suggest the success of the policy approach that the Department 
earlier opposed.  A second contrast concerns the involvement of the legal profession 
in the policy formation process.  Its opposition to proposed institutional and 
procedural changes set the scene for the descriptions in chapters 6 and 7 of the means 
by which that opposition frustrated those changes and the policies that prompted 
them.  Those chapters about the Mediation Service and the Employment Relations 
Authority, the ERA equivalent of chapter 3, establish the connection between 
advocacy culture, resolution system design and policy outcomes. 
Chapter 8, like Chapter 4, reveals another perspective on advocacy culture and 
institutional process by moving the focus from representatives to decision-makers. Its 
focus is the Employment Court’s reaction to ERA restrictions on its powers to 
supervise inferior institutions. 
The data in these chapters is categorised according to whether it addresses quality of 
process in the institutions described or quality of policy outcome.  The observations 
and conclusions about the data of each chapter form the basis of the themes relevant 
to the central theory about the influence of advocacy culture on institutional dispute 
resolution system design and policy outcomes addressed in the concluding chapter 9. 
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Chapter 2 
Employment Contracts Act Institutions 
Policy Origins  
 
Introduction 
National Party policy for the 1990 General Election emphasised the need for a more 
flexible labour market by reducing collective and increasing individualist negotiation 
of terms and conditions of employment and the representation of employee interests.1 
However after the election the process of legislating the promises concerning dispute 
resolution provoked a hard fought policy dispute about the reach of labour market 
deregulation. The dispute aligned some public servants and their departments with 
Cabinet policy moderates and others with policy radicals. The resulting Part VI, 
Employment Contracts Act (ECA) reflected a series of political compromises: a new 
statutory regime instead of amendment of the existing one; retention of a specialist 
employment jurisdiction over resort to the civil courts; abolition of the Mediation 
Service in favour of an Employment Tribunal; retention of the Labour Court as the 
Employment Court; extension of statutory minima for grievance processes to the 
entire workforce over none at all.   
This chapter describes the policy process (concerning issues of access, legal and lay 
assistance, formal and informal procedures, dual and single function institutions, 
timing of institutional change) that resulted in the dispute resolution system and 
institutions of the ECA. The aim is to establish a basis for demonstrating how the 
individualist outcome sought by both radicals and moderates was facilitated by the 
extension of grievance rights to the whole workforce and dispute resolution system 
design.  The radical lobby opposed both. 
Interrogation of this conflict requires a description of the detail of the respective 
policy positions of advisers, policy makers and stakeholders and their strategies and 
tactics. 
The chapter concludes with a list of structural and process issues relevant to the 
subsequent operations of the dispute resolution institutions and system selected. 
Labour policy context 
Legislation governing the relationship between employer and employee has been a 
feature of New Zealand industrial relations since the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1894.  By 1991 this relationship was based on what was known as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  National Party, Policy on Industrial Relations, 8 May 1990. Its key components, voluntary unionism, 
bargaining structures embracing a variety of arrangements, contractual status for employment 
agreements and a minimum code included the extension of rights to the resolution of disputes and 
grievances to all employees: Pat Walsh and Rose Ryan, The Making of the Employment Contracts Act, 
in Raymond Harbridge (ed) Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experience, Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 1993).  	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national award system – a series of formally recognised awards that set legal 
minimum conditions of employment that were binding on the employers and (most) 
employees in the industries or occupations on which they were based.  Their terms 
and conditions were the subject of bargaining between unions and employer groups 
with state provided conciliation and arbitration when agreement could not be reached.  
By 1984 it was clear that the statutory regime needed to better reflect changes of 
bargaining practice.  The incoming Labour Government therefore sought to reform 
aspects of the system.  It began by abolishing compulsory arbitration for pay claims 
(disputes of interest). It went on to reform the structure and powers of unions, clarify 
rights to strike and make some changes to the dispute resolution institutions, but it 
retained the essential character of the award system (including the representation of 
employees through a system of collective bargaining) notwithstanding some intense 
philosophical differences within the governing party about the place of regulation and 
collective (over individual) interests in industrial relations.2  
This debate presaged the industrial reforms of the incoming National Government in 
1990. Against what has been described (of the Labour Relations Act 1987) as either a 
centralist-collectivist response to inequalities of bargaining power and consequent 
conflict3 or a failure to provide for a controlled transition to greater enterprise 
bargaining,4 the argument for greater bargaining flexibility triumphed. It privileged 
individual over collective bargaining of terms and conditions of employment, 
couching what has been described as an agenda to strip employees of bargaining 
power and workplace voice,5 as the promotion of freedom, choice and labour market 
efficiency.6 
The debate about deregulation of the labour market forced policy makers back to 
basics in respect of the nature of dispute resolution, the need for state involvement, 
the structure of the resolution institutions and whether a specialist jurisdiction should 
be maintained.  Much of the thinking on these issues had never been subject to the 
challenge that the deregulation debate required.  The policy struggle that resulted in 
the new statute covered the full range of issues that arise for public dispute resolution.  
The reforms brought specialist dispute resolution facilities for the first time to all 
employers and employees – regardless of whether they were covered by a collective 
arrangement – and changed the nature of representation in this jurisdiction.  This, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 	  Gordon Anderson, The Future of Employment Law [2014] 6 Employment Law Bulletin, 79 
describing the result as “a small pluralist oasis in the new-right landscape created by Labour’s 
neoliberal deregulatory reforms”; John Deeks, New tracks, old maps: continuity and change in New 
Zealand labour relations 1984-1990, (1990) 15(2) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 99: “In 
New Zealand since 1984, labour market, labour relations and personnel issues have been a key focus 
of ideologists keen to reinforce a unitarist frame of reference in corporate affairs.”	  
3	  Penelope J Brook, New Zealand’s Employment Contracts Act: An Incomplete Revolution (1991) 
(Spring) Policy, 6. 
4 	  Gordon Anderson and Moira Thompson, Mazengarb’s Employment Law, Vol 1, General 
Introduction, (loose-leaf ed, Butterworths, Wellington); Gordon Anderson, The Employment Contracts 
Act 1991: an employers’ charter? (1991) 16(2) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 127, 
argues that the consensus between the two major representatives of employers (New Zealand 
Employers Federation) and employees (Federation of Labour) 20 years previously was no longer 
existent by mid 1980s – the employers adopted a position that unions were anachronistic and marginal 
to good industrial relations. 
5	  Gordon Anderson, note 2 at 80.	  
6	  Employment Contracts Act 1991, Long Title. 
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turn, affected processes or styles of resolution.  Prior to 1991 the dominant resolution 
style of individual disputes was heavily influenced by the bargaining styles of parties 
to collective bargaining.  Impasses were resolved in large part by assisted negotiation. 
After 1991 the influx of lawyers as representatives introduced the requirements of 
legal method to dispute resolution.  Impasses were regarded as requiring arbitration.  
The implications of this for the public provision of dispute resolution facilities will be 
considered in later chapters.  
National Party Policy for 1990 General Election 
This policy, released to the public on 8 May 1990, proposed to deregulate the labour 
market (by abolishing the award system in favour of individual employment 
contracts) and make changes to the dispute resolution system by ending the union 
monopoly over the representation of workers with personal grievances, reviewing the 
Labour Court and the Arbitration Commission and revamping mediation and 
conciliation procedures. It signalled the opening up of personal grievance procedures 
to non-union member employees by asserting that no group or individual would be 
denied access to dispute resolution procedures. 
At issue was the means by which the personal grievance jurisdiction would be 
extended to all employees: whether the current system would be made available to all 
or via a dual system (one for union and the other for non-union employees).  The 
latter option (lobbied for by employment-at-will advocates7) was regarded as having 
the disadvantage of reinforcing the benefits of union membership (based on a view 
that one of the main attractions of union membership was the right to take personal 
grievances) and the former option as preferable only if the Labour Court was not 
retained.8   
National Government Policy Divisions 
Work by the Department of Labour (via its Industrial Relations Service) on the 
implementation of labour market policy commenced immediately after the election.9 
The Minister of Labour, Hon W F Birch, wished to introduce the reform legislation in 
two parts, the first of which would be in the first week of December 1990.  He wanted 
a working group set up before Christmas to review the dispute resolution institutions, 
the results of which would form part of the second stage of the reform programme in 
the New Year. 
By early November 1990, however, a clear division in the new Cabinet about this 
strategy became evident.  The Minister of Labour regarded reform of bargaining for 
collective agreements as the legislative priority with reform of the industrial relations 
institutions to be dealt with later. His initial plan was to amend the Labour Relations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Penelope Brook, Freedom at Work, The Case for Reforming Labour Law in New Zealand, (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1990). 
8	  Paul Bell for Minister of Labour, Minute, 16 November 1990; David Peetz Individual contracts, 
bargaining and union membership (2002) 28 Australian Bulletin of Labour, 1.	  
9	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Minute (of meeting between Minister of Labour, 
Secretary of Labour and General Manager Industrial Relations Service) 2 November 1990.  At this 
meeting the Minister presented his officials with a document known as legal drafting instructions, 
compiled by Paul Bell in the months leading up to the election, which became the basis of development 
of the Employment Contracts Act.  
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Act 1987. 10  The Minister of Finance, Hon Ruth Richardson, was opposed to 
incremental reform, preferring a “clean slate” approach through a completely new 
labour statute based on voluntary contracting and the common law of contract.11  
Labour contracts would be enforced through the civil courts (District and High 
Courts) as non-union individual contracts were, ameliorative contracts legislation 
(e.g. Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, Contractual Remedies Act 1979, Contracts 
(Privity) Act 1982) would not apply and the “Minimum Wages Act”12 would be 
repealed,13 for the reasons that the ordinary courts should be the forum for disputes 
resolution:   
 
I believe this is essential in view of the string of poor decisions by Labour Court Judges; [the 
labour market needed to be protected] from some of the worst features of the various contractual 
Acts referred to – features that would probably open the way for harmful judicial activism.14    
 
Officials reflected this division of view, with those in the Departments of Labour, 
Justice and the State Services Commission (SSC) coming in behind the Minister of 
Labour and Treasury officials supporting the Minister of Finance.15 The Treasury 
position was met by a policy assessment from Labour officials that warned that  
a labour relations policy that rests entirely on individualised contracts secured through the civil 
justice system runs the risk of relatively high bargaining and disputes resolution costs both for 
many employers and workers.  An industrial relations regime that permits individualised 
contracting only, takes no account of the economies of scale available through collective 
arrangements, nor of the moderating disciplines (e.g. against wildcat industrial action) that are 
available through collective bargaining.16   
There was also the practical problem of resourcing the radical agenda.  Labour 
officials warned that the extension of the dispute resolution regime from 40% of the 
workforce (that was then unionised) to all employees had considerable resourcing 
implications for the existing institutions, the Mediation Service and the Labour 
Court.17 For the radical agenda this warning was welcomed. It wanted to abolish those 
institutions. 18   It sought reliance on the Rule of Addis 19  for all employment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Minister of Labour, Memorandum For Cabinet, 9 November 1990. 
11	  The Treasury, Paper, Labour Contracts (undated) faxed by A. Sundakov to Department of Labour 
on 16 November 1990. 
12	  The Minister’s term for the Minimum Wage Act 1983.	  
13	  Minister of Finance, Memorandum to Cabinet, 12 November 1990.	  
14	  Ibid, Draft Labour Bill, Annex 1, Explanatory note about clause 5.  This position has been described 
as reflecting the criticism of the Business Roundtable that specialised institutions pay too much 
attention to the content of contracts, implying terms into them, and that civil courts would produce 
significantly different judgments about contracts: Nick Wailes, (citing Gordon Anderson) The Case 
Against Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour Law: The Philosophical Assumptions of a Common Law for 
Labour Relations (1994) 19(1) New Zealand Journal	  	  of Industrial Relations, 1. 
15	  The concern about continued use of the Labour Court judiciary was that they “had proved 
particularly adept at innovative interpretations of dismissal and redundancy law”: Penelope Brook, 
note 3 at 9. 
16	  General Manager Industrial Relations Service and the Assistant Commissioner of State Services to 
Minister of Labour and State Services, Paper: Labour Relations Amendment Act No 2 1990: Public 
Policy Issues, 12 November 1990, at [8].   
17	  Ibid.    
18	  David Smyth, The Treasury, Paper: Note of Positions of Labour Department and Treasury on 
Labour Market Reform as at 18 Nov, 18 November 1990: “… if Treasury’s views are adopted there 
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arrangements and a return to the position prior to 1970 where modified at-will terms 
and conditions applied to much of the workforce.20  It was thus horrified by the 
proposal to extend personal grievances (characterised as a tax on employment) to the 
whole workforce.  Retention of a separate jurisdiction would perpetuate a lack of 
respect for contract law principles and “a pattern of third-party interference” in 
employment.  Failure to abolish statutory minima for wages, holidays and health and 
safety would compromise the purity of the freedom of contract approach they sought 
for the new legislation.21 
The battle to prevail that followed this opening skirmish continued through the 
following year until the final form of the legislation was approved in April 1991.  The 
tactics engaged by the protagonists echoed their positions on the content of the 
struggle.  Their officials were directed by Cabinet to work together to produce the 
necessary policy papers (the Officials Working Party on the Employment Contracts 
Bill) but whilst the (Labour, Justice and SSC) officials in the Birch camp were able to 
do so, the Treasury members of the group chose not to.  The Treasury strategy was to 
undermine the power of any challenge to its preferred positions.  This was achieved 
by the simple expedient of failing to table essential policy positions until the last 
minute, failing to contribute to the debate until after other participants considered it 
concluded, and the issue of its own policy papers after (and in response to) the papers 
contributed by the others.22  This caused the Labour Minister to record his desire to 
deal with dispute resolution mechanisms “in a more consultative fashion”.23  
The Minister of Finance was successful in the struggle over whether to reform 
existing legislation or start anew but in the quarrel over sequencing legislative change 
the Minister of Labour prevailed,24 although not without the casualty sustained by his 
officials who had pressed for an assessment of institutional dispute resolution 
requirements once the new deregulated labour market environment had been 
established.  This would have seen the retention of existing institutions – the Labour 
Court and the Mediation Service for the initial phase of the Employment Contracts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would be no formal need for a state mediation service (although Government could take a separate 
decision to provide one), or a separate Labour Court.”  at 4. 
19	  Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488. 
20	  Roger Kerr, conference paper, Lessons from Labour Market Reform in New Zealand, H R Nicholls 
Society’s XXVI Conference, Melbourne (18 March 2005). 
21	  Ibid.	  
22	  Minister of Labour to Prime Minister, letter and Cabinet Strategy Committee paper: Industrial 
Relations, 20 November 1990: “We talked earlier today about the difficulties caused by the lack of 
agreement between Treasury, the Labour Department (Ralph Stockdill’s group) and Ruth Richardson 
and myself on procedure, let alone for the content of the required paper.  Ross Tanner has prepared a 
potted summary of events over the weekend, which you may find illuminating.” 
23	  Minister of Labour, Memorandum For Cabinet, 9 November 1990 at [5] p 2.	  
24	  Minister of Labour, Media Statement, 19 December 1990; Minister of Labour for Cabinet Strategy 
Committee, Cabinet Committee paper: Development of the Government’s Industrial Reform Package, 
20 November 1990; Minister of Finance for Cabinet Strategy Committee, Cabinet Committee paper: 
Economic Policy and Comprehensive Labour Market Reform, 20 November 1990; Cabinet Strategy 
Meeting Minutes, 21 November 90: CSC(90) M 2/2:  The Committee agreed to adopt the operational 
guidelines set out in the Minister of Labour’s paper, directed that drafting of the legislation commence 
immediately and noted that a second Bill to integrate institutional arrangements would be introduced in 
the New Year. 
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Act.25  Instead, the officials were locked into a policy debate about whether any 
institutions at all would feature in the reforms.26 
Labour Market Policy: Regulation 
The Department of Labour was forced back to policy basics by this debate, in 
particular on the place of regulation in the labour market. Its view was that a labour 
relations regulatory framework should serve the following purposes: lowering the 
costs on employers and employees by providing procedural certainty in bargaining 
and disputes resolution; lowering external costs to the community (that arise, for 
instance, from industrial disruption); and providing cost-effective protections for 
employees otherwise exposed to unreasonable commercial or safety risks.27  Its 
rationale for continuing state involvement in the proposed reforms included a critique 
of the Treasury policy as overly reliant  
on outcomes. An assessment of the case for an institutional complement to that policy rests on 
the case for defined processes to ensure the harmonious and equitable achievement of those 
outcomes.  If they are to be fully effective, these processes should be robust enough to cope with 
the pressures placed upon them, both in depressed and buoyant labour market conditions.28   
This required an acceptance that the costs of industrial conflict are invariably imposed 
on others not involved in the issues at stake, meaning that there is a benefit of state 
involvement in industrial dispute resolution in lowering those costs.  
On the choice of forum for dispute resolution Labour officials noted that whilst it was 
theoretically possible to rely on the civil courts, the costs – financial and social – of 
doing so were likely to be considerably higher than were then current.29  
Acknowledging that the argument for retaining specialist institutions was dependent 
on assessments of their long-term benefits and the net resource costs of alternatives, 
they emphasised the public signalling function of specialist institutions:  
To provide no specialist industrial relations institutions runs the risk that the State has no 
capacity, (short of some form of one-off legislative intervention) to influence bargaining 
behaviour, and particularly disruptive bargaining behaviour.  On the other hand, the 
establishment of some institutional presence signals publicly that the State has some interest in 
constraining excessive bargaining behaviours and promoting industrial harmony.  This can be 
seen by contrasting the need for the Whangarei Refinery Expansion Project Disputes Act 1984 to 
prevent work stoppages on site as opposed to the action of the Labour Court in sequestering the 
assets of the seamen’s union when they ignored an order of the Labour Court to return to work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour,	  Paper,	  Labour Relations Amendment Act No 2 1990: 
Public Policy Issues, 12 November 1990. 
26	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour:	   Industrial Relations: Institutional Issues Paper, 19 
November 1990.  
27	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Paper: Potential Positive and Negative Effects of the 
Draft Amendment Bill (Freedom of Association Model), 16 November 1990. 
28	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, note 26	   at [6] p 3; cf Brook, note 7, who derided 
legislating for outcomes when government regulated unions and described labour market regulation 
based on the freedoms of contract and association as targeted at “processes rather than outcomes” at 
130. This in turn is met by John Deeks who argues that labour market deregulation is not argued in 
relation to outcomes but in relation to beliefs or ideology: the market as “a priori good rather than 
good as a consequence of what it could and did deliver.” John Deeks cited by Ellen Dannin, The 
Origins and Impact of New Zealand’s Employment Contracts Act, (Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) at 91	  
29	  Department of Labour, note 26.	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over a rail ferries dispute.   These potential benefits should be measured alongside the cost of 
state provision.  Any institutional structures should be considered on the basis of resource cost-
effectiveness relative to the Government’s wider policy objectives.30 
An additional analysis of the role of institutions sought to identify those functions 
under the proposed bargaining system that might require third-party involvement, the 
institutions providing those functions (Mediation Service and Labour Court) and what 
would happen in their absence: no access to state provided facilitation for the 
negotiation of employment contracts (collective or individual); no access to disputes 
resolution for those covered by collectives, except on an individual basis; and no 
access to institutional means to enforce contractual obligations, as the result of the 
deficiencies of the common law of master and servant.  At that time remedies for 
common law actions were limited to damages, dismissals were effective upon receipt 
of the required period of notice and damages were limited to income covered by the 
notice period: 
Thus the inherent inadequacy or inappropriateness of the remedies available to the individual 
under common law combined with the difficulty and costs of taking actions in the civil courts 
means it is not often realistic for individuals to pursue breaches of their contracts of employment, 
even if they were informed enough to do so.31  
 
Labour officials concluded this advice by asserting that disputes about negotiations, 
grievances and enforcement are an inherent part of the negotiating process, but the 
absence of specialised industrial relations institutions to assist with difficulties or 
impasses would significantly increase the potential for industrial unrest.  As would 
any failure to address issues of inequity. The problem of the barriers to access that the 
civil courts represented was repeated along with a warning that their effectiveness in 
resolving industrial disputes would be constrained by jurisdictional factors. 
Additionally they would require a significant increase in resources – potentially more 
than that devoted to specialist industrial institutions, given the amount of work 
processed by the Mediation Service and the Labour Court:  
The substantive issue is therefore not one of whether the State should be involved in assisting in 
the resolution of disputes or in the enforcement of employment contracts, as it inevitably does 
have that function.  The issues are essentially the extent to which it is involved in setting 
parameters beyond those that apply in the civil courts; the institutional framework it wishes to 
provide to underpin that involvement; and the most cost effective way in which that may be 
achieved.  It is therefore proposed that the institutional implications of the proposed labour 
market reform be addressed in the context of the role of the State providing: an institutional 
framework for mediation; the institutional and jurisdictional framework for dealing with disputes 
over the application and enforcement of contracts of employment; the institutional and 
jurisdictional framework for dealing with disputes of the nature of a personal grievance.32 
 
Provision of information (e.g. model contracts, dispute procedures, minimum codes) 
was another issue considered relevant to state involvement in the labour market.  This 
was described as state involvement for the purpose of assisting parties to employment 
contracts because decisions to engage are dependent on adequate information.  If the 
workforce were to be converted to employment by individual contract there would be 
a need for clear guideline information (for both employers and employees).  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ibid, at [12], p 4.	  
31	  Ibid, at [15], p 5.	  
32	  Ibid, at [16], [17], p 6.	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Department doubted that a universally acceptable commercial supplier of such 
information could adequately meet this need.  The issue was not so much supply, as 
whether the information was accepted as authoritative.  State provided information 
was more likely to meet this condition, thus lowering transaction costs between 
bargaining parties and facilitating the monitoring of bargaining outcomes for policy 
assessment purposes.33  
The mechanisms for dispute resolution to be included in legislation continued to be 
the subject of debate between Treasury and the Department of Labour after Cabinet 
accepted the need for a two-stage legislative process.  A draft memorandum (prepared 
by Labour officials)34 containing an outline of what the Employment Contracts Bill 
would contain drew an immediate response from Treasury that it omitted mention of 
the system by which employers and workers would choose whether their employment 
contracts would be  
governed by general law or by the special statutory scheme that would replace the Labour 
Relations Act.  Both individual and collective contracts were to be possible under general law, 
while the special statute was to apply only to collective arrangements.  Workers and employers 
were expected to opt explicitly into either the general or the special regime…35 
This triggered a Cabinet direction to the officials to resolve the issue.  The result was 
the inclusion in the Bill of specific rights to sue on employment contracts in the civil 
courts.36 Four days later Cabinet approved the Bill for introduction to the House of 
Representatives. 37   The Ministerial war over acceptable dispute resolution 
mechanisms continued to rage, with the Minister of Finance asserting that the 
legislation brought employment contracts under the jurisdiction of the law of 
contract 38  and the Minister of Labour forewarning potential changes to the 
institutional framework (from those contained in the Bill), decisions about which 
would be left to the Select Committee.39 
Introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill 
The initial drafts of the Employment Contracts Bill40 provided for a Mediation 
Service (a continuation of the existing service) and a Labour Court (without lay 
members). They also provided for a continuation of the practice under the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 of having grievance committees consider personal grievances 
whereby the employee submitted their grievance to the committee (composed of an 
equal number of representatives for each party and a Chair), the employer submitted a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Ibid.	  	  
34	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Memorandum for Cabinet Legislation Committee, 3 
December 1990. 
35	  The Treasury to Minister of Finance, Memorandum, 4 December 1990.   
36	  Cabinet Legislation Committee, Minutes (6 December 1990 9 a.m.) LEG(90) M 28/6 Pt. 1, Cabinet 
Legislation Committee Minutes (6 December 1990 5.30 p.m.) LEG(90) M 28/6 Pt. 2.  
37	  Cabinet Minute, (10 December 1990) CAB (90) M 44/19.  
38	  The Treasury to Department of Labour, Draft Press Statement from Minister of Finance, Labour 
Market Reform, 18 December 1990.  
39	  Minister of Labour, Speech Notes, Introduction (First reading) of the Employment Contracts Bill, 
19 December 1990.  
40	  Employment Contracts Bill 1990:	  (134/P, 134/1-4) drafted in successive iterations 2 – 16 December 
1990 and a later undated draft that also contains the Explanatory Note (including that the Bill would 
come into force on 1 May 1991).	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response, and in the absence of a negotiated resolution, the decision of the committee 
was binding.41 There were similar provisions for the settlement of disputes about 
collective contracts42 and procedures for the conciliation and arbitration (by the 
Mediation Service) of disputes arising during the negotiation of collective contracts.43  
Introducing the Bill the Minister of Labour described a number of changes to 
streamline the processes of these institutions and enlarge access to them.  Grievance 
committees would be responsible for resolving grievances with no rights of appeal to 
the Labour Court, except on points of law.  All employees whose employment 
contracts (collective or individual) provided for personal grievance procedures would 
have access to grievance committees and they would not need to do so through a 
union.44  He went on, however, to foreshadow potential changes by announcing that 
the Select Committee would be further considering institutional structure and calling 
for submissions from interested parties.45 
The ECA that was given the Governor General’s assent on 7 May 1991 contained 
radically different provisions. Those providing for the establishment and operation of 
an Employment Tribunal replaced the provisions concerning the Mediation Service.  
Provisions establishing and providing for the operation of the Employment Court 
replaced those concerning the Labour Court.  
The process by which this occurred was a mix of stakeholder input (via specific 
consultation), public consideration (via submissions to the Select Committee 
considering the Bill) and a continuation of the policy battle both between officials and 
members of the Executive described above. 
Institutional dispute resolution: the policy process 
Stakeholder Consultation 
The Minister of Labour invited submissions on personal grievances and the 
employment institutions from the Employers Federation, the Council of Trade Unions 
and the Business Roundtable in January 1991.     
The Business Roundtable submission argued strongly for the abolition of all 
institutions, for the common law of contract to prevail and for the civil courts to be 
the only available dispute resolution institutions:  
any institutional arrangements that preserve a special labour jurisdiction will result in judicial 
behaviour that does not reflect the government’s intentions of treating employment contracting 
according to the same principles as standard contract law.46    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41Employment Contracts Bill 1990: (134/P, 134/1-4) First Schedule: Standard Clauses in relation to 
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It was particularly concerned about the retention of the Labour Court, asserting that 
there would be no need for additional resources if its jurisdiction (but not its judges) 
was simply absorbed into the civil court system – so long as no special labour division 
of those courts was thereby created.  Interestingly the paper accompanying this 
submission referred to the  
efficiency of the Labour Court in organising fixtures [as] an important factor [in any step to 
remove it].  The small size of the Court, the limited business and the (relatively) few advocates 
and counsel make communications easier.  Lack of formality and procedural niceties contribute 
to this efficiency.  The civil Courts are cumbersome by contrast, a fact which is only slowly 
being redressed.47  
This contribution, by a lawyer reliant on work in the Labour Court, served to 
highlight the contradictions of the agenda of the radical section of the business lobby.  
It could succeed only by significantly limiting employee powers to challenge 
employer decisions, which in turn depended on the erection of barriers of access to 
authoritative dispute resolution.  The inefficiencies of the civil court system were 
perceived by the economists of this section of the lobby to provide those barriers. For 
the lawyers, however, the interests of clients and the business opportunity that arose 
from that relied on low barriers of access to courts. 
Abolition of the Mediation Service was recommended on the grounds that mediation 
was currently in use only because it was free, was not provided by the state for other 
commercial contracts, and private mediation could fill any gaps (on the basis that a 
market for mediation services would rapidly develop and competition between 
providers would ensure their quality). 48  
The Council of Trade Unions (CTU) asserted the need for institutions like the Labour 
Court and the Mediation Service and personal grievance procedures regardless of the 
labour relations environment created by the reforms.49 It argued that a principles 
based approach to the institutions required the Labour Court to retain its equity and 
good conscience jurisdiction and informality of process, and the Mediation Service to 
retain its facilitative functions.  
These institutions and procedures should be swift, efficient, and unencumbered by unnecessary 
procedural purity.  They should be accessible i.e., practical and affordable; in the interests of 
achieving workability, equity and stability.50 
This submission echoed the position of Labour officials about the need for policy on 
the institutions to be formulated after implementation of the reforms – reasoning that 
this would provide an opportunity to assess the practical impact of the new legislation 
before the institutions were changed. 
In common with the CTU submission the Employers Federation argued for 
accessibility and affordability of new structures and the importance of mediation 
services.  But that was the extent of any common view.  For employers there were 
serious difficulties with the existing institutions – delays in achieving final results, the 
combination of mediation and arbitration functions in grievance committees, the 
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repetition of proceedings at committee and court hearings as the result of de novo 
hearings in the Labour Court, and the focus on issues of process at grievance 
committee hearings by the Labour Court.51  
The submission advanced four options for the delivery of mediation services –
disbanding the Mediation Service (leaving mediation services to be provided by the 
private sector), restructuring it into a State Owned Enterprise (to compete with private 
sector providers) or retaining it either as is or with its monopoly rights (for the 
provision of services) and arbitration function removed. The theme of the pros and 
cons of these options was choice, the cost of private sector provision, and the need for 
arbitration to be separately provided.   
 
Arbitration would be provided by a tribunal (located between the Mediation Service 
and the Labour Court) which would be informal and accessible, administered by the 
Justice Department, Government funded, using the services of private sector 
arbitrators (selected in each case by the parties to a dispute) whose decisions could be 
appealed only on a point of law.   
 
The Labour Court would be retained but with a limited jurisdiction to hear appeals 
and referrals of points of law from the tribunal, compliance and strikes/lockouts.  It 
would be administered by the Justice Department and would lose its equity and good 
conscience jurisdiction.  The alternatives, of either disbanding the Labour Court or 
establishing a labour division of the High Court, were also considered.  The practical 
difficulties of disbanding a court, and the barriers to access, increasing cost, the 
requirements of rules of evidence, and the exclusive representation rights of lawyers 
in the High Court meant neither option was feasible. 
 
In the articulation of policies that best served the interests of their respective 
constituencies (big business, labour and small/medium business) these submissions 
reveal the importance of process in the construction, removal or alleviation of access 
barriers to effective and authoritative dispute resolution.  Barriers could be 
constructed by limiting resolution to the civil courts, removed by retention of 
facilitation with arbitration as an option for facilitation failure, or alleviated by a 
preference for arbitration over facilitation. 
 
Officials’ positions:  The Department of Labour position 
The Department of Labour continued to argue for the status quo.  The need for it to 
look for confirmation from others for the success of the institutions it administered 
had by then become apparent:  
The report of the Law Commission (1989) on the courts notes that the volume of work handled 
by the Labour Court is beyond the present capacity of the civil courts.52 
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The proposal to extend the personal grievance jurisdiction had implications for the 
workloads of the current institutions but this resort to the Law Commission 
underlined the point that the civil courts were never in the position to assume this 
workload. 
The case for specialist institutions in the labour market was mounted on the basis of 
their special expertise, flexibility, avoidance of legalism, encouragement of 
informality and preservation of Parliament’s intentions,53 and for labour institutions in 
the settlement of disputes for compromise and adjustment, the accommodation of 
long-term interests, improved relationships, avoidance of further disputes, 
incentivising long-term stability and balance in the labour market, and the conclusion 
of acceptable contractual outcomes.54 
Lay representation in the whole dispute resolution process was regarded as critical to 
effectiveness of stable industrial relations:  
By contrast, the average occupants of the judicial bench are more used to dealing with ‘one-off’ 
settlements, derived from the application of abstract principles embodied in precedents, and have 
little knowledge of the realities of the workplace and the ongoing nature of the employment 
relationship.55 
The ready availability of solutions or remedies personal to the parties, the use of 
informal procedures and a less adversarial, more investigative atmosphere in the 
labour jurisdiction was contrasted with the imposition of inflexible legal precedent, 
the need for legal rulings, automatic reliance on lawyers and the costs of legal 
representation.  Specialist institutions best reflected Parliament’s intentions for the 
labour market because the common law was regarded as failing to reflect the realities 
of that market. It assumed equality of bargaining power, relied on limited remedies 
(wage loss only) and was problematic for social needs for stability and balance in 
employment relationships. 56 
This preference for facilitative over arbitrative approaches to dispute resolution can 
best be understood by reference to the Department’s view of their consequences.  
Facilitation was regarded as forward-focused, long term, relationship-based, 
emphasising the importance of compromise. Arbitration was perceived as short term, 
dichotomous (right/wrong), backwards oriented (via dependence on precedent) with a 
focus on contractual terms rather than the needs of relationships. 
The Labour Court avoided these traps because it had a wide-ranging jurisdiction, was 
the latest in a series of specialist institutions established for the labour jurisdiction 
since 1894, was acknowledged as having specialist expertise by the civil courts, and 
noted for the consistency of its judgments, had had many of its (controversial) 
decisions upheld, allowed lay advocates, lawyers, parties themselves to be heard thus 
providing enhanced access to all comers, and relied on relatively informal procedures 
which resulted in a more expedient and efficient disposal rate of cases.57 
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Similarly the Mediation Service was noted as having a dual role – facilitation and 
arbitration – whilst offering a low cost service, information and advice to empower 
parties to reach their own decisions, informality in hearings where a ruling was 
required, and the use of employer and employee representatives in such hearings to 
allow the reality of the workplace to be taken into account and incorporated into 
workable decisions.58  
 
Data for the 3-year period to 30 September 1990 on the use of the institutions 
revealed that personal grievance claims averaged 770 annually, 51% of which were 
resolved by agreement/facilitation, 44% by mediator decision (9% of which were 
appealed) and 5% by referral to the Labour Court.  Thus, of the 2304 grievances over 
this period, 197 (8.5%) required Labour Court input, indicating that the:  
 
high rate of disposal of cases at the committee stage, where the parties have access to third party 
advice and information, suggests that this facilitative function has a significant role to play in 
lowering external costs through achieving workable outcomes as well as enabling such disputes 
to be settled as near as possible to the point of origin.  The relatively low number of appeals of 
decisions made by mediators also support the notion of a lower order resolution body having the 
power to determine settlements without the need for incurring the comparatively higher cost to 
the State of a court ruling.59 
 
The Department did concede, however, the potential for conflict to arise between the 
facilitative and arbitrative functions of the Mediation Service as the result of the 
introduction in the (December 1990 version of the) Employment Contracts Bill of 
provisions to summon witnesses and hear evidence.  This was characterised 
(somewhat disapprovingly) as introducing a more formal element into arbitration.  
 
The resource implications for specialist institutions in the new environment involved 
issues of access and demand arising from increased access to grievance procedures, 
and responses to the new industrial environment.  The Department was unable to 
translate those changes into estimates of demand. 
 
The Department’s second position was that the status quo had to be retained as an 
option because the existing institutions had been established to meet the objectives 
specified above (special expertise, flexibility, avoidance of legalism, encouragement 
of informality and preservation of Parliament’s intentions) and they would serve as a 
measure of the strengths and weaknesses of the other options. 
 
The use of the civil court system as an option was discounted on the basis that it 
would face the legal difficulty of adjudicating two separate strands of employment 
law (the common law of master and servant and the statutory jurisdiction), it was 
unable to operate flexibly, informally and expediently (compared to the Mediation 
Service and Labour Court) and its use would incur added costs by both parties and the 
State. 
 
A mix of specialist lower order and civil court higher order institutions was similarly 
dismissed in favour of a specialist jurisdiction serviced exclusively by specialist 
institutions to fully cover the range of actions provided by the legislation.  This led to 
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an option that the Department was prepared to countenance: a specialist lower order 
disputes resolution body in terms of either the retention of the Mediation Service or 
the establishment of a new body, a ‘low-level’ tribunal with a facilitative function 
over a range of matters for which court adjudication was unnecessary and with 
potential to consider personal grievances if that jurisdiction was to be enlarged to 
include all employees.   
 
This option required the Department to confront the problem of conflict between the 
facilitative and arbitral functions of this body by suggesting they be separated.  An 
industrial tribunal (presumably a slightly higher order one) would assume the arbitral 
role.  It would comprise a legally qualified chair and two lay members representing 
management and labour.  Its consensus decisions would be brief and free of legal 
jargon.  The emphasis would be on common-sense based on experience in industrial 
relations rather than strict application of legal principles, less formality than a court 
and representation by the parties themselves.60 
 
This was not, however, an option favoured by the Department.  It questioned the need 
for lay representation on a tribunal as an unnecessary duplication of representation 
(and added costs to the State) if employers and employees had direct access to it and 
the ability to fully represent workplace realities.  At this point it was also noted that 
no apparent added advantage had resulted when specialist courts comprised a lay 
membership.  
 
From this emerged the option for a single ‘lower order body’ with direct rights of 
access and representation by parties, separate but complementary facilitative and 
adjudicative functions and a wider jurisdiction that encompassed some of the 
functions then performed by the Labour Court.  
 
Recommended was the establishment of specialist institutions at both low and higher 
levels and deferral of their structure and resource requirements.61 The Government’s 
position (as put by the Minister of Labour) required institutions that were accessible 
to individuals, able to resolve disputes as near as possible to their point of origin, and 
take account of the uniqueness of the labour market and the realities of the 
workplace.62 This required the establishment of a facilitative body, a specialist lower 
order tribunal (with jurisdiction to determine personal grievances, disputes, and 
enforcement and compliance matters) and a specialist court to act as an appellate body 
and with jurisdiction for actions such as torts, injunctions and review.63 
 
Officials’ positions:  The Treasury position 
 
The reaction from The Treasury was immediate. The proposals conflicted with 
provisions in the Bill that empowered parties to use the civil courts and to negotiate 
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contracts outside its purview.64  It suggested commissioning a background paper from 
the Department of Justice and the Law Commission about the principles underlying 
formation and operation of judicial institutions, but that the Government could take a 
lead in developing policy on labour market institutions:   
The design of legal institutions has tremendous consequences for the operation of the labour 
market.  For example, rules about unfair dismissal developed by the Labour Court in the last few 
years came about partly because the specialist nature of the Court encouraged it to operate 
outside the mainstream of legal opinion.65  
This reaction also, however, signified some movement in the Treasury view about the 
place of institutions in the reforms:  
We agree that the general court system may not always deliver quick, credible and low cost 
dispute resolution, and that access to clear provisions for dealing with grievances is 
important…we support the idea of a low-level tribunal…it would be appropriate to explore the 
possibility of allowing Small Claims Tribunals to deal with employment issues.66 
Officials’ positions: The Options paper on Institutions 
Both positions were referred to Cabinet, and officials directed to develop in more 
detail the Labour proposals.67 The result was an Options paper for Institutional 
Arrangements, drafted by the Department of Labour, containing four options.  
Option 1 proposed the retention of the Labour Court and the Mediation Service but 
with some changed functions.  It was noted in its final form as the option supported 
by the Council of Trade Unions and the institutions were described in terms of their 
specialist knowledge, ready accessibility and current functions.68 Included in the 
description of the Mediation Service was its dual facilitative and arbitrative functions 
and a summary of criticism of that duality. 
Option 2 proposed a specialist lower level tribunal, the abolition of the Mediation 
Service and the retention of the Labour Court.69  The Employers Federation supported 
this option in its final form.  Option 3 proposed a specialist lower court and the High 
Court, with no provision at all for any specialist institutions as the 4th Option. 
Whilst SSC and Justice officials agreed with the thrust of the draft, Treasury 
complained about it as biased in favour of specialist institutions and significant 
legislative interventions.  It regarded the options relying on the civil courts as “straw 
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men” characterising the paper as suffused with a fundamental distrust of the general 
legal system.70  
 
The content of these objections is of interest not only for what it reveals about 
Treasury’s limited understanding of the way courts operated, but also for its refusal to 
accord any weight to the experience or the statistical evidence other officials 
produced about court functioning.  Its focus was fixed on the type or content of the 
judicial decisions that would result.  The objection, for instance, to retention of the 
current institutions (Option 1) was that they:  
 
may lose sight of the general business environment within which labour markets have to 
function, and may make decisions damaging to economic development.  The availability of lay 
representation may reduce the quality of legal argument.  This could encourage appeals to higher 
courts, and consequently cause uncertainty.  Low cost to individuals may encourage excessive 
litigation.71  
 
Its objections to the retention of a specialist court (in Options 1 and 2) concerned the 
problem of having an appellate court removed from the “mainstream of legal 
development”.72  To this end it preferred reliance on the High Court over the Labour 
Court, on the basis that the High Court had a “more mainstream” approach to torts, 
injunctions and review, was more familiar with commercial environments and 
developments in the law of contract. 73  Its response to reservations about barriers to 
access was a review of High Court procedure, on the basis that problems of access 
affected all contracts, not just employment ones. 74 
 
The Options paper was approved for distribution to the Select Committee and by early 
March had been circulated to those who had already made submissions on the Bill.75 
 
Officials’ positions:  the Interdepartmental Working Party 
 
In the meantime the officials from Labour, Justice, SSC, Treasury and the Prime 
Minister’s Department continued to meet for the purpose of ironing out policy issues 
that remained outstanding.  The differences between Treasury and the other 
departments on institutional issues remained. 
 
The SSC’s contribution to the debate noted that the policy choices were essentially 
polar: retention or modification of existing institutions within a framework of 
specialist labour law and practice or no provision for any specialised institutions and a 
reliance instead on the ordinary courts and the general law of contract for outcomes.76  
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Asserting that the key criteria for institutional structures included an effective and 
equitable means of dispute resolution and the provision of certainty and stability in 
practice, it specified its preference for retention of specialist arrangements tailored to 
suit the new industrial environment and for Option 2.  This was the option that it 
believed would minimise the costs associated with restricted access, the ‘bidding up’ 
of disputes that would be encouraged by excessive formalism, legalism and excessive 
and costly litigation (both directly and via the possible demands on legal aid).77  
This SSC position on institutional structure shared with the Employers Federation an 
assumption that formalism, legalism or adversarialism were tropes of the civil courts.  
The Department of Labour, by contrast, regarded them as behaviours associated with 
lawyers (as advocates and judges).  The importance of the distinction is that the SSC 
position was based on a belief that in order to minimise the risk of those tropes 
dominating dispute resolution an institutional arbiter could be called low-level and 
informal and its litigants and their representatives would behave accordingly.  The 
Department saw provision of arbitration per se as the invitation to resort to formalist 
or legalist behaviours.  The absence, in these discussions, of focus on tropes of 
representation was highlighted by the need for amendment to the Bill’s provisions on 
representation when the spectre of motorcycle gangs as bargaining agents was 
raised.78  
This was not an issue, however, on which Labour dwelt at that time. It identified the 
source of policy differences as contrasting views of the labour market.  It did not 
accept the “commercial libertarian view of labour relations”, preferring to see them 
as involving a balancing of “individual and corporate values”, and commercial, 
economic and social values – both long and short term.79 It identified the weaker of 
disputant parties as vulnerable should the common law option favoured by Treasury 
predominate. It characterised a dispute resolution system that is costly, inaccessible or 
reflects imbalances of power as encouraging the aggrieved to other or indirect means 
of expressing frustration and as creating an advantage for the well-endowed over the 
poorly-endowed because legal and other transactional costs are typically regressive so 
that the more litigious a process the more it costs.  
 
Asserting that the best results for dispute resolution institutions occur where the rules 
succeed in facilitating, rather than suppressing or diverting an orderly and sustainable 
bargaining process, Labour favoured quick accessible recourse to resolution, 
describing the alternative as requiring disputant parties to conform to standard legal 
procedures that do not necessarily facilitate smooth and equitable adjustment.80 
 
Echoing the sentiments of the SSC and Labour papers the Department of Justice cited 
Fair Trading and Credit Contracts legislation (statutes that the Minister of Finance 
asserted should not apply to the labour jurisdiction) as accepting that the law does not 
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treat all commercial contracts alike, recognising that different subject matters require 
different treatment, particularly where there are imbalances of bargaining power.81  
 
Justice identified the principles relevant to choice of institutions for particular 
jurisdictions as the degree of formality required, representation type (participant or 
lawyer), speed, cost, mode of resolution (facilitation or arbitration), and claim 
numbers.  The availability of resources (the cost of decision makers, their 
administrative support and the transaction costs of the proceedings to parties and the 
State) and practicalities (rules, forms, appointment of decision makers, consultation 
processes) had also to be considered. Access to justice was regarded as an important 
principle, with recent experience indicating that specialist institutions like the 
Disputes Tribunal designed for particular jurisdictions provided the most effective 
access to all-comers.82 
 
Justice officials were critical of proposed changes to existing institutions, warning 
that the value of the status quo arose from the difficulty of estimating dispute volumes 
in new environments. They preferred assessments of existing systems for their 
capacity to cope with additional or enlarged jurisdictions:  
 
there appears to be a reasonable degree of user satisfaction with the existing institutions.  They 
could provide a stable and familiar landmark to guide the transition.  The bill does change their 
roles but not so fundamentally that they too must be replaced.  There may be advantages in 
retaining them at least in the short term.  The existing expertise and experience of decision 
makers could play an important part in ensuring a smooth transition at a time when there is likely 
to be a lot of uncertainty and possibly, proceedings.  Few additional resource implications or 
issues of practicality would arise...because the bodies and support structure already exist.83 
  
The potential for delays (and barriers to access) in newly created systems was noted, 
as was the superiority of consistency and certainty of decision making by specialist 
bodies in those jurisdictions requiring greater attention to legislative policy in their 
outcomes than courts. The development of case law, termed slow and ad hoc, was 
also more dependent on particular issues as they arose and the ability of parties to 
litigate, restriction of appeals to the Labour Court on points of law would raise issues 
of definition requiring clarification that could only occur case by case over time, 
introduction of legal rules to the Mediation Service raised the potential for increasing 
formality, which in turn would result in increased legal representation, requirements 
for transcripts and recording of evidence.  A concurrent jurisdiction with the civil 
courts had the potential to result in the development of divergent streams of labour 
law – a recipe for confusion and uncertainty.84 
  
The creation of new institutions in Option 2 (specialist tribunal and court) would be 
more expensive than retaining the existing ones, suitably qualified decision makers 
had to be found and trained, their administrative requirements identified and met and 
new procedural rules drafted. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Department of Justice, Paper, Employment Contracts Bill: Institutional Options, 12 March 1991. 
82	  This was also the conclusion of research conducted a couple of decades later: see Laing, Righarts, 
Henaghan, A preliminary study on civil case progression times in New Zealand, (University of Otago, 
Legal Issues Centre, 2011)   
83	  Department of Justice, note 81, at [b] p 5	  
84	  Ibid at [4] p 3.	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All institutional options faced the potential for increased numbers as the result of 
extending the personal grievance jurisdiction and this had implications for the legal 
aid budget.  
 
Of option 3 (appellate High Court) Justice noted that the High Court Rules would 
apply (requiring Judges, not Parliament, to amend those which did not work in the 
labour jurisdiction), the absence of the equity and good conscience jurisdiction would 
result in the overturn of more decisions and a lack of consistency between tribunal 
and court would arise; practical problems of an increased workload would result (the 
Courts Amendment Bill 1990 then before a select committee was designed to offload 
a significant proportion of its work because the High Court was not coping with it); 
appointment of additional judges and consultation with existing ones would be 
required; and accessibility would reduce because delays already existed.85  
 
The option of using the Disputes Tribunals was discounted because they had a limited 
jurisdiction, hearings of only an hour, their referees were not trained in labour law 
matters, and they would need to be restructured. This would affect both their ethos 
and effectiveness, thus negatively affecting the public interest. If District Courts were 
required to absorb this jurisdiction they would be swamped and other reforms planned 
for the court system would be undermined.86 
 
Treasury referred to the quality of decision-making from the civil courts as a cost or 
trade-off that had to be recognised in the design of labour market institutions.  It was 
therefore inappropriate to try to force decision-making into low-cost options for cost 
saving reasons. Creating low cost institutions was furthermore not the only way to 
ensure access to all.  
 
Most disputes that occur in society are resolved privately, often informally, by the participants.  
In many ways, the Government-run court and tribunal system provides machinery of last resort.  
People rely on formal and drawn out public processes only when they are unable to find 
voluntary solutions.  The role of courts is complicated by the fact that judges do not just resolve 
private conflicts, they also make public policy in the process.  This is why the quality of judicial 
decision-making is so important, and why expensive procedural constraints are inevitably 
imposed on judges. I think it is important that we design labour market institutions in a way that 
would not discourage people from resolving their disputes privately.  For example, if the costs of 
the court system are subsidised, as is the case at present with the Labour Court, the incentive to 
find private solutions is reduced.87   
 
In a replay of the skirmishes between officials in November and December before the 
Bill was introduced, the meeting between them that followed the circulation of these 
papers revealed SSC, Justice and Labour in one corner (supporting Options 1 or 2) 
and Treasury in the other, asserting it had not had time to complete its analysis. It was 
agreed that a paper combining the majority views would be prepared and referred to 
Treasury so that its views could be incorporated in the report for the Cabinet Strategy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Ibid at 7.	  
86	  Secretary of Justice for Minister of Justice, Memorandum, 15 March 1991.   
87	  The Treasury, Paper,	  Labour Market Institutions Officials Group, 14 March 1991 at 2:  An informal 
reaction by Labour officials to this paper in a handwritten fax dated 15 March 1991 (Bob Hill to Joanne 
Silberstein) warned of its covert messages, unchanged perceptions and philosophy, naivety about 
institutional dispute resolution and attempted re-litigation of issues previously resolved.   
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Committee.88 Again Treasury’s input could not be included in the resulting report.89  
Its position was contained in a separate paper. 90  It proposed a new option: 
replacement of the existing institutions with a low-order Employment Tribunal (a 
hybrid between the Disputes Tribunals and the Mediation Service with a limited 
jurisdiction under $10,000) leaving appeals and major cases with public policy 
implications to the general court system.91 
Select Committee:  Mediator and Judicial submissions 
The Select Committee invited the Judges of the Labour Court to make submissions on 
the options papers and the Chief Judge accepted this invitation.92  The mediators of 
the Mediation Service made two sets of submissions to the committee.93  The 
divergent views of these players in the institutions about mediation functions and the 
role of legal procedure in the resolution process reveal the essence of a debate that is 
ongoing.  This is the debate about the characterisation of the issues in a dispute: 
behavioural, legal or a mixture of the two? Legal training emphasises the importance 
of the legal issue.  Non-lawyers believe that this approach ignores the influence of 
behavioural issues.  The mechanism by which any dispute is resolved is generally 
dependent on which side of that debate the facilitator of its resolution lies. It can be 
argued that this difference is fundamental to the measurement of effectiveness of 
dispute resolution procedures and institutions, particularly in relationship disputes and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Inter-Departmental Officials Committee, Minutes, Employment Contracts Bill Outstanding Issues, 
15 March 1991.	  
89	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Report for Cabinet Committee on Enterprise, Growth 
and Employment on Employment Contracts Bill, Outstanding Policy Issues, 22 March 1991:  The 
Executive Summary described the competing philosophical alternatives (statutory or contractual 
resolution procedures) as “no justifiable case for specialist labour relations procedures or institutions” 
(the free market position supported by Treasury) versus “appropriate procedural and institutional 
arrangements to promote free, fair and efficient bargaining” (the protective position supported by 
SSC, Justice, Labour).  
90	  The Treasury for Minister of Finance, Employment Contracts Bill – Outstanding Policy Issues, 22 
March 1991. 	  
91	  Assistant State Services Commissioner Doug Martin to Minister of State Services, letter, ECB: 
Outstanding Policy Issues, 25 March 1991; Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, ECB – 
Outstanding Policy Issues: Treasury report T91/1088 of 22 March 1991, 25 March 1991:  This letter 
also complained about the Treasury participation on the Inter-Departmental Officials Committee by 
referring to the meeting of 15.3.91 (at which all departments had agreed they would submit papers they 
had each prepared but Treasury circulated a very brief paper that it said did not contain its full analysis) 
and then the agreement at that meeting that a report containing the views of the 3 departments who had 
prepared substantive papers would be prepared, sent to Treasury and then its report would be 
incorporated.  But the Treasury position was not available and therefore could not be incorporated. 
Treasury recommendations were never discussed by the other officials because they didn’t know about 
them.  There was also no time to comment on them before the Cabinet Committee meeting: at [4-6] p 
3.    On the substance of the Treasury paper the letter stated that its acknowledgement of a need to 
balance employee protections with freedom of contract “represents a shift from what we had previously 
understood to be the Treasury position”, at [3(a)].  The letter complained further about Treasury’s 
selective use of submissions to the Select Committee: it quoted the Russell McVeagh position but 
ignored “comment about the …clear majority [of submissions from both employer and employee 
groups] favouring the retention of the Mediation Service and Labour Court”. at  [3(d)]. 
92	  Chairman Labour Committee to the Chief Judge Labour Court, letter 12 March 1991; Chief Judge 
Labour Court, Submission to the Labour Committee  (undated).  
93	  Mediators of the Mediation Service, Submission to the Labour Committee on the Employment 
Contracts Bill 1990: Institutional Options, March 1991; Mediation Service to Department of Labour, 
Submission to the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 1990, 12 April 1991. 
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in their use of time, and the following description of positions illustrates why this may 
be so. 
The Chief Judge recommended that grievance committees unable to facilitate a 
resolution have the power to arbitrate taken from them.94 This view reflected a well-
understood position by lawyers that those involved in attempts to settle a dispute 
should not then become its arbitrator:  
 
Until 1987 persons chairing grievance committees had no right to determine grievances without 
the consent of the parties which was rarely given.  Instead the decision had to be referred…to the 
Arbitration Court.  It is a long step from that situation to one where chairpersons, possibly 
without legal qualifications, have the right to decide finely disputed issues of fact…95 
 
His additional position was that de novo grievance appeals to the Labour Court could 
be discontinued, but only if:  
 
there is first a full judicial inquiry with the parties having due prior notice of the nature of the 
case they have to meet and having, at the hearing, right of cross examination and, in advance of 
it, the right to summon witnesses and to have documents produced…96 
 
The mediators did not accept that mediation and arbitration functions are 
incompatible.  Their experience of splitting these functions (prior to 1987) whereby 
the Mediation Service mediated and the Conciliation Service arbitrated was that the 
ensuing double handling of disputes became a major source of complaint (including 
by parties).97  Additionally they worried about issues of efficiency and the added costs 
of ensuring separate personnel were available to deal with both functions required of 
the same dispute.98 They characterised the objection as founded on theory and 
ignorant of the effectiveness of actual practice.99  The objection was undermined by 
the paucity of complaints about dual powers – a single judicial review from over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Chief Judge Labour Court, Submission to the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 
1990 (undated):  “This duality of roles is to a purist – and all Judges and most lawyers are purists – an 
unsatisfactory way of dispensing justice.  Apart from rare statutory exceptions, any Judge who 
operated in that way would at once have his judgment set aside on appeal or review because he or she 
will have acquired information other than that which is presented to them by way of evidence in the 
case.  A lot of this information is of a highly prejudicial but otherwise irrelevant nature bearing only 
upon other experiences of the employer with the same worker or… the union with the same employer…  
To avoid such a duality of roles means defining and separating the various functions of statutory 
mediators… it is unsatisfactory for the same mediator to fill both roles.” at 15 
95	  Ibid, at [2(d)] p 8	  
96	  Ibid, at [2(b)] p 8	  
97	  Mediators, note 93.   
98 	  Ibid: “Changes in institutional arrangements…may generate… a system that is impossible to 
manage under present budgetary constraints… [More officers would be required] if grievances and 
disputes are to be processed with the same efficiency as presently experienced….  In many disputes 
mediators in NZ both mediate and arbitrate within a single dispute in an efficient and fair manner 
satisfactory to both parties…there is little to suggest that combining mediation and arbitration 
provides for a less efficient or equitable way of resolving disputes.” at 12. 
99	  Ibid; Mediation Service, note 93.	  The dual functions of Dispute and Grievance Committees first 
obliged them to facilitate settlement and to arbitrate only when mediation failed. Committee procedures 
involved parties in the decision-making process: ”this involvement allows the Chairperson to increase 
the parties understanding of the legal issues, improve personal relationships, and to plan to avoid 
future disputes.  These results of the disputes and personal grievance procedures are important 
because of the on-going relationship of the disputants, and are not part of the outcomes generally 
associated with Tribunal or Court proceedings.”  at 2 
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3,000 disputes in the previous four years and a low number of successful appeals of 
arbitrated decisions.100 Some disputes (e.g. interpretation of contractual provisions) 
not amenable to mediation ensure the mediator was arbitrator from the outset.  Others, 
particularly grievances, concern:  
problems in personal relations between the employer and employee, or the employer’s 
representative and the employee or…to relations between the grievant and other employees.  
Often these types of grievance are better handled by mediation.  The mediator is basically 
concerned about altering relationships, and may be involved in encouraging inter-personal 
bargaining over issues of a personal rather than a financial nature…On the other hand, the issue 
may be a fundamental point of principle related to the management of the enterprise, or a 
fundamental principle concerning human rights.  These fundamental principles are not subject to 
bargaining and, in this type of grievance, arbitration is the appropriate dispute resolution process.  
The appropriate dispute resolution process therefore may vary according to the subject matter of 
the grievance.101  
Interestingly the Chief Judge made a similar point, although not in respect of this 
particular issue, in making the case for a specialist employment jurisdiction by 
distinguishing between issues of morality/justice/fairness as they are considered in the 
civil courts and in employment law:   
in employment law there is no one community of right-thinking persons whose standards can be 
applied.  Instead there are two or three or even more disparate communities of right-thinking 
persons whose differing ideologies and employment cultures are entitled to consideration when it 
comes to determining the justice of a particular case.  It is not so often a question of deciding 
between conflicting accounts of the facts as of deciding between competing interpretations and 
perceptions of undisputed facts.102  
The solutions proposed by each on this issue of the potential for function conflict are 
also revealing. The mediators believed the problem could be overcome by providing 
disputants with a choice: a med/arb option or straight arbitration.103 The Chief Judge 
proposed two separate institutions with shared personnel, one of which would provide 
a chair for the (mediating) committee and the other a tribunal or hearing officer who 
would formally receive evidence and adjudicate upon it.104 The mediators’ reaction to 
that was to point out that institutions of first instance in any dispute resolution system 
should emphasise voluntary settlement.  If that failed then there was, in the Labour 
Court, an arbitration body and no need to replicate its functions in an additional 
tribunal.105   
Moving from the general to the specific the mediators were concerned that adoption 
of Option 2 and the replacement of the Mediation Service with an employment 
tribunal would transform the resolution process of the disputes/grievances they dealt 
with to something more formal and legalistic.  This would increase the time required 
to dispose of a matter (they compared the day usually taken by a grievance committee 
with the two-plus days required by the Labour Court in its de novo hearing of an 
appeal) in a jurisdiction with a growing workload.  In what can now be accepted as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Mediation Service, note 93: 1 judicial review in 3000 disputes, 50% of disputes settled voluntarily, 
less than 10% of Chairmen’s arbitrations appealed and of those less than 50% successful.	  
101	  Mediators, note 93, at 16. 	  
102	  Chief Judge, note 94, at 14.	  
103	  Mediators, note 93. 	  
104	  Chief Judge, note 94.	  
105	  Mediation Service, note 93.	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prescient statement of things to come, the mediators asserted that the alternative 
would be to accept the slower processing of disputes and grievances or to increase the 
number of statutory officers substantially:   
The arrangement would neither improve the cost effectiveness nor the administration of the 
procedures set down in the legislation.  Not only is the Mediation Service cost effective from the 
point of view of state funding, but [it] is inexpensive from the perspective of the parties.  There 
is no requirement that the parties be represented by legal counsel, although lawyers can, and do 
represent clients within the procedures.  The issue is not one of lawyer versus lay representation, 
but the continued use of affordable, and cost and time effective procedures…106 
Select Committee:  Public Submissions 
Of the general submissions that addressed institutional issues before the Options 
papers were circulated, 83 supported retention of a separate employment jurisdiction 
in some form and 18 saw no need for one.107 Thirty-seven of those in support came 
from unions, 20 from employers and 26 from others:  
The union submissions have largely urged the retention of the main features of the current 
Labour Court, particularly its specialist Judges, equity and good conscience jurisdiction, and lay 
representation.  Three of the submissions have suggested extending the Court’s jurisdiction to all 
employment contract matters.  Similarly the submissions from other…sources have mostly 
argued the case for retention of a separate Court.  The submissions of employers span a wider 
range of possibilities, including a separate Court with no equity and good conscience jurisdiction 
(NZEF) and a separate division of the HC. However 13 of the 20 support retention of a separate 
Court with equitable jurisdiction, …108 
Submitters to the earlier Select Committee were sent the Options papers and invited to 
make further submissions.109 Analysis of the responses revealed that 47 supported 
Option 1, 23 Option 2, and 3 each Options 3 and 4.110 
Of those who supported Option 1 almost half were unions and 6 were employers. 
Ease of access and lay representation were regarded as key to the success of the 
institutions in minimising resolution costs and disruptions to workplaces.111 Employer 
submissions supporting this option came from those who were familiar with and 
approved of the workings of the existing institutions and procedures.  They wished to 
retain these perceived advantages.112 Other non-union submissions warned of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Mediators, note 93, at 10.	  
107	  Department of Labour:	  Paper, 13 March 1991 (containing analysis of general submissions to the 
Labour Committee which addressed institutional issues).	  
108	  Ibid, at 1.	  
109	  Chairman of the Labour Committee to submitters, letter, 1 March 1991. 
110	  Department of Labour, (Draft) Report of the Department of Labour to the Labour Select 
Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 1990, Part VI Institutions (undated, c late March 1991).  	  
111	  Ibid. 	  
112	  Hesketh Henry for Goodman Fielder Wattie (NZ) Ltd, Submission to the Labour Committee on the 
Employment Contracts Bill 1990 (undated): The Mediation Service and Labour Court “are able to 
offer a more accessible and a more constructive dispute resolution environment.  One of the 
distinguishing features of employment law disputes is that the parties are often in close daily 
contact…[so that it is in the] best interests of all concerned that those dispute resolution procedures 
operate quickly, efficiently and with a minimum of hostility.”  Also recommended was the compulsory 
inclusion of Grievance Committee procedures in all employment contracts, exclusivity of jurisdiction 
in employment disputes, an extended intervention function for the Mediation Service because it is less 
expensive and time consuming than the ordinary courts. 
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potential increase in dispute numbers and dismissed the concern about the Mediation 
Service’s dual role for the reason that the same dual function operated successfully in 
the Disputes Tribunal.113 
In its comment on the support for Option 1 the Department used the opportunity to 
argue, again, for retention of the institutional status quo to ensure a smooth transition 
to the new industrial environment.  But it conceded that the status quo failed to 
address the perceived difficulty of dual resolution roles in a single process.114 
The reasons for supporting Option 2 (over half of which came from employers) 
focussed on minimising cost and delay and the need to separate mediation and 
arbitration functions.  Also, however, was:  
an element of concern that the replacement of mediators with a tribunal could detrimentally 
affect the positive features of the current system such as speed and informality.  A number of the 
submissions which favoured the option noted that current levels of accessibility, informality and 
lay participation needed to be retained.  Two submissions stressed the need for the service to be 
readily accessible in the regions as well as major metropolitan areas…115  
A number of those who chose this option laboured under some misapprehensions 
about how it would work.116  Some submitters had no idea how the existing system 
operated because they saw in this option advantages that were already cited by others 
as reason for retaining the status quo.117  For the Department this was the option that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hesketh Henry for Allied Personnel Services and other employers in the waterfront industry, 
Submission to the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 1990 (undated): Mediation 
Service and Grievance Committee hearings “are an effective and practical way of resolving 
employment disputes…an effective employment law dispute resolution system must work with greater 
speed and a greater degree of trust and cooperation than the ordinary civil courts.”   
113 National Council of Women Submission to the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts 
Bill 1990 (undated):”…there is the potential for a sharp increase in the number, scale and range of 
disputes between employer and employees with the replacement of the national awards with a host of 
individual and collective agreements...  [Something similar to the Disputes Tribunal – regarded as] 
readily accessible can provide a non-threatening form of justice appropriate to matters which can be 
resolved by common sense…We would like more thought to be given to ensuring that the advantages of 
both mediation services and lower order disputes resolution body are available”; Dunedin Community 
Law Centre Submission to the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 1990 
(undated):“The existing Mediation Service satisfies the requirement of quick resolution.  Concern is 
noted in the option paper about mixing a mediation role with one of arbitration, we do not share this 
concern.  The current Disputes Tribunal legislation successfully creates a Tribunal which moves from 
a mediation role to one of arbitration depending on how the case develops.  From our experience this 
works well.”  
114	  The Report of the Department of Labour, note 110.	  
115	  Ibid, at 148.	  
116	  Alexander Szakats, formerly of Victoria University of Wellington School of Law, Submission to 
the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 1990 (undated): proposed a model that 
replicated Grievance Committee membership and procedure. 
117 	  Peter Boxall, Research Fellow Monash University, Melbourne. Submission to the Labour 
Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 1990:  “I prefer option 2 since it offers the possibility, I 
assume, of speedier and less formal process and thereby holds the potential to ‘increase the equity’ in 
the system. … Reforms which make the process less rather than more formal, quicker rather than 
longer, simpler rather than more technical are to be welcomed.  Such a process is manifestly more 
equitable given the well-known differential ability of individuals to pursue enforcement of their 
rights…it must be recognised that the building of an industrial culture in which disputes ... and 
grievances are resolved without direct action has been one of the critical success stories of NZ labour 
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addressed the problem of dual function, offered the advantage of continuity at the 
appellate stage and the opportunity to design a low-level informal tribunal that could 
replicate the flexibility and low cost of existing institutions.118 
Cabinet’s choice 
The Minister of Labour and his Department therefore recommended adoption of 
Option 2 with the amendment of the Bill to provide for the abolition of the Mediation 
Service and the establishment of an Employment Tribunal to adjudicate on disputes 
and grievances and other matters then dealt with by the Labour Court that could more 
conveniently be dealt with at entry level, to provide a separate mediation service for 
those matters able to be resolved without the need for adjudication, and to provide 
facilitation services outside its jurisdiction as an adjudicating body, if invited by the 
parties.  The mediation function would be provided on request or offered when a date 
of hearing was sought by the parties but would not include adjudication.  Adjudicators 
of the Tribunal would hear evidence on oath, summon witnesses, record evidence, 
prohibit publication of evidence, call and receive evidence otherwise inadmissible, 
award costs, refer a matter to the Employment Court on point of law. 119 
Cabinet chose Option 2.120 
Enacting the Employment Contracts Act 
The select committee acknowledged support for the existing institutions but 
summarised its position on them as requiring some change whilst retaining their 
essential character and accessibility.121  On 23 April 1991 the Chairman reported back 
to the House its changes to the Bill.122 Replacement of the Mediation Service by an 
Employment Tribunal was described in terms of the retention of the former’s low 
cost, easy access, mediation and arbitration functions (but with a clear split between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
relations reform in the last 20 years.  The Labour Court (and its predecessors) has been a key player in 
this.  I would hate to see this good work undone.” 
118	  The Report of the Department of Labour, note 110.	  
119	  Ibid; Department of Labour Chief Legal Advisor to Chief Parliamentary Draftsman, Drafting 
Instructions, 12 April 1991: The new Employment Tribunal would have 2 distinct functions – 
mediation and adjudication:  “It can only adjudicate within its jurisdiction.  But it can mediate both 
outside its jurisdiction (informally) and inside its jurisdiction (formally).  For the informal side, only 
brief mention in the Bill is needed.  The intention was to empower the administrators of the Tribunal to 
assess first whether a proceeding could be mediated:  Even if a matter is immediately set down for 
adjudication without mediation the Tribunal may still order mediation once the adjudication hearing 
gets under way…No one member can provide both mediation and adjudication services in the same 
case.” at 1 
120	  Cabinet Minutes, (2 April 1991) CAB (91) M 12/13. 	  
121	  Report of the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill, April 1991: “Retaining the 
shape of the existing industrial relations institutions received a great deal of support.  However, the 
Committee was concerned that, in the move to a contract-based system, the roles of these institutions 
will need to change to some degree, although their essential character and accessibility can be 
retained.  Accordingly the committee favoured the establishment of a lower level tribunal to be called 
the Employment Tribunal to meet the dispute resolution needs of the parties to employment contracts.  
Its jurisdiction would cover both functions of adjudication and mediation.  A Court of Record called 
the Employment Court, replacing the existing Labour Court, is recommended by the committee.  This 
court would have the same administrative and appointment arrangements as those provided for in the 
bill in relations to the Labour Court.  The Employment Court would have both Court of first instance 
and appeal responsibilities.” at 9  
122	  Chairman Labour Committee, Speech Notes, 23 April 1991.	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them), and expanded jurisdiction. Its decisions could be appealed to the new 
Employment Court, which would have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine 
actions for the recovery of penalties, in tort, for injunctive relief and judicial review 
and concurrent jurisdiction (with the District and High Courts) to determine 
proceedings founded on or relating to an employment contract.123 
The Minister of Labour, in his report back speech, also emphasised speed of access – 
but for all, describing the new institutions as much more democratic and a vast 
improvement on the slow, selective and cumbersome procedures which they 
replaced.124  
Retained, for the purpose of grievance resolution, was the Labour Relations Act 
requirement to include in employment contracts procedures for settling grievances 
before recourse to outside assistance.125 The ECA version emulated the procedural 
steps previously required of unions and employers, with the added imposition of a 90 
day time limit for initial submission, but with no requirement that the parties’ written 
statements form the basis of any subsequent hearing.126  
 Later, at the second reading of the Bill, the purely facilitative and non-exclusive 
nature of the mediation services on offer (private mediation was a choice disputants 
could make) were included as features of the new Tribunal.127 
However, the constituency for which these changes were made, the employers, were 
not fully satisfied.  The complaint was not with the new institutions but with the 
statutory provisions governing their functions and powers, in particular the power of 
the tribunal to order parties to mediation whether or not the parties chose that 
approach.  In a warning that now seems prescient the employers worried that the 
retention of that power combined with universal rights of access would result in a 
more unwieldy and bureaucratic system than then current.128 These fears were fuelled 
some weeks later by the suggestion that the tribunal’s regulations (then being 
formulated) should include some rules for discovery.129 This brought protests from 
both the Council of Trade Unions and the Employers Federation,130 both of whom 
made the same point that the tribunal was intended to be low level and informal and 
that discovery processes immediately formalised or legalised its procedures.  These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 104(10)(h). 
124	  Minister of Labour, Speech Notes, 22 April 1991; cf John Hughes, The Employment Tribunal and 
the Employment Court (1991) 16(2) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 175, who predicted 
that the rules requiring all evidence to be put to the Tribunal would lengthen the hearings of 
grievances: “the Tribunal stage may come to resemble the 2 to 3 day hearings which were once the 
usual province of the Labour Court when hearing grievances de novo.” at 176. 
125 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 215, 7th Schedule. 
126 Employment Contracts Act 1991, Sch 1, s 32; The LRA requirements in Sch 7 (8),(9) to have the 
union and employer written statements put before the grievance committee and to form the basis of its 
consideration of the grievance were not included in the later Act. 
127	  Minister of Labour, Speech Notes: Second Reading of Employment Contracts Bill (undated).	  
128	  NZ Employers Federation to Minister of Labour, letter 29 April 1991 at 3. 
129	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memorandum 15 August 1991.  The suggestion was 
made in early August by the Chief Judge of the Employment Court and apparently referred to the NZ 
Council of Trade Unions and the NZ Employers Federation for comment.	  
130	  NZ Council of Trade Unions to Department of Labour, Submission, 15 August 1991; NZ 
Employers Federation to Department of Labour, Submission, 27 August 1991.	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views were referred to the Minister of Labour and no rules for discovery were 
included in the Employment Tribunal Regulations.131 
The Bill to which assent was given in May 1991 provided for the establishment of an 
Employment Tribunal and Employment Court.  It came into force on 19 August 1991.  
The objects of Part VI, (in s 76) provided for the establishment of: 
(a) Specialist institutions with exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the rights of parties to 
employment contracts 
(b) Appropriate services that will facilitate the mutual resolution by parties to employment 
contracts of differences that arise between them, it being recognised that, in many cases, 
such parties are the persons best placed to resolve such differences and should be assisted 
to do so themselves 
(c) A low level, informal, specialist Employment Tribunal to provide speedy, fair, and just 
resolution of differences between parties to employment contracts, it being recognised 
that in some cases mutual resolution is either inappropriate or impossible 
(d) A specialist Employment Court to oversee the role of the Employment Tribunal and to 
deal with particular legal issues, it being recognised that the nature of employment 
contracts is such that the parties to employment contracts from time to time require the 
assistance and certainty that can be provided by a specialist court. 
 
The ink was hardly dry on the new legislation when the Law Society petitioned the 
Ministers of Labour and Justice for urgent amendment to its jurisdictional 
provisions.132  It foresaw problems arising from the concurrent jurisdiction of the civil 
courts and the employment institutions from different appeal rights, rules of evidence, 
limitation rules, remedies, the place of equity and good conscience, the use of non-
legally qualified decision makers.  It also expressed concerns about the absence of 
any monetary or complexity limits on the tribunal’s jurisdiction. No amendments to 
the Employment Contracts Act resulted from this petition.133 
 
Conclusions 
The vigour with which the policy conflicts described above were argued had at least 
two results. The first arises from the variable victories and losses experienced by the 
protagonist factions: the result was a theoretically inconsistent statute, in that the 
neoclassical contractual based theories of the radicals (drafted under tight secrecy and 
little consultation134) are reflected in Parts I135 and II136 but Parts III137 and VI138 
(victories of the moderates) are more consistent with previous labour relations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memorandum, 15 August 1991; NZEF to 
Department of Labour, and to Minister of Labour, Letters 27 August 1991.  
132	  NZ Law Society to Minister of Labour and to Minister of Justice, letters, 31 May 1991.	  
133	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memorandum, 15 August 1991. 
134 Walsh & Ryan, note 1, compare the absence of consultation on these provisions (to which they 
attribute clear manifesto commitments and a shared understanding of policy direction) to the extensive 
consultation concerning the institutions (which they argue were the result of pre-election uncertainty 
about policy direction). 
135 Freedom of Association 
136 Bargaining 
137 Personal Grievances 
138 Institutions 
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legislation.139  Second, it meant that a range of issues concerning the provision of 
dispute resolution services was covered, but others were omitted. Assumptions about 
the institutional status quo and its replacement, some articulated above, others not, are 
notable for their focus on structure.  This came at the expense of considering the 
evidence about the effects of cultural tropes (representatives requirements of structure 
and modes of operating in high frequency resolution institutions) presented by Justice 
whose contributions (with Labour’s) were all but ignored.  As should become clear in 
the following chapter this omission is crucial to understanding why the statutory 
objective for low-level, speedy and informal dispute resolution was subverted.   
This is not to mean, however, that the ideas that were subject to intensive debate were 
irrelevant (even if lightweight)140 rather that they resulted in outcomes that were 
different from those argued for them.  Thus, the issues concerning a specialist 
jurisdiction (over reliance on civil courts) and a statutory (over common law) basis of 
the principles for claim resolution are relevant to the outcome sought by the Minister 
of Finance.  They are discussed at the end of the next chapter, but given the success of 
that outcome, do not reappear.  Access to justice (specifically the barriers to) is the 
subject of anxious consideration in policy for the Employment Relations Act (both 
before and after its enactment), but it suffered, too, from a focus on institutional 
structure (and outlier representation) rather than cultures of representation. 
Availability of arbitration at entry level undermined the effectiveness of the 
Employment Tribunal thus ensuring it became an issue in need of redress for the 
Employment Relations Act, as was the issue of separating modes of resolution, the 
latter creating a fresh set of problems in practice.   The warnings of the mediators and 
their employer detailed above may appear to have laboured the point of their 
differences with judicial notions of best practice but they serve to introduce the idea 
of different approaches and practices (and distinct resolution cultures) to conflict 
resolution in the employment jurisdiction. 
Never articulated in the policy process described above were the implications of the 
transition of representation from collective (union and employer association 
advocates) to individualist (lawyers and self-employed employment advocates).  The 
consequences of this omission form the basis of the following chapter.  
Representation and its effects on institutional structure became the one issue common 
to the policy and operations of both statutes.  As such representation was never 
considered in the terms within which it operates – radically differently depending on 
form (individualist or collectivist).   
Thus the issues that dominated primary source material about policy and operations 
for the employment jurisdiction after the ECA was enacted concerned the means by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Rose Ryan and Pat Walsh, Common Law v Labour Law (1993) 6(1) Australian Journal of Labour 
Law, 230; Nick Wailes, The Case Against Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour Law:  The Philosophical 
Assumptions of a Common Law for Labour Relations (1994) 19(1) New Zealand Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 1; Bernard Robertson, The Arguments for a Specialist Employment Court in New Zealand 
(1996) 21(1) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 34. 	  
140 Ellen Dannin, Working Free, The Origins and Impact of New Zealand’s Employment Contracts 
Act, (Auckland University Press, Auckland NZ, 1997) described them thus: “…it is striking how 
lightweight their arguments are and how poor their research was.  This campaign was conducted by 
the most powerful, moneyed and well-connected groups in New Zealand, so lack of resources cannot 
explain the poor quality of what they advanced.” at 40. 
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which this transition occurred and its effects on the statutory objectives for the 
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Chapter 3 
Employment Contracts Act Institutions 
Operations and Policy: The Employment Tribunal 
 
Introduction 
Although the dispute resolution institutions established by the ECA appeared to result 
from a series of compromises between the political and bureaucratic disciples of free 
market libertarianism, National Party moderates and civil servants with experience of 
the employment jurisdiction, it is also possible that they were selected by the 
moderates as a mechanism to ensure an orderly transition from collectivist to 
individualist approaches to labour relations.  Co-option of incentives to collectivise – 
rights of grievance and informal claim processes – were key to undermining unions 
and shaping acceptance by potential union members of individual employment 
contracts.  By this means both outcome and process goals could be achieved. 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether and how these policy goals were met 
by the operation of the entry-level institution, the Employment Tribunal. The bulk of 
the material about it concerns the quality of its processes for individual (as distinct 
from collective) employment disputes.  Description and analysis of the process goal 
takes the statutory objective for process as a basis of categorisation.  Discussion of the 
outcome goal concludes this chapter. 
Quality of Process 
Although a number of employers familiar with the Labour Relations Act dispute 
resolution regime were keen to retain that system and structure,1 the provision of 
arbitration at entry level in the ECA reflected the desire of the Employers Federation 
to achieve finality for employers at first instance.  But it preferred the relative 
informality of grievance committee processes over those of the Labour Court.  For 
these reasons much of the Labour Court’s original jurisdiction was transferred to the 
Employment Tribunal, the policy prescription for which was to be low level, speedy 
and informal.  It would offer arbitration and mediation as alternative modes of 
resolution of choice for all disputes and grievances. 
The analysis that follows will first examine the requirement for the Tribunal to 
operate in a low level and informal way by assessing whether the claims filed, the 
means by which they were processed and the ways in which they were resolved 
fulfilled this policy requirement.  It will then assess whether the requirement to 
operate in a speedy fashion was met.  
The method of analysis of the low level and informal policy requirement relies on a 
separation of each of the constituent parts and personnel of the claims and resolution 
process, and a consideration of the statistical data, literature and archived information 
relevant to each part.  The first part concerns the way claims or applications were 
made.  The second part concerns the way that claims were processed and resolved and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See chapter 2:  Select Committee, Public Submissions, p 31.	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it is further classified into sections which consider choice of mode of resolution, the 
effects of choice of the adjudication mode, claim withdrawals, the effects of 
representation, member (decision-maker) work rates (output) and the costs of the 
respective modes of resolution (main centre and regional). 
The method of analysis of the policy requirement for the Tribunal to operate in a 
speedy fashion relies on similar material but is organised in a slightly different way.  
This is for two reasons: the material relevant to the low level and informal mandate 
applies also to the issue of speed; and much of the archived material concerned the 
issue of delay at the Tribunal.  First considered is the way delay was measured and 
second a description of the complaints of delay.  This is followed by accounts of the 
measures for redress (which include the appointment of additional members and 
registries, administrative responses and incentives to influence choice of mode) and 
policy responses. 
Conclusions about these separate aspects of process will focus on the ways they 
interacted, and the consequences of those interactions for the policy mandate in s 76 
ECA.  This will contribute to the assessment of the effectiveness of competing policy 
positions about choice of institutional structure and mode of resolution on institutional 
functioning identified in the Conclusion of Chapter 2. 
Low level and informal 
Making claims 
Applications to the Employment Tribunal were categorised by the Department of 
Labour according to whether they were claims for arrears of, or recovery of wages, 
compliance with statutory or contractual obligations, complaints concerning parental 
leave arrangements, penalty actions (arising from breaches of statutory obligations), 
disputes (generally arising from interpretations of awards or collective contracts) and 
personal grievances (arising from claims of unjustified dismissal, discrimination, 
sexual harassment, duress or disadvantage). 
The Department collected statistics about application numbers in two main ways: by 
counting the numbers of applications filed, and by counting the number of claims 
filed.  Some applications contained more than one claim.  In terms of categorising 
claims by type, counting and categorising the claims in each application, rather than 
categorising an application according to the main claim within it results in more 
accurate statistics. However all of the claims in any one application were considered 
together (in the same way as multiple causes of action in a statement of claim in the 
civil jurisdiction are treated), because they arose from a problem of the employment 
relationship, regardless of the ways they were described.  For this reason multiple 
claims in an application were more relevant to remedy - and the number of potential 
remedies available to an applicant – than to the way an application was managed.   
The use of both of these ways of presenting information about applications to the 
Tribunal enabled the Department to choose between the use of application or claim 
numbers and types, depending on the conclusions it wished the intended reader to 
draw.  Explanations of the differences between applications and claims were 
generally absent from the information so presented, as were explanations about 
changes that occurred in the types of statistics collected about the operation of the 
employment institutions over the period under consideration (1991 – 2000). Where 
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relevant, these changes will be noted in any description or analysis that invokes the 
data affected.2 
Although the Tribunal did not formally begin to conduct hearings until mid August 
1991, all proceedings under the new legislation were required to be filed at the 
Tribunal from 15 May 1991.  For the year ended 30 June 1992 2332 applications 
(containing 2547 claims) were filed. This marked the beginning of a 6-year period in 
which application numbers exceeded the previous year’s filings, although at 
inconsistent rates of increase. In the 92/93-year 880 more applications were filed than 
in the 91/92-year, an increase of 37%, but in the 93/94 year the increase (382) was 
11%.  This was followed by annual increases of 18%, 20% and 5% before successive 
falls in application numbers (1.6%, 16% and 3.5%) were recorded for the final 3 years 
of the ECA regime.3   
The significance of both the successive rises and the erratic rates of rise of 
applications lay in implications for managing the Tribunal workflow. As discussed 
below in respect of the issues of choice of mode of resolution and of delay that 
dogged the Tribunal from as early as 1992, the Department experienced difficulty in 
accurately predicting future resourcing needs, particularly in respect of the 
membership of the Tribunal.  It had little experience of rapid or sharply variable rises 
in the use of the institutions it administered.4 
Increases in application numbers were accompanied by increases in numbers of 
claims, but the differences between the two were subject to rises in both number and 
proportion. For instance, in the 91/92 year there was a difference between application 
and claim numbers of 215.  This amounted to 8.44% of total claims, but in the 
following year the difference was 13.11%.5  In the 93/94 year it was 16.26%.  By the 
97/98-year the difference was 20.68%.   
The significance of this data lies in what it suggests about the formality of the process 
of claiming. A forum that relies on the technicalities of claiming as a basis of 
resolution or appeal of the matters before it incentivises multiple claiming as the 
means by which a remedy (any remedy) can be obtained. The steady rise of multiple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Data cited in this and following chapters was derived from Department of Labour Monitoring 
Reports.  These were issued monthly and also quarterly.  Much of the data relied on has been collected 
from a series of such reports.  It forms the basis of calculations about trends over time.  Accordingly it 
is not possible to attribute to data selected any particular Monitoring Report.  Data that is not footnoted 
is therefore derived from a number of these reports. 
3	  Application numbers subsequently rose annually for the 5 years following June 1992 thus: by 880 to 
3212 in 1992/93; by 382 to 3594 in 1993/94; by 658 to 4252 in 1994/95; by 892 to 5144 in 1995/96; by 
285 to 5429 in 1996/97.  The fall in application numbers for the following 3 years by 92 to 5337 in 
1997/98, by 868 to 4469 in 1998/99 and by 157 to 4312 in 1999/00:  Department of Labour Monitoring 
Reports; Dianne Donald and Joanna Cullinane An Analysis of Personal Grievance Statistics in New 
Zealand from 1984 to 1998, (1998) Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand Conference, 
Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 184.	  
4	  Joanna Cullinane and Dianne Donald, (2000), Personal Grievances in NZ, University of Waikato: 
For the period 1982-89 resolution of personal grievances steadily hovered around an annual rate of 
500;	  Bronwyn Boon Remedies for Unjustifiable Dismissal under the Labour Relations Act 1987 (1992)  
17 (1) NZ Journal of Industrial Relations, 101: The Labour Court dealt with a total of 287 dismissal 
proceedings between 1987-1991 and in 1990 grievance committees dealt with 310 grievances.	  
5	  The percentage differences for subsequent years were: 1994/95 = 15.53%, 1995/96 = 17.04%, 
1996/97 = 18.5%, 1997/98 = 20.68%, 1998/99 = 19.31%. 
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claims in applications to the Tribunal suggests that applicants (or their 
representatives) perceived this as increasingly necessary for the success of their 
proceedings with the passing of time.  This suggests a rise of formality in the process 
of claiming, the reasons for which will be discussed below in use of representatives 
and the Employment Court’s review role.  
Personal grievances alleging unjustifiable dismissal constituted the bulk of the 
applications made to the Tribunal.  For the 91/92-year they comprised 63% of the 
applications (and 58% of the claims) filed. This rose the following year to 72% of 
applications, (62% claims). For the 7 remaining years of the ECA regime 77-79% of 
applications (63% of claims) were dismissal grievances.   Although grievances 
claiming disadvantage rose more than four fold from 102 in 1992 to 452 in 1999 they 
remained at 3-4% of total claims until 1999 when they rose to 8%.  
Aside from grievances the most common applications to the Tribunal were for arrears 
of wages and recovery of holiday pay.  Although wage arrears claims rose from 420 
in 91/92 to a peak of 1000 in 96/97 they fell steadily in proportion to other claims 
from 16.4% in the first year to 12.4% in the 98/99-year. Applications for recovery of 
holiday pay tell a different story: they rose steadily in number and proportion from 46 
(1.8% of claims) in the first year to a peak of 415 (6%) in the 1997/98-year. 
Compliance actions dropped steadily from 206 (8% of claims, 8.8% of applications) 
in 91/92 to 157 (2.8% of claims, 3.5% of applications) in 98/99 and disputes from 112 
(4%) to 101 (2%) over the same period. The Department’s calculation of the main 
application types and percentages for the period May 1991 to February 1993 (70.6% 
grievances, 16.9% wage arrears, 7.7% compliance and 3.3% disputes) may well have 
accurately described the work of the Tribunal at that time but it proved to be an 
inaccurate predictor of incoming work.  These figures represent the lowest proportion 
of grievances and the highest proportions of the 3 other categories for the period of 
the ECA.   
This dominance of personal grievances can also be explained in another way.  In the 
89/90-year 811 personal grievance claims were filed.  In September 1989 union 
density statistics6 indicate that there were 648,825 union members in the workforce, 
revealing a personal grievance claim rate of 125 per 100,000 union members. 
For the first full year of the Tribunal’s operation (91/92) 1609 grievances were filed.  
The working population was 1,452,895, indicating a claim rate of 110 per 100,000.  
The following year 2505 grievances were filed from a working population of 
1,486,666 meaning a claim rate of 169 per 100,000. For the 93/94-year the claim rate 
was 192 and 215 for the following year.  In 95/96 it climbed to 240. By June 1997 the 
rate was 268. 
This data indicates that the number of personal grievances increased significantly out 
of proportion to previous rates of claim and other workplace problems.  The steep 
climb in claim rate suggests, in terms of Rau’s dispute pyramid model, 7  that 
something clearly changed in the relationship between the third, fourth and fifth steps 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Aaron Crawford, Raymond Harbridge, Kevin Hince, Unions and Union Membership in NZ; Annual 
Review for 1996, (1997) 22 (2) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 2.	  
7	  Allan Rau, Edward Sherman and Scott Peppet, Processes of Dispute Resolution:  The Role of 
Lawyers (Foundation Press, Westbury, New York, 2006).	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(establishing a dispute, seeking advice and filing a claim) when personal grievances 
were made available to the whole working population.   
Cullinane and Donald postulate motivational and structural explanations, attributing, 
in respect of motivation, the economic, social and political environment created by 
the ECA to the dismissals of increased numbers of employees, as the result of 
employer perceptions of more flexibility to ‘fire at will’, white collar and professional 
employee perceptions of the economic advantages of challenging dismissals, and the 
widespread publication of this means of deriving financial gain.8  These are what Rau 
describes as the forces that dictate the internal configuration of specific disputes 
pyramids and shape the context in which the kind and number of problems are 
perceived and conflicts generated.  They could also be described as structural 
explanations because they are consistent with the explanations advanced by Roth, 
Hughes 9  and Wilson: 10 	  removal of the union monopoly on filing grievances 
undermined the vetting role undertaken by unions (they only took cases they knew 
had a basis for a remedy) and left no mechanism for screening out unmeritorious 
cases;	  and	  the deregulated and decentralised industrial environment led to a growth in 
its levels of contractualism, and litigious behaviour as the result of the replacement of 
a collectivist by an individualist approach to problem resolution in the labour 
jurisdiction. 
Processing and resolving claims 
Choice of Mode of Resolution 
In contention during the policy debates about institutional structure was the 
simultaneous exercise of Mediation Service powers to mediate and arbitrate.  
Conventional legal wisdom dictated they had to be exercised separately, 
notwithstanding the views of users of the Service, its mediators and Labour officials 
that the evidence of both separate (prior to 1987) and simultaneous use suggested that 
the latter was more satisfactory.  Med-arb, as practised between 1987 and 1991 was a 
two-step process sequentially involving mediation and, contingently, arbitration 
presided over by a single neutral who filled both roles, if required.  The final outcome 
typically combined any agreements reached in the mediation phase with the neutral’s 
decisions on any unresolved matters that proceeded to the arbitration phase.11 
From an administrative perspective the use of the decision function when a mediated 
settlement could not be achieved left significantly fewer grievances unresolved.  By 
September 1989 the Department was able to confirm the effect.  Of the 191 
grievances processed by the Mediation Service in that quarter, 89 (47%) were 
resolved by agreement in committee, 88 (46%) were decided by the Chair, consistent 
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  Cullinane and Donald, note 4.	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  Paul Roth, Editorial: The Cost of ‘Individualising’Labour Law, [1997] Employment Law Bulletin 82; 
John Hughes, Personal Grievances in Raymond Harbridge (ed) Employment Contracts: New Zealand 
Experiences, (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1993): “The fairly strict approach... by the unions 
was demonstrated by the number of successful ‘default’ actions brought under s 218 of the 1987 Act by 
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  Ross Wilson, Mediation – a Union View. Purism or Pragmatism (1996) 22 Employment Today, 18.	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with those of the previous two quarters in 1989.12 This meant that over 90% of 
grievances were either settled or decided (in roughly equal proportions) as the result 
of one meeting or hearing, although the decision making function increased the 
number of applications to the Labour Court as the result of appeals from mediator 
decisions (from 240 in the September 1988 quarter to 256 in the same 1989 quarter). 
The ‘problem’ of accommodating both functions was resolved by empowering the 
Tribunal to mediate and arbitrate in separate proceedings, unless both parties sought 
mediator arbitration.13 Claimants could thus choose the mode of resolution of their 
applications.   
Between May 1991 and 31 March 1992 the Tribunal received 1623 applications for 
adjudication and 42 for mediation.  It quickly became apparent that its membership of 
14 was unable to offer adjudication services in these proportions because of the 
member time taken up by this option.  Hearings were rarely completed in less than a 
day, and then a written decision had to be produced.14  By contrast mediations were 
generally completed in half a day with no additional work required of a member once 
a settlement was reached and recorded or after it became clear that settlement was not 
possible.15  
Adjudication continued to be the mode of first choice of almost two-thirds of 
applicants16 (at least until June 1994 when the Department stopped recording modes 
of choice) notwithstanding that this was not the dominant mode of resolution: around 
a third of dispositions by the Tribunal in these early years were adjudicated; two 
thirds were mediated.17   
By September 1992 the Department was able to report that times to outcome (i.e. 
between application and disposition) differed between the two modes:  peak 
mediation settlements occurred between 61-120 days from application whilst most 
adjudicated claims took at least 2 months longer: the Tribunal was dealing with 
“mediated matters within an appreciably shorter timeframe than adjudications.”18  
The administrative response to this problem was to offer mediation to those who 
chose adjudication, as a first attempt at resolution and available significantly earlier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Paper: Monitoring and the Labour Relations Act 
1987, 28 February 1990, at 3. 
13 	  Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 88; John Hughes, The Employment Tribunal and the 
Employment Court, (1991) 16(2) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 175, argued that this 
provision reinforced the New Zealand stereotype of the mediator as arbitrator and that the opportunity 
to separate mediation and adjudication functions was lost. 	  
14	  The time required to complete written decisions varied between members. This affected the rate at 
which the Tribunal could deal with other matters requiring hearings: Alistair Dumbleton The 
Employment Tribunal – Four Years On, (1996) 21(1) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 21.  
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  Ralph Gardiner, paper, The Employment Tribunal: A Report from the Trenches, International 
Employment Relations Association Conference, University of Waikato, 12 July 1995.	  
16 	  In the 92/93 year 56% of applicants sought adjudication.  In the 93/94 year 62% sought 
adjudication. 
17	  In the 92/93 year 35% of Tribunal dispositions were adjudicated and 64% mediated.  In the 93/94 
year 32% were adjudicated and 68% mediated.  	  
18	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour: Monitoring the Employment Contracts Act – 
Quarterly Monitoring Reports as at 30 September 1992, Section 4 Institutional Monitoring, 13 October 
1992, at 10.	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than a hearing. Of the 683 applications that were actively resolved by 31 March 1992 
only 6% required adjudication following mediation.  Half of the remaining 94% of 
dispositions were solely mediated, and the other half solely adjudicated.19 
Double use of the Tribunal (mediation then adjudication) was the consequence of 
withdrawing the power of mediators to make a decision (without parties’ consent) 
once it became clear during mediation that settlement was unlikely.  However it 
formed the basis of a view that the effectiveness of the Tribunal’s mediation function 
was strengthened by its separation from decision-making. 20  The high rates of 
settlement (an 85% resolution rate) and the low take up rate of subsequent 
adjudication (only half of matters that failed to settle at mediation proceeded to 
adjudication) were cited in support of this proposition.  The issue remained live, 
however, particularly for those with experience of both systems, who remained 
concerned about the cost and the formality that separation of modes of resolution 
signified.21 They continued, through the 1990s, to argue for greater use of the power 
to ask the mediator to make a decision because this was the system that worked 
informally under the Industrial Relations Act (parties sought a decision when they 
couldn’t agree because they sought finality and wanted to avoid the cost of litigation) 
and by operation of the law under the Labour Relations Act:  
the history of the Mediation Service over some 20 years points to the viability of the med/arb 
mix as a successful vehicle by which to bring about early satisfactory informal and cheap 
resolution of industrial disputes.22 
This power to ask a Tribunal mediator to make a decision was contained in s 88(2) 
ECA.  Reliance on it was effectively scotched in 1993 when the Employment Court 
held that mediators had no power to make decisions, even if the parties had 
consented.23  This position was overturned by the Court of Appeal in 199524 but  
med/arb was a choice rarely made until the end of the decade: the first such decision 
was recorded in the 97/98 year. The following year 33 such decisions were issued, 5% 
of the total decisions made that year. 
By 1997 the offers of mediation had successfully changed the proportions of those 
who sought adjudication at the outset. An explanation of the Tribunal’s workflow25 
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  McAndrew, Morton, Geare, note 11.	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  Walter Grills, Dispute resolution in the Employment Tribunal, Part I: Mediation, (1992) 17(3) New 
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showed that over a typical 2-3 month period of 1000 applications there would be 750 
applications for mediation and 250 for adjudication.  Eighty of the mediation 
applications would be withdrawn and of the 670 remaining 570 would result in 
settlement and of the 100 unsettled half would be withdrawn.  Of the adjudication 
claims 110 would be withdrawn and of the remaining 190, 150 would result in an 
accepted decision and 40 would be appealed or referred to the Employment Court.  
This model reveals a change of proportion of outcomes requiring Tribunal input 
between settlements and decisions (rising proportion of settlements and decreasing 
proportion of decisions) and confirms a consistent 5-6% rate of double intervention 
(mediation + adjudication).  However another model on which the Department relied 
in 199726 to support an application for increased funding for the Tribunal suggested a 
higher rate of double intervention of close to 12%.  In the absence of definitive 
calculations, but by reference to the number of decisions issued annually it is probable 
that the rate lay between these figures, suggesting, in turn, a slight rise of rate between 
1992 and 1997. 
The trend for high preference but falling rates of dispositions for adjudication is 
confirmed by comparing the 91/92-year (36% of total dispositions were mediated 
settlements, 26% adjudicated and 37% were withdrawn) to the 96/97-year (mediated 
settlements rose to 63% of all dispositions whilst adjudications fell to 12% and 
withdrawals to 24%).  If withdrawal and mediation rates are considered together (as 
party determined dispositions) in contrast to adjudication rates over the period of the 
ECA regime it becomes clear that party/assisted negotiation of the employment 
problem/s at issue was increasingly preferred (74% rising to 86%) over adjudication 
(26% reducing to 12%). 
This trend, rising application and settlement rates against declining trial rates, 
necessitated by court system architecture which has capacity to fully respond to only a 
minority of the matters put before it, is associated with the development of a 
complementary relationship between litigation and negotiation 27  (litigation is a 
strategic move in the process of negotiation, rather than the other way round), or 
litigotiation – the single process of disputing in the vicinity of official tribunals.28 
Although low trial and high settlement rates were a feature of the Labour Court’s 
operations, high application rates were not, so the Department had no experience of a 
trend more familiar to administrators of the civil court system. 
 
Effects of choice of adjudication 
Aside from the higher time requirement for hearings that choice of the adjudication 
option demanded (25% of hearings required more than a day)29 as time passed the 
Tribunal recorded more written decisions per application.  In the 91/92-year it 
recorded 349 decisions on 312 adjudicated applications.   In other words substantive 
decisions made up 89% and ancillary (interlocutory and costs) decisions 11% of the 
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  The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
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28 	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total.  The following year 680 decisions were made on 585 applications (86/14%).  
This trend of rising proportions of ancillary decisions continued, so that by the 98/99 
year the proportion of substantive decisions had reduced to 71% and ancillary 
decisions had risen to 29% of recorded decisions.  
This may be why the Department allowed 3-4 days per member for an adjudication 
and half a day for a mediation in the calculations it was required to make to address 
backlogs and the appointment of additional members to the Tribunal. 
The need for ancillary written decisions suggests that the parties to an application who 
require them are unable or unwilling to settle these matters themselves (e.g costs for 
the successful party) or they became an administrative requirement. Whatever the 
reason for them written decisions on ancillary matters are a measure of formality of 
the institution that issues them.  Rising proportions of written ancillary decisions 
suggest a rising degree of formality of process at the Tribunal.  
Withdrawals 
Withdrawals of applications represent either an acceptance by an applicant that their 
case has insufficient merit to proceed, or a settlement between the parties of the 
dispute, generally before it is heard.  
In its collation of data about the work of the Mediation Service and the Labour Court 
under the Labour Relations Act regime the Department did not routinely record 
withdrawals from grievance committee hearings. However withdrawals were the 
dominant mode of disposition at the Labour Court.  In the period April 1989 to 
September 1990 they ranged from 61% - 81% of quarterly recorded dispositions. At 
this time the Labour Court had exclusive jurisdiction to consider applications for 
compliance and wage arrears claims.  The Department was aware that withdrawal 
rates vary according to application type, noting in early 1992 that compliance matters 
had the highest rates of withdrawal (64%) and personal grievances the lowest 
(32%).30  Given the dominance of grievance over other claims under the ECA this 
explanation for withdrawal rates requires further explication. In the 91/92-year 37% 
of the Tribunal’s completed matters were withdrawals.  Thereafter they fell from 31% 
in the 92/93 year to a steady average of 25% from the 94/95 year to the 97/98 year. 
These figures could be regarded as corroborating the Department’s view that 
withdrawals were related to application type (the highest withdrawal rate was 
associated with the lowest proportion of claim type) but they also suggest a 
connection to mode of resolution.  There is a correlation between adjudication and 
withdrawal rates, in that the higher the adjudication rate, the higher the withdrawal 
rate.  A rising rate of mediated settlements was accompanied by a falling rate of both 
adjudicated decisions and withdrawals. A potential link between the process of 
adjudication and the withdrawal rate was the subject of comment by the Department 
in mid 1992:  
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Of all outcomes…36% were withdrawals.  Approximately 70% of these occurred prior to a 
hearing.  59% of all withdrawn applications were assigned to the adjudication process rather than 
the mediation process when the withdrawal occurred.31 
The link was further clarified 5 years later in the workflow model described above32 
which showed that the withdrawal rate for applications for mediation (before held) 
was 11% but for adjudication was 42%.  These figures each excluded the withdrawal 
rate that followed an unsuccessful mediation.  
The significance of the difference in withdrawal rates between applications for 
mediation and adjudication (and of the rise in mediation withdrawal rate following 
mediation) suggests that withdrawals may be an incident of the adjudication process, 
rather than an incident of institutional dispute resolution assistance. It can furthermore 
be argued that the dominance of withdrawals in disposition rates for the Labour Court 
(a purely adjudicative body) and their relative absence in grievance committee 
statistics underlines this point.   
Additionally, the low rate of mediation withdrawals pre-hearing may be an incident of 
the level of risk of proceeding. Withdrawals are most likely to occur when the parties 
prepare for their proceeding to be heard or dealt with (i.e. immediately beforehand). 
This represents the one time when both are focused on the upcoming process, and the 
risks and benefits of proceeding. Since no or little risk/benefit analysis is required for 
the mediation process because of the absence of consequence that attends upon failure 
to settle, there are few or no incentives for self-resolution beforehand in the mediation 
process. 
However disposition statistics for the last couple of years of the Tribunal’s operations 
indicate a rising rate of withdrawal (a return to the rates of the early years of over 
29%), a steady adjudication rate (13%) and a falling mediated settlement rate (39% in 
the 98/99 year).  Additionally the Department began to record the numbers of private 
settlements registered with the Tribunal for enforcement purposes. In the 97/98-year 
109 such settlements (3.5% of total settlements) were recorded.  This rose to 873 the 
following year (48% of total settlements).  They represented private settlements 
reached within “the vicinity of official tribunals.”33   As such, if they are considered 
with mediated settlement and withdrawal rates they confirm the theory of the 
relationship between litigation and negotiation – that litigation is a tactic of 
negotiation because it is the means by which parties are forced to deal with each 
other.34  The higher rate of self resolution indicated by combining withdrawal and 
private settlement rates for this last period of the Tribunal’s operations suggest a 
reducing dependence on its mediation function.   
In other words the provision of the mediation function operated, in the middle years 
of the Tribunal’s operations, as some kind of brake or limit on withdrawal rates, 
presumably because it offered risk-free official intervention to litigants.  As the 
likelihood of what the Tribunal would order became more familiar to representatives 
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the rates of self-resolution (but within the vicinity of the Tribunal)35 rose, thus 
triggering the higher withdrawal rate earlier associated with the adjudication option.  
Withdrawals therefore appear more likely to be an incident of institutional dispute 
resolution than mode of resolution. If the analysis of the effects of representation on 
formality of dispute disposition (below), is taken into account it can further be argued 
that withdrawal rates are an incident of the type of representation that litigants 
engage. 
Effect of representation 
The ECA provided for a range of representation for parties to proceedings.36  The 
three major types, lawyers, self-employed advocates (with and without formal legal 
training) and union/employer association advocates differed in their training and 
qualifications for the advocacy role and in their approaches to issues of process. A 
difference between lawyers/self employed advocates and union/employer association 
advocates was the business opportunity that representation offered.   
Union and employer association advocates were salaried employees of organisations 
whose major focus of attention in the 1990s was on the collective interests of their 
members.  Advocacy of individual problems was regarded as an incident of servicing 
the collective interests of their memberships but not an end in itself.37  Individual 
casework was regarded as time consuming and, for union organisers, included 
consideration of the effects of the workplace problem on other members and the 
business enterprise itself. The interests of individual members could not compromise 
collective interests, particularly given that reinstatement was the primary remedy.38 
Individual advocacy was free of charge because it was an incident of membership 
fees. 
Until 1991 personal grievances were available only to union members and the 
grievance had to be taken in the name of the grievant’s union so the filtering or 
vetting function described above meant that only grievances with prospects of success 
were taken on. Grievances were first considered by grievance committees that 
consisted of employer and employee representatives chaired by a mediator from the 
Mediation Service.  At that level advocacy was routinely the domain of union and 
employer association advocates, although some employers relied on lawyers.  
Lawyers as representatives were more likely to appear in the Labour Court, 
particularly in respect of actions other than grievances that were not restricted to 
union members.  
Historically, part of the tension between union and employer interests in the labour 
jurisdiction concerned the means by which disputes were resolved, in particular the 
professionalisation of the institutions created for this purpose and the limits on direct 
action that were traded for formal rights of dispute resolution.  Employers saw 
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advantages for their interests in recourse to legal process but unions regarded legal 
process as the means by which consideration of substantive issues was either ignored 
or subsumed.  From the 1970’s onwards the focus of union suspicion of the processes 
of the jurisdiction’s institutions concerned growing backlogs of work, greater legalism 
and concentration on technical detail at the expense of substantive issues.39 
To address these concerns the Labour Government enacted the Labour Relations Act 
1987. It provided for an Arbitration Commission (to deal with disputes of interest)40 
and a Labour Court, which dealt with disputes of rights: the interpretation of awards, 
grievances, and other actions regarded as ‘legal matters’. The effect of these changes 
of institution was regarded as continuing and accelerating the trend of legalising 
labour issues.41  The Labour Court, unlike its predecessors, was not a court of 
conciliation and arbitration.  It was purely a court of record, with appeal, review and 
first instance functions.  It was also regarded as presiding over the waning use of 
employer and employee representatives in the resolution or disposition of labour 
disputes, generally operating on a Judge alone basis except for demarcation disputes 
and personal grievance referrals or appeals.42  
This trend accelerated under the ECA. Under the LRA an average of 60% of parties 
were represented by union or employer association advocates and 36% by lawyers in 
the Labour Court.  Under the ECA this ratio “switched dramatically” to 70% lawyers 
and 28% advocates in the Employment Court and 60% lawyers and 35% advocates in 
the Employment Tribunal,43 becoming cause for complaint: the Tribunal was accused 
of “operating too slowly, often as a result of the involvement of lawyers”; 44 
employers’ use of lawyers at its hearings were obliging others to do so; this led to 
legalistic processes that extended hearing times and delays from scheduling 
difficulties caused by lawyer unavailability.45 They were accused of ignoring the 
Tribunal’s mediation option in favour of arbitration	  rendering it slow and legalistic, 
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and for that reason a call was made for their involvement to be restricted, as it is for 
the Disputes Tribunal.46  
The business lobby belief that lawyers undermined the ability of the Tribunal to reach 
“common sense decisions on dismissals and compensation”47 highlighted a basic 
distinction between union and lawyer/business approaches to remedy.   Union 
organisers regarded conciliation of employer and employee interests as the 
fundamental requirement of their task when confronted by conflict.48 They regarded 
retention of the job for the employee as a major goal. Much of their effort, therefore, 
lay in repair of damaged work relationships.  This involved a heavy emphasis on 
negotiation, education and “keeping lines of communication open”.49 Unwinding a 
dismissal or a warning was therefore of greater importance to union representatives 
than pursing compensation.  
Lawyers, as representatives, had a different focus. In part this arose from the 
imperative in legal training to identify the source of breach before determining 
remedy, generally associated with monetary compensation.  The result was that the 
first task of the lawyer was allocation of responsibility for breach, which, in terms of 
the client relationship (“a lawyer should advance their client’s partisan interests with 
the maximum zeal permitted by law”50) generally involved a search for fault by the 
other party.   Of itself, this imperative lends itself more easily to position taking and 
confrontationalism, so that the search for breach rendered restoration of relationships 
much more difficult than assertion of remedy (compensation), even if restoration of 
the working relationship was the more desirable option for the client.51 
A distinction, therefore, between collectivist and individualist advocacy for grievants 
lay in the pursuit of different outcomes, which in turn affected the means by which 
those outcomes were pursued. These differences can be considered in terms of timing, 
use of and effect on mode of resolution, grievant assumption of risk, and choice of 
representative. 
Timing 
The point in conflict at which assistance is sought differs for collectivised and 
individual employees. Unionised employees were better equipped to recognise 
problems in need of resolution than their non-unionised counterparts,52 thus ensuring 
that attempts at de-escalation of conflict occurred before the need for disciplinary 
action arose. 53 This in turn was dependent upon the establishment of working 
relationships between union officials and management, which facilitated the dialogue 
necessary to negotiate problems in the workplace as they arose.  Where no such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Graeme Hunt, Employment Tribunal no place for expensive lawyers, National Business Review, 26 
February 1993.	  
47	  Ibid. 
48	  Donald, note 37.	  
49	  Ibid.	  
50	  Parker and Evans, note 28.	  
51	  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Towards Another View of Legal Negotiation: the structure of problem 
solving, (1984) 31 University of California Los Angeles Law Review, 754. 	  
52	  A C Nielson for Department of Labour, Research Report, Survey of Employment Disputes and 
Disputes Resolution, November 2000.	  
53	  Donald, note 37.	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relationships existed it was the role of union officials to determine with whom to 
negotiate problems in workplaces and to establish a working or negotiating dialogue 
likely to result in early or acceptable resolution.54 By contrast lawyers were less likely 
to be consulted until matters were seriously awry.55 At this point the lawyer is less 
likely to have other sources of information about the dispute than the union advocate, 
who, in turn, is not required to advance a grievant’s interests above those of others.56  
Lawyers, on the other hand, have an obligation to a client to do the best they can for 
them, the tools available being the filing, or defending, of proceedings. Codes of 
ethics underline these obligations by endorsing zealous advocacy of clients’ causes.57 
This in turn affected the point at which assessment of a grievant’s prospects of 
success of achieving a remedy occurred.  A union member with low prospects of 
success was unlikely to attract representative effort beyond the workplace.58 Other 
grievants were less likely to obtain this assessment until they were at the Tribunal:   
more often than we would wish applicants arrive at our hearings so pumped up with expectation 
that little short of a howitzer will reach them as they float about somewhere above cloud nine.  
Similarly we still meet employers who clearly have made a botch of a dismissal and who believe 
that payment of another week’s notice should bring the ship home.59 
This difference of timing (with increased use of lawyers) reduced the number of 
disputes resolved ‘closer to the workplace’ and increased the number of those 
requiring Tribunal involvement.60 
Mode of Resolution 
Whilst unions and employer associations expended much of their effort on avoiding 
the need for outside intervention,61 lawyers were trained to regard courts and tribunals 
as their first port of call.62 Negotiating skills were to collective advocates what 
litigation skills were to lawyers.  This had the following effect on the Tribunal: 	   
At first, mediation was a bit of a mystery to some lawyers who argued their case across the table 
comfortably enough but then didn’t seem to know how to negotiate and cut a deal.  That, of 
course, had long been the very bread and butter of the union officials and their Employer 
Association counterparts… Some representatives (c 1991 onwards) may as yet not fully 
appreciate a reality which those advocates and union officials with extensive service in the 
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  Ibid.	  
55	  UMR for Department of Labour, Research Report, The Process of Dispute Resolution: A qualitative 
study amongst employers and employees, January 2002.	  
56	  Ibid.	  
57 	  Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism, The American Way of Law (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2001) at 55. 	  
58	  Donald, note 37.	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  Gardiner, note 15.	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  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, paper, The Employment Contracts Act – Institutions 
and Personal Grievances, 26 November 1993.	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  Donald, note 37.	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  Parker and Evans, note 28.	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industrial trenches had long before identified – the job of the representative is to resolve a matter 
and the mediator is a tool of their trade.63  
These observations reflected the concerns of the Tribunal membership about the 
conduct of legal representatives at hearings, the quality of their advocacy, and their 
behaviour during the mediation process. They sought training for lawyers in Tribunal 
advocacy. 64  Some Tribunal members new to adjudication were sufficiently 
intimidated by the demands of counsel in the procedural point scoring underpinning 
trial advocacy to request training for themselves in procedural issues.65 This had 
implications for both modes of resolution, although it was the presence of legal 
counsel inexperienced in the mediation process that was regarded as frustrating the 
perceived advantages of an informal low-level specialist Tribunal, the use of lay 
advocates and the equity and good conscience jurisdiction. 66	    
Lawyer reliance on adversarial posturing in non-judicial processes, arising from a 
tendency to view such processes through the optic of litigation, has been long 
understood:67 
These processes may be approached as if they were merely variants or extensions of the judicial, 
adversarial model which to so many lawyers is the paradigm of disputing.68 
The dominance of lawyers as representatives also affected the style of mediation as 
the result of its function as the forum that preceded adjudication.  Likely adjudicated 
outcome, as predicted by the mediator, became the basis for settlement by parties who 
were legally represented. This in turn required mediators to sacrifice a facilitation role 
for assessment of litigation risk, turning them into ‘deal makers’, engineering 
agreements on ‘exit packages’ for often long-dead employment relationships.69   
Lawyer effects on the Tribunal’s adjudicative function were seen to be adversarial 
and controlling, and over time “they became more inventive with their arguments and 
challenges.” 70  That the Tribunal should operate for the convenience of legal 
representatives was underlined shortly after it began when it was asked to depart from 
its practice of starting at 9 a.m in favour of traditional Court hearing times.71  
Requests such as this, the reluctance to adapt to the requirements of the mediation 
function and a continuing insistence on choice of adjudication as first option suggests 
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  Gardiner, note 15; A study of 100,000 civil cases terminated in Taiwan from 2000-2006 showed 
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Empirical Legal Studies, 309. 
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  Department Of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memo, Workflow of Employment Tribunal to end of 
November 1992, 10 December 1992.	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  Department of Labour, Service Contract Performance Evaluation for Employment Tribunal Report, 
12 March 1993.	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  Menkel-Meadow, note 51; Munro, note 35:  Munro argues that the Maori Fisheries negotiations 
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68	  John Murray, Allan Rau, Edward Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution: The Role of Lawyers, 
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a connection between business opportunity and the reluctance of lawyers to 
acknowledge the validity of non-judicial processes: 
some lack of enthusiasm can often be explained by simple self-interest [which is] at least partly a 
matter of economics: Lawyers, especially those paid by the hour, are able to extract substantial 
fees from prolonged conflict, and may have an incentive to shape disputes in such a  way as to 
maximise their benefits from them.  Economic changes such as intensified business conflict – 
and above all heightened competition in an increasingly entrepreneurial legal profession – may 
also play a role in dampening interest in non-adversarial settlement.  And self interest can have 
other, less tangible aspects: Alternative processes often function in such a way as to transfer 
greater power and control over disputing to the parties themselves, or to other professionals...72  
Risk 
The cost of representation by counsel, particularly for adjudication, was payable 
regardless of outcome.73  Analysis of adjudicated outcomes revealed that almost half 
of the grievances litigated yielded no remedy for the grievant.  Of those who did 
obtain a remedy over half were awarded less than $5,000 in compensation.  Ninety-
three per cent of successful grievants were awarded less than $12,000. Costs awards 
never met the full cost of representation.74 
By contrast the cost of union membership was seen as akin to an insurance premium 
that offered representation for individual problems at no extra charge.  If advocacy 
was required, it carried with it exemption from indemnification of the other party if 
unsuccessful, the full benefit of any compensation award, and vigorous attempts to 
resolve the problem in the workplace (i.e. before matters escalated to dismissal).75 
The consequences for grievants of choice of representative therefore differed in terms 
of risk.  Union/employer association members took the risk, when litigating, that their 
organisation would refuse to represent them if their prospects of success were too 
low. Those relying on lawyers or self-employed advocates had little or no risk of a 
refusal to assist but they undertook all the risk associated with their prospects of 
success.  They risked paying a costs award to the other party if they were 
unsuccessful and even if successful they took the risk that the cost of representation 
would match or exceed any compensation awarded.  
Choice  
The analysis above fails to account for the persistent dominance of lawyers as 
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representatives in this jurisdiction.76  One explanation is that lawyers are more likely 
to be associated with getting ‘the best deal’ at the other party’s expense, 
notwithstanding that this assumption is not generally supported by research.77 A 
related, but opposing idea, “that negotiation on financial matters through lawyers will 
do little to increase independent communication between the parties” does appear to 
have some validity.78  
Tribunal Member Output 
In its first year of operation Tribunal members (14 were appointed amounting to 12 
full time equivalents [FTEs]) settled 437 and decided 312 applications.  This averages 
36 mediations and 26 adjudications per member annually, or 3.6 and 2.6 per member 
per month (calculated on the basis that 10 months of 22 working days per month is a 
working year because it accounts for annual leave, sick and other leave entitlements).  
If the 4 days per adjudication that the Department allowed for this mode and the half 
day that most mediations took are totalled (12 days) it is clear that these figures 
indicate a low disposition rate per working month. 
The following year (16 FTE members) the average monthly disposition rate was 6.4 
for mediations and 3.6 for adjudications (18 days).  The peak year for disposition by 
adjudication, the 93/94-year (22 FTEs) saw 822 substantive decisions issued taking an 
average of 16 working days per member per month.  The 8.3 mediations required just 
over 4 days.   
The peak year for dispositions was the 96/97-year (24 FTEs) when 13 mediations and 
2.5 adjudications per member per month occurred.  By this time the average number 
of annual adjudications had settled into 26 per member per year, requiring 10 or 11 
days per month, leaving the same number of days available for mediations.  At no 
time, however, did the number of settlements reached require this amount of time 
(even by taking into account the approximately 15-20% of mediations that were not 
settled). In the 97/98 year the disposition rate for mediations dropped to 12 per 
member per month, reducing the following year to less than 8. 
Output rates, highest from the 93/94 to the 97/98 years, coincide with falling 
withdrawal rates, rising mediation settlement rates and the issue of the highest 
numbers of substantive decisions (notwithstanding their falling proportion of all 
dispositions).  Withdrawal rates are most closely associated with periods of lowered 
output rate.  Output was lowest for the first two and the last two years of the 
Tribunal’s operations.  For the first two years the proportion of adjudications to total 
dispositions was high, as was the proportion of withdrawals.  For the last two years 
the proportion of withdrawals rose with that of private settlements and the numbers 
and proportions of mediated settlements fell.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 	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The connection can be explained by the practice of late notification of withdrawals, 
when it became difficult or impossible for Tribunal staff to substitute waiting 
proceedings. Inability to reschedule proceedings at short notice “due to the 
unavailability of clients’ lawyers”79 was noted by the Report of the Labour Select 
Committee in 1993, but there is no evidence that this resulted in any significant 
changes to the Tribunal’s setting down and other administrative practices. 
Unavailability of representation as the result of withdrawals close to hearing dates 
was advanced by the Department in 1999 as one of three reasons why average waiting 
times for matters to be resolved at the Tribunal continued to increase.80   
By 1999 application rates were declining, as were disposition rates.  But the numbers 
of applications awaiting disposition continued to rise. The Department collected two 
sets of backlog statistics: applications awaiting a hearing and applications 
outstanding.  The second set was a combination of applications that hadn’t been dealt 
with and those that had, but were awaiting a decision following adjudication. This 
latter set included those who sought adjudication following an unsuccessful mediation 
and those who were awaiting a decision on a hearing already conducted.   
The differences between these sets of data reveal that although the numbers awaiting 
attention grew steadily (but unevenly) from 691 at the end of 1991 to 3022 at the end 
of 1999, the numbers awaiting a decision grew at a different rate.  If the average 
withdrawal rate is deducted from both sets of data (to determine more accurately the 
applications requiring Tribunal intervention and to account for those requiring both 
mediation and adjudication) then the number of decisions awaited from hearings 
already held can be calculated.  There was nothing to count until the end of 1993 
when (approximately) 270 applications were awaiting a decision.  At that time an 
average of 58 applications were decided per month, so this figure represents 4.5 
months of decisions.  Five years later about 830 decisions were awaited. The average 
number of applications decided had fallen to 53 per month, so this represents 15 
months of decisions.   
This means that, over time, as the number of decisions per application grew, the rate 
at which substantive decisions were issued slowed.  If considered alongside the output 
rates calculated above, the 2.6 adjudications per month that Tribunal members 
averaged required more than 4 working days per application to complete.   This 
appears to have affected the numbers of mediations that were conducted after the high 
point in the 96/97-year of 13 per member per month.  The effect on the backlog at this 
point was to slow its rise, but this ended with the reduction over the following two 
years of settlements to 12 and then 8 per member per month.   
Additions to Tribunal membership had no permanent effect on backlogs. For the 3 
years over which most of the additional appointments were made, in the early 1990s, 
the backlog hovered around 1500 but, thereafter, rising application numbers ensured a 
rising backlog. Output rate per member had some effect on the backlog but the 
backlog had no measurable effect on output rate. 
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80	  Department of Labour to Minister for Enterprise and Commerce, Memorandum, Employment 
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Operational Costs 
In the course of the annual Budget funding round in early 1997 the Department was 
required to establish for the Treasury why it wished to increase its mediation 
settlement rate, rather than offer more adjudication.  It prepared the following table81 
of the cost to the Department of each mode of resolution.  It includes the cost of 
disposition at the 5 Tribunal city bases and the regions, the costs per day of 
adjudication and the cost of those applications that required both modes of resolution. 
These costs were calculated by reference to the time required of Tribunal members 
and support staff and the costs associated with travel and use of venues. 
Projected no’s type   cost per app  total cost 
     $   $ 
1144  withdrawn app      59.57     68,151 
2128  mediation @ base   415.93   885,094 
1044  mediation circuit    587.60   613,452 
152  adjud (1 day) @ base 2470.68   376,754 
73  adjud (1 day) circuit 2985.68   217,745 
27  adjud (long) base  7228.74   194,525 
13  adjud (long) circuit 8258.75   106,290 
356  med + adj (1 day) @ base 2865.35             1,019,518 
170  med + adj (1 day) circuit 3552.01   604,446 
63  med + adj (long) @ base 7623.41   478,674 
30  med + adj (long) circuit 8825.08   265,017 
 
This table reveals the significance of the difference in the cost of mediation and 
adjudication.  Of greater significance however is the cost of adjudication relative to 
the size of the remedies at stake.  If 56% of remedies were $5,000 or lower, then it is 
quickly apparent that, for many successful claims, the cost of the professionals – 
Tribunal and representatives – was higher than the remedy at stake.   
Speedy 
Measuring delay 
Although the theme of administrative and public attention for the nine years that the 
ECA was in force was overwhelmingly about the delays in having proceedings heard 
at the Tribunal, once they became apparent and then endemic, the immediate 
response, in terms of applications filed after May 1991, suggested to officials that 
early fears of a rapid increase in the number of claims as the result of the extension of 
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the personal grievance jurisdiction to all employees were unfounded. 82   This 
confidence dissipated soon thereafter. 
The two major ways that the Department calculated and described delay were by time 
and number: the average times that applications waited to be heard and determined (or 
mediated) and the size of the backlog.   
The Department’s assessment of waiting times was initially counted in days, as it had 
been for the institutions that operated in the jurisdiction before 1991.  The major time 
categories were: 90, 120, 180 days and more than a year. The measures of delay were 
applications on which nothing happened for more than 90 days from filing.  Thus, 
when, by mid 199283 the proportion of hearings held within 90 days of application 
dropped from 63% in the previous quarter to 51%84 the Department described this as 
sharp, indicating that a higher Tribunal output rate was not coping with the increase in 
application numbers. Comparisons of applications awaiting hearing in August 1992 
and March 1993 indicated that the 28% waiting for 3-6 months in August grew to 
35% in March and the 7% waiting longer grew to 23%.85 Put another way, of the 
applications heard in the first year, 47 waited more than 6 months.  This grew to 686 
in the second year.86  
These figures also reveal that the language of delay had transformed periods 
described in days to months by 1993.  The use of time period descriptors varied from 
this point on.  The Department’s descriptors are those adopted for the data that 
follows.  It is not clear why they varied.  
The data was also categorised by registry.  Auckland was the bellwether for delay, 
which is unsurprising since roughly half of applications were filed there.  In the first 
year of operation the Auckland registry disposed of 32% of its completed applications 
within 90 days, Wellington 73% and Christchurch 76%. This reduced the following 
year to 16% in Auckland, 15% in Wellington, and 58% in Christchurch.87 The trend 
suggested here, that the Christchurch registry had lower waiting times than the other 
two registries, persisted for the entire period of the Tribunal’s operations.   
The backlog consisted of applications awaiting hearing, regardless of time of filing.  It 
became a measure of delay once it exceeded the number of applications made for the 
previous 3 months (this being the optimum period identified by the Department 
within which proceedings should be heard88).  Thus when, at the end of 1992, the 
1441 applications awaiting hearing represented about 6 months of applications (the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Department of Labour,	  Notes for Estimates Debate, Impact of Employment Contracts Act (undated c 
late Sept, early Oct 1991) at 6. 
83	  End of the second quarter for 1992, but the end of the public service reporting year: 1 July-30 June.	  
84	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour: Monitoring the Employment Contracts Act – 
Quarterly Monitoring reports, June 1992, 13 July 1992. 
85	  NZ Council of Trade Unions, Submission to Labour Select Committee Review of the Employment 
Contracts Act, 19 May 1993.  
86	  Minister of Labour for Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Response to	  Question for Written Answer, 
No 2397, 18 May 1993.	  
87	  Deputy Leader of the Opposition for Minister of Labour, Questions for Written Answer, No’s 2395 
– 2402, 18 May 1993.	  
88	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Memorandum: Employment Tribunal Regional 
Waiting Times, 11 February 1998.	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average for 1992 was 235 per month) the Department had another measure of delay.  
Interestingly, and notwithstanding a rising application rate, this measure of delay (6 
months of applications) represented a high point that was exceeded next in 1998.  For 
the 5 years between these periods, when application rates rose from an average of 284 
to 467 per month, the backlog hovered between 4.6 and 5.5 months of applications.  
By this measure the backlog was at its highest in 1999 when it represented 9 months 
of applications made that year.89 
The third measure of delay was an historical comparison with earlier backlogs.  The 
backlog at the end of 1992 had more than doubled from the 691 awaiting hearing at 
the end of 1991.90 Thereafter, apart from small dips in 1994 and 1998, the trend was a 
rise in numbers awaiting hearing to a peak of 3022 at the end of 1999. 
By the end of 1994 average waiting times were 2 months for mediations and 7 months 
for adjudication.91  Waiting times increased over the following two years to 4 and 8.5 
months respectively.92 An additional registry in Hamilton in early 1996 to cope with 
the upper North Island workload slowed the rate of increase in waiting times in the 
Auckland registry between the 92/93 and 98/99 years from 18 to 20 weeks for 
mediation and 26 to 57 weeks for adjudication, but had no effect on Wellington where 
the increase for mediation was from 20 to 32 weeks and for adjudication from 24 to 
67 weeks.  Christchurch maintained its superiority over the others, but sustained 
increases of 12 to 16 weeks for mediation and 16 to 44 for adjudication over this 
period.93 
The regions, outside the main centres, generally suffered longer waiting times, 
ostensibly as the result of the circuit system by which applications in a particular 
region would be accumulated until there were sufficient to occupy a Tribunal member 
for a number of days.94 Establishing a registry in Hamilton was to the immediate 
advantage of the cities closest to it because they experienced the shortest average 
waiting times for mediation (4 months).95 For other regions it is not clear whether 
waiting times were a function of numbers, distance from or ease of access by the city 
servicing them, or administrative differences between the three Tribunal centres.96 It 
is also unclear how the circuit system affected waiting times for adjudications.  The 
shortest waits (7-9 months) were in South Island regions serviced by the Christchurch 
Tribunal.   City applicants waited 10-15 months.  The regions that waited the longest 
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90 	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91	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Monitoring the Employment Contracts Act – 
Quarterly Monitoring reports, December 1994, February 1995.	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  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memo, Delays in the Employment Tribunal, 31 
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93 Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Response to Question for Written Answer, 4 May 
1999 (re increase in average waiting times in the Employment Tribunal). 
94	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memorandum: Delays in the Employment Tribunal, 31 
January 1997.  
95	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memorandum, Employment Tribunal Regional 
Waiting Times, 11 February 1998.  
96	  Mediation waiting times were 5 months in Whangarei, Hamilton, Gisborne, Palmerston North, 
Timaru, Ashburton, West Coast, and Dunedin, 6 months in Blenheim, Nelson, New Plymouth, 
Wanganui, and Queenstown, 7 months in Hawkes Bay, and 8 months in Invercargill.	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times (18-22 months) were all serviced by the Wellington Tribunal, the members of 
which did their own calculations asserting that average waiting times for mediation 
for the 7 centres in the Wellington region was 7.99 not 10 months as calculated by the 
Department and 15.14 months for adjudication, not the 19 months reported.97  It is not 
clear whether similar differences existed also for data from other centres.   
Complaints of delay 
Concerns about the potential for delays at the Tribunal were expressed at the outset 
when the implications of creating a specialist jurisdiction were first realised.  Non-
union employees under the previous regime accessed their local Disputes Tribunal or 
District Court for resolution of their disputes with employers but these avenues of 
relief were no longer available after May 1991.  Members of Parliament for two South 
Island electorates (representing both sides of the House) petitioned the Minister of 
Labour to allow minor matters such as wage arrears claims to be dealt with as before, 
but to no avail.98  
Within a year of commencing its resolution function in mid August 1991 the Tribunal 
was subject to criticism that it was operating too slowly,99 presaging a series of 
complaints about delays in obtaining fixtures and hearings.100  By year’s end the 
complaints of delay in the press forced a response that emphasised the increase in 
jurisdiction to universal rights of access, a recent steep increase in application 
numbers and the appointment of additional members to the Tribunal.101 By early 1993 
the Council of Trade Unions was seeking monthly reviews of Tribunal delays.102 
Although early complaints were diffuse about cause it was not long before the 
Tribunal’s approach to adjudication was identified as the culprit.  The Employers 
Federation was amongst the first to note that the Tribunal was processing matters in a 
“more formalised, legalistic and lengthy manner.”103 By then the Tribunal had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Wellington Employment Tribunal members to Managers, Industrial Relations Service and the 
Institutions, Paper: Current Delays, 18 May 1999. 	  
98	  Nick Smith, MP Tasman, to Minister of Labour, letter, 28 August 1991, concerned that the 14 
members of the Employment Tribunal would be insufficient to cope with the workload; Pete Hodgson, 
MP Dunedin North to Minister of Labour, letter 20 November 1991, raising concerns about wage 
arrears matters that were formerly dealt with by the Disputes Tribunal. Requested Disputes Tribunal be 
given jurisdiction over minor wages arrears.  Response, Minister of Labour to Hodgson, 13 December 
1991: Request refused. 
99	  Department of Labour,	  note 44. 
100	  Graham Kelly, MP for Porirua, to Minister of Labour, Questions for Written Answer, 12 August 
1992; Press Bulletin, Dominion and Radio New Zealand, 17 September 1992; Union Law Centre to 
Minister of Labour, letter, 8 October 1992; Ross Robertson MP, to Minister of Labour, letter, 8 
October 1992; NZCTU to Minister of Labour, letter, 18 December 1992:  complaint about delays 
assigning hearings in Employment Tribunal. 
101	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour’s Principal Press Officer, letter, 19 November 1992.   
102	  New Zealand Council of Trade Unions to Department of Labour, letter, 12 March 1993; Response, 
Department of Labour to NZCTU, 15 March 1993.	  	  
103	  NZ Employers Federation to Secretary of Labour, letter, 2 April 1993, at 3; Dumbleton, note 14, 
accepted adjudication by the Tribunal did not live up to the speedy objective for it, but attributed blame 
for its legalism to the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal, both generators of long complicated 
decisions expanding or qualifying generally simple concepts: “What I thought was intended was 
something in the character more like the grievance and disputes committees which had operated under 
the Labour Relations Act and not something like the Labour Court under that Act.  It remains my view 
that the essence of adjudication in the Tribunal was intended by the Employment Contracts Act to be 
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operating for 2 years during which nearly half of adjudicated outcomes took more 
than 6 months (over a year in some cases) from filing to hearing whilst less than 20% 
of their mediated counterparts took this time to resolve.104 
Employers were also keen to eliminate what they perceived to be the sources of 
increased claim numbers.  Amongst these was the provision of legal aid under the 
new Legal Services Act 1991.  Their concern was that the provision of legal aid	  
would work against the objective of resolving labour market disputes expeditiously 
and at the lowest level possible.105  
The Chief Judge of the Employment Court entered the fray in mid 1993 when he was 
reported as noting that the delay in obtaining hearings at the Tribunal was sufficiently 
serious to warrant urgent attention. 106   This coincided with the Labour Select 
Committee inquiry into the effects of the Employment Contracts Act on the labour 
market. Tribunal members who gave evidence to the Committee were concerned that 
the low level, informal objectives for the Tribunal were not being met.  Agreeing that 
the expansion of the grievance jurisdiction to all employees was significant, they 
pointed out that this had resulted in a change of grievant, which in turn affected 
hearing times.  Middle management employees excluded from the previous grievance 
jurisdiction were perceived by Tribunal members as over-represented in 
adjudications. Their claims were described as more complex than those of wage 
earners, demanding more time to hear and decide. 107  Evidence recording (in 
adjudicated hearings) for appeal purposes, and the existence of Regulations for the 
Tribunal contributed to perceptions that its processes were overly formal and 
legalistic.108  These views were relied on by the Committee in the two reports that 
were produced, which reflected majority and minority views of the issues raised by 
the Inquiry.109 
Waiting times continued to be the subject of complaint (including from the legal 
profession) through to the 1999 general election.110  Other complaints concerned the 
high number of personal grievances lodged at the Tribunal, the use of contingency 
advocates, the availability of legal aid for grievances, the “rumours of advice from 
Social Welfare staff to dismissed persons to file personal grievances to avoid the 26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the determination of the rights and remedies of employers and employees in a summary way; i.e 
without undue regard for the formalities of law as may be applied by the High Court, the Employment 
Court or the District Court even in its civil jurisdiction.  “Low level” and ‘informal’ were not only 
descriptions of the ambiance of the Tribunal but were also a reference to matters of procedure and 
style in respect of both decision making and decision delivery.” at 30.	  
104	  Deputy Leader of the Opposition to the Minister of Labour: Question for Written Answer No 2399, 
18 May 1993. 
105	  New Zealand Employers Federation to Secretary for Justice, letter (undated, early 1992).	  	  
106	  Helen Clark, MP to Minister of Labour Question for Oral Answer No 5 (Due 4.5.93) What action, 
if any, does he intend to take in the light of the reported comment by Chief Judge Tom Goddard that 
the delay in Employment Tribunal hearings ‘is a serious situation which does need attention and needs 
it now.  There is a tremendous backlog’? Answer:  A temporary panel of 7 part time members of the 
Employment Tribunal for the purpose of focusing on the backlog is to be appointed. 
107	  The Report of the Labour Committee, note 45. 	  
108	  Limits on the scope of appeals also required all potential issues and arguments to be raised and 
dealt with at first instance, which also contributed to perceptions of legalism. 
109	  The Report of the Labour Committee, note 45.	  
110	  Waikato District Law Society to Minister of Labour, letter, 7 March 1997; NZ Law Society to 
Minister of Labour, March 1999; response, Minister of Labour to NZ Law Society, 16 March 1999. 
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week stand down period” and the focus by the institutions (as perceived by employer 
associations) on process at the expense of substance in personal grievances.111 They 
were acknowledged as a reason for increased funding for the Tribunal and a review of 
its processes. 112 
Perhaps because that review never materialised, complaints about waiting times 
continued to dog the Minister of Labour in Parliament. There was little new in his 
responses.  The Department took the opportunity offered by his request for reasons 
for continued increases in average waiting times at the Tribunal in mid 1999 to 
attribute limited resources to the problem, whilst acknowledging that increased 
resource and a drop in applications had failed to address the backlog.  Accumulated 
caseload as the result of constrained resources from inception was now said to be the 
problem, particularly for the regions that experienced the longest waiting times.  It 
suggested that an increase in number and efficiency of the Tribunal membership and 
more resources for the regions were the measures most likely to address the 
problem.113 
The Department adopted a wider view of the problem, however, for others, attributing 
the Tribunal’s increased caseload to statutory changes to the labour jurisdiction. The 
resulting emphasis on individual rights and obligations in employment contracting 
meant greater (individual) requirements for the dispute resolution and enforcement 
services of the State.  This was seen to be a direct result of the extension of rights of 
access to grievance and disputes procedures to all employees, changes to the nature 
and structure of bargaining, specifically the demise of the national award system, the 
decline of unions as information and enforcement agents, the transfer of minimum 
employment conditions from awards to statutory minima.  Increases in the resourcing 
and accessibility of state provision of information and enforcement, at little or no 
direct cost to individuals, encouraged an increasing reliance on them.  The precedent 
effects of key judgments enhanced public awareness of these services that in turn 
affected subsequent demands for enforcement action. Changes in the economy and in 
the circumstances of individual employees were also regarded as affecting their 
propensity to utilise the services offered by the State.114 
Measures to redress delays 
Membership of the Tribunal 
The initial complement of 14 Tribunal members was also the number of mediators 
employed by the Mediation Service immediately prior to May 1991.  It was clear to 
the Department by mid 1992 that this was insufficient to cope with claim numbers. 
Three additional Tribunal members were appointed by the end of that year to meet the 
increased demand,115 followed by the appointment of eight temporary members in 
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  Meat Industry Association to Minister of Labour, letter, 27 June 1998. 
112	  Minister of Labour to NZ Employers Federation Conference, Speech Notes, 12 May 1998.  
113	  Minister of Labour, Response to Question for Written Answer 4 May 1999; Department of Labour 
to Minister of Labour: Report on the reasons for continued increases in average waiting times in the 
Employment Tribunal (undated but prepared as part of the response for written answer). 
114	  Department of Labour to Kate Hamilton, Centre for Labour and Trade Union Studies, University of 
Waikato, 12 March 1999. 
115	  Department of Labour, note 101.  
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May 1993,116 at the time the Labour Select Committee began its inquiry. By August 
1993 it accepted that the additional temporary members were insufficient.  It 
recommended the appointment of additional adjudicators and mediators if waiting 
lists and times could not be substantially reduced. 117  Notwithstanding the 
Department’s belief that the backlog had begun to reduce and application numbers 
were falling, three more temporary members for the Auckland Tribunal were 
appointed in mid 1994.118  This effectively doubled the complement of members of 
the Tribunal from 14 to 28 in less than 3 years of operation.   
By mid 1999 it had become clear to the Department that the part-time members 
needed to be converted to full time.119   
Additional registries 
The Hamilton registry was established in January 1996 to cope with the upper North 
Island workload, and a Dunedin registry in July 1998 to service the lower half of the 
South Island.120  
Funding 
Funding for the Tribunal was $5.694m for the 1993/94 financial year ($5.798m 
spent), $6.318m annually for the years 1994-96 rising to $6.896m for the years 1996-
98.  The initial basis on which this rise in funding was secured was that it would 
reduce to $6.718m for the 98/99 year.121 For the 96/97 budget round the Department 
argued for retention of the $2.11m (approved in May 1994 for the following two 
budget rounds for the temporary panel of 8 Tribunal members) in addition to extra 
resourcing for increasing demand and the growing backlog.  It argued that it had 
relied on a number of administrative and regulatory options to strengthen the 
incentives for more cost effective and efficient dispute resolution in the Tribunal (e.g 
encouraging applicants to accept mediation) but that there were:   
limits to the extent to which reallocating work priorities and switching resources internally can 
contribute to an overall reduction in total workload and case backlogs.  Current levels of demand 
and resourcing mean that such strategies are likely to be limited in their effect in the absence of a 
sufficient resource raise.  Despite the productivity gains made to date, projected future demand 
levels will put increased pressure on waiting times and backlogs, without corresponding 
increases in resource.122 
Treasury agreed to support this bid only when it became clear that the advice it sought 
about increasing application fees, the effect of the 26 week stand down for entitlement 
to welfare benefits, incentives and disincentives on frivolous claims would have no 
effect on the problem then confronting the Department, that the terms of the panel of 
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  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memo: ECA: Resourcing of Employment Tribunal, 
11 February 1993.  
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  The Report of the Labour Committee, note 45.	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  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Draft Government response to Report of the Labour 
Select Committee on the operation and effects of the Employment Contracts Act, 9 March 1994. 
119	  Department of Labour to Minister for Enterprise and Commerce, Memorandum, Employment 
Tribunal Waiting Times, 4 May 1999.	  
120	  Minister of Labour to Pete Hodgson, MP, letter, 28 February 1997.	  
121	  Department of Labour: Funding and Workload of the Employment Tribunal, (undated c 1996). 	  
122 	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memo, Vote Labour: Review of Funding of 
administration and enforcement, 21 December 1995.	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eight temporary Tribunal members were due to expire mid year at a time when 
application numbers were still rising.123 Funding of $1.875m was approved for the 
following 3 budget rounds to maintain current demand only.  No funding was 
approved for the management of future demands.124 This forced the Department to 
look for savings in other areas of its expenditure for transfer to the Tribunal.125 
For the 1997/98 budget round the Department sought an additional $650,000 to 
reduce waiting times at the Tribunal.126 As part of the exercise to garner Treasury 
support for this bid the Department prepared the table of costs set out above which 
costed all Tribunal resolution functions, revealing the relatively high costs of 
adjudication over mediation functions.  This triggered a different response from 
Treasury than previously.  It wanted to know how additional funds would reduce 
waiting times, but also wanted to target adjudication waiting times.  It was concerned 
that reductions to mediation waiting times would result in greater use of this function, 
but it also wanted fee increases to be considered to encourage lower cost mediation 
and discourage use of higher cost adjudication.127  
The Department’s reply noted that its target times for mediation were 2-3 months 
because it was within that period that effective settlement occurs:  
The professional opinions and experience of the tribunal members themselves is that mediations 
will settle in those timeframes.  In their, and our, experience, where hearing times for mediation 
are delayed outside the target ranges, the parties will fail to settle in that manner, and will then 
proceed to adjudication – an altogether more lengthy, expensive and resource intensive process 
for all concerned.128 
It went on to note that current waiting times were 6-7 months, meaning that its 
priority was to improve capacity to deal with the mediation workload.  It therefore 
disagreed that funding should be directed at adjudication and took the opportunity to 
lobby for an increase in the Tribunal membership (a minimum of three additional 
members) to establish regional coverage where waiting times were longest – 
Hamilton, Dunedin, and Wellington.129  It got an increase - $.4m with the difference 
to be funded by rises in Tribunal fees.130  This allowed for the appointment of two 
additional members for the Hamilton registry.	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  The Treasury to Department of Labour, letters 10 and 30 January 1996.	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  Minister of Finance to Minister of Labour, letter (undated) advised that Gatekeeping Ministers 
considered bids on 13 March 1996.  They agreed to support an increase of $m1.875 for 96/97; 97/98; 
98/99 to maintain current demand.  But no funding to manage future demands to 99: Cabinet Minutes, 
15 April 1996, CAB(96)M13/5(24). 
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  Department of Labour to Secretary of Labour, letter, 25 March 1996; Secretary of Labour to 
Minister of Employment, letter, 25 March 1996; Department of Labour to Secretary of Labour, letter, 2 
April 1996, – transfer of savings to fund 1 additional member of Tribunal at annual cost of $200,000. 
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  Department of Labour (internal) memo, 17 January 1997; Department of Labour to Minister of 
Labour, memo, 21 January 1997.	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  The Treasury to Department of Labour, letter, 25 March 1997.	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  Department of Labour to The Treasury, letter, 26 March 1997.	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  Ibid.	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  Minister of Finance, Minute, 5 May 1997; Cabinet Minute, (26 May 1997) CAB (97)M 19/10 (29): 
Cabinet agreed to an increase in Vote Labour of $m.450 to reduce backlogs and waiting times to be 
met by increases in Revenue Crown of $m.400; agreed $m.250 of Crown Revenue by increase in fees 
and if this amount not generated then amount to Industrial Relations institutions would decrease by the 
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Additional funding of $3m was secured for the Tribunal in 1998131 to tackle the 
backlog of waiting applications, particularly in the regions, and to account for the 
disappearance of the previous increase in funding swallowed up by Higher Salary 
Commission increases to Tribunal member remuneration.132 This was followed by an 
increase of $1.77m to increase the capacity of the Tribunal in the 1999 budget 
round.133	  	  
Administration 
Conspicuous by its absence from the data archived by the Department are the files of 
Tribunal administrators.  There is, consequently, little information about 
administrative responses to the problems of delay.  In the detailed counting of 
applications, waiting times, disposition rates and the explanations for them, this 
absence is of interest.  Of the information that is available about the Department’s 
administrative practices, a passive approach to the problem of delay is apparent.  
Since organisational culture (the extent to which court administrators are prepared to 
take the lead in organising court business) has been identified as the key determinant 
of performance (in terms of delay, convenience to parties and use of court resources) 
evidence of administrative passivity is likely to suggest poor performance.134  Apart 
from an early recognition that applicants had to be incentivised to choose mediation 
as a resolution option there is no evidence of any other changes to administration to 
increase disposition rates.    
There is, however, evidence of the means by which the backlog data could be 
differently categorised to reduce the numbers apparently awaiting hearing.  This 
involved the use of a float of applications capable of being set down for the following 
2 months.  Since mediations took only half a day on average but adjudications 3-4 
days, more potential mediations and fewer adjudications increased the float, which, as 
the result of its exclusion from the waiting list, reduced the numbers awaiting hearing.  
However this was something of an illusion because there were no guarantees that the 
applications in the float would be dealt with in the float period. It was also clear, at 
the time this idea was mooted, that disposing of mediations at the expense of 
adjudications was already the practice in the Auckland registry and that the result was 
a ballooning backlog of cases awaiting adjudication.135  
The suggestions of efficiencies that accompanied this analysis of the backlog in late 
1993 were furthermore more dependent on the membership of the Tribunal than its 
administration.  Recommendations included the intensive use of mediator only 
members to work on switching adjudications to mediations, dual warranting (new 
appointees with mediation and arbitration skills), transferring lengthy adjudications to 
the Employment Court, reductions of circuiting, restricting the Wellington 
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  Minister of Labour to NZ Law Society, letter, 16 March 1999.  
132 Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, letter, 1998 Budget – Proposals for additional 
resourcing to maintain current IRS operation, 19 December 1997; memo, 26 January 1998; Aide 
Memoir: 1998 Budget – Vote Labour Industrial Relations Proposals (undated); Minister of Labour to 
NZ Employers Federation Conference, Speech Notes, 12 May 1998; Department of Labour to Minister 
for Enterprise and Commerce, Memorandum, Employment Tribunal Waiting Times, 4 May 1999.  
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  Cabinet minute, (12 April 1999) CAB(99) M 10/5(27).	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  C Whittaker, A Mackie, R Lewis and N Ponikiewski, Home Office Research Study 168, Managing 
courts effectively:  The reasons for adjournments in magistrates’ courts, (Home Office, London, 1997) 
135	  Department of Labour, Internal Memo, Backlog, 20 October 1993. 	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membership from deferring adjudications at setting down times, using the reserve 
bench for adjudications characterised by high fallout and/or very short hearing times 
and/or considering the value of a modified call-over system. 136   This last 
recommendation, along with a warning that withdrawal rates of 40% for adjudications 
could not be ignored were the only signs that there was any role for administrators in 
the problem of delay. 
It is clear from this list that the adjudicative function was perceived to be the major 
reason for the backlog.  This was the function that the Department opposed having to 
administer at entry-level. It could be argued, therefore, that its passivity of approach 
to administration was a function of the need to demonstrate to the Executive the 
problem of the option chosen for the employment institutions.  
The Department also lacked experience of this function at entry level.  The Labour 
Court had a smaller first instance jurisdiction than the Tribunal, significantly fewer 
claims, a small, highly specialised bar, high withdrawal rates, and, as noted above, no 
experience of the phenomenon of adversarialised or litigation dependent modes of 
resolution.  
Asked in 1999 why average waiting times at the Tribunal continued to increase, the 
Department identified three reasons: the lag between identification of demand or 
capacity gaps and increased funding; the variation in the regions of waiting times 
(which affected the averages for a region as a whole) as the result of the circuit 
system; availability of representation (paucity of short-notice availability as the result 
of withdrawals close to hearing dates).137  This question was posed when application 
numbers had fallen for over a year, the Tribunal had a complement of 29 members, 
and self and mediated settlement rates were relatively high.     
Another hint of what lay behind this passivity of administrative approach comes from 
an incident that occurred when budget constraints were particularly tight in late 1997. 
The Tribunal’s manager announced a freeze on circuit adjudications as a temporary 
means of enabling it to operate within budget until the beginning of the new financial 
year, only to be confronted by the fact that he lacked the power to make that decision: 
the choice of when and where the Tribunal’s dispute resolution services would be 
delivered was statutorily reserved for the Tribunal membership.138 The announcement 
provoked complaints from provincial MPs, law firms, the NZ Law Society and the 
Employers Federation, and an internal legal opinion confirming that the manager 
lacked the power he sought to exercise.139  The freeze had to be substituted for a 
limited suspension of circuit work in favour of main centre work.140   
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  Department of Labour to Minister for Enterprise and Commerce, Memorandum, Employment 
Tribunal Waiting Times, 4 May 1999.	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  Employment Contracts Act, s 88(4).	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  The announcement on 22 December 1997 was followed by letters to Minister of Labour from MPs 
for Marlborough (24.12.97), Nelson (19.12.97), Palmerston North (23.12.97), law firm in Richmond 
(7.1.98), the Employment Law Centre in Napier (7.1.98), NZ Employers Federation (16.1.98) and the 
NZ Law Society (28.1.98) complaining about this decision.  The same response was provided to 
complainants blaming the HSC Determination and promising that individual requests for hearings in 
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  CEO Institutions to Employment Tribunal members and staff, Memo, 22 December 1997, advising 
that adjudication hearings would be limited to the main centres from 1 April 1998; Chief Adjudicator 
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The recasting of the entry-level resolution functions of the labour jurisdiction into a 
Tribunal meant that the membership was appointed by warrant from the Governor-
General.  This had implications for administration at that time because warrants 
conferred a different status on the membership than mere employment.  Members 
answered to the Chief Adjudicator, not Department officials.  More importantly, 
disposition of the matters before them was solely their preserve.  The Department had 
no powers to assess and improve the individual performance of members, nor to 
replace them during the term of the warrant.  So whilst its administrative staff could 
receive and process applications, and schedule hearings, they had no powers over 
rates of disposition once a hearing had commenced.   
This was not much of a problem for mediated applications because they rarely 
required further input from the mediating member once concluded: the usual practice 
was to set out terms of settlement at the conclusion of a successful mediation thus 
ensuring no difference in the time required of a mediator between resolved and 
unresolved matters.  
It was, however, a problem for the adjudicative function.  Competence and confidence 
of decision maker affects the time a hearing takes and the time in which decisions are 
issued.  The former was clearly less of a problem than the latter given that 75% of 
hearings took a day or less.  Since disposition rates were affected by delays in issuing 
decisions and those delays increased over the decade, overall output rates were 
affected.  The Department had no power to intervene, except in its scheduling 
decisions, with the result that there were few incentives on the membership to 
complete matters.  This helps to explain the tripling of the backlog over five years 
noted above.141 
Status and power relationships thus appear to have influenced Tribunal operations, 
particularly in respect of the adjudicative function and in the search for reasons why 
the problems of delay were not perceived to be the responsibility of Tribunal 
administrators. 
Allied to this issue were the contradictions inherent in the statutory scheme for the 
Tribunal and the sources of its funding.  The problem of providing for a low level, 
informal and speedy institution with an arbitrative function, was compounded, for its 
administration, by the incorporation of superior court shibboleths about judicial 
independence into legislation.  As the narrative above illustrates, court systems are 
susceptible to the tensions between funding decisions made by the Government of the 
day, user expectations and judicial views of independence.  They are particularly 
vulnerable if the latter have the imprimatur of statute.  The transformation of a 
constitutional convention to ensure the impartiality of judicial decision making into a 
power to decide when and where Tribunal hearings could be held (usually the 
preserve of administrators) all but guaranteed that, in the face of funding constraints, 
effective administration of the Tribunal was undermined.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Employment Tribunal to CEO Institutions, letter, 22 December 1997; CEO Institutions to Chief 
Employment Tribunal, letter, 23 December 1997; Industrial Relations Service to Department of Labour 
Legal Section, letter, 13 January 1998; Legal Section, Department of Labour, Legal Opinion, 16 
January 1998, noting that the directive concerning provincial hearings was of no legal effect because of 
the discretion in s 88(4) ECA; CEO Institutions to Employment Tribunal members and staff, Memo, 28 
January 1998, changing directive in memo of 22 December 1997 to suspension of circuit work. 
141	  From the equivalent of 4.5 months of decisions in 1993 to 15 months of decisions in 1998.	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Policy Responses 
The early period of the ECA regime is notable for complaints about the Tribunal and 
the absence of any Cabinet interest in policy responses to those complaints.  This 
created a policy gap that was quickly filled by the Parliamentary opposition, 
particularly in the 1993 election year with the select committee inquiry.  It produced 
two reports, reflecting majority (Government) and minority (Opposition) positions.  
The majority report made a number of recommendations, including a review of the 
Tribunal Regulations, but no review occurred and none of its recommendations were 
implemented, except for the appointment of more Tribunal members.142 
The major focus of Departmental effort, incentivising greater use of the Tribunal’s 
mediation function, saw it resort, mid way through the decade, to its judicial officers 
for ideas about how this could be achieved.  Its discussions with the Chief Judge of 
the Employment Court143 and the Chief Adjudicator of the Tribunal144 resulted in 
their agreement that the Tribunal was ill equipped for its adjudication role, litigation 
was an inefficient use of its resources, and the low-level and informal aims for its 
operation were incompatible with its statutory and practical functions and its 
personnel: 
Contributors to legalism are statutory function, de facto Labour Court function, role of lawyers 
(and their advocacy of legal arguments and defences) the need and requirement from the 
Employment Court to provide reasoning for their decisions so appeals can be determined and the 
increased body of employment law since 1991.145 
Also discussed was the place of Calderbank letters in promoting out of court 
settlements, increasing costs charged by the Tribunal, adjournment of hearings for a 
mediator to take over, and the need for legislative change to enable the Tribunal to 
impose mediation on parties at the outset.146 
These views were replicated a year later in response to the Department’s invitation to 
Tribunal members to comment on the industrial relations policies contained in the 
Coalition Agreement of 11 December 1996 (codification of personal grievances; 
minimisation of judicial activism; addressing delays at the Tribunal).  The 
contribution of one member, memorable for the vernacular in which it is expressed, 
neatly, if robustly, represents the views of those with long experience of the 
jurisdiction: 
The adjudication system is long-winded, excessively pedantic and above all horrendously 
expensive.  The system cannot be ‘speedy and informal’ with the current legislation and 
regulations in place.  The objects clause of part IV of the Act is in conflict with the provisions of 
ss 92(2) and 96…These clearly define adjudication proceedings as ‘judicial proceedings’.  In the 
real world judicial proceedings are not, and cannot be, ‘speedy and informal’.  Someone has to 
decide whether they want judicial or they want speedy and informal – you cannot have both.  
Having worked under the Industrial Relations Act…the Labour Relations Act and the 
Employment Contracts Act my view is that the mediation-arbitration provisions of the LRA were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Department of Labour, note 118.	  
143	  Department of Labour, record of discussion with Chief Judge Employment Court, 14 December 
1995.	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the most efficient and workable.  They did not have the theoretical purity of the current 
mediation-arbitration split but in practise worked well.  Basically the system has become 
ridiculously expensive.  We can’t take the crap out of the lawyers but the crap could be taken out 
of the system.  The current regime simply won’t allow speedy and informal and you can’t have 
proceedings at a reasonable cost unless they are speedy and informal so we either cop what 
we’ve got or change the system.  Tinkering around the edge won’t do it if you want ‘speedy and 
informal’. You need to completely revisit both the Regulations and those parts of the Act that 
have turned adjudication into judicial proceedings.  It’s been good for tribunal members salary 
claims and the legal profession and bad for everyone else and needs to be sorted out to do the job 
that I think was originally intended by Parliament.  That is, to give people access to low level 
mediation and arbitration in employment matters.147 
 
By contrast the Law Society response to this invitation criticised the use of non 
legally qualified Tribunal members as adjudicators, the failure of the precedent 
function of the employment institutions to provide sufficient certainty for 
representatives, the absence of appeal rights on facts for wrongful dismissal claims 
(able only to be commenced in the Employment Court), overlapping High and 
Employment Court jurisdictions, incentives for unjustifiable dismissal claims as the 
result of the 26 week stand down from entitlement to welfare benefits and 
contingency fee advocates, and delays at the Tribunal.  It sought improved speed of 
Tribunal processes, better case management and training for Tribunal members in 
mediation and adjudication skills, the appointment of more members and Judges, the 
use of teleconferencing for mediations, direct rights of access to the Employment 
Court, wider appeal rights to the Court of Appeal.148 
This marked the beginning of Ministerial interest in policy issues associated with 
delay.  It also coincided with a Cabinet desire to limit the influence of the 
Employment Court.149  By then applications requiring adjudication by the Tribunal 
were waiting 8-9 months. Delay of this type was attributed to the transformation of 
what was intended to be low-level informal dispute resolution in the Tribunal to an 
increasingly legalistic approach to adjudication.150 This was said to result from 
process requirements imposed by the Employment Court in the exercise of its 
supervisory or review function, and the use of legal representation that had 
“introduced a level of formality and a more adversarial approach to claims.”151 
These conclusions were derived from an external legal opinion152 that questioned the 
Court’s practice of its powers of supervision.153  Court judgments that contained lists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Maurice Teen to Department of Labour, letter, 30 October 1997.  
148	  NZ Law Society Employment Law Committee to Minister of Labour, Submission, Summary Points 
on Review of Employment Legislation, 1 December 1997. 
149	  A full description of this interest in the Employment Court is contained in chapter 4, following. 
150	  Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 76.	  
151	  Department of Labour for Cabinet Committee on Strategy and Priorities,  Issues Paper on Personal 
Grievance (undated but in response to a Cabinet request of 22 September 1997 and issued prior to 12 
November 1997)	  at	  [54] p 12.	  
152	  The opinion, from Peter Chemis of Buddle Findlay consisted of three reports that were delivered to 
the Department on 6 June 1997: The Nature, Limits and Effects of the Supervisory relationship between 
the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal; Appeals from the Employment Tribunal to the 
Employment Court; Appeals from the Employment Court to the Court of Appeal. They were 
commissioned following the Coalition Agreement, 1996, between the National and New Zealand First 
Parties described in chapter 4 following.  
153	  Peter Chemis for Department of Labour, Report: The Nature, Limits and Effects of the Supervisory 
Relationship between the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal, 6 June 1997; Department 
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of questions the Tribunal should ask in respect of particular issues were cited as 
influencing the Tribunal to apply a rules-based (over a principles based) approach to 
adjudication.154  This was said to sacrifice speed and informality for consistency.155 
The Court’s wide variety of directions to the Tribunal included specific issues and 
findings of fact necessary to resolve a matter, the powers it could and should use, 
priorities it should accord to particular cases, the principles it should rely on and the 
documents it required to determine a matter.156 
A major reason for the range and depth of these interventions was attributed to the 
absence of any express limits on the Court’s supervisory function (despite the 
apparent constraints in ss 88 and 140 ECA of the Tribunal’s power to regulate its own 
procedure and its jurisdiction to hear disputes at first instance). This highlighted a 
clear conflict in the Act’s objects (as expressed in s 76) because the supervisory role 
(as interpreted by the Court) operated to inhibit the low-level informal approach 
mandated for the Tribunal:  
This last factor does not always operate as a limit on the Court’s supervisory role.  Sometimes 
the Tribunal’s low-level status has been used by the Court to justify intervention.157 
Internally, the Department noted that although the Tribunal had the power to regulate 
its own procedure, and was not bound to follow the Court’s directions, it had never 
adopted an independent course.  It regarded the Court’s requirement that the Tribunal 
fully state its reasons for decision as most likely to be responsible for increases to its 
workload.158 
These conclusions featured in a later policy paper about industrial relations reforms 
prepared in May 1998 – shortly after Cabinet had approved (in principle) a transfer of 
the Employment Court to the District Court – in a discussion about the Court’s 
appellate and supervisory roles.159  Of the appellate role, the paper asserted the need 
to balance the low-level informal nature of the Tribunal’s role against the need for 
consistency and justice.  Maintenance of this balance required that the appeal 
structure be restricted to some extent, particularly appeals on factual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Labour, The Supervisory Role of the Employment Court over the Employment Tribunal (undated, c 
early 1998). 
154	  Trotter v Telecom [1993] 2 ERNZ 659, Cunningham v TNT [1992] 1 ERNZ 956, United F&CWU v 
Talley [1992] IERNZ, Roche v Urgent Medical Services [1995] 2 ERNZ 159, PSA v Electricity Corp 
[1991] 2 ERNZ. Other decisions cited to illustrate the use of other supervisory functions were: Smith v 
Armourguard [1993] 1 ERNZ, Cruikshank v Alliance [1992] 3 ERNZ, Du Pont Peroxide Ltd v 
Verboeket [1993] 1 ERNZ 124, McHale v Open Polytechnic [1993] 1 ERNZ, Labour Inspector v Cook 
[1994] 2 ERNZ 473, Davidson v Telecom Central [1993] 2 ERNZ 819, Anderson v Employment 
Tribunal [1992] 1 ERNZ 500, Lewis v Davis Trading Co [1992] 1 ERNZ 421, McClutchie v Land 
Corp [1993] 1 ERNZ 388, Reid v Fire Services Commission [1996] 1 ERNZ 228 (no jurisdiction to 
order security for costs) cf NZ Baking Trades IUW v Foodtown [1992] 3 ERNZ 305. 	  
155	  Peter Chemis, note 153.	  
156	  Ibid.	  
157	  Ibid, at [7] p 6. 
158	  Department of Labour, note 153.	  
159 Department of Labour, Policy Paper, Industrial Relations Reforms: Outstanding Issues, 11 May 
1998	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determinations.160 To that end it noted a Cabinet direction to develop options for more 
informal adjudication and appeals. 161 
None of these options for change appear to have been the subject of analysis by the 
Department.  Cabinet’s intention to subsume the Employment Court in the District 
Court did not survive consultation with the judiciary.  
Conclusions 
Conclusions about this quality of process material are classified in terms of their 
significance to the policy debates described in the previous chapter. 
Statutory (over common law) basis of the principles for claim resolution 
The absence of statutory guidance about resolution of dismissal grievances,162 the 
claim that dominated the employment jurisdiction after 1991, and the disappearance 
of stakeholder involvement in their consideration shifted their focus away from the 
workplace into the courtroom.  This meant that whilst the right to claim a grievance 
was based in statute the resolution of such claims became more obviously rooted in 
the common law than prior to the ECA.  This was a function of individual claiming 
unmediated by context that resulted from the transfer of responsibility for claiming 
from collective to individual interests.   
The result was an unsequenced or haphazard judicial development of the principles 
associated with justification for dismissal, a phenomenon associated with the 
development of social policy by the courts rather than the legislature.163 Because this 
process demanded an exclusive focus on the circumstances of the individuals engaged 
by the grievance it invited further (similar but apparently different) claims and more 
refinement, but was the means by which practices that affected collective interests 
could be ignored, thus establishing judicial consideration of the principles of 
justification as an element in the shift from collectivist to individualist approaches to 
labour disputes.  
This policy debate can thus be characterised as a struggle over differing forms of what 
is described as juridification, the means by which state intervention is regarded as 
necessary for limiting and controlling social conflict in the labour jurisdiction.  The 
classic way of achieving this was via legislative and administrative regulation of the 
parties to collective employment arrangements.  This was the position adopted by 
Labour, Justice and SSC policy advisers, the proponents of a quality of process 
approach to the jurisdiction. 164 
The advocates of deregulation advanced the argument that is regarded as the 
fundamental, but flawed critique of this theory: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Ibid.	  
161	  Ibid.	  	  
162	  The Employment Contracts Act 1991, Part III Personal Grievances (ss 26-42) defines unjustifiable 
dismissal as one of 5 types of personal grievance in s 27(1)(a) but is thereafter silent about the basis for 
such a claim.  By contrast grievances based on discrimination (s 28), sexual harassment (ss 29, 35, 36) 
and duress (s 30) attract detailed statutory grounds for claims. 
163	  Donald Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1977).  	  
164	  Chapter 2:  Official’s positions: the Interdepartmental Working Party, p 25 
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Simitis argues that this is not simply a demand for a return to the ‘pre-interventionist’ period, 
simply that the role, the responsibility, and the priorities of the state should change.  Rather than 
give priority in state policy to individual employment protection, the overall objective of the 
state should be to give priority to the revitalisation of the market economy and to divest 
employers of responsibilities which may prevent them from responding effectively to changes in 
market forces.165 
The method of steering the changes sought by this lobby was via the courts, not by 
legislation.  It believed that traditional court (arbitrative) processes were more likely 
to advance its particular interests but the evidence of Tribunal functioning suggests 
that the outcome sought by this lobby was available regardless of court forum.    
Specialist jurisdiction (over reliance on civil courts) 
Radical lobby fears that a specialist jurisdiction would obstruct the outcome it sought, 
return to employment-at-will, appeared to be vindicated by the influx of non-union 
white-collar grievants at the Tribunal when it was first established.166 This class of 
grievant, regarded as a dominant influence on the grievance jurisdiction,167 had the 
financial resources to pursue appeals to the Employment Court, whose approach to 
the procedure of dismissal (“third-party interference in employment relations”) 
became a consistent source of complaint from the radical lobby throughout the term 
of the ECA.168   
However this grievant class was associated with reliance on lawyers and 
adjudication 169  and thus locked into the outcome of exchanging jobs for 
compensation,170 thereby establishing a norm capable of application to other classes 
of grievant, a phenomenon described as “courts must act when litigants call.”171  
Notwithstanding the radical lobby’s view that dismissal compensation amounted to a 
tax on employment,172 the outcome that resulted from exchanging jobs for money 
(over reinstatement) was sufficiently close to employment-at-will to ensure that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Jon Clark The Juridification of Industrial Relations: A Review Article, (1985) 14(1) Industrial Law 
Journal, 69 at 76	  
166 The Report of the Labour Committee on the Inquiry into the effects of the Employment Contracts 
Act on the NZ Labour market, September 1993:	   	  Submissions from Tribunal members and the Council 
of Trade Unions complained about the dominance of middle management employees in the grievance 
jurisdiction, their insistence on adjudication and their use of lawyers. 
167	  Ibid.	  
168 Colin Howard, Monograph, Interpretation of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, (NZ Business 
Roundtable and NZ Employers Federation, Wellington, 1996); Hon Max Bradford, paper, What 
Happens Now? Labour-Management Government Relations Seminar, Industrial Relations Centre, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 20 March 1997. 
169	  The Report of the Labour Committee, note 166.	  
170	  This exchange essentially altered pre-1991 goals of grievance resolution, the retention of the job 
from which a grievant was dismissed. 
171	  Horowitz, note 163, at 38: This phrase refers to the absence of control or organisation over social 
policy issues that arise in the courts when individuals litigate.  The ensuing decisions have precedent 
value for litigants who follow.  The result is the unsequenced or haphazard development of policy 
matters (like justification for dismissal) arising, not from the worst or most extreme examples of the 
behaviour at issue, but from litigants with the inclination and resources to litigate and the ability to 
provide a more favourable (to them), but incomplete view of the practices of which they complain.	  
172	  Charles W Baird, The Employment Contracts Act and Unjustifiable Dismissal:  The Economics of 
an Unjust Employment Law, (NZ Business Roundtable and NZ Employers Federation, Wellington, 
1996).	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universal and mandatory nature of the just cause requirement of dismissal 
remained.173 
This suggests that specialisation of jurisdiction failed to undermine this policy goal as 
the radical lobby feared.174  Nor did it disrupt the goal of the moderates for an orderly 
transition from collectivist to individualist approaches to labour disputes.  
Policy officials sought retention of the specialist jurisdiction to facilitate quality of 
dispute resolution process.  The potential for the adjudicative mode of resolution to 
undermine that goal was mitigated by retention of the mediative mode that became 
the means by which rising but unpredictable claim numbers could be accommodated 
and (eventually) processed.  Thus an incident of the specialist jurisdiction was 
availability of the administrative resource and co-ordination required for this response 
to the problem.  This connects the moderates’ quality of outcome need for an orderly 
transition to the officials’ desire for quality of dispute resolution process, suggesting 
that an incident of the specialty of jurisdiction facilitated a quality of outcome goal.  
Representation (individualist vs collectivist) 
Extension of representation rights, whereby collective advocates were replaced by 
lawyers as the dominant representative type, led to a heavy bias towards adjudication 
as the choice of mode of resolution, a surging but haphazard application rate, the 
predominance of dismissal grievances, problems of administration, and increasing 
amounts of Tribunal member time and effort required for proportionally fewer 
adjudicated outcomes.  
The influx of lawyers also transformed the point at which institutional intervention in 
this jurisdiction occurred.  For collective advocates it was available when discussion 
and negotiation failed to produce a settlement but for lawyers it was the means by 
which negotiations began. Thus institutional intervention became the first rather than 
the last step in the resolution process.  
Lawyers were, however, available to all-comers, took their fees from remedies, were 
associated with the vindication of individual rights and redress, won (and publicised) 
lottery-like compensation awards, and so ensured that rights of grievance were 
perceived to be superior to or an adequate substitute for membership of unions and 
employer associations.175 
The result, higher proportions of employees who could be dismissed, effectively at 
will so long as there remained the promise of money as the means of exchange, was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  Despite a provision of the Coalition Agreement 1996 (between the National and New Zealand First 
parties) to codify the personal grievance jurisdiction no legislative change resulted. 
174	  Roger	   Kerr’s description of a major weakness of the ECA as a failure to “give the task of 
administering a regime based on contract law to the general courts” in a 2005 review of the lessons of 
labour market reform in NZ was unmatched by any analysis of how this affected the results, the first 
noted as “the virtual disappearance of multi-employer contracts…in a freer environment [where] most 
employers want to deal directly with their own workforces and vice versa”:  Roger Kerr, paper,  
Lessons from Labour Market Reform in New Zealand, H R Nicholls Society’s XXVI Conference 
Melbourne, 18 March 2005, at 9.	  	  
175	  Kagan, note 57, argues that the basic causes of adversarial legalism – popular demands for fair 
treatment, recompense, and protection combined with mistrust of government and fragmentation of 
political and economic power – remain unchanged and unchangeable in the United States. 
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crucial to widespread employee acceptance of this particular bargain. That lawyers 
remained the dominant representative type was thus an important contributor to 
realisation of the quality of outcome goal, increased flexibility of the labour market.  
Separate modes of resolution 
This policy debate, about whether assisted negotiation or the provision of evidence 
according to the demands of legal method should precede first-instance adjudication, 
also concerned fundamental differences about the significance of time and place in 
conflict resolution. The need to resolve grievances quickly, preferably in the 
workplace and if not by use of whatever strategies were necessary, formed the basis 
of collectivist views of institutional structure. For the disciples of legal method speed 
of resolution was less important than the pursuit of justice in specifically designated 
institutions.  
The representation of these two perspectives in the Tribunal membership176 as well as 
in representatives had consequences for concepts of control/ownership and time in 
claim processing. 
Separation of resolution function177 meant that Tribunal members and representatives 
more familiar with arbitration as a contest largely of process assumed ownership or 
control of that function, whilst those more familiar with mediation controlled the use 
of that function.  The lack of familiarity of legal representatives in the 1990s with 
state provided mediation services ensured that Tribunal members had greater powers 
of control over that function than the adjudication function.  The passivity required of 
adjudicators by legal method was the means by which control of that function could 
be asserted by the lawyers. 178   This explains both the perspective and the descriptions 
of Tribunal functioning by the members cited above.  
The effects of these differences of ownership of function can be measured in terms of 
time.  The effect on adjudication was to lengthen the time and increase the detail 
(more claiming, more ancillary decision making) required to achieve finality. By 
contrast mediations retained their form and function: they routinely took half a day 
over the whole of the ECA regime.  
Ownership and control of resolution function may also account for low apparent use 
of the power to arbitrate in mediation.179  Although the Employment Court was 
responsible for suspending its use, restoration of the power made little difference, a 
consequence attributed to mediation success rates that mediators were unwilling to 
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  The initial complement of 14 was made up of 5 lawyers and 9 mediators from the Labour Relations 
Act 1987 Mediation Service. 
177	  Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 78(3).	  
178 Susan Corby and Paul Latrielle, Employment Tribunals and the Civil Courts: Isomorphism 
Exemplified (2012) 41(4) Industrial Law Journal, 387, ascribe the adoption of civil-court values and 
tropes by newly established employment tribunals to the mimetic pressures of common legal training, 
legal apprenticeship and role socialisation, and government resource control pressures. 
179	  Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 88(2):  the use of this function was not separately counted by 
the Department of Labour until 1997/8.  Its availability and use in the early part of the decade was the 
subject of anecdote and recall but not statistics presumably because it was exercised within mediation 
and the outcome contained in terms of settlement that signified resolution by mediation.  No appeal 
was available where parties agreed to a mediator decision because all terms of settlement were final 
and binding on the parties.	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compromise by offering powers of decision.180 Membership output rates, mediator 
wariness of lawyer representatives, the requirement to obtain consent for the exercise 
of the power, suggest that retention of purity of mode of resolution became a 
preferred option because it required less effort. 
Maintaining purity of mode had time and costs implications if it resulted in double 
use of the Tribunal: at least four and a half days of member time and a seven-fold 
increase in cost (from $415 to $2865) on a single application.  The price for the state 
was $2450 per double-use resolution, but significantly higher for litigants. 181 
Substantial savings were available from the institutionalisation of med-arb: 3,437 
projected single use claims were costed at $2.39 million and 619 double use claims at 
$2.36 million, but only if it operated as described by the mediators that pined for its 
return i.e. as it had done before the ECA, within the times prescribed for mediation, 
and in the absence of the requirements of process imposed on the Tribunal’s 
adjudicative function. 
The implications for time of resolution of maintaining the purity of the mediation 
function arise from its use as triage by administrators, as the basis for resolution by 
collective advocates and as a preliminary process of adjudication for individual 
representatives. Effective pre-claim litigation risk analysis in the labour jurisdiction 
(on which administrators had previously relied for management, budgeting and 
planning purposes) atrophied with the transfer of representative function from 
collective advocates to lawyers and self-employed advocates.  For those represented 
by the latter groups mediation became the first occasion on which their positions on 
the grievance were subject to the litigation risk analyses conducted by collective 
advocates before claims were made.  The mediation function that was utilised by 
collective representatives to achieve finality performed a different function for their 
lawyer colleagues.   
It was the Department’s recognition of this effect that drove its decision to persuade 
those choosing adjudication to first attempt mediation.  By promoting mediation as 
earlier available and settlement as more desirable for litigants it was able to 
significantly reduce the proportions of those awaiting an adjudication function over 
which it had much less influence or control.  Greater reliance on mediation arising 
from the consistency of time required for this function promised efficiencies in 
management, budgeting and planning.  The time required to achieve finality in each 
adjudication was incapable of accurate prediction.  Whilst it was possible to assume 
approximate hearing times it was not possible to make similar assumptions about 
scheduling hearings, withdrawals, interlocutory and costs applications, and decision 
writing times.  The uncertainties that arose from these incidents of the adjudicative 
function dominated the problem of time management for the Department, such that it 
never overcame them.  Its success in reducing the proportions of applications that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  Ian McAndrew, Adjudication outcomes in the Employment Tribunal: Some early comparisons with 
the Employment Relations Authority (2001) 26(3) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, cf 
Gardiner, note 21, who lamented the attrition of the med/arb power, attributing it to policy 
considerations concerning institutions and appeal mechanisms. at 350.	  
181 	  McAndrew, note 180, notes that costs orders of $5,000 were typical following one day 
adjudications and that this affected settlements at mediation by the need to incorporate representative 
costs in monetary settlements.  Given that costs awards rarely reflect the level of costs incurred and that 
over 90% of compensation awards were below $12,000, litigants who underwent unsuccessful 
mediation were thus liable to incur costs of representation that exceeded any compensation awarded. 	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required adjudication never translated into the efficiencies of administration (reducing 
delays) that it anticipated with each increase of resource. 
This suggests that the policy requirement for low level, informal and speedy dispute 
resolution institutions is significantly dependent on certainty of time requirements of 
the resolution functions selected.   
It can therefore be argued that separate resolution modes, key to the imposition of 
legal method on grievance disposition, formed the basis of a slower, more formalised, 
legalistic and expensive resolution culture as the result of the demands of the 
arbitrative function, notwithstanding that mediation resolved significantly more 
claims. 
Mediation’s value to the Tribunal was primarily ameliorative.  It was the means by 
which claim processing efficiencies could be achieved and it became a forum for 
litigation risk analysis, settlement operating as an incident of risk analysis, not the 
reason for its use.  Mediation was thus essential to adjudication for the way it 
facilitated the survival of the arbitrative function.  Adjudication had the opposite 
effect on mediation by obstructing early access and limiting (via reliance on 
adjudication’s remedies) the range of potential resolution options.  
These conclusions suggest that the requirement for mediative and arbitrative modes of 
resolution to be offered separately was incompatible with the statutory objective for 
the Tribunal of informality, low level, speed, justice and fairness.182 Since separation 
of function is a requirement of the pursuit of justice value that underpins legal method 
and informality, low-level and speed are values associated with collectivist 
approaches to dispute resolution these conclusions highlight the difficulty of 
incorporating both value sets in one institution.  
 
 
Quality of Outcome 
The dominant policy rationale for the ECA, increased labour market flexibility via 
institutionalisation of enterprise bargaining (preferably between employer and 
individual employee), had a number of dimensions.  
[W]age flexibility meant speeding up adjustments to changes in demand, particularly 
downwards; employment flexibility meant easy and costless ability of firms to change 
employment levels, particularly downwards, implying a reduction in employment security and 
protection; job flexibility meant being able to move employees round inside the firm and to 
change job structures with minimal opposition or cost; skill flexibility meant being able to adjust 
workers’ skills easily.183 
These are the effects of what Brian Easton describes as short-term flexibility, to 
which he adds its capacity to undermine long-term flexibility (how a labour force 
increases its skills and ability to perform a multitude of tasks) and to erect barriers to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 76(c). 
183	  Guy Standing, The Precariat, The New Dangerous Class, (Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2011) 
at 6.	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the development of loyalty to the employer and worker acquisition of specific 
skills.184 
By the mid 1990s there was sufficient evidence of decentralised collective bargaining, 
increased use of individual employment contracts, wide variations in wage 
settlements (with some groups – low income, female, private sector - experiencing 
substantial decreases in basic rates185 and others – Standings’ salariat and proficians 
and Boxall’s managers186 - large increases) to establish wage flexibility as a major 
outcome of the ECA. This came at the expense of traditional relativities and notions 
of comparative wage justice.187   
Also apparent were changes to conditions of work that extended ordinary hours 
(beyond eight per day and forty per week) and days of work before penalty rates 
applied (if they applied at all – over a third of employees had no penalty rate 
provision by 1995).188 
Flexibility of employment levels (the ability of employers to vary employee numbers)  
also increased: 
This is suggested by the rapid recorded increases in the level of part-time, casual and temporary 
forms of employment, as well as in the growing incidence of self-employment since the 
legislation reviewed have been put in place. It is also indicated in the increased ability of 
employers to vary the amount of labour used through changes in the number of hours worked 
and the range of tasks employees are expected to perform. There has also been a substantial 
reduction in constraints placed on the establishment of work contracts and on the ability of 
managers to dismiss employees.189 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  Brian Easton, The Economic Impact of the Employment Contracts Act (1997) 28(1) California 
Western International Law Journal, 209: “the primary gains to employers from the Employment 
Contracts Act have been lower pay and greater freedom to manage, not higher output per worker” at 
215.	  
185	  Raymond Harbridge, Bargaining and the Employment Contracts Act: An Overview; Janet Sayers 
Women, the Employment Contracts Act, and labour flexibility both in Harbridge (ed) Employment 
Contracts: New Zealand Experiences, (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1993) 31, 210. 
186	  Standing, note 183, describes class relations in the global market system of the 21st century as 
consisting of 7 groups, the second and third of which in descending levels of income are: the salariat 
(still in full time employment, in large corporations and government agencies/public administration) 
most of whom have their pensions, paid holidays and benefits paid by the state; and proficians with 
highly marketable skills who earn high incomes on contract and move around willingly; Peter Boxall 
Management Strategy and the Employment Contracts Act 1991 in Harbridge (ed) Employment 
Contracts: New Zealand Experiences, (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1993) 231  argues that it 
was the management class that sought the changes enacted in the ECA. 
187	  Keith Abbott, Research Paper 4, Can Deregulation Save Australian Industrial Relations? A Review 
of British and New Zealand Policy Experience and its Implications for Australia, (Politics and 
Administration Group, Australian Federal Parliament 1995); Erling Rasmussen, John Deeks, Assessing 
the Impacts of the Employment Contracts Act, (1997) 28 (1) California Western International Law 
Journal, 275.	  
188	  S Teicher and S Svensen, The Nature and Consequences of Labour Market Deregulation in 
Australasia, Current Research in Industrial Relations, Proceedings of 11th AIRAANZ Conference, 
Brisbane, 30 January 1997. 
189	  K Hince and R Harbridge The Employment Contracts Act:  An Interim Assessment, (1994) 19(3) 
NZ Journal of Industrial Relations, 237.  
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These outcomes were the result of “the virtual disappearance of multi-employer 
contracts,”190 the rise of enterprise bargaining and the diminished importance of 
collective bargaining, rapid falls in union membership.  In September 1989 union 
density statistics (measured by comparing union membership with membership of the 
total workforce) showed that 44.7% of the working population belonged to a union 
(up from 43.5% in December 1985). In May 1991 union density was 41.5% of the 
total workforce, dropping to 35.4% seven months later. For the period 1992-96 it 
continued to slide from 28.8% at the rate of about 2 percentage points a year to 
19.1.191  The speed of this decline following the passage of the ECA suggests a causal 
relationship.192 
[T]he combination of growing fiscal constraints, uncertain economic growth, perpetually high 
inflation and unemployment rates, and changes in the structure and sources of employment since 
the early 1980s, have all contributed to the diminution of trade union power and membership. 
This development, in turn, is also widely acknowledged as having provided New Zealand 
employers with increasing scope to set bargaining agendas, control bargaining outcomes and 
determine at what level with the organisation negotiations with workers and their representative 
will take place.193   
This shift in the balance of power in the workplace between workers and management 
(conferring on the latter increased autonomy in setting terms and conditions of 
employment) and the reduction of union influence was attributed by commentators as 
resulting in a greater role for the Tribunal and the Court in matters concerning 
discipline and employment security, whilst simultaneously feeding the perception 
amongst the business community that these institutions prioritised the interests of 
employees.194 
This was not, however, the reality.  Analysis of grievances for the 4-year period prior 
to 1992 (under the LRA), in 1994 and 1998-9 revealed different outcomes for 
grievants under the LRA and the ECA.  The LRA (dismissal) grievances fell into 3 
groups: those resolved at first instance by a grievance committee in 1990 (159), all of 
which were found to be unjustifiable; those (151) decided by the committee chair in 
1990 (when consensus unforthcoming) found 57% of the dismissals unjustifiable; 
those heard by the Labour Court between 1987 and 1991 (287) had two different 
outcomes – for those heard between 1987-1990, 73% of the grievances were held to 
be unjustifiable reducing to 54% for those in 1991.195 
For those decided under the ECA there were reasonably consistent outcomes for 
employers and employees.  In 1994 54% of employers were ordered to remedy the 
problem raised by the grievance meaning 46% of grievants failed to obtain any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  Roger Kerr, note 174. 
191	  Crawford, Harbridge, Hince Unions and Union Membership in NZ; Annual Review for 1996, 
(1997) 22(1) NZ Journal of Industrial Relations, 2.  
192	  Jane Kelsey, Economic Fundamentalism, (Pluto Press, London, 1995) 
193	  Keith Abbott, note 187, New Zealand, at [1]; The result, two thirds of the workforce on informal or 
individual employment contracts, many of whom under standard-form, roll-over contracts on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis, used primarily by employers for cost-cutting, concession-bargaining and de-
unionisation; Sarah Oxenbridge, The Individualisation of Employment Relations in New Zealand: 
Trends and Outcomes in Deery & Mitchell (eds) Employment Relations Individualisation and Union 
Exclusion An International Study, (The Federation Press, Leichhardt, NSW, 1999). 
194	  Rasmussen and Deeks, note 187. 
195	  Bronwyn Boon, note 4. 	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remedy.196 The later analysis focused on outcomes rather than remedy but grievant 
success rates were fixed at 52%.  This mirrored the results from the Employment 
Relations Authority for a similar period.197   
These outcomes indicate that the common complaint of employer representatives that 
the ECA institutions had made it “impossible to dismiss employees”198 was truer of the 
LRA institutions.  The complaint,199 however, had a corollary.  It, along with media 
reports of large compensation payments (and the lower prominence accorded 
unsuccessful claims)200 suggested a dispute resolution system accessible to individual 
employees. 
Thus, if an orderly transition from collectivist to individualist bargaining was 
regarded as dependent on a dispute resolution system acceptable to individuals (who 
would otherwise be either collectivised with expectation of remedies or not, with no 
expectation of redress) then a quality of outcome policy goal could be posited as 
achieving acceptable outcomes for employers in greater flexibility of wage and 
conditions on offer whilst offering employees the reassurance of a responsive system 
of grievance redress. 
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  Ralph Gardiner, note 15.	  
197	  McAndrew, Morton, Geare, note 11.	  
198	  Erling Rasmussen and Felicity Lamm, Paper, From collectivism to individualism in New Zealand 
employment relations, AIRAANZ Conference, Auckland, October 2005. 
199 	  Roger Kerr, The New Zealand Employment Contracts Act: Its Enactment, Performance and 
Implications (1997) 28(1) California Western International Law Journal, 89, argued that changes to the 
Court, the law of personal grievances, including opting-out were necessary as redress. 
200	  Ibid. 
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Chapter 4 
Employment Contracts Act Institutions 
Operations and Policy: The Employment Court 
Introduction 
The last chapter argued that the policy goals for the Employment Tribunal as a low 
level, informal and speedy entry-level dispute resolution institution were frustrated by 
the inclusion of a separate arbitration function.  However it was this function that 
helped facilitate the quality of outcome goal sought by the moderate policy lobby – 
greater flexibility of the labour market via an orderly transition from collectivist to 
individualist approaches to employment disputes. 
The Tribunal’s arbitrative function was subject to the Employment Court’s (EC) 
powers of review.  Its exercise of those powers was seen to dominate the way that 
adjudication operated at the Tribunal, suggesting that the review function was 
incompatible with the low level, speedy and informal policy prescription for the 
Tribunal.  
Unlike the Tribunal, the EC functioned as a court of record (as had the Labour Court 
prior to the ECA).  Much of its jurisdiction was, however, affected by the ECA.  It 
retained first-instance powers over actions in equity and tort (mainly strikes and lock-
outs) and appellate powers over grievances but lost first-instance powers for a number 
of statutory actions (compliance, wages protection, holidays and minimum wage 
issues).1 
Whilst the major theme of the attention paid to the Tribunal concerned its processes 
and delay, that paid to the EC concerned its judgments.  The critics were also 
different.  The Tribunal attracted complaints from employees, unions and small-
medium employers but the EC’s critics were large employers. They were less 
interested in issues of process than in the implications of its decisions.  They believed 
the EC was actively undermining the employment-at-will policy outcome goal. 
This chapter begins with a short analysis of the ECs functioning in terms of the data 
about its processes.  The bulk of the chapter concerns the policy reaction to its 
approach to dismissal grievances.  It is categorised as a quality of outcome issue 
because the concern about compromising outcome goals was the theme of the relevant 
data. 
Quality of process   
The EC retained its Labour Court complement of 6 judges until November 1997 when 
numbers were reduced to 4, notwithstanding the reduction of work that resulted from 
the changes of jurisdiction in 1991.  However this had no impact on disposition rates.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 104. The power to hear and determine any action founded on an 
employment contract in s 104(1)(g) came to be used by those wishing to bypass the Tribunal’s 
exclusive first-instance jurisdiction over grievances by reliance on the common law action, wrongful 
dismissal.  First instance matters within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction could be removed to the Court by 
leave (s 104(1)(c)-(e)). 
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The Department began to note in 1992 that lowered application numbers had no effect 
on times to final outcome.2 
Applications awaiting hearing increased from 131 at the end of 1992 to 294 at the end 
of 1998, notwithstanding high withdrawal rates  (averaging 50%) and low annual 
application numbers (301 in 1992, peaking at 452 in 1995 and reverting to 303 in 
2000). Put another way, applications awaiting hearing at the end of 1992 constituted 
44% of the total application numbers for that year, rising to over 65% in 1997.  
Judgments delivered provide some guide to disposition rates, although interlocutory 
and costs applications mean that more than one judgment per proceeding may occur.  
The data reveals that 206 judgments were delivered in the 91/92 year or an average of 
34 per judge (3.4 per month), 170 in 92/93 (28 per judge), 163 (27) in 93/94, 228 (38) 
in 94/95, 181 (30) in 95/96, 216 in 96/97 (36), 209 (52) in 97/98 and 197 (49) in 
98/99. 
Over this period the EC never received more than 11% of the applications made to the 
Tribunal (the range was 6.3% – 11%), it had higher withdrawal rates and after mid 
1992 it never determined much more than a third of the decisions issued by the 
Tribunal (the range was 19% - 35%).  Given that decisions constituted a decreasing 
percentage of total Tribunal dispositions (26% in 92 reducing to 12% in 99) it 
becomes immediately apparent that there were significant differences in disposition 
rates between the two institutions.  This suggests that the EC was able to devote much 
more time to each proceeding than the Tribunal, notwithstanding differences between 
them in the way that evidence was gathered for those matters that they had in 
common:  appeals from Tribunal decisions (which accounted for between a third and 
a half of the EC workload).  The Tribunal heard the evidence in person and the EC 
worked off transcripts of this evidence.  Since it is much quicker to read than to hear 
evidence the time differences can only be accounted for in the submission and 
decision making process. 
The appreciably slower rate of disposition of an arguably light workload had fewer 
public consequences for the EC.  It did not attract the complaints of delay that the 
Tribunal did.  The Department, recording problems of delay (e.g 12-month waiting 
time for hearings in 1999) justified them in terms of dispositions (more than 
applications received for the two prior operating years), reduced personnel, type of 
work (there were a number of ‘long’ cases - up to 10 weeks hearing time) and judicial 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Monitoring the Employment Contracts Act – Quarterly 
Monitoring Reports as at 30 September 1992, Section 4 Institutional Monitoring, 13 October 1992.	  
3	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Report, Delays in the Employment Court, 18 February 
1999; cf, Judge T G Goddard, Curial Institutions under the Employment Contracts Act: 1991-1997 
(1997) 28(1) California Western International Law Journal, 103, who called for the replacement of two 
retired Judges as part of a warning about reduced judicial resource, the inevitability of delay and the 
effect on the civil jurisdiction of transferring “another four or five thousand cases a year” from the 
employment jurisdiction. 	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Quality of Outcome  
Complaints 
Recorded criticism of the EC focused on signs of partiality, reiterating the concerns of 
the Minister of Finance about the Labour Court noted in chapter 2. When the Chief 
Judge spoke at the swearing in of Tribunal members in 1991 his use of the phrase 
‘People’s Tribunal’ was misreported as ‘the People’s Court’ provoking a complaint 
to the Minister of Labour of a “clearly discernible anti-employer bias”:  
the Chief Judge views the Court as an instrument intended to favour ‘the worker’…[Can] NZ 
afford an institution, pivotal in the evolution of employment relationships, whose activities are so 
likely to be guided by anti-employer bias?4 
The business lobby that argued for the abolition of the specialist jurisdiction and the 
use of the High Court in place of the Labour Court in early 1991 renewed its calls for 
these reforms in late 1992, via complaints about the EC’s judicial activism and 
assertions of the need to limit grievance compensation for procedural unfairness and 
notice dismissals lacking reasons.5  The complaints couldn’t be taken seriously, in the 
Department’s view, in light of the problems of methodology that plagued the paper in 
which they were contained.6  However the paper’s criticism of long and wordy 
judgments was regarded as a valid point:   
it should be noted, however, that with the increasing use of legal representatives rather than lay 
advocates, proceedings of the Employment Court and Employment Tribunal are in general 
becoming more legalistic and involve legal arguments and precedents to a greater extent.7 
The administrative consequences of the EC’s exercise of its review function over 
the Tribunal was of more concern for the Department:  
the nature of the direction provided to the Tribunal by the Court is being monitored.  One area on 
which particular attention is being focussed in this monitoring is the requirements put on the 
Tribunal by the Court in relation to the range of matters that should be addressed in Tribunal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Alan Jones, Industrial Relations Manager, Fletcher Challenge to Minister of Labour, letter, 20 August 
1991.	  
5	  NZ Business Roundtable and NZ Employers Federation, Report on the Labour/Employment Court, 
An Analysis of the Labour/Employment Court’s approach to the interpretation and application of 
employment legislation, December 1992; cf Gordon Anderson, Interpreting the Employment Contracts 
Act: Are the Courts Undermining the Act? (1997) 28(1) California Western International Law Journal, 
117, who argued that the criticisms of the Court were not about legal issues so much as its failure to 
reflect the political and economic perspective of this lobby. Its criticism of the EC consideration of 
procedural fairness reflected the lobby’s failure to preserve, in the EC Bill, cl 17(3) that, had it survived 
the Bill’s second reading, would have outlawed reliance on procedural fairness as a basis for dismissal 
grievances: Bronwyn Boon, Procedural Fairness and the Unjustified Dismissal Decision, (1992) 17 (3) 
NZ Journal of Industrial Relations, 301. 
6	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Comments on the NZ Business Roundtable and NZEF 
report on the Labour/Employment Court, An Analysis of the Labour/Employment Court’s approach to 
the interpretation and application of employment legislation, 4 February 1993: the court and tribunal 
decisions cited included English, Labour Relations Act, Court of Appeal and Tribunal decisions.  Of 
the 58 decisions cited as evidence of the Employment Court’s judicial activism, only 11 were 
Employment Court decisions and the EC, in a number of those decisions, had adopted the contractual 
approach that the Report urged for interpretation.   
7	  Ibid.	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decisions.  These requirements have the potential to affect the ability of the Tribunal to function 
effectively. 8 
The pressure on the EC to mitigate its approach to procedural fairness in grievances 
and on the Government to disband it was maintained via the business and city print 
media through 1993.9 It culminated in a series of Parliamentary questions seeking 
confirmation of the lobbying for its abolition and assurances that this was not on the 
Government’s policy agenda.10  The response described the most recent attacks on the 
EC as criticisms of the decisions of its Chief Judge and the number of appeals they 
apparently attracted (9 from 200 judgments, 5 of which were upheld).11 This appeal 
rate was lower than that of the High Court. The Chief Judge’s appeal rate (higher than 
other EC judges) was the result of his practice of presiding over the more 
controversial cases (more likely to be appealed, regardless of judicial identity).12 
Policy debates 
Whilst the Government saw no need for any policy changes in the employment 
jurisdiction mid decade the Business Roundtable did.  Election year and the prospect 
of the first MMP Parliament in 1996 saw it reprising its attacks on the specialist 
nature of the employment jurisdiction in general and the EC in particular. 13   
By then the Minister of Labour was different from the person who oversaw the 
enactment of the ECA.14  He took the issues raised by the Business Roundtable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, The ECA – Institutions and Personal Grievances, 26 
November 1993.	  
9	  Roger Kerr, The Independent, A court for employment or unemployment, 7 May 1993; Evening Post, 
Employment Court’s future ‘under review’ 17 September 1993; Evening Post, Court in the line of fire, 
21 September 1993: the latter two articles contain criticism of the EC Chief Judge by Max Bradford 
(Chair Labour Select Committee) who is quoted as saying “the jury is still out on the future of the 
Employment Court” and Alan Jones (Fletcher Challenge): “the Labour Court (sic) should be 
disbanded” and all employment contract cases should go to the District and High courts.  He was also 
critical of the Tribunal, arguing that its judges (sic) were too cloistered.  The Council of Trade Unions 
was cited as arguing for the specialist jurisdiction to be maintained; see also other news media stories 
described as “a media campaign that was probably unique in New Zealand for its vitriolic and 
sustained and highly personalised attack in the Employment Court and its judges”: Gordon Anderson 
Employment Law: The Richardson years, (2002) 33 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 
887 at 889. 
10	  Helen Clark to Minister of Labour, Questions for Written Answer No 5186-7, 16 September 1993, 
and Answers, 28 September 1993.  
11	  Supplementary Information to Question 5187.  
12	  Minister of Labour to NZ Employers Federation, letter 30 November 1993 (in response to letter 
NZEF to Minister dated 20 October 1993).	  	  
13	  Gordon Anderson, The Specialist Institutions: the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal 
(1996) 21(1) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 1;	  Bernard Robertson, The Arguments for a 
Specialist Employment Court in New Zealand (1996) 21(1) New Zealand Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 34; Professor Charles W Baird, Speech to the Karori Rotary Club (undated c May 1996) at 
6-7: “The Employment Contracts Act…gives the main responsibility for interpretation and enforcement 
to a specialist court, the Employment Court?... Under s 188…the personnel of the Labour Court 
became the initial personnel of the Employment Court.  With one exception, they still are.  This was a 
huge mistake, for those judges were already dedicated to treating labour relations in a unique way.  
They were perhaps the least well qualified to launch a new era of legal equality for labour relations.”	  
14	  Hon Max Bradford was the Minister of Labour in 1996.  He had chaired the Labour Select 
Committee that considered the Employment Contracts Bill in 1991 when the Hon W Birch was the 
Minister of Labour. 
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sufficiently seriously to seek advice about whether the Human Rights or Bill of Rights 
legislation precluded the possibility of amending the ECA to provide for union-free 
and union-only employment based on voluntary bargaining (the Minister of Labour in 
1990 scotched the same suggestion made by the then Minister of Finance).15  The 
Department pointed out that the EC was overseen by the Court of Appeal that had:  
issued a number of significant decisions, for example in relation to bargaining behaviour, which 
consider the overall philosophy of the Employment Contracts Act and provide guidance to the 
Employment Court on how the new framework should be interpreted.16 
A sturdier response to the call to abandon the specialist jurisdiction (or at least the 
EC) came immediately before the election from employment lawyer and National 
Party activist Peter Kiely who argued that the equity and good conscience jurisdiction 
(anathema to opponents of the specialist employment jurisdiction) had been a part of 
labour law for some time.  He noted that it was the Court of Appeal17 and not the 
courts in the specialist jurisdiction that established, in 1985, that contracts of 
employment had to contain implied terms of fairness.18  He confirmed that changes to 
the present structure of the jurisdiction were unlikely to occur after the election and 
that as it then operated it offered significant advantages for legal practitioners.  
Asserting that debates in a “new and developing jurisdiction” were normal and 
healthy he cautioned against confusing controversial decisions with the need to 
abolish the structure created to provide their resolution.19 
Noting the essentially political nature of differing or opposing views of the ECA he 
also observed that few:  
issues demarcate the National Government from its opposition parties as clearly as the 
Employment Contracts Act. National views the legislation as central to its claims of economic 
success.  Opposition parties such as Labour and the Alliance maintain that the implementation of 
it has eroded basic work conditions for employees since its inception in 1991.20 
These approaches to the policy issues raised by the reforms reiterated the competing 
policy positions of the radicals and the moderates described in Chapter 2.  Both 
sought a more flexible labour market but they differed about the strategy necessary to 
achieve this outcome. The radicals sought removal of legal redress for complaints by 
employees whilst the moderates perceived that a functioning dispute resolution 
system would be the means by which the goal of labour flexibility was publicly 
accepted. This explains why they shared the view that the traditional arbitration model 
of dispute resolution in the civil court system could not process large numbers of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Advice, 20 June 1996.	  
16	  Ibid, at [19].  	  
17	  Marlborough Harbour Board v Goulden [1985] 2 NZLR 378; that procedural fairness was a 
creature of the common law was a point also argued by John Hughes, Personal Grievances in 
Harbridge (ed) Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences, (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 1993), 89.	  
18	  Peter Kiely, Paper, Employment Law under MMP, NZ Law Society Employment Law Conference, 
1996. 
19	  Ibid.	  
20	  Ibid; cf Peter Kiely MMP: Aligning the Judicial and Parliamentary Functions, (1996) 21(2) New 
Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 178, where he argued that the EC and the CA judiciary were 
continuing to apply Labour Relations Act principles “in spite of the sharp change in statutory policy” 
wrought by the ECA. 
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claims. For the radical lobby the civil system was a necessary barrier to access for 
complaints and for the moderate lobby the reason to retain specialist institutions, the 
need to guarantee public acceptability of the new system and as a means of securing 
the employment jurisdiction as a business opportunity for lawyers (the only way to 
interpret the description of a jurisdiction then over 100 years old as new and 
developing).   
Policy Initiatives  
Coalition Agreement to Review the Personal Grievance Jurisdiction 
Following the General Election in late 1996 the coalition parties (National and NZ 
First) agreed to review EC decisions to determine whether Parliament’s intentions 
were sufficiently clearly expressed to minimise judicial activism in the employment 
area.21  
Pressed for the reasons for this in Parliament the Minister replied that:  
Some legislative provisions set out within the Employment Contracts Act may not have fully 
explained Parliament’s intentions when passing the Act.  There is particular concern that some 
Court decisions are beginning to affect flexibility in the labour market, and impact on the level of 
employment.  In some areas it may be that the Court’s decisions have moved away from the 
central principles of the Act as intended by Parliament.  There has been debate, for example, 
about the obligations of employers in relation to procedural fairness, concerns about the Court’s 
willingness to set aside dismissals which are otherwise substantively justified.  At present, many 
of the obligations of employers and employees are unclear, scattered through a range of legal 
decisions, and subject to continuing legal challenge.  No one’s interests are served by such a 
situation.  It is important to have clear law, and fair and efficient procedures which are 
understood by all parties to resolve this kind of dispute.  It is important that all such concerns are 
fully explored and carefully considered in the review.22 
The terms of reference for this review were agreed in August 1997, when it was also 
agreed that reports assessing the EC approach to the principles concerning unjustified 
dismissal would be commissioned from two sources, law firms Chapman Tripp and 
Bartlett Partners.  The terms of reference included the following: 
o What could the courts reasonably have concluded was the intent of ‘unjustifiable dismissal’ in the 
context of the Employment Contracts Act 
o Were the decisions of the courts, and the Employment Court in particular, consistent with that 
intent; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Coalition Agreement between National and New Zealand First parties (1996), Industrial Relations 
Key Policy Initiative, 5; John Hughes, The Employment Court, ‘Judicial Activism” and the Coalition 
Agreement, (1997) 28(1) California Western International Law Journal, 167;  Laila Harre to Minister of 
Labour Question of the Day, 19 March 1997:” Is it the intention of the Government to review the 
existence of the Employment Court as well as to conduct a formal study of the Court’s decisions?” 
22	  Minister of Labour to Laila Harre,	   Supplementary Reply to Supplementary Question, 19 March 
1997: What kind of issues does the Minister expect to arise as a result of the review? Hughes, note 21, 
believes that reasons for hardening attitudes to the EC between the 1993 and 1996 elections included 
increased pressure from employer groups following unpopular decisions about bargaining 
communication and fixed term contracts, increased rate of appeals to the CA, Tribunal delays, 
increased legalism and formality, and a differently composed Labour Market Policy Group in the 
Department of Labour that reflected support for ECA principles. 
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o If not, why were they not consistent (i.e did the courts not follow the intent, was the intent unclear 
to the extent that there were many possible options, was the result driven by other factors like the 
nature of court processes)? 23 
 
 
Adopting different routes the opinions reached the same conclusion that the principles 
established prior to the ECA continued to be applicable and applied.24 
The reason for commissioning this advice arose in part from a concern that issues of 
procedural fairness were dominating assessments of justification.25 It is not clear 
whether other concerns included the explosion of personal grievance claims to the 
institutions after 1991, but this issue was covered by both opinions. 
The Chapman Tripp opinion linked this focus on procedural fairness to the increase in 
personal grievance claims directly by postulating that the former arose from the latter. 
Noting increasing numbers of claims, it suggested that the application of personal 
grievance procedures to all employees (from restricted availability to union member 
employees) and in particular senior management and professional employees had 
resulted in higher awards which in turn became a focus for the media and other 
commentators.26  Galanter describes this phenomenon as media reports of legal cases 
that provide a skewed view of “Davids besting Goliaths” when it is the reverse that is 
true: Goliath corporate litigants are more often successful in court proceedings than 
their David adversaries.27 
This explanation of cause and effect echoes the point made by Rau et al that rights 
based conflicts are shaped by the economic, social and political context in which 
problems are perceived and disputes develop.28 Particular risk factors for claiming and 
disputing are the status, relationships, educational levels and legal contacts of 
disputants. In the absence of an institutionalised remedy system claiming and 
disputing, particularly in the courts, is incentivised.  This is because the development 
of remedies almost inevitably lags substantially behind the recognition of rights.29  
Thus a freshly created jurisdiction for a group of high status, well-paid and educated 
employees who had been previously denied remedies now apparently available to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, letter, Terms of reference for an independent review of 
court decisions in respect of personal grievances, 1 August 1997.	  
24	  Jack	   Hodder, Joanna Holden, S. Coleman, Opinion for Department of Labour, Review of the 
institutions and the Employment Contracts Act 1991 – the meaning of ‘unjustifiable dismissal’, 
November 1997; this view was echoed in Hughes, note 21. 
25	  Ibid:  “Since the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act, the debate over the meaning of 
unjustifiable dismissal has heated up.  The Employers Federation, the Business Roundtable and the 
Independent Newspaper have taken the lead against the specialist Employment Court and the decisions 
reached by that Court and the Court of Appeal, particularly on procedural fairness issues and 
redundancy.  The Employment Court and the Court of Appeal decisions in Brighouse (1994) in 
particular have come under severe criticism as have a number of decisions in which reinstatement has 
been ordered.” at [119]. 
26	  Ibid.	  
27	  Marc Galanter,	  The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts (2004)	  1(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 459. 
28	  Allan Rau, Edward Sherman and Scott Peppett Processes of Dispute Resolution:  The Role of 
Lawyers, (Foundation Press, Westbury, New York, 2006). 
29	  Ibid.	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them became the vehicle by which a focus on the (pre-existing tenet of fairness in 
employment contracts) procedural fairness of dismissals arose.  
This point is underlined by the motivations for claiming provided by the ECA 
identified by Cullinane and Donald as: the policy requirement for greater flexibility in 
the labour market, more movement between jobs, employer beliefs that dismissals 
would be easier, and the rising use of business restructures as the means of shedding 
and replacing staff.30 
Another reason for the increase in grievances was identified by the Chapman Tripp 
opinion as the “removal of representation and bargaining issues as a source of 
conflict” and the shift from ‘collectivism’ to ‘individualised’ disputes:31 
What this has meant is that the body of case law developed with respect to a unionised workforce 
is now being applied to professionals, management and other higher level employees.  The 
development of the implied term of trust and confidence at common law was starting to impact 
on those employees prior to the Employment Contracts Act but, nevertheless, the appearance of 
those employees before the employment institutions, and the application of the earlier case law 
to them appears to have come as a shock, at least in certain quarters.32 
This identified the problem of procedural fairness for the business lobby as a failure to 
adequately consider its application to the whole working population in the policy 
development of the ECA.  The use to which the relevant legal principles would be put 
was an unanticipated consequence of the labour market reforms that imposed 
(procedural) conditions on the means by which grievances could be raised but left 
substantive principles untouched.  It raises some wider issues, however, about the 
consequences of replacing a regulated with a deregulated labour jurisdiction.  
For Kagan the public policy and dispute resolution functions of the new institutional 
structure created the perfect conditions for ‘adversarial legalism’ to flourish.33  By 
replacing a regulated system of awards, collective arrangements and dispute 
resolution dominated by stakeholders (employer groups and unions) of approximately 
equal bargaining strength with an unregulated bargaining environment, decision 
making authority moved from hierarchical (dominated by official decision makers 
applying authoritative norms or standards) to participatory (influenced by disputing 
parties, and lawyers, normative arguments, evidence). Decision making style (the 
extent to which parties/interests/officials insist on conformity to legal procedures, 
rights and duties) moved from informal (discretionary judgment, bargaining and 
informal processes) to formal (controlled by legal rules and procedures). The result, 
adversarial legalism, 
	  
is a method of policymaking and dispute resolution with two salient characteristics.  The first is 
formal legal contestation – competing interests and disputants readily invoke legal rights, duties 
and procedural requirements, backed by recourse to formal law enforcement, strong penalties, 
litigation and/or judicial review.  The second is litigant activism – a style of legal contestation in 
which the assertion of claims, the search for controlling legal arguments, and the gathering and 
submission of evidence are dominated not by judges or government officials but by disputing 
parties or interests, acting primarily through lawyers.  Organisationally, adversarial legalism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Joanna Cullinane and Dianne Donald, Personal Grievances in NZ, University of Waikato (2000). 
31	  Hodder, et al, note 24.	  
32	  Ibid,	  at [191].	  
33	  Robert A Kagan, Adversarial Legalism, The American Way of Law, (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2001).	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typically is associated with and is embedded in decision-making institutions in which authority is 
fragmented and in which hierarchical control is relatively weak.34 
Applied to the policy and process of employment dismissals this analysis suggests 
that a focus on procedural fairness was an inevitable outcome (rather than an 
unanticipated consequence) of the labour market reform encapsulated in the ECA. 
The Bartlett opinion anticipated this analysis by noting that, historically the industrial 
courts approached issues in a less legalistic way than the civil courts, mainly as a 
result of legislative prescription.35  Cited as illustrative of this approach were: the 
prohibition on lawyers (from 1973 to 1987) from having a right of audience in the 
Industrial/Labour Courts; the inclusion of non-legally qualified panel members in the 
Labour Court; the freedom to admit evidence that is ‘not strictly legal’ and the:  
relatively brief and uncomplicated procedural regulations, at least as compared with the highly 
complex and developed rules of court which determine the procedure of general jurisdiction.36  
Thus the fuss about the way the employment institutions were operating arose from a 
business preference for the strict rules and principles of the courts of general 
jurisdiction and a corresponding ignorance of the history of the industrial jurisdiction.  
In addition,   
a further thread which runs through the approach of the courts to the interpretation both of 
industrial legislation and of employment contracts is the view that the employment relationship 
cannot be equated to a conventional business relationship although that view has become less 
pronounced in recent decisions.37 
The opinion concluded that legislative changes superficially peripheral to the issue of 
dismissal were part of the problem of the increase in grievances: their extension to the 
entire workforce; the introduction of the 90 day limit for their submission; the 
elimination of reinstatement as a primary remedy; abolition of the union role in 
initiating (and filtering) claims; substitution of grievance committees by the 
Employment Tribunal; introduction of contributory fault as relevant to remedy rather 
than justification for dismissal. 
The observation that the transfer of power to initiate grievances from unions to 
individuals resulted in unmeritorious claims no longer subject to the filtering process 
that unions undertook seems to have triggered a request (the sole recorded reaction to 
both opinions) from the Minister of Labour for advice from the Department about 
institutional powers to dismiss frivolous and trivial cases.  The response, that the 
power had been exercised rarely notwithstanding numbers of attempts to strike out 
vexatious proceedings, took the matter no further but met the Department’s objective 
of closing down subsequent inquiries.38   
Part of the point of Kagan’s model of adversarial legalism, its fragmentation and lack 
of coordination of authority and decision making, is that it characterises systems, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Ibid, at 9.	  
35 	  Philip	   Bartlett for Department of Labour, Opinion, Review Of The Institutions/Employment 
Contracts Act: The Meaning Of Unjustified Dismissal, November 1997.	  
36	  Ibid, at [A4(e)].	  
37	  Ibid, at 12.	  
38	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Paper, Employment Tribunal’s power to dismiss 
frivolous and trivial cases, 24 March 1998. 	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rather than their disparate parts. The Minister’s request reveals the futility of a focus 
on the particular in the absence of analysis of the system of which it was part. 
Specialist Jurisdiction 
Of the policy issues that appear to have dominated the Minister of Labour’s thinking 
in 1997 and 98, none received more attention than the idea that the EC should become 
part of the District Court.  
Officials championed the status quo for its access to greater judicial expertise about 
the realities of the workplace and its flexibility in the provision of resolution services 
by the use of mediators.  They believed that the existing structure had the potential to 
limit the rigidity of precedent on which the civil courts were required to rely and that 
it would better preserve Parliament’s intention to establish an employment dispute 
resolution system that took account of equity issues and imbalances of power between 
contracting parties.39 
Support for the view that the Executive should impose limits on the EC came from 
another legal opinion on the Court’s supervisory powers over the Tribunal. 40 
Although it concerned matters of little interest to the radical lobby (because it focused 
on the internal operations of the employment institutions, rather than on labour market 
issues) it did what the other two opinions (commissioned later in the same year) failed 
to do by providing a basis for concern about the ECs exercise of its powers.  Its 
rationale for action against the Court attributed to it responsibility for the problems of 
delay at the Tribunal.  By contrast the common view of the other opinions was that 
the EC was behaving no differently from any court faced with the same issues.     
The Treasury contributed by commissioning some economic research (as part of its 
Court Performance project) a focus of which was analysis of the effects of judicial 
decision making on “efficient employment outcomes” and the means by which 
specialist courts “affect such outcomes”.41 Apparent from the Department of Labour’s 
report of the research was that it had not been consulted about it, nor was it convinced 
about the quality of the data or methodology.  The purpose of the research was said to 
be the identification of characteristics that influence litigation outcomes (posited as 
those of the litigant, the environment, the law and the institutions) but it can be 
inferred that there was a strong suspicion on the part of Labour officials who attended 
the seminar at which the research was described that it was concerned primarily with 
institutional characteristics.  The difficulty already apparent to the researchers was 
that whilst there was a wealth of data about the functioning of the employment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 	  Department of Labour, Why we should keep the Employment Court:  Occasional papers on 
Employment Law, No 3, September 1997; cf Department of Labour Election Brief 38 (October 1996) 
cited by Hughes, note 21, as noting concerns about the Court, inconsistencies between judicial 
decisions and statutory intent leading to uncertainty and confusion and its suggestions for redress – 
widening the pool of judicial talent, rotating judges, transferring the EC to the general jurisdiction, 
widening the scope of appeals.	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  Peter Chemis for Department of Labour, Opinion, The Nature, Limits and Effects of the Supervisory 
Relationship between the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal, 6 June 1997. 
41	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Report on Seminar by Dr George Barker and Dr 
Stuart Schwab on an Economic and Empirical Analysis of Litigation in NZ Courts, 3 December 1997, 
at 1. This was a report of a seminar presented to members of the Law and Economics Society that 
outlined the proposed research methodology and presented some preliminary data on research then 
being undertaken by Dr Barker and Dr Schwab for the Treasury.  
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institutions, there was correspondingly very little about the general court system.42  
Labour officials had other concerns.  Data about decision-making was derived from 
both EC and Tribunal decisions but no distinction was made between sources, 
meaning that appellate decisions were likely to have different characteristics from 
first instance ones, but they were all lumped together.  In addition decisions were 
categorised on the basis of win or loss with no account of the subtleties involved in 
‘wins’ that attract no or a low remedy, or remedies lower than an employer expected 
to pay.43  
The paucity of comparative data from the civil courts meant that the data from the 
employment institutions could not be meaningfully assessed.  Nothing further 
appeared to come of it,44 although its value lies as another illustration of the persisting 
differences of approach between the Department of Labour and Treasury to issues of 
institutional design in the labour jurisdiction.   Institutional structure, therefore, 
remained a function of the major policy difference between them about appropriate 
policy goals for this jurisdiction, Treasury’s quality of outcome position representing 
the interests of big business, or capital, and the Department’s quality of process 
position representing the interests of small business and labour. 
Notwithstanding the opposition from Labour officials to the idea of transferring the 
EC to the District Court it nonetheless took hold. The objective of the proposal was:  
to integrate the Employment Court into the perceived ‘mainstream’ of judicial decision-making, 
thus increasing judicial independence and enhancing the quality of judicial decision-making.45  
To that end the Cabinet Economic Committee agreed in principle, in late April 1998, 
to transfer the exclusive jurisdiction for employment matters from the EC to a 
specialist division of the District Court, with the removal of some matters to the High 
Court, pending consultation with the judiciary.  It also agreed to ask officials: 
to investigate ways of making the Employment Tribunal more informal and less legalistic, and to 
enhance the Tribunal functions in accordance with its objective of informality, and facilitating 
solutions to disputes between employers and employees.46  
This was the result of a concerted attempt, by Department officials, to divert the 
policy focus from the EC to the Tribunal, its major administrative headache at that 
time.  Its policy papers on the proposed move to the District Court were peppered 
with suggestions for changes to the ECs supervisory role over the Tribunal, to 
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  As part of my research for this thesis I was advised by officials at the Ministry of Justice that there 
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43	  Department of Labour, note 41.	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  Department of Labour for Cabinet Economic Committee, Paper: Future Administration of the 
Employment Court, 21 April 1998, 98/002150, at 1.	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  Cabinet Minutes: Strengthening the Role and Operation of the Employment Tribunal, (28 April 
1998) CAB (98) M 14/5B: noted that work on amending the Employment Contracts Act to improve the 
ability for the Employment Tribunal to operate in a low level and informal manner more consistent 
with the policy intent behind its establishment, will be incorporated into separate work on the future 
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Tribunal adjudication processes (reducing legalism and increasing informality), to 
rights to appeal and to the ways evidence was heard and considered.47 
The statistics that the Department had earlier gathered about appeal rates and 
outcomes for the EC and the High Court (which showed a lower rate of appeals from 
EC decisions and the same percentage of decisions overturned by the Court of 
Appeal)48 appeared not to be relevant to the decision to disestablish the EC.   
However, notwithstanding Cabinet’s adoption of its Economic Committee’s 
recommendation, the proposal foundered.  It had always been accepted that 
consultation with the judiciary was necessary before the transfer proceeded but it 
seems that the result of that consultation was not anticipated.  By mid-July 1998 that 
consultation with the Chief Justice, Chief District Court Judge, Chief Judge of the 
Employment Court and the Solicitor-General had occurred. The Minister of Justice 
wished to consider further the policy issues they raised.49  Contemporaneously the 
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice had been developing proposals for changes 
to the structure and processes of other specialist courts, as well as the processes of 
judicial appointments, complaints about judges, and the nature of judicial immunities. 
These proposals were to be reported back at the end of August 1998.50 Some technical 
amendments to the ECA concerning the Tribunal’s powers to make orders about 
contracts, to enforce mediated settlements and to issue suppression orders were 
approved.51 
No transfer of the EC to the District Court occurred.  By then the radical lobby had 
located a more reliable forum for the advancement of its policy agenda, the Court of 
Appeal (CA).  As Anderson notes, prior to the enactment of the ECA the CA had been 
largely content to adopt a pragmatic approach to labour law matters generally and in 
particular to common views of fairness and the necessity for employee protections in 
grievance resolution.52  This changed after 1991. The CA’s earlier deference to the 
specialist expertise of the Labour Court was replaced by what Anderson argues was a 
negation of that expertise held by the EC. 
The CA enhanced ‘rights to manage’ at the expense of employee protections in three 
main ways:  statutory protections in holiday and minimum wage legislation could be 
avoided by CA endorsement of the incorporation of holiday pay in weekly pay53 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Policy Paper, Industrial Relations Reforms: 
Outstanding Issues, 11 May 1998. 
48	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memo, Appeals from decisions of the High Court and 
Employment Court, 20 August 1997, was in response to a request from the Social Services Select 
Committee for statistics on the percentage of EC decisions appealed to the CA and overturned: 8% of 
EC decisions since its establishment were appealed, 46% of those decisions were upheld, and 4% 
overturned.  For the year 96/97, 16% of High Court civil decisions were appealed, of which 26% were 
upheld, and 4% overturned. 
49 Cabinet Minutes, Employment Court: consultation with judiciary, (20 July 1998) CAB (98) M 
25/15,  
50	  Ibid. 
51	  Ibid.  
52 Gordon Anderson, Reconstructing New Zealand’s Labour Law, Consensus or Divergence? (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 2011). 
53	  Gladstone Milk Bar Ltd v Henning [1998] 3 NZLR 183 (CA). 
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prioritising the apparent intention of parties to enter into contracts for services;54 
protections against dismissal could be avoided by the use of fixed-term contracts55 
and redundancy;56 and objectivity in establishing justification for dismissal was 
abandoned. 57   The common law principle, trust and confidence, offered the 
appearance of a degree of mutuality in the employment relationship but a case 
analysis revealed otherwise: 
Decisions of the Court of Appeal in particular have minimised the impact of the term on 
employers and largely limited its use to the personal grievance jurisdiction, where it may provide 
assistance in arguing that a grievance has occurred but cannot be said to impose any substantive 
new obligations on employers. … From an employee perspective, however, the term may not 
have imposed new substantive obligations in addition to the obligation of fidelity, but it does 
seem to have been used as a useful justification for extending the scope of that obligation.58  
Aside from revealing why reliance on the civil court/common law nexus was so 
important to the radical lobby, Anderson’s analysis articulates how this alignment of 
position on employer rights between the radical lobby and the CA during the ECA era 
advanced the proprietary interests of employers at the expense of employee 
protections.   
Thus the radical lobby’s focus on the EC’s approach to procedural fairness masked 
the source of the fundamental changes to the jurisdiction’s approach to employee 
protections that were necessary for the transition to employment-at-will. 
 
Conclusions 
The period of the EC under the ECA was marked by a key change of Minister.  The 
Minister for its first years, the Cabinet moderate who shepherded the ECA through the 
legislation process, remained relatively impervious to the attempts of the radical lobby 
to re-litigate the issues they failed to have incorporated into legislation in 1991.  This 
changed with the appointment of Hon Max Bradford, who sought to introduce a fresh 
vigour to the role. 59 Amongst the reasons for a failure to implement the radical 
lobby’s desire to be rid of the Court was an opaque focus on data related to 
institutional and economic issues arising from the ECA and their interrelationship: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  TNT Worldwide Express (NZ) Ltd v Cunningham [1993] 3 NZLR 681 (CA). 
55 Principal Auckland College of Education v Hagg [1997] 2 NZLR 537 (CA). 
56 	  GN Hale & Son Ltd v Wellington Caretakers etc IUW [1991] 1 NZLR 151 (CA); Aoraki 
Corporation ltd v McGavin [1998] 3 NZLR 276 (CA). 
57 Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil NZ Ltd [1992] 3 ERNZ 483 (CA); W & H Newspapers Ltd v 
Oram [2001] 3 NZLR 29 (CA). 
58 Anderson, note 52, at 129. 
59 Erling Rasmussen, John Deeks, Assessing the Impacts of the Employment Contracts Act (1997) 28 
(1) California Western International Law Journal, 275, cite an unpublished paper, Max Bradford, What 
Happens Now? Institute of International Research, 11th Annual Industrial Relations Conference, 1997, 
as describing anticipated amendments to the ECA to include incorporation of Holidays and Wages 
Protections legislation, and EC decisions on dismissal and fixed-term grievances. 
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much of the advocacy for further reform of the Act rests on the presumption that additional 
institutional changes, particularly with respect to the roles of the Employment Court and the 
Employment Tribunal, provide the key to improved economic performance.60 
By then it was becoming clear that the economic benefits claimed for deregulation 
and de-collectivisation of the labour force, particularly productivity gains, had failed 
to materialise. 
The Minister may have thought he was on safer ground when he sought externally 
commissioned legal advice about the means of achieving desired policy outcomes.  
The Department probably understood the difficulty (for the radical lobby) of 
commissioning legal advice for outcomes more likely to reduce than enlarge a 
burgeoning new market for legal services, so the advice had the effect of supporting 
its positions – about the ECs powers of review and the need to assess fairness of 
dismissal process (its objection to legalising the assessment did not alter its view that 
the assessment was necessary).  From a quality of process perspective, the 
Department’s chief concern during the legislative process, the EC performed as 
expected. 
The complaints about the EC, assessed against Kagan’s connection between the 
political status of business and business institutions with adversarial legalism (the 
more decentralised and deregulated an economy the more likely it resorts to lawyers 
and litigation to resolve conflict), the fragmentation of business-labour relations and 
the vulnerability of labour-management relations in the United States, to adversarial 
legalism, 61 suggest that the business lobby’s dependence on North American views of 
New Zealand’s specialist employment jurisdiction became the means by which it 
avoided confronting the source of its problems with procedural fairness.  Its 
complaint, in other words, was about the use of principles concerning process against 
it, accustomed as it was to issues of process in the courts advancing, rather than 
inhibiting, its interests.  
From a quality of outcome perspective procedural fairness marked the reality of the 
transition from collectivist to individualist approaches to conflict resolution.  It served 
to confirm that increased numbers of individualised employees were subject to 
dismissals they could not accept, thus suggesting that employment-at-will was 
operating in all but name.  Resort to complaints about unfairness and demands for 
recompense were the exchange for workforce acceptance of (effective) employment-
at-will as an aspect of increased labour market flexibility. 
This is the point made by Hince and Harbridge who argue that the real agenda of the 
reforms: 
…ideology and power were fundamental motivators of the key proponents of the Employment 
Contracts Act.  From such a perspective even substantial economic and social costs would be a 
price worth paying to create a fundamental shift in employment relationships and labour market 
power that undoubtedly resulted.62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid; for a British perspective on use of employment tribunal procedural change as a tool for 
economic stimulation see David Mangan Employment Tribunal Reforms to Boost the Economy (2013) 
42 (4) Industrial Law Journal, 409.  
61 Kagan, note 33.	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  Kevin Hince and Raymond Harbridge, The Employment Contracts Act: An Interim Assessment 
(1994) 19(3) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 235 at 236.	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This resulted in outcomes associated with Thatcher era Britain63 - the emergence of a 
non-union sector based on the principle of cost-minimisation that experienced higher 
levels of turn-over and injury rates, greater use of casualised labour and compulsory 
redundancy and a dismissal rate twice that of the unionised sector: 
NZ has been through a period of social Darwinism wherein the strong have got stronger, the 
weak, weaker, the rich richer and the poor poorer, the advantaged have become more so and so 
have the disadvantaged.  Almost any schism in society that existed has widened and become 
more overt.64 
Indicated, therefore, from the conclusions of chapter 3, (the measures opposed by the 
radical lobby did not obstruct its agenda) is that so long as institutions of dispute 
resolution are subject to the tropes of legal method, it mattered not how they were 
constituted for a successful transition from pluralist to unitarist approaches to 
employment relations. 
Common law and legal method were thus vital elements of the power transition 
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Chapter 5 
Employment Relations Act Institutions 
Policy Origins  
 
Introduction 
In the period 1991 to 2008 there was a major difference to the way the National and 
Labour led Governments relied on policy to shape the operations of the employment 
institutions.  No significant policy activity occurred following the Employment 
Contracts Act (notwithstanding pressure from the radical business lobby) until the 
coalition agreement of 1996 raised the issue of personal grievances. This provoked 
renewed consideration of the Employment Court’s (EC) role. But the status quo was 
maintained. No changes, either to the EC or to the law concerning grievances, were 
made.    
This suggests that the labour market outcome sought by the policy makers of 1990 
was perceived as in the process of being achieved.  The radical lobby certainly 
thought so, notwithstanding a continuing complaint about the strategy deployed to 
reach that goal.1  That strategy difference – whether an accessible dispute resolution 
system was necessary for the transition from collectivised to individualised 
approaches to labour issues – centred on the role of the employment institutions.  
Juridification theory suggests the institutions were critical to the transition from 
legislative and stakeholder to judicial regulation of those issues. In terms of the 
strategic instincts of National moderates the institutions formed a basis for public 
acceptance of this change.2   Since this was the strategy with which the radical lobby 
took issue, it led the charge to destabilise the EC, to which it attributed responsibility 
for a disruptive focus on procedural fairness. This was perceived as undermining the 
outcome goal of widespread employment-at-will, a marker of increased labour market 
flexibility. 
This period of policy (as distinct from lobbying) inactivity can be contrasted with 
what occurred between 2000 and 2008.  It began with an apparent intention, via 
policy activity and legislation, to move away from formal, legalist approaches to 
labour relations and dispute resolution towards policy based on academic and 
consumer research.    
The aim of this chapter is to describe the policy process for the employment 
institutions that resulted in Part 10 Employment Relations Act (ERA) for the 
following purposes:  to establish a similar basis of comparison between policy and 
operations as is contained in previous chapters about the ECA; and as a basis for 
comparison of policy, process and outcome (for the institutions) between the ECA 
and the ERA eras.  
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  Roger Kerr, Lessons from Labour Market Reform in New Zealand, The HR Nicholls Society’s XXVI 
Conference, Melbourne, 18 March 2005. 
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Journal, 69.	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Since policy about the structure and processes of the institutions dominated policy 
formulation, quality of process issues will precede description of desired outcome. 
 
Quality of Process 
Post-election Policy Issues for Employment Institutions 
Following the 1999 election the Minister of Labour met with what were described as 
Labour Party Interest groups3 for the purpose of eliciting their views about their 
preferred approaches to changes to industrial relations and the employment 
jurisdiction. The recorded consensus was that personal grievances and disputes should 
be routed through the mediation process, with mediators given the power to make 
binding decisions.  Appeals would be heard de novo by the EC. Those using the 
institutions could appear personally, be represented by an agent, or with the consent 
of all parties, a lawyer.4 These positions represented a desire to revert to the Labour 
Relations Act regime of the late 1980s and were included in consideration of the role 
of the institutions.5  Eliminating rights to be legally represented and the prescription 
of non-legalistic procedures for evidence were also mooted. The Department and 
Labour activists shared the view (at this point in the process) that formal procedures 
and legal representation were inextricably connected, hence generation of the option 
of regulating pre-institutional processes to incentivise effective dispute resolution by 
ensuring all avenues of redress were explored before resort to the institutions.  Also 
connected was the issue of combining med/arb procedures in one process.  This raised 
the question whether the Tribunal was the appropriate body for this process and what 
appeal rights would be available.6 
The options concerning the EC focused on their effects on the Tribunal’s autonomy:  
whether its supervisory role and the current appellate structure and role (points of law 
only or the power to reconsider facts) should be retained.7 
Policy development of Employment Relations Bill 2000 
By early January 2000 officials had formulated three options for the institutions: 
improving the existing system; splitting mediation and adjudication functions into 
separate institutions; establishing a new mediation/arbitration function (in the absence 
of a mediated settlement the mediator would arbitrate).8 Assessment of each option 
relied exclusively on the problems created by the ECA:  the increased availability of 
the personal grievance procedure to the whole workforce and the reduced role of 
unions in the resolution of disputes within the workplace and as filters for the 
institutions.9 Reasons for criticism that the Tribunal had failed to deliver the “low 
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  Department of Labour description: see Record of meeting: Minister of Labour with Labour Party 
Interest groups, 22 December 1999.	  
4	  Record of meeting: Minister of Labour with Labour Party Interest groups, 22 December 1999.	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  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Employment Relations Bill – Policy Issues, 23 
December 1999.	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.	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  Department of Labour, Role of Specialist Employment Institutions, 11 January 2000. 
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level, non-legalistic and speedy mechanism” prescribed for it were summarised as 
delays caused by representation by lawyers and advocates, too few Tribunal members 
and Court judges; the necessity for the Tribunal to record its reasons in lengthy 
decisions for the purpose of enabling the Court to consider facts on appeal and to 
exercise its supervisory function, over-detailed procedures and high representation 
costs arising from “increased legalism and…extensive preparation”.10 
The central theme of the Department’s position was that legalism inhibited effective 
dispute resolution:  
The Employment Contracts Act introduced a framework based around individual rights and 
obligations based on employment contracts, which had inherent tendencies toward legalism.  
Individuals are increasingly aware of their rights, and more prepared to pursue their claims 
legally when their incomes and livelihoods are at stake.  The individual nature of the claims, and 
the diversity of employment relationships has also increased the complexity of legal arguments 
that are pursued.  The increase in legalism may increase individuals’ ability to exercise their 
rights to justice, however, it also has the effect of being adversarial, time-consuming, and 
costly.11  
Suggestions for the first option, improvement of the existing institutional framework, 
replicated options canvassed with the Labour Party Interest Group: reduced formality 
of process and decision making by the Tribunal, removal of the Employment Court’s 
oversight function, limited appeal rights, screened entry-level claims via evidence of 
prior attempts at resolution and reduced rights of representation. By then it was clear 
that splitting the Tribunal’s mediative and adjudicative functions was in 
contemplation, requiring consideration of where adjudicated hearings would 
commence.12    
The second option, establishing separate entry-level mediation and adjudication 
institutions was seen as potentially increasing the number of mediated settlements. 
This raised the issue whether mediation should be compulsory before adjudication 
could be sought and the risk that the benefits of compulsory mediation would be 
minimal and expensive.13 
The third option, an institution with a combined mediation/arbitration function would 
offer mediation first, an outcome (if settled) that was final and binding or a decision 
by the mediator with a right of review of that decision.  The risks were that each 
function would be undermined by failures to disclose information that could be the 
basis for a decision.  Mediators could be restricted by pressure to maintain a neutral 
decision-making process and parties could withhold information in anticipation of a 
court hearing.  There was potential for them to treat the mediation as adjudication and 
adopt more formal approaches, so that if mediators had high levels of autonomy they 
would be perceived as not providing a fair system of justice. A lengthier process and a 
focus on its rules were also feared.14 
Recommended was an institutional structure consisting of a specialist mediation 
function and two specialist adjudication bodies (entry level and appellate) supported 
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by proactive provision of information and advice about the options available to 
disputants (the second option).  The policy objectives perceived to be fundamental to 
the efficient operation of these institutions were the need to support the employment 
relationship as a whole in place of the existing focus on defining or resolving 
contractual issues; and the facilitation of speedy (close to the event), accessible 
(informal) and fair dispute resolution by avoiding legalism.15 
Mediation function 
Mediation assistance would be available in a different form from that offered by the 
Employment Tribunal.  Whilst its style of mediation was accepted as the means by 
which a high proportion of the disputes before it were resolved, it was also noted that 
this function was not advertised (as the result of resource constraints), was reactive 
(invoked only once the employment relationship had already broken down), relied on 
formal application and was often required to traverse all legal issues arising from the 
problem – whether or not they were relevant to ultimate settlement. The suggested 
solution was a wider focus on supporting existing employment relationships, rather 
than on the narrower negotiation of terms of exit from a practically defunct contract.  
This change of focus was regarded as key to changing the style of mediation to an 
approach that would be “less formal and legalistic”.16 To this end mediator skills that 
were specifically interpersonal and problem solving (and thus capable of engaging the 
trust and cooperation of the disputants) would be privileged over legal knowledge.  
Vesting mediators with a broad discretion, empowering them to adopt a horses-for-
courses approach to the type of mediation assistance required, and ensuring there 
were no limits on subject matter were also intended to emphasise the policy desire for 
greater informality and responsiveness. The wish for a move away from legalism was 
expressed in terms of “practical solutions” and a recommendation that there should 
be no rules about initiating mediation17 or the point at which it was offered.18 
Averting relationship breakdown was regarded as particularly important: 
given the legislative objectives of reinforcing the employment relationship (rather than enforcing 
a contractual relationship or remedying a breach of same) and the emphasis on reinstatement as 
the primary remedy.  This has important implications for the style of mediation adopted – 
arguing for a higher degree of informality of process, ease of access … as well as for the levels 
of resourcing required to sustain such practices, particularly as irreconcilable breakdowns in the 
employment relationship will continue to occur and the current style of post hoc grievance 
mediation will remain part of the system, even if a shift in priorities is experienced.19 
Limits on the desire for a break with legalism are apparent in the evaluation of options 
for arbitration in mediation. In terms of the debate about the Labour Relations Act 
med/arb provisions (described in chapter 2) the Department’s recommendation of the 
‘pure’ option, (whereby no arbitration services would be offered) adopted the legalist 
view that modes of resolution must be offered separately.  The status quo option (on 
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  Department of Labour, Employment Institutions – Options Paper, 28 January 2000. 
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  Ibid, at 3.	  
17	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barrier to access because it required specialist knowledge of the application process. 	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request or by consent) was said to solve the problem of impasse but create the 
problem of addressing (any and all) legal issues raised by the parties.  The med/arb 
option (arbitration in the absence of settlement) raised the problem of appeal rights 
and had the potential to undermine both mediative and adjudicative functions. ‘Pure’ 
mediation offered a conducive environment for parties to reach their own decisions.20   
Three institutional options for the provision of mediation were canvassed:  status quo 
(i.e. provision by Tribunal), the establishment of a separate state funded mediation 
service or contracting out the mediation function to private providers.  The advantages 
of a separate state funded service were noted as encouraging the establishment of a 
specialist body of mediators, tighter focus in recruitment on the social skills of 
problem solving and communication, the ability to employ more personnel at a lower 
cost (because legal qualifications would not be required) and wider accessibility.21  
This led to a recommendation to change the employment status of mediators:  
Tribunal members are currently independent statutory officers.  As such, a concerted change of 
approach to how they perform their duties cannot be directed (other than in terms of statutory 
objectives), compared to employees, who would be more able to be ‘managed’ and given clear 
administrative direction.22  
Also recommended was retention of existing certifying functions over private 
settlements for enforcement purposes. 23 
Adjudication function 
The Department recognised that: 
Some form of adjudication is a necessary component of a dispute resolution structure, as there 
are situations where parties are unable to resolve their differences themselves, however, it is 
necessary to determine the appropriate level of formality, considering the need to balance 
accessibility with providing a fair process.24 
Appeal rights, original jurisdiction, informality, filtering and representation were the 
initial policy issues by which this balance between accessibility and fair process was 
considered.  By contrast with the policy process of 1991 this one adopted the access 
to justice position upon which legal method is based, particularly in its consideration 
of structural options. 
Appeals and originating jurisdiction 
The alternative structures were adjudication by a low-level body with appeals on fact 
and law to a higher level specialist body and final appeal to the Court of Appeal or an 
informal med/arb hearing with a de novo right of appeal.  The first was recommended 
because it had three levels, two rights of appeal, conformed to the standard court 
system structure and confined originating jurisdiction to the lower level body.  It 
risked delays from the formalism that accompanied the claims made of this function 
but this was seen to be preferable to the potential for the med/arb option to relegate 
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mediation to a secondary function, generate high levels of dissatisfaction from its 
informality of process and incentivise appeals. Retention of the status quo for appeals 
to the Court of Appeal (law only) was recommended for the reason that this had 
worked well under the ECA. 25  
Informality 
Having adopted the access to justice position on these options policy makers were 
then confronted with the problem of formality.  It was obvious that the new 
originating institution should have the power to regulate its own procedures, but this 
was what the Tribunal had and its adjudication processes were conceded to be 
relatively formal. Regulatory prescription mandating simpler procedures and 
administration and shorter, less detailed decisions was one solution, but it did not 
address the formality of hearing processes that plagued the Tribunal.  Resolving this 
problem would require a departure from the detail of legal and factual issues that were 
regarded as having dominated the form and content of Tribunal decisions. The 
demands of precedent had led to the development of a significant body of case law, 
perceived as an end in itself, but no longer tolerable.  Allied to this issue was the 
Employment Court’s supervisory power.  Restricting it was required: 
The effect of this change would be a clear indication to the Employment Court that its 
supervision role is limited to providing guidance on substantive issues through its appellate 
function.  The Employment Tribunal would have the opportunity to develop its own procedures, 
without having to demonstrate that those procedures are in accordance with the direction of the 
Court.26 
Filtering 
The requirement for prior attempts at dispute resolution before adjudication was 
sought, an attempt to address the problems of delay at the Tribunal, was the subject of 
a recommendation to incentivise such efforts: to ensure a higher proportion of 
disputes could be resolved extra-judicially; and to increase institutional capacity to 
process claims more quickly.  Prior attempts could be taken into account in decisions 
and the institutions could have the power to order parties to mediation before 
proceeding, where this was seen to be appropriate. 
Representation  
Rights of representation at the originating institution were considered by reference to 
the problem of legalism that lawyers had brought to the jurisdiction following the 
ECA.  One solution was to remove rights of legal representation, but this raised 
access to justice issues: 
Restricting legal representation in the mediation process may be less risky, as the matters are 
likely to be resolved by seeking a mutual resolution, rather than based around complex legal 
arguments, and adherence to legal procedures and rules is not required.  However, representation 
can provide a useful purpose in mediation by providing an objective person who can guide the 
disputant, which can be a tense and stressful time for individuals.  Restricting legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Ibid, at [29]	  
26	  Ibid, at [35]	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representation also limits the options for suitable representation for parties that are not union 
members.27  
Alternatives posed included permitting agents for any party and lawyers with consent 
of all parties, or full rights of representation.  The choice of status quo (full rights) 
was tempered by a suggestion for solving the problem of undesirable representative 
behaviour via administrative processes aimed at encouraging informality.28  
Inquisitorial model  
For this reason inquisitorial models (N.Z and overseas) were investigated. Officials 
who consulted other low-level tribunals29 about their hearing processes as part of this 
inquiry found some common themes in communication and control. Sophisticated 
communication skills (on the part of both administrative and decision making 
personnel), proactive administrative assistance for users, an emphasis on accessibility 
and active engagement with claimants were the qualities consistently highly valued by 
those consulted. Natural justice – the measure of fairness of process that the 
Department was conscious would be the source of criticism of its choice of informal 
procedures30 – was accommodated (by each of the tribunals consulted) by reference to 
behavioural, rather than prescriptivist process requirements.  Good communication 
and reflective listening skills, according to one participant, meant that parties were 
more likely to accept an adverse result if they could see that they had been heard and 
their dignity respected.31 Another addressed the natural justice issue more directly: the 
traditional adversarial model was not the only way to guarantee it, just as cross 
examination was not the only way to accommodate the right to be heard.32  
These insights were regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify recommendation of 
an investigative model for the originating institution: 
The inquisitorial approach on the other hand, is derived from the French legal system.  It 
involves a lot more control on the part of the adjudicator in order to establish what really 
happened… 
Parties are given the opportunity to present their case, and challenge the other side’s case, 
however they are not given the opportunity to question witnesses directly as in the Common Law 
model.  Less emphasis is given to the need to test witness’ credibility and the impressions gained 
during cross-examination.  In French civil cases, there is a strong emphasis on written evidence, 
as opposed to oral, and judges are given all documents prior to the case which they examine 
carefully to allow for a closer examination of the issues involved during the hearing.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 	  Ibid, at [41]; cf Kuo-Chang Huang, How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcomes: An 
Empirical Perspective from Taiwan (2008) 5(2) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 309, a study of 
100,000 civil cases in an inquisitorial jurisdiction found that legal representation had no significant 
bearing on case outcomes when parties go to trial. 
28	  Department of Labour, note 15, at [41].	  
29	  Tribunals consulted were the Principal Disputes Tribunal Referee, the Complaints Review Tribunal 
Chairperson and the Chairman of the recently concluded TranzRail Inquiry. 
30	  Department of Labour: note 15, at [41].	  
31	  Department of Labour, Notes of Interview with Chairperson Complaints Review Tribunal, 12 April 
2000. This position was supported by social research of specialised administrative tribunals that found 
claimants were more likely to accept governmental decision making when they perceived the decision 
maker was not biased against them, and when they felt that the decision maker listened carefully, 
treating them and their arguments with respect: Robert A Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American 
Way of Law, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2001). 
32	  Department of Labour, Notes of Interview with Chairperson TranzRail Inquiry, 23 August 2000.	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Arguments in favour of an inquisitorial or investigative approach are that it assists parties that 
are not represented, and that it may be a better way of obtaining the facts without a hearing being 
dominated by technical arguments that may be presented by counsel.  Where a party fails to 
provide enough evidence, even though evidence may be available, it allows the adjudicator to 
intervene, and ensure that all relevant evidence is properly presented and tested.33 
Addressing the technical requirements of an investigative approach, officials 
emphasised the need for decision-makers to have well developed social and 
communication skills and for decisions to be in a clear and concise format and 
restricted to content necessary to establish the reasons for a decision.  They also noted 
the value of case management strategies that ensure party awareness of rights and 
obligations, and specify issues for resolution prior to hearings, in reducing hearing 
times.34 
Following adoption of this model, officials had the benefit of differing legal views of 
the procedures proposed for the Authority.  They encapsulate competing approaches 
to informality.  The Crown Law office could only see risk because with the: 
lack of formal procedures or full decisions, parties may not perceive that they have been heard or 
have had a full opportunity, or are adequately informed of the procedure adopted.  This may also 
prejudice parties’ rights to apply for a judicial hearing; the determination may not fully record 
the procedure, evidence and basis for findings.  It is not clear how the natural justice provisions 
will sit with the express procedural provisions.35 
The Chair of the recently concluded TranzRail Inquiry, a Queens Counsel, supported 
adoption of the investigative model for its ability to empower decision makers to 
tightly control proceedings thus reducing their length and complexity.36   
Cabinet Consideration 
By mid-February 2000 the proposed changes to the status quo could be summarised 
as the dis-establishment of the Employment Tribunal, the establishment of a 
Mediation Service and a separate lower level adjudication service, the Employment 
Relations Authority, with full first-instance jurisdiction to hear and determine all 
types of employment dispute, the retention of the EC for appeals on matters of law 
only and appeals to the Court of Appeal with leave only, retention of rights of 
representation and mediation to be undertaken before adjudication could be sought. 37 
On referral back from Cabinet, splitting originating jurisdiction for individual and 
collective disputes between the Authority and the EC, further modified these changes.  
The Authority would determine individuals’ claims and the EC collective disputes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Department of Labour, Overview of other judicial, or quasi-judicial, or administrative decision 
models and the application of principles, processes or approaches in those models to the Employment 
Relations Authority (undated, c mid 2000) at [3] – [5].	  
34	  Ibid.	  
35	  Crown Law Office, paper, Overview of The Employment Relations Act, August 2000, at [24]. 
36	  Department of Labour, note 32.	  
37	  Cabinet minute, Employment Relations Bill – Confirmation of Government Reform Package for the 
ad hoc Committee on Employment Relations Bill, (9 February 2000) CAB(00) M4/6(1), AER(00).	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(strikes/lockouts, freedom of association).  Appeal rights to the EC were also 
significantly enlarged by the inclusion of rights to full de novo hearings.38  
Further refinements from the Minister, that were among matters later agreed by the 
Cabinet, included the power for the Authority to set its own procedures and rules of 
evidence. 39  The Authority would also be required to formulate its written decisions 
to meet the needs of the parties rather than the requirements of a higher court. The 
Minister’s primary concern lay in balancing the need to preserve existing rights of 
claimants to seek specific redress against the need for a lower level decision-making 
body to act in a “pragmatic and realistic way” without “excessive legalism or 
formality”.40  
The ensuing Cabinet discussion about an objective of the Employment Relations Bill, 
that it “recognise that legal rules tend to be divisive rather than constructive” resulted 
in an invitation to the Minister to reword it.  Her response was to agree to delete it, 
but not before the following justification of that particular wording: 
The intent of this provision, or sub-objective, needs to be seen in the specific context of the 
proposals for dispute resolution and grievance resolution under the Bill.  In short, that the 
emphasis here should be on processes and institutions that are directed at ensuring practical 
effective dispute resolution in a way that satisfies the principles of natural justice yet does not 
become trapped in excessive legalism and formalism.  In addition, that dispute resolution 
processes are aimed at settling differences and enhancing the ongoing employment relationship.  
That is, the promotion of co-operative and consensual, rather than adversarial and potentially 
divisive problem-solving techniques.41 
Stakeholder views 
Contemporaneous with the policy development process by officials was consultation 
by the Minister with the employment jurisdiction lawyers and judiciary, the former 
because they had become “major players” under the ECA and were perceived as 
having a major stake in the continuation of that regime, although they proved to be 
difficult to engage in a substantive way in the policy process.42  
Judicial views on a range of issues under consideration were sought, including 
concerns about the role of lawyers in mediation. The judges were unable to accept 
that the shortcomings of the current system could be attributed to the legal profession: 
It seems to be generally considered that, on balance, the legal profession is helpful in achieving 
the resolution of disputes by way of mediation as much in the employment context as in 
commercial ADR.  Many, if not most litigants would feel uneasy about going into the process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Office of Minister of Labour, Cabinet Submission, Employment Relations Bill – Finalisation of 
Outstanding Elements 17 February 2000, Options for Dispute Resolution and Enforcement, 17 
February 2000.	  
39	  Cabinet Minute, Employment Relations Bill - Dispute Resolution and Enforcement, (16 February 
2000) CAB(00) 63; AER (00) M 3.	  
40	  Cabinet Submission, note 38 at [21].	  
41	  Ibid, at [5].	  
42	  Margaret Wilson, The Employment Relations Act: A framework for a fairer way, in Rasmussen (ed) 
Employment Relationships, New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act (Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 2004), 9. 
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without the benefit of legal advice on call as the negotiation develops and possibly takes 
surprising turns.43  
They indicated that the minimum number of judges for the EC might have to increase, 
that the criteria for removals of proceedings and appeals to the EC should be widened 
and that the position of Head Registrar (to whom the other two would report) should 
be created. 
The view that the EC would require more judges was echoed in a number of lawyer 
submissions to the Select Committee that considered the Employment Relations Bill 
mid year. The Auckland District Law Society position was based on a view that 
parties to employment relationships had “the absolute right to have their dispute 
heard by a judicial body”44  and that the proposed structure of the institutions 
compromised access to justice from the power to appoint non-legally-qualified 
members to the Authority, and the absence of an express requirement of them to act 
judicially, record evidence, summarise submissions, give reasons for credibility 
findings, or record hearings. It was particularly exercised by the proposal to confer on 
the Authority powers that only the High Court had, in respect of the statutes to which 
it could look for remedies, the absence of any review function by the EC over the 
Authority and the absence of an exclusive jurisdiction for the EC to hear penalty and 
injunction claims.  Its major concerns about the Mediation Service were that it would 
be administered by the Department of Labour and its mediators would be employees, 
rather than warranted judicial figures.  The absence of statutory initiation procedures, 
powers to withhold information from mediators, sanctions for doing so and powers to 
review mediation proceedings were additional concerns.45 
 
Submissions from specialist employment lawyers were based on similar beliefs about 
the impracticality of informal procedures in this jurisdiction and of adversarial 
processes as the only way of managing proceedings characterised by “antagonism” or 
“strongly divergent views”.46 Expressing the same concerns as those of the Auckland 
District Law Society, one submission unwittingly undercut its plea to maintain the 
status quo by asserting both that delays at the Tribunal were attributable to the ECs 
exercise of its review function, and that the EC should retain this power.47 Pouring 
scorn on the idea that any employment relationship problem could form a basis for 
redress it urged the Committee to confine the Authority’s jurisdiction to identifiable 
causes of action.  Both predicted that the EC would be overburdened by dissatisfied 
customers seeking a full judicial hearing of their dispute, as the result of the 
Authority’s exercise of its draconian powers, with one going further to assert that the 
superior courts would impose upon the Authority the obligation to act judicially: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Chief Judge, Employment Court to Minister of Labour, letter, 15 February 2000.	  
44 	  Auckland District Law Society, Submission to Employment and Accident Insurance Select 
Committee, Employment Relations Bill, (undated c mid 2000), at [1.1]. 
45	  Ibid.	  
46 	  Christopher Toogood, QC, Submission to the Employment and Accident Insurance Select 
Committee, Employment Relations Bill, (undated) and Associate Professor William C Hodge 
Submission to the Employment and Accident Insurance Select Committee, Employment Relations Bill 
(1 May 2000). 
47	  Christopher Toogood, QC, note 46.	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….the ERA cannot be permitted, and will not be permitted in practice, to make ‘practical 
decisions quickly, with a minimum of detail, focussing on key issues and how to resolve them’ 
with an emphasis on informality.48 
 
The other advanced the view that investigative procedures were slower than 
adversarial ones, citing Human Rights Commission investigations as evidence: 
 
The notion that an Authoritarian/Investigator can touch down in a workplace, ask a few 
questions and emerge immediately with a determination is fabulous.  In addition, an investigator 
who is also a decision-maker will always be on the precipice of a breach of natural justice.  In 
the Human Rights Commission the investigative role is separate from the determinative decision 
making role: the Authority will both investigate and determine, will be both police officer and 
judge…. A review of the Authority’s determination will be a common outcome.49 
 
Support for these views came from at least two unions whose submissions were 
prepared by their legal officers.  One opposed the establishment of the Authority 
because a lack of clarity about its processes compromised members’ demands for 
certainty from adjudication, if required to resort to this method of problem 
resolution.50 The other doubted that the investigative procedure was capable of 
delivering on the promise of speedy, informal and practical justice because of what it 
perceived as its dual investigative and judicial role.  It too feared increased recourse to 
the EC.51 
 The inability of a party to call their own witnesses, the risk that informality would 
result in further bullying or victimisation of workers by aggressive employers or 
advocates, absence of rights to cross-examine, the length of time investigations would 
take, the extended jurisdiction for the Authority over bargaining, good faith and 
injunctions, uncertainty about the need for members to be legally trained, and no 
necessity for reasons for credibility findings were the reasons advanced by one union 
for regarding tribunal adjudication as more likely to deliver “more just and certain 
outcomes” than investigative meetings.52  
 
The opposing view, from a lawyer with recent experience of the investigative model, 
emphasised the need to have the new processes clear from the start.  To ensure that 
the Authority would operate in an entirely new way he warned against recruiting 
Tribunal members to the Authority with “set ideas about process”.53 Supportive of 
the format documents the Department proposed to adopt for proceedings, the 
proposed use of support staff to assist parties and telephone directions conferences he 
issued some advice about dealing with lawyers.54  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Ibid, at 8.	  
49	  Associate Professor William C Hodge, note 46, at [7.4].	  
50	  Service and Food Workers IUW, Submission to the Employment and Accident Insurance Select 
Committee, Employment Relations Bill, (undated) at [12.14].	  
51	  Post Primary Teachers Association, Submission to the Employment and Accident Insurance Select 
Committee, Employment Relations Bill, (undated).	  
52	  SFWU	  Submission, note 50, at 73-79.	  
53	  Department of Labour, note 32.	  
54	  Ibid: the advice included the need to clarify procedure at outset, use of a long table with parties 
seated either side (to facilitate constructive discussion), keeping lawyers seated, not accepting written 
submissions nor using the word ‘submission’.	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The Chief Tribunal Adjudicator and some Tribunal members, who opposed mediators 
becoming employees instead of holding warrants, repeated concerns in these 
submissions about the administration of the Mediation Service by the Department. 
 
Related concerns about the lack of clarity about mediator qualifications and the 
potential use of mediators with generic, rather than specialist employment expertise, 
were raised after the select committee process by reference to research that suggested 
that employment conciliators in Britain were less effective than their New Zealand 
counterparts because they offered conciliation only and were civil servants who were 
not required to be experienced in employment relations or law.  Mediation at the 
Employment Tribunal was described in this research as more proactive.  Its reliance 
on the evaluative model was attributed to higher settlement rates in New Zealand:  
This study identified the difference between the conciliator’s role and the mediator’s role as 
being a significant reason behind the different rates of settlement.55 
 
Select Committee Consideration 
The Employment and Accident Insurance Select Committee considered the 
Employment Relations Bill.  It was advised by the Department of Labour.  In its June 
2000 report to the select committee, after canvassing the submissions made, the 
Department formally reported on the policy reasons for the proposed changes to the 
employment institutions.  The first of the proposed changes underlined an intention to 
de-formalise the process by which grievances were resolved: 
Schedule 1 of the Employment Contracts Act provided a relatively formal ‘one size fits all’ 
process for the resolution of grievances including the exchange of documents between the parties 
setting out their respective positions.  This type of process is inconsistent with the policy 
approach in the Bill, which emphasises the desire of the parties to resolve their employment 
problems in the way best suited to their situation through informal means.56  
Allied to this emphasis on encouraging parties to resolve their own problems was the 
creation of a separate mediation function: 
The Employment Relations Bill establishes institutions which are intended to improve on the 
delivery of problem resolution services through the separation of the distinctly different 
functions of decision-making and mediation.  The Bill also places emphasis on mediation, as a 
more appropriate process for the resolution of employment problems, as it focuses on 
empowering individuals to resolve their problems themselves.  The Bill also emphasises a wider 
approach to mediation which includes a spectrum of assistance from information provision and 
face-to-face communication between the parties at the workplace.57  
The policy hope was that there would be less need for disputants to obtain legal 
assistance for mediation. This hope was bolstered by the view that legal aid would not 
be available for representatives to attend mediation because it was restricted to 
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  Susan Corby, Resolving Employment Disputes – Lessons from Great Britain? (1998) 23(3) New 
Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 153 at 159 cited by Peter Kiely, seminar paper on Employment 
Relations Bill, New Institutions:  Functions and Powers under the New Legislation (undated, c August 
2000).	  
56 Report of the Department of Labour to the Employment and Accident Insurance Select Committee, 
Employment Relations Bill, June 2000, at 115.	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  Ibid, at 150. 
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representation at court or tribunal proceedings.58  That, however, was the only plan to 
limit legal representation at mediation.  In conceding the advantages of representation 
at mediation by the presence of an objective person from whom a disputant could 
obtain suitable guidance, the Department essentially scuttled the recommendation of 
the Labour Party Interest group that legal representation occur only by consent of all 
parties to a claim. 59 
A large number of submissions were noted as supporting mediation so long as 
mediators had the requisite skills and training, but some, noted as coming mainly 
from employers, opposed compulsory or state provided mediation (on the grounds 
that there were plenty of private mediators about, or the Department was 
insufficiently independent as the provider).  The Department’s response emphasised 
its ability to adopt a strategic approach to the range of services required and to most 
efficiently allocate resources by targeting them where appropriate. Additionally the 
Mediation Service was regarded as having an important role in the dissemination of 
information about employment rights and obligations – information provision being 
regarded as a major way of de-escalating employment problems and reducing the 
need for judicial intervention.60  
Submissions about procedural and confidentiality issues at mediation were addressed 
by underlining the policy goal of focusing on the problem at issue, rather than on how 
it had been processed.  
On the issue whether mediation should be compulsory before adjudication the 
Department was concerned about the risks of litigants simply going through the 
motions in order to qualify for adjudication assistance.61  However it also envisaged a 
much less formal and more flexible adjudication service, available on request, with 
“no barriers to access for parties in terms of specialist knowledge of how to apply” 
and with work priorities responsive to need, effect and workload.62 
The Department’s response to those who opposed the establishment of the Authority 
referred to the broad powers conferred on the Tribunal to regulate its own procedures 
as failing to achieve the policy goal of low-level speedy dispute resolution. The new 
institutional framework was designed to remedy that problem by separating 
adjudicative and facilitative functions.  The concerns about its extensive investigative 
powers, potential for delays, wide and potentially complex jurisdiction, denial of 
judicial hearing, mixed role (investigation and decision making), informal procedures, 
lack of transparency in those procedures, lack of requirement for legal training were 
confronted by the assertion that the Authority was established to operate in a way that 
would not be constrained by the formalities of a judicial hearing.  It had powers that 
would enable it to take greater control of the matters before it and to operate flexibly, 
quickly and pragmatically. But the use of these powers did not preclude robust 
advocacy or argument about the merits of a case or the relevant legal principles, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Ibid: it also reflected a subsequent finding that parties are most likely to settle a case when neither is 
represented: Kuo-Chang Huang, note 27. 
59 Department of Labour, note 8. 
60 Ibid, at 153. 
61 Department of Labour, note 15. 	  
62 Ibid, at 7.	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because parties would retain the role of preparing and presenting their cases. However 
the need to incorporate the principles of natural justice was conceded: 
The Authority’s approach to decision-making is relatively unprecedented in NZ.  This does not 
mean that the principles of fairness will be compromised.  While the Bill in its current form does 
not make this explicit, it is intended that the Authority will be required to act in accordance with 
the principles of natural justice, and this needs to be clarified in the Bill.  This will include giving 
the parties the opportunity to be heard, and to respond to allegations against them.63 
Also conceded was the need to ameliorate the Bill’s provisions about the requirement 
to submit a good faith report to the EC on a challenge. Noting that the provision was 
intended to provide an incentive to take the Authority seriously the Department 
recommended an amendment to ensure that good faith reports would only be required 
if sought by the Court.64 
The need for adequate resourcing of the institutions was conceded by the 
announcement that the number of personnel available to deal with problem resolution 
would double.65 
In summary the changes to the adjudicating institutions were designed to ensure:  
• they were the exclusive providers of court based adjudication services (by 
excluding the Arbitration Act from applying to employment problems – to 
avoid involvement in the employment jurisdiction by the ordinary courts), 
although parties could still use their own alternative dispute resolution 
processes;66  
• there would be no need for them to focus on the way that an issue was dealt 
with by the forum below;67  
• the establishment of a “new body with new powers” the Employment 
Relations Authority (to avoid confusion with the Employment Tribunal) with 
specific powers unconstrained by the formalities of a judicial hearing, to 
operate flexibly, quickly and pragmatically in a wide jurisdiction, and to take 
greater control of proceedings to get to the nub of a problem;68  
• that included in the Authority’s new powers were investigative powers, 
limited decision-recording obligations and minimal administrative processes;69  
• full rights of appeal in the challenge of an Authority determination to the 
Employment Court, the ability to seek full de novo hearings or to limit an 
appeal to a particular question of law or fact;70  
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  Report of the Department of Labour, note 56 at 150.	  




68 Ibid, at 150. 
69 Ibid: “It is not intended that the Authority will carry out lengthy investigations, as a significant role 
in preparing and presenting arguments will still be carried out by the parties themselves…A significant 
amount of the Employment Tribunal’s time is currently used in writing decisions, which often include 
unnecessary detail, and which causes an unnecessary strain on resources and creates delay.” at 161. 
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• that the Authority’s processes would be taken seriously by the parties to an 
investigation by the provision of good faith reports to the Court, if sought, on 
any challenge to an Authority determination;71  
• that the Employment Court focus would be on the employment relationship 
problem at issue, and not on the way the issue was dealt with by the other 
institutions;72  
• further limitation of appeals to the Court of Appeal by: 
o  requiring leave which could only be granted if there was a public 
interest in the outcome:73  
o requiring, in the determination of appeals, regard to the objects of the 
legislation generally and as expressed in each of its parts.  
The reason for this limit on Court of Appeal powers was noted as follows: 
The express exhortation strengthens the normal presumption and discourages judicial activism. 
Combined with the legislative overruling of several Court of Appeal decisions in the ER 
Bill, this provision indicates that the Government does not intend to have the spirit of its 
legislation frustrated by a Court of Appeal that has already nailed its ideological colours to the 
mast.74 
Explaining the policy reasons behind these proposed changes to a Public Law 
Conference the Minister of Labour focussed on the need to reduce legalism in the 
employment relations dispute resolution system as an important policy aim.75  This, 
she said, was best achieved by designing processes that could resolve issues “as close 
as possible to their point of origin” (in the hope that working relationships could be 
supported and maintained), reduce the need for “legal and technical” arguments and 
representation and lower compliance costs for small employers by ensuring a 
“straightforward, common-sense and more user-friendly process.”  Notwithstanding 
their location in principles of fairness or reasonableness, the institutions, she argued, 
would still play an important role in interpreting the law:   
many employment relationship problems arise as a consequence of interpersonal difficulties 
[but] others involve substantive points of law, and the Courts are the proper place for these to be 
resolved.76  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Report of the Employment and Accident Insurance Legislation Committee (majority), undated: “In 
the case of a de novo hearing, the Court will hear the matter as if it had not been heard by the 
Authority and as if no decision had been made by the Authority.” at 38	  
71	  Ibid.	  
72	  Report of the Department of Labour, note 56.	  
73	  Report of the Select Committee, note 70: “The role of the Court of Appeal is to provide guidance on 
difficult matters of law, not to determine factual matters which are more appropriately dealt with by 
the specialist employment institutions.”	  at 40. 
74	  Paul Roth, The New Institutional Framework, [2000] ELB, 64 at 68.	  
75	  Minister of Labour, Address to Public Law Conference in Wellington: The Employment Relations 
Bill – a Case Study in Turning Policy into Legislation, 19 June 2000.	  
76	  Ibid.	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Employment Relations Act 2000 
When the Minister of Labour moved that the Employment Relations Bill be read in 
the House a second time on 8 August 2000 she noted that the Select Committee spent 
five months (169 hours) hearing and considering 2305 substantive and 391 oral 
submissions, but that apart from some technical changes to Part 10 (Institutions) no 
substantive changes to those particular provisions were recommended.77  On moving 
that the Bill be read for a third time a week later she said:  
I wish to ensure that this House clearly understands the broadness of the notion of mediation 
services under this Bill, and how the institutional arrangements generally are designed to focus 
on the problem between the parties.   
The mediation services being established are about flexible and innovative problem solving.  
They are not confined to the limited formal mediation constructs that our employment lawyers 
are used to.  They instead occupy a continuum from the provision of information through to 
formal or ‘pure’ mediation, the mix being chosen to suit the features and needs of the case in 
hand.   
If a problem does go beyond mediation to the Authority and the Court, those institutions are 
charged with focussing on that problem and resolving it.  They will not waste their own time, 
and that of the parties, by looking at how their fellow institutions have previously dealt with the 
same problem.78  
To these ends the objects for the institutions linked the ideas of: ‘successful 
employment relationships’ with reliance on the duty of good faith; their success with 
the prompt resolution of problems by the parties themselves; prompt resolution with 
ready access to ‘problem-solving support’ and information; problem solving 
procedures with flexibility; the inevitability of requirements for ‘judicial intervention’ 
with the need for triage by arbitration uninhibited ‘by strict procedural requirements’; 
‘difficult’ legal issues with ‘higher courts’.79 
If these objectives are compared to those for the institutions in the ECA it is 
immediately apparent that recognition of the need to encourage self-resolution is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Hon Margaret Wilson, NZ Government Press Release, Employment Relations Bill Second reading, 8 
August 2000.	  
78	  Ibid.	  
79	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 143. 
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common to both,80 as is the desire for informality of process at entry level,81 and the 
necessity to resort to more formal court processes for complex legal issues.82   
The differences between the ECA and the ERA included the timing of institutional 
involvement, the formal recognition of the role of information provision in dispute 
resolution, and the supervisory role of the EC. The timing issue concerned the point at 
which outside assistance should be made available to disputing parties.  The focus in 
the ERA, on supporting successful employment relationships, the availability of 
expert problem-solving support at short notice and on flexibility of problem solving 
procedures suggest a policy desire for disputing parties to resolve their differences 
before rights were affected or breaches of obligation crystallise.  It can be contrasted 
with the objective of providing specialist institutions to deal with the rights of parties 
to employment contracts in the ECA wherein that assistance was available once 
rights, obligations and their breach in contract had crystallised.   
In policy terms the ready availability of information and assistance in s 143(c) ERA 
formed part of the strategy for early intervention in dispute resolution.  Similarly the 
supervisory role of the Court over the Tribunal (s 76(d) ECA) reinforced the 
importance of correct legal process in dispute resolution.  This point of difference was 
underlined by the means by which the objectives were expressed. 
The policy desire of the Labour Government to emphasise the relational over the 
contractual nature of employment was echoed in a perceived need to de-couple 
dispute resolution (problem-solving) from formal legal process.  This required some 
attention to be paid to the use of language.  Thus ‘parties to employment contracts’ in 
the ECA became ‘employment relationships’; ‘differences’ became ‘problems’; 
‘speedy, fair and just resolution of differences’ became ‘problem-solving support’. 
De-legalising the language may have served other functions: the need, for instance, to 
signal a move away from the concept of dispute as the assertion of individual rights (s 
76(a) ECA) to a greater focus on resolution, regardless of source of dispute.   
A related difference concerned the connection between process and institutions. 
Section 76 ECA introduced the Tribunal and the Court and defined their respective 
roles.   The institutions are not named in s 143 ERA, underlining the intention to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Employment Contracts Act, s 76(b):  Appropriate services that will facilitate the mutual resolution 
by parties to employment contracts of differences that arise between them, it being recognised that, in 
many cases, such parties are the persons best placed to resolve such differences and should be assisted 
to do so themselves; 
Employment Relations Act, s 143(b): recognise that employment relationships are more likely to be 
successful if problems in those relationships are resolved promptly by the parties themselves; 
81	  Employment Contracts Act, s 76(c): A low level, informal, specialist Employment Tribunal to 
provide speedy, fair and just resolution of differences between parties to employment contracts, it 
being recognised that in some cases mutual resolution is either inappropriate or impossible: 
Employment Relations Act, s 143(f): recognise that judicial intervention at the lowest level needs to be 
that of a specialist decision-making body that is not inhibited by strict procedural requirements;	  
82	  Employment Contracts Act, s 76(d):  a specialist Employment Court to…deal with particular legal 
issues, it being recognised that the nature of employment contracts is such that the parties to 
employment contracts from time to time require the assistance and certainty that can be provided by a 
specialist court. 
Employment Relations Act, s 143(e) recognise that there will always be some cases that require 
judicial intervention; (g): recognise that difficult issues of law will need to be determined by higher 
courts	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privilege procedural flexibility over the institutional means by which dispute 
resolution services would be delivered. 
Notwithstanding this difference of focus about issues of process, statutory definitions 






Apparent from the earliest policy advice about institutional structure was a desire to 
address what were perceived to be the defects of the existing structure.  However it 
became the sole driver of institutional reform, crowding out alternatives, thus 
ensuring domination of the policy process by the problems of the (immediate) past.   
This explains the use of the term legalism to embody all that was regarded as 
problematic: the effects of requirements of legal process on the operations of the 
Tribunal; the way the ECs review function was exercised; the width of rights of 
appeal; the preference for adjudication as a first choice of mode of resolution and the 
corresponding absence of formal filter or triage mechanisms for reducing pressure on 
the Tribunal.  Just as legalism was regarded as the source of all problems, so would 
informalism operate as a universal panacea.84  This required detailed consideration of 
cause and effect for remedial options, mainly by reference to the means by which 
representatives could subvert policy intentions.  
Thus, removal of the ECs review function would only have the desired effect if the 
appeal structure was altered.  Its mere existence was regarded as having the capacity 
to impose an undesirable formality of process on the lower order institution.85 
However, less formal procedures in that body raised concerns that review and appeal 
rights would be adversely affected.  Conferring a de novo jurisdiction on the ECs 
appellate function addressed these concerns because it reduced incentives to rely on 
defects of Tribunal process as the basis of appeal, provided a traditional adversarial 
forum for those who equated informality with unfairness, and eliminated the problem 
of confining the appellate function to the evidence adduced in the lower body.  The 
problem of surface compliance (going through the motions of resolution attempts by 
lower order bodies in order to save evidence for the appellate one) raised by this 
appellate function was solved by transferring control for the provision of evidence 
from the parties to the Authority. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s103 contained a sixth ground for a grievance, racial harassment, 
but otherwise is almost identical to Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 27, which in turn was the same 
provision as the Labour Relations Act 1987, s 210 (except that the word worker was replaced by the 
word employee) which was based on the Industrial Relations Act 1973, s 117, the statute that 
introduced the claim. 
84	  Richard Abel (ed), The Politics of Informal Justice (Academic Press New York, 1982). 
85	  Department of Labour, note 8.	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Separation of modes of resolution also served to address more than a single issue.  
The intention for the Mediation Service was that it would reduce pressure on the 
adjudication functions of the other two institutions by operating as a filter for 
proceedings for which settlement was likely. This undermined the prerogative of 
representatives to select mode of resolution. It also diverted them from focussing on 
process by requiring them to address issues of substance (the essence of the 
Department’s campaign against legalism). 
Process disputes about whether mediation was appropriate were avoided by the 
decision to refrain from statutorily requiring it to be compulsory.  Imposing on the 
Authority a duty to ensure that, where appropriate, matters were subject to mediation 
achieved compulsion by indirect means but the discretion to waive the requirement 
ensured that its ability to act quickly was not compromised.86   
Structuring the route of dispute resolution in this way addressed the problem of 
classifying disputes according to the mode of resolution regarded as most appropriate 
for them.  As some of the lawyer submissions to the select committee revealed, a 
characteristic of lawyer representative culture is a confidence about identifying what 
matters are or not capable of negotiated settlement. 87  Their assertion of this 
confidence ignored the important fact about litigation in this jurisdiction that 
settlement occurred during the litigation process in more claims than were heard and 
decided but it serves to underline the difference of (representative) cultural view 
described in chapter 3 about timing of negotiation.  Union/employer association 
representatives relied on early negotiations for early settlements and had adapted their 
behaviour towards each other accordingly, whereas lawyer representatives were more 
likely to see negotiation as a function of the litigation process.88   
Separation of resolution functions created a problem for the preferred resolution mode 
of the Government’s political supporters, med/arb. This mode addressed the problem 
of dependence on multiple institutions or hearings for the resolution of low-level 
problems, an issue overridden in the policy development process by fears that a 
med/arb mode would be swamped by the demands of process.89  The concern about 
multiple hearings appears also to have been subsumed by an optimism that mediation 
as the dominant mode of resolution would solve this problem for most claimants.  The 
inclusion of med/arb as an option offered by the Mediation Service (for parties who 
consented) avoided problems of appeal or review by the expedient of conferring the 
same status on mediator decisions as settlements.90  
The major lesson of institutional functioning from the Department’s experience of the 
Tribunal, adequate resourcing for the new structure from the outset, resulted in the 
promise to double personnel at the lower levels.91 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Employment Relations Act, s 159: Duty to consider mediation.	  
87	  See, for example,	  the submissions in note 46.	  
88	  Mark Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, (2004) 1(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 459. 
89	  Department of Labour, note 15.	  
90	  Employment Relations Act, s 150 Decision by authority of parties.	  
91	  Report of the Department of Labour, note 56.	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Apart from the creation of the Mediation Service the institutional structure imposed 
on the jurisdiction by the ECA, designed to privilege individual over collective 
interests, remained intact.92  Never explored, for instance, were options that returned 
responsibility for grievance resolution back to employees and employers, or a 
committee system at which the interests of both parties were represented in the 
facilitation/decision function, or to any structure dominated by the collective interests 
of parties to employment disputes.  It can thus be argued that retention of a structure 
that represented the preferences of legal representatives over collective ones 
entrenched, rather than challenged, their domination of dispute resolution in this 
jurisdiction.  The addition of another tier to the structure served only to consolidate an 
already dominant position.  This is a point Richard Abel makes in respect of what he 
calls the movement from formalism to informalism which he argues solidifies shifts 
in power from the less to the more privileged, but is nonetheless characterised in the 
language of process.	   	  Process values appear neutral: informalism does not obviously 
favour any group or category but because the outcome of informal processes is 
described as compromise and that produces unbiased results only when the opponents 
are equal then compromise between unequals “inevitably reproduces inequality”.93 
This is also the position of Owen Fiss who argues that settlements reflect wealth and 
power inequalities and adjudication aspires to autonomy from distributional 
inequalities.94 
However Abel also argues that informal institutions have the capacity to advance the 
liberation of the less privileged, a more humane process (if they “express some of the 
aspirations of the disputants”), greater participation by parties and less dependence 
on professionals.95 
This in turn suggests a quality of outcome measure for the new structure, particularly 
if the view is correct that change in process, substance or institutional access alters 
outcomes: 
Because the vast majority of disputes are resolved by the disputants themselves anticipating the 
behaviour of legal institutions (formal or informal), the consequences of any change in that 
behaviour is greatly amplified in extra institutional social life.  All processes are outcome 
influential, if not outcome determinative. 96	  
In providing for reinstatement as the primary remedy for individual grievances, a 
measure of its success would be the shift in remedies from damages for dismissal to 
reinstatements, or from ended to mended employment relationships. This was 
certainly the prediction of one commentator at the time this remedy was 
foreshadowed: 
In the individual context of personal grievance claims, the remedy of reinstatement will probably 
stage a comeback. This is likely to result in a significant change to the way personal grievances 
are resolved in the future. Where it is claimed, reinstatement is likely to become a more 
commonly awarded substantive remedy and this, in turn, will likely result in increased numbers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Roth, note 74. 
93	  Richard Abel, Conservative Conflict and the Reproduction of Capitalism: The Role of Informal 
Justice (1981) 9 International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 245, at 257.	  
94	  Owen Fiss, (1984) Against Settlement, 93 Yale Law Journal 1073. 	  
95	  Abel, note 93 at 263.	  
96	  Abel, note 84 at 301.	  
	   114	  
of cases where interim reinstatement is sought and granted, pending the substantive resolution of 
grievances.97	   
The differences between the policy hope and Abel’s prescription for successful 
informal institutions also suggest a quality of process measure:  the extent to which 
this structure advances or inhibits resort to the primary remedy.  Abel is pessimistic.  
Characterising the privacy in which informal institutions operate as isolating grievants 
and inhibiting collective perceptions of common grievances, he argues that their 
remedies are limited to what their more powerful adversaries are prepared to offer: 
As a consequence the grievant is receptive to the only remedy the informal institution can offer – 
exit from the relationship.  Informalism thus offers a result, as well as a process, that is 
individualistic: it fosters labour mobility...This simply provides normative sanction for the 
dominant response to grievance and incipient conflict – namely avoidance.98 
Focusing on policy goals of maintenance and restoration of community relationships 
he observes that: 
It is ironic that institutions publicly justified by the ideal of community and targeted at disputes 
arising in ongoing relationships serve instead to dissolve community and to terminate 
relationships by facilitating exit.  Just as compromise preserves the material status quo, so exit 
reproduces the social status quo.  The mediation technique chosen by most programs – 
communication by the disputants only indirectly, through the mediator, a form of shuttle 
diplomacy – increases the probability that the relationship will be severed, just as it does in 
labour disputes.  Informal justice can be seen as adapting the middle class response to conflict – 
exit – to the circumstances of the dominated by surrounding that option with greater physical 
security and endowing it with authoritative normative approval. 99	  	  
This suggests that the challenge for the new structure, in both quality of outcome and 
process terms, concerned its ability to influence and effect changes to the results of 
employment relationship problems.  If it continued to preside over the terms of ending 
those relationships, then it could safely be concluded that the changes to process were 
for nought.  If, however, it became the means by which problem resolution 
contributed to greater stability of existing relationships then some success could be 
claimed for it.   
Mediation function 
The Department attributed the problem of legalism in mediation to perceptions of it as 
a function of the Tribunal’s adjudicative jurisdiction, meaning that it suffered from a 
formalised application or initiation process which required claims to be couched in 
terms of contractual legal issues and was restricted, in the remedies available, to those 
mandated by the adjudicative function.  It thus conformed to lawyer requirements of 
the settlement process (formal claiming, appearance at a neutral forum, settlement of 
legal issues by a third party) by mimicking the way that lawyers settle litigation at the 
court door.   
Disrupting this model was regarded as dependent on changing the object and style of 
the mediation services on offer, so that policy effort was devoted to the characteristics 
of the institution, in the hope that the shuttle style of Tribunal mediation (on which 
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Employment Law Bulletin, 3.	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  Abel, note 84, at 290.	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  Ibid, at 294.	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legal representatives relied) would be overtaken by other approaches.100  The extent to 
which changes to initiation procedures and the style of mediation would alter these 
expectations was not considered. This may well have been the result of an optimism 
that since representation at mediation was unnecessary it would dissipate.  In turn, this 
suggests a reduction in levels of representation at the Mediation Service resulting in 
the availability and use of a range of mediation styles as a quality of process measure 
of success. 
Another measure of policy success concerned the point at which mediation services 
would be sought.  Early intervention, for the purpose of strengthening, or maintaining 
rather than facilitating termination of employment relationships was the major policy 
goal for the Mediation Service.  The emphasis, during the policy development 
process, on its information provision function suggested that it would operate 
proactively, to ensure that employers and employees were both aware of the 
assistance it could provide and incentivised to use it.  However the means by which 
this would occur was not spelt out.  This policy goal is also one that can be measured 
by reference to the status of employment relationships at the point at which the 
Mediation Service became involved. 
The need for the information function highlights a fundamental problem for the 
evolution of mediation from its original use in the 19th and 20th centuries (as the 
means by which the collective interests of well-organised and experienced adversaries 
in industrial disputes were conciled) to its use in the 21st century for individuals with 
widely differing levels of understanding and power.101 Joint facilitation of individual 
grievances by representatives of both capital and labour in the 1970s and 80s 
mitigated this effect by ensuring a rough kind of equality of arms in the availability of 
information and advice to disputants.  This effect was lost with the transfer of the 
mediation function to the Tribunal whose guarantees of confidentiality had the effect 
not only of isolating disputants (from those with similar issues) but also of restricting 
flows of information about the resolution of those issues by others.102  
This suggests a similar quality of outcome measure for the information function as for 
reinstatement: the extent to which mediation contributed to the mending rather than 
the ending of employment relationships. 
The employment status of mediators was a subject dear to the Department’s heart, 
perhaps as a result of its experience of administering solely warranted officers at the 
Employment Tribunal.  Their refusal to accept administrative direction about circuit 
work in 1998 (when temporary reductions were proposed as the means to remain 
within budget allocations) became the subject of press attention and complaints to the 
Minister and revealed the existence of simmering tensions between warranted and 
administrative personnel.103  Employee status was likely to have been perceived as 
delivering staff who would be more co-operative and/or more easily directed, in the 
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  Julie Morton, MA Thesis: Reducing Legalism: The Impact of the Employment Relations Act 2000, 
University of Otago, 2003. 
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  Allan Rau, Edward Sherman, Scott Peppet Processes of Dispute Resolution: The Role of Lawyers 
(4th ed, Foundation Press, Westbury, New York, 2006).	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  Abel, note 84, at 290.	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event of fluctuations of demand, thus providing the Service with the flexibility that 
the Tribunal lacked. 
It is, however, more likely that its inability to impose performance accountability 
standards on warranted officers and to influence their rates of pay (set independently 
by the Higher Salaries Commission) were the reasons for its advocacy of this status.  
It was easier for the Department to collect and act upon information about individual 
mediator rates of settlement if they were employees, and to manage its budget.  Part 
of the problem of resourcing for the Tribunal was created by HSC determined salary 
increases that were required to be met from existing budgets, unlike those for the 
judiciary which were outside the Department’s budgetary responsibilities.  The 
Department was, furthermore, forced to go cap in hand to its Minister whenever 
increases in Tribunal member numbers were required to address delays.  This must 
have operated as an incentive to change because control over mediator salaries 
suggested they would be cheaper to employ so that more of them could be engaged, 
thus conferring on the Department more power to directly address resourcing issues 
than it had for the previous decade.   
This stance on employment status suggests the measure of success for this policy 
position as concerning timeliness of response to requests for mediation services.   
The Department’s recommendation opposing the inclusion of a med/arb function 
represented a significant departure from its views of its utility to grievance 
committees in 1991.  At that time it was regarded as a policy success because it 
provided for the final resolution of a greater number of grievances at entry level 
thereby reducing the need for the Labour Court to be involved.  This change of heart 
underlined the dominance of its fears of further formalising mediation: any decision-
making power carried that risk in its view.  There may also have been a worry about 
the time that would be taken up by the decision-making function.  A ‘pure’ mediation 
process had a greater chance of occurring within pre-set or acceptable time limits (e.g 
half a day).104  These concerns were addressed by introducing requirements of consent 
for med/arb.105  There were, however, no obligations on the Service to advertise this 
function so take-up was likely to be affected by how well understood the existence of 
this power was to potential users. Its measure of success, given the Department’s 
opposition to it, can therefore be connected to its visibility.  
Adjudication function 
An explanation for resort to the inquisitorial or investigative model for the Authority, 
beyond the need for a local response, comes from an historical analysis of 
delegalisation movements in the United States, where cost (to parties and the state) 
was accepted as the major driver of reforms designed to address the problem of legal 
formality.106 The common response (at each end of the 20th century) was to channel 
and absorb minor conflict into specialised forums.  This response was itself an aspect 
of broader social reforms which: 
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  Department of Labour, note 15.	  
105	  Employment Relations Act, 2000 s 150. 
106	  Christine Harrington, Delegalization Reform Movements: A Historical Analysis, in Richard Abel 
(ed) The Politics of Informal Justice, (Academic Press, New York, 1982).	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attempted to expand the judicial capacity of courts and court-related institutions to manage minor 
disputes through the use of informal procedures, mediation and arbitration.  The objectives of the 
contemporary [late 20th century] delegalisation movement are efficient dispute processing and 
expansion of access to justice in minor criminal and civil disputes.  Both goals have antecedents 
in the progressive [early 20th century] reforms.  Critics of both sets of reforms have argued that 
these two objectives are in conflict.  But this historical overview has suggested that by 
examining these objectives in light of the organisational context from which delegalisation 
programmes develop, we find these objectives are collateral policies of an administrative-
technocratic rationale for judicial intervention in order maintenance.  It is apparent that dispute 
processes premised upon hostility to formality play a significant role in the judicial management 
strategies of the 20th century.  The expansion of administrative access to justice and the 
expansion of participatory access to justice under such reforms were facilitated by the rise of 
judicial management and extended through the contemporary decentralisation of judicial 
management.  Both objectives were structured by the politics of judicial management – the 
concentration of judicial power under an ideology of expanding participation.107 
This description of the means by which order maintenance has come to be dominated 
by the legal paradigm helps to explain why the policy development process was 
confined to improvements to an institutional structure in place for barely a decade.  
The characterisation of the desire for change to institutional dispute processing as 
‘hostility to formality’ neatly encapsulates the nature of the struggle between 
administrative and lawyer interests over the Authority’s adjudicative function.  
Lawyer concerns confirmed policy and administrative views about legalism (or 
formalism) because they relied on arguments that, decoded, equated quality (of 
decision, decision maker and process) with status.  Accordingly ‘justice’ was only 
possible via judges (or at a pinch, the legally qualified) and adversarial process.  
These views can be contrasted with those of Fiss, who characterises adjudication as 
the pursuit of ‘justice’, not in terms of status or process, but in terms of its 
reinforcement of public, communitarian values.108	  In its use of public resources and 
reliance on public law, adjudication explicates and underlines public values – those 
embodied by statute – so that litigation of them is the (public) mechanism by which 
they are enforced.  Perceived in those terms, it could be argued that adjudication need 
not be tied to any particular mode, or set of rules, so long as process and decision are 
publicly defensible. 
However Kagan’s description of Western European inquisitorial systems as offering 
efficiency advantages over their common law adversarial counterparts in claim 
resolution emphasises their multi-dimensional characteristics as a key aspect of their 
success.109  In addition to the greater control that judges have over case progress in 
inquisitorial systems, and their higher ratio to representatives (2-4 representatives per 
judge, cf 18 per judge in the United States) their recruitment, training, socialisation 
and supervision are directed at maximising adjudicative predictability, a social value 
accorded less status in common law jurisdictions.110  Efficiency in case progression 
could be regarded as an incident of this goal, rather than as an aim in its own right.  
This raises the issue whether it is possible to pluck from a system a mode of 
adjudication reliant for its success on a culture and a host of other characteristics not 
included in the transfer. 
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  Ibid, at 63.	  
108	  Fiss, note 94.	  
109	  Kagan, note 31. 
110	  Ibid.	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These competing ideas about the arbitration function suggest that the measure of 
success for the investigative model lay in timeliness, rates of appeal and choice of 
mode of appeal.  The time between claim and resolution would reveal whether 
investigations were quicker (and cheaper) than traditional adversarial processes, a 
high de novo challenge rate would confirm lawyer concerns about the problems of 
process in the ERA111 but a low rate could be scored as a win for the policy makers.112   
Adjudicative predictability, a potential measure of success of the investigative model, 
had particular relevance for the employment jurisdiction as the result of the 
preponderance of dismissal grievances.  However the intention for the Authority to 
resolve problems (not legal issues) informally and immediately via “succinct 
determinations (rather than long legal decisions)”113 militated against this measure, 
as did the Authority’s power to resolve problems regardless of the way they were 
presented or classified.  Precedent, an incident of legal method, was implicitly 
disavowed as a basis of problem resolution for the Authority because the higher 
courts could address difficult issues of law.114  Predictability, the stated aim of the 
Chief Judge in 1991,115 was therefore dependent on an adversarial rather than an 
inquisitorial institution. 
The most significant changes to appellate functions were intended to disrupt 
formalism’s connection of ‘justice’ to status.  Thus, limiting EC review functions to 
Judicature Act judicial review powers and further deferring their exercise by requiring 
rights of appeal to be exercised first116 was intended to deter reliance on process as the 
means of obtaining rights of audience at the Court of Appeal. This intention to reduce 
incentives to rely on superior resources in the search for the institutionalisation of 
ideological positions117 was reinforced by the addition of obligations on the Court of 
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  Kenneth Johnston, King John, Runnymede, the Magna Carta, and Other Stuff [2000] ELB 158: 
“The simple fact of the matter is that process rights have been hard won over a long time (in fact, since 
the 15th of June 1215), and they remain vitally important. In the writer’s view there is every prospect 
that the procedure which the Employment Relations Authority seems likely to adopt in exercising its 
adjudicative role may be the subject of challenge.” 
112	  Phillip Green, Vive La Difference? Dispute resolution under the Employment Relations Act 2000 
[2000] ELB, 137: “Unless there is transparency within the process (and natural justice is concerned 
with ensuring a high degree of visibility through the process), then the Employment Relations Authority 
will be bereft of integrity before it starts work. This may require of the Authority that in practical terms 
it tempers the application of s 174(b). A strict reliance by the Authority on s 174(b) is likely to create 
mistrust. The party who “loses” will have that mistrust confirmed, because the process does not allow 
the opportunity for a losing party to understand how it was that the decision came to be made.  
The adage that “for justice to be done it must be seen to be done” is drawn from the well of human 
experience which says that such an approach will find a large measure of acceptability. 
The ER Act may offer speedy resolution, but will it provide for a just resolution?” 
113	  Lorraine Skiffington The Making of the Employment Relations Act — a Recipe for Success [2001] 
ELB 37. 
114	  Ibid.	  
115	  T G Goddard, Chief Judge, Employment Court The Only Constant is Change …The Changed Role 
of the Employment Court under the Employment Relations Act 2000 [2000] ELB 115: “My vision for 
the Court in 1991 was to achieve certainty in an environment that was novel and therefore obscure. I 
saw certainty as a high form of justice in this ambiguous atmosphere. Was this achieved? History will 
be the judge. An indicator may be that cases have latterly been settling at the Court door in increasing 
numbers.”   
116	  Employment Relations Act, 2000 ss 188(4), 194.	  
117	  Roth, note 74.	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Appeal to apply a public interest test to the questions of law before it and to have 
regard to the objects of the statutory provisions at issue.118  
The measure of success of this policy goal is likely to be in the extent to which the 
affected courts acknowledged and applied these restrictions. This would be reflected 
in the number of challenges and appeals. Compliance would reduce and non-
compliance increase them.  
Representation and institutional personnel 
Explicit in the policy process was the intention to reduce the presence of lawyers in 
the dispute resolution institutions, particularly at the lower levels.119  Not only were 
parties free “to choose any other person to represent” them120 but statutory provisions 
about the roles of mediator and Authority member remained pointedly free of 
individual qualification requirements.  Although lawyers were associated with the 
formalist response to the ECA, to which increases in the time and cost of enforcing 
rights (particularly individual rights) were attributed, they have long operated as a 
focus for fears about their capacity to undermine intentions to confront formality.  
Abel’s characterisation of informalism as “expressing a strong, if implicit animus 
against lawyers”121 does not prevent him from also noting the paradoxical effect of 
reforms that seek to eliminate lawyers but which generate more legal business for 
them as the result of the way that “informalism interacts with formal legal institutions 
along complex boundaries”.122 It operates to both simplify disputes and increase their 
number, “making them more amenable to mass processing and permitting lawyers to 
increase their profits”.123  This is an accurate description of the reaction of the legal 
profession to the creation of the Employment Tribunal and the appearance of no-win-
no-fee advocates. It may also explain the predictions of a rise in appeals to the EC that 
its de novo function and the Authority’s investigative function would yield. 
It is in the description of the means by which informal institutions exchange 
institutional dependence on lawyers for that of paraprofessionals (“notwithstanding 
the rhetoric of disputant participation and self-reliance”)124 that Abel’s analysis can 
be put to use.  He argues that informal institutions possess distinctive advantages for 
some participants and disadvantages for others.  This raises the issue whether the 
change of role for mediators from the Tribunal to the Mediation Service had the 
potential to affect their status and authority as the result of the influence on the 
Department of academic perceptions of the role as non-directive and facilitative.125  
These ideas conflicted with lawyer requirements for the evaluative, directive style of 
Tribunal mediation.  The facilitative/evaluative dichotomy was the subject of much 
debate between mediators in the United States in the 1990s when lawyers and former 
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  Employment Relations Act, 2000 ss 214(3), 216.	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  Hon Laila Harré, Associate Minister of Labour, Speech notes “The Future of New Zealand’s 
Industrial Relations Framework”, address to the 14th Annual Industrial Relations Conference, 
Auckland, 7 March 2000: “The aim of these institutions is to keep costs down and make it unnecessary 
to involve a lawyer every time an employer or employee has a problem”.	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  Employment Relations Act, 2000 s 236.	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  Hutcheson, Mediation in the 21st century, [2000] Employment Law Bulletin, 99. 
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judges came to dominate their ranks. Their more directive evaluative style challenged 
the existing facilitative style: 	  
Some lawyers, and particularly former judges, did not easily take to the traditional non-directive 
style of mediation, relying instead on their legal knowledge and experience to ‘reality test’ with 
the parties about the strength of their cases and to ‘evaluate’ the issues and predict court 
outcomes. [The Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service relied heavily on ex-judges as 
neutrals] in the conviction that the parties often wanted some sort of evaluation of their cases by 
a person who could speak with experience and authority about how a court might resolve a 
dispute.126       	   
This suggests a quality of process measure of success of the facilitative style favoured 
by policy for the Mediation Service as the extent to which it survived representative 
requirements for the evaluative model. 
A related feature of Abel’s informal institutions is that officials within them with legal 
qualifications tend to dominate the shape of such institutions. They attract judicial 
support because of their value as repositories for economically, politically and 
socially insignificant or repetitive cases that don’t fully engage judicial legal skills 
(and may resist legal resolution) and because the existence of subordinates 
(particularly in high numbers) is status enhancing.  Such institutions come, 
eventually, to resemble the courts they were designed to replace.127   
This suggests a measure of policy success for the Authority as the degree to which the 
Authority developed and maintained the inquisitorial culture prescribed for it. This 
was likely to depend on who dominated in the struggle for control over evidence 
availability, Authority member or representatives.  As Roth noted, the change of 
representative culture required by this change to adjudicative function would only 
occur if industrial practitioners perceived that their clients’ interests were best 
advanced by shedding old adversarial habits for a mutual problem-solving approach 
that incorporated good faith obligations. 128 
There is also a quality of outcome measure suggested by the policy desire to reduce 
the influence of lawyers on claiming and disputing in this jurisdiction: the extent to 
which their influence diminished, or altered in line with policy goals for problem 
solving approaches that supported, rather than ended employment relationships. 
The following three chapters will describe and assess the operations of the institutions 
in terms of these policy goals and suggested measures of their achievement. 
 
Quality of Outcome 
 We are endeavouring to rebuild an economy that recognises the reality of the global economy 
for a small economy such as ours. We must trade. We must compete. We must develop our 
skills. We must create environments that support and encourage innovation and creativity.129 
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  Hon Margaret Wilson, Minister of Labour, New Zealand’s Path Forward [2001] ELB 1. 
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This policy position for the ERA could well have explained policy for the ECA were 
it not for a prefacing disavowal of the latter’s construction of the employment 
relationship as a purely economic contract.  This may explain why the new 
Government’s desire to promote collectivism in the labour market was expressly not 
to be at the expense of individualism,130 nor a return to the traditional instruments of 
compulsory unionism, national awards, monopoly unions, and compulsory 
arbitration.131 
 
Ultimately, the aim is to encourage individualism and collectivism to flourish side by side. 
Balancing the rights of individuals and promoting collectives presented quite a challenge to 
ensure that the legislation catered for both diversity and flexibility while addressing the 
fundamental issue of inequality in the workplace.132 
   
Both collective and individual rights would be enforced by the employment 
institutions, only more quickly and at less cost than under the ECA, by substituting its 
legalism for good faith, mutual trust and confidence and an emphasis on the human 
relational nature of employment. The ERA would focus on behaviours rather than 
contracts, on rebuilding cooperative workplace relationships for improved levels of 
productivity, buttressed by a new brand of mediation as the primary problem-solving 
process designed to be “fair, flexible and free”, neither institutionalised not restricted 
to formal intervention, supported by a specialist decision-making body uninhibited by 
strict procedural requirements and reinforced by reinstatement as the primary 
remedy.133  
 
This policy ambition for institutional process – that it would influence the day-to-day 
behaviours and negotiations on which employment relationships depend, in the hope 
that increased productivity, innovation and skill development would result134 – can be 
contrasted with the approach to the institutions under the ECA.  In 1991 expectations 
of the institutions was limited to their role in order maintenance (in the transition 
from collectivism to individualism).  
 
Analysis of outcomes will focus on the consequences of the ECA that the ERA was 
designed to overcome:  
 
a reduction in the level of unionisation from around 60 per cent to about 20 per cent of the 
workforce; increased flexibility in the use of labour through an increase in casualisation of work; 
stagnant gains to productivity to around 0.5 per cent a year; increasing levels of income 
inequality, especially in the middle income groups; increased compliance costs, especially in the 
area of personal grievances where the advent of lawyers increased the costs of the process of 
dispute resolution; and a decline in the skill base through a combination of emigration and failure 
to resource skill training and retraining.135 
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  Lorraine Skiffington, note 113. 
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134 David Mangan, Employment Tribunal Reforms to Boost the Economy, (2013) 42 (4) Industrial Law 
Journal, 409 argues that recent reforms to employment tribunal procedures in Britain emphasise the use 
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this intention. 
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Chapter 6 
Employment Relations Act Institutions 
Operations and Policy: The Mediation Service 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold: to describe the operations of and the policy 
development process for the Mediation Service (MS); and to assess both in terms of 
the measures (quality of outcome and quality of process) suggested in chapter 5 and 
those contained in the Department of Labour’s Evaluation and Monitoring Strategy 
for the employment institutions.1 This 3-phase strategy to ascertain the effects of the 
legislative changes to the labour environment was intended to focus on the new 
mediation and adjudication structures and the means by which they met the objectives 
of speedy, informal dispute resolution closer to the workplace, fewer formal disputes 
and better, fairer, ongoing employment relationships.  Phase 1 of the strategy 
proposed research on how well prepared employers were to respond to the changes.  
Phase 2 proposed monitoring and tracking of the institutions, for the purpose of 
determining what effect the MS had on the resolution of disputes, by the collection 
and analysis of data about claims (types, numbers, timeliness, resolution, institutional 
capacity). Phase 3 proposed an assessment of the effect of the changes on 
employment relationships two or three years after the Act came into force by looking 
at whether there was any change in the number and type of disputes handled by the 
institutions. 
The following analysis describes the MS’s operations and policy development for the 
period between 2000 and 2008 in terms of the Department’s Evaluation and 
Monitoring Strategy.  Discussion of that material is contained in the section entitled 
Conclusions that considers, first, quality of process measures and, second, quality of 
outcome measures.   
Operations: 2000-2005 
Claim and Use Statistics  
As occurred in the Employment Contracts Act era, the Department changed its means 
of collecting and describing the data concerning the employment institutions from 
time to time after the Employment Relations Act was enacted.  Immediately apparent 
was a significant increase in reliance on institutional dispute resolution provided by 
the MS.  In its first 9 months of operation (1 October 2000 – 30 June 2001) the MS 
received over 450 more requests for assistance than the highest of the annual filings at 
the Employment Tribunal.2  As with the Tribunal, requests for MS assistance initially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Evaluation and Monitoring Strategy, 2 May 2000.	  
2	  In 1997 5,581 proceedings were filed at the Tribunal.  Between 1 October 2000 and 30 June 2001 
6035 requests for assistance were made to the Mediation Service: Department of Labour for Minister 
of Labour, Industrial Relations Service – Monthly Monitoring Reports, October 2001-June 2002. 
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increased annually,3 but unlike the Tribunal they stabilised within 3 years, so that by 
2005 the MS could expect to receive between 4,400 and 4,800 requests for assistance 
each 6 months (as it had between December 2002 and December 2005).4  
Personal grievances dominated the subject matter of mediations.  By 2002 they 
constituted 65% of the workload.   
Timeliness of resolution rates differed significantly from the Tribunal.  Most requests 
were completed within 3 months of receipt (94% in the December 2002 quarter, 
compared with 91% in the same 2001 quarter).5 
Of outcomes derived from requests for assistance in the period 1 July 2001-30 June 
2005 (average = 7000 annually) withdrawal/not proceeding rates stabilised at around 
21%, settlements following mediation at 57% and not settled rates at 17%.  However 
once private settlements are added to these outcomes it becomes clear that settlements 
rose in both number and percentage (of all outcomes) from 1291 (14%) to 2634 
(27%).6 Private settlements are those concluded outside the Service, but registered 
with it for enforcement purposes. 
Satisfaction rates 
User satisfaction with the MS was high at the end of its first nine months of operation 
with a client satisfaction rate of 86%. Its services were regarded as an improvement 
on those offered previously, particularly for speed of scheduling mediations and 
flexibility with arrangements.7  A subsequent survey of satisfaction rates appeared to 
confirm the early one:  
The emphasis on mediation has been a success.  The June 2002 EMA (Central) survey concluded 
that 70% of surveyed employers who have attended mediation have been satisfied with the 
process and outcome, which suggests that the Act is working well…. Client satisfaction surveys 
confirm this view, with 88% of surveyed mediation users indicating they were either satisfied or 
very satisfied with mediation.8 
By 2004 the Service’s “culture of prompt and effective organisation” was described 
as one of its “undisputed triumphs”:  
 
Almost without exception, the support officers at the Mediation Service are well organised 
and supportive in attempts to arrange prompt mediations. Further, the Mediation Service has 
shown a willingness to indulge parties by arranging mediations to fit particular circumstances 
which, among other things, might include: 
  • a willingness to mediate after working hours (to accommodate the needs of the parties); 
  • a willingness to mediate on weekends; 
  • an ability to take account of cultural considerations (by involving appropriate people in the 
mediation process — often in addition to the mediator); and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In 2001 7,480 requests were received, rising to 8,920 in 2002 and 9,400 in 2003.  Since then annual 
requests hover around 9,000. 
4	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour,	  Use of Contact call centre (Infoline) and Mediation 
Service,	  (undated c early 2006).	  
5	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Issues Paper, Review of the Employment Relations Act 
(undated, c February 2003).	  
6	  Department of Labour, Key Messages: Employment Relations The ERA is working (undated, c 2006).	  
7	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour,	   The First 9 Months under the ERA: Report for the 
period 2.10.00-30.6.01,	  25 July 2001.	  
8	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Report (undated c late 2002).	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  • a practical ability to take account of parties’ concerns (such as security issues in the case of 
workplace violence or sexual harassment problems). 
 
In short, from the practitioner’s perspective, the Government has provided a well-oiled machine, 
with an admirable ability to provide mediation services in a prompt fashion and taking into 
account the particular circumstances of the parties to mediation. 9 
 
Mediation style 
The policy goal of ensuring the style of a mediation process was appropriate to the 
problem at issue was for the purposes of equipping the MS for an early intervention 
role in employment problems,10 providing for flexibility of service provision, and 
reducing the perceived formality of the Tribunal’s evaluative style of mediation.  This 
appears also to be the reason for the employment of mediators for the MS from a 
variety of backgrounds.  Some came from the Tribunal, union or employer 
associations, and others from different dispute resolution institutions and 
backgrounds.  From the perspective of representatives, they fell into two groups: 
those with or without employment dispute experience.  The former were identified 
with the evaluative, shuttle style that dominated Tribunal mediation and the latter with 
a facilitative style that was less dependent on knowledge or experience of the 
employment jurisdiction.11  
Facilitation was regarded as well suited to repair and maintenance of on-going 
employment relationships, but these were not the problems presented to the MS in 
high numbers.   Both union and lawyer representatives were recorded as critical of the 
facilitative style (associated with lack of industrial experience) although those from 
unions lacked the intensity and frequency of lawyer complaints.  At the heart of 
complaints lay the role of the neutral in explicating the boundaries for resolution:  
“they want someone to tell them what might happen”.12  
Neutral assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of party positions were regarded 
as promoting settlement.  Their absence triggered some representative insistence on 
choice of mediator, which in turn resulted in widely disparate mediator workloads and 
settlement rates.13  Mediators with larger workloads and higher settlement rates were  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Andrew Scott-Howman, Reflection on Mediation: a Practitioner’s Perspective [2004] ELB 123 
10	  Paul Roth, The New Institutional Framework [2000] ELB 64: “Mediation services deal with 
‘employment problems’ as defined in cl 157(3), which includes any problem arising from or related to 
an employment relationship and, in particular, any problem with existing terms and conditions of 
employment, and any problem with the determination of new terms and conditions of employment”.  
11	  Julie Morton, M.Com Thesis, Reducing Legalism: The impact of the Employment Relations Act 
2000, University of Otago, August 2003; This difference may have been the motivation for training 
sessions in employment law for mediators lacking employment dispute experience: Paul Roth and John 
Hughes conducted at least one block of these sessions in 2002 (recollection of Paul Roth, written 
record unavailable).	  
12	  Ibid, p 75; Steven Hooper (Chief Mediator) Report on the use of preventative pro-active mediation 
techniques as an alternative to event-based processes (2002) noted increased volume but consistent 
and dominant profile of dismissal grievance demands to broker exit packages were inhibiting the 
Service from adopting an early intervention role.	  
13	  Morton, note 11, cites disparities of settlement rates of between 50% and 97%: p 79; disparities 
between mediation styles is a well-researched issue: Grant Morris Eclecticism versus Purity: Mediation 
Styles Used in New Zealand Employment Disputes, (2015) 33(2) Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 203; 
James Wall, Timothy Dunne and Suzanne Chan-Serafin, The Effects of neutral, evaluative and 
pressing mediator strategies, (2011) 29(2) Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 127; Daniel Klerman and 
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identified as those with industrial and/or Tribunal experience.  The initial practice of 
allowing representatives to choose the mediator had ended by 2004, prompting one to 
observe that the practice was “neither appropriate nor practically achievable in a 
large number of circumstances”.14 
Mediators regarded the requirement to mediate, the separation of modes of resolution, 
the speed of scheduling and the absence of the need for initiating documents as 
evidence of a reduction of formality and legalism at the MS (compared to the 
Tribunal).  Lawyers took the view that nothing had changed, but there was a spectrum 
of views from unions about mediation formality. They regarded separation of 
resolution modes as significant, but saw the behaviour of lawyer representatives (who 
were perceived as engaging too often in surface negotiation as a response to 
requirements to mediate) as contributing to an increase in formality and legalism.15 
The numbers of mediations concluded by mediator decision were less than 1%, 
notwithstanding the Department’s hope in 2004 that the planned amendments to s 150 
of the Act would increase their number and the rate at which low-level matters were 
resolved. It was forced to admit that the MS was limited in its use of case 
management techniques to manage its workload, that there was not much attention 
paid to triage or prioritisation of requests but that this was about to change.  It 
intended to accord priority to collective negotiations, ongoing work relationships and 
urgent matters.16 
Mediator Quality 
The Department was criticised for the lack of attention it paid to quality assurance 
issues affecting its mediators,17 and the absence of feedback or complaint mechanisms   
concerning them.18 Tensions between mediators and representatives centred on their 
respective roles: mediators believed that lawyers regarded mediation as preparation 
for adjudication,19 and lawyers believed that mediators too often slid into advocacy 
for the unrepresented.20  Commonly acknowledged were tensions arising from the 
legal positions of the parties: legal assessments of party positions were regarded by 
mediators as sometimes helpful but other times obstructive of settlement21 but any 
expression of a view about the legal merits of a position by a mediator was described 
as “always unhelpful”.22  The articulation of these concerns suggests that a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lisa Klerman Inside the Caucus: An Empirical Analysis of Mediation from Within, (2015) 12(4) 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 686; Kenneth Kressel, Tiffany Henderson, Warren Reich, Claudia 
Cohen, Multidimensional Analysis of Conflict Mediator Style, (2012) 30(2) Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly, 135. 
14	  Scott-Howman, note 9.  
15	  Morton, note 11.	  
16	  Department of Labour	   to The Treasury: Budget bid for (inter alia) 8 additional mediators, 8 
additional support staff for Mediation Service (undated but early 2004) 
17	  Morton, note 11. 
18	  Scott-Howman, note 9, noted the absence of a formal process of feedback about mediators, and 
practitioner fears of complaints about mediators affecting subsequent mediation. 
19	  Colleen Hicks, Mediator:  Employment Mediation – Getting the Best Results from Mediation [2005] 
ELB 44, noted that evidence testing by advocates in mediation potentially mitigated against settlement.   
20	  Scott-Howman, note 9.	  
21	  Hicks, note 19. 	  
22	  Scott-Howman, note 9.	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neutral way of assessing mediator competence would have been useful. 
 
The absence of best practice standards or objective measures to evaluate mediator 
practice was complicated by the range of industry qualifications in dispute resolution, 
and organisations to which practitioners could belong, and the absence of any 
requirement to do so.  The result was that initiatives to improve the provision of 
mediation tended to be dependent on individuals, or regional offices.  Some, for 
instance, concerned about the quality of representatives, offered process and advocacy 
seminars for new advocates that were well received by district law societies, unions 
and employer associations, but this appears not to have been considered as part of any 
national strategy.23 When the upcoming effect of the 2004 amendments to the Act on 
mediator practice was raised the absence of a mediator handbook or guidelines was 
the subject of communication between mediators.24  There was no unanimity of view 
– some mediators believed the absence of guidelines was appropriate because it 
underlined their power to adapt mediation procedure to the circumstances of 
particular problems.   
 
Guidelines were issued for use in early April 2005.25  They described the policy 
intention behind the amendments  (the need for early attention to a problem) and the 
triaging process necessary to determine which matters would be transferred to the fast 
track process (single issue problems, remedies sought below $5,000, or only non-
monetary, no ongoing relationship to preserve).  Mediators were first required to 
determine whether a problem was suitable for fast track, then to obtain party 
agreement to limited timeframe resolution (by linking failure to mediator decision) 
and consent to use of the s 150 process. 
These Guidelines were followed two years later by the Strengthening Mediation 
Practice Project. It sought to establish a best practice framework to ensure consistency 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Phillip de Wattignar to Department of Labour: Response to Green Paper on the Improvements to the 
Employment relationship Problem Resolution System, (undated, c 2008) p 4; see also training seminars 
for mediators in employment law, note 11.	  
24	  Email communication between mediators employed by the Department, December 2004; the paucity 
of empirical literature on what constitutes competent mediation practice was not confined to New 
Zealand, see Dorothy J. Della Noce Evaluative mediation: in search of practice competencies, (2010) 
27(2) Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 193. 
25	  Department of Labour,	  Chief Executive’s Instructions to Mediators also called General Instructions 
to Mediators (undated, c April 2005)	  
26	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Briefing Paper,	  Strengthening Mediation Practice, 12 
April 2007. 
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Policy Development 2000-2005 
Research projects 
Dispute incidence 
The first Phase 1 research the Department commissioned (a quantitative survey) 
sought data about the incidence of disputing (requiring third party assistance) in 
workplace environments.27  
The range of sources of information sought by employer and employee respondents, 
their limited reliance on that provided by the Department,28 and the significant 
differences between employer and employee samples (2000 in each) in their reports 
of dispute incidence and outcomes29 suggested an absence of uniformity about, or 
common understanding of, remedy systems in workplaces.  Clear, however, were 
differences between unionised and non-unionised employees: 61% of all employees 
who had experienced a problem were aware of written guidelines in the workplace for 
their resolution; 79% of union members were aware. This was regarded as consistent 
with other data available to the Department indicating that written procedures were 
more likely to be available in more unionised sectors, and unionised employees were 




This survey was followed a year later by a qualitative study of employer/employee 
experiences of disputes and their resolution processes, factors relevant to success or 
failure and the new industrial environment.31 The absence of congruity between 
employer and employee views revealed by the earlier survey was confirmed in this 
research (and a third survey a year later)32 by reference to a range of issues: 
employees had a low, and employers (by the act of having to produce or revise 
employment agreements) a high awareness of the new Act, the Employment Relations 
Service and changed employer obligations; employees found it difficult to visualise 
dispute resolution as a process but larger employers maintained a process driven 
approach influenced by the Employment Contracts Act; employers viewed these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 	  AC Nielsen Ltd for Department of Labour, Survey of Employment Disputes and Disputes 
Resolution, November 2000:  a quantitative survey of employer and employee experiences of disputes 
and their resolution for the purpose of measuring the incidence of disputes in the workforce, procedures 
for resolution, dispute outcomes, perceptions of the role of the Department of Labour, and establishing 
benchmarks for future research about the impact of the new Act on the incidence and process of 
dispute resolution.	  
28	  The Department of Labour Infoline was used by 10% of employees as a source of information about 
a particular dispute and as a source of information about dispute procedures by 7% of employers; the 
Department’s other institutions – the Labour Inspectorate and the Tribunal were a source of 
information for less than 3% of each group: ibid.	  
29	  For example, the employee survey reported 273 disputes per 1000 employees and 20% remaining in 
their jobs following resolution of a dispute but the employers reported a dispute rate of 22 per 1000 and 
44% remaining in the job: ibid.	  
30	  Tony Waldegrave, Diane Anderson, Karen Wong, Evaluation of the Short-Term Impacts of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000, Department of Labour, November 2003.  	  
31	  UMR Research Ltd for Employment Relations Service, The Process of Dispute Resolution – A 
qualitative study amongst employees and employers, January 2002.  
32	  Waldegrave, et al, note 30.	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processes as fair to both parties with a few perceiving it as biased in favour of 
employees, whilst high levels of frustration were articulated by employees about the 
lack of clear resolution of disputes, delaying tactics and the difficulty of remaining in 
employment after raising a dispute. 33  This may explain why employees were 
dissatisfied generally with dispute outcomes and employers believed the majority of 
disputes were settled amicably.   
For employees, third parties in disputes had support or advisory roles but for 
employers they had a very specific role of providing expertise on the new legislation. 
Introducing them to resolve a dispute was regarded as escalating the problem.  Thus 
whilst most employers wanted to avoid formal mediation, most unions chose it as 
their first port of call.34   
Choice of problem-solving process was dependent on its desired outcome. If 
employers wanted a workplace relationship to continue, private interventions (e.g 
private mediation) were preferred, but if they sought to end it a confidential 
settlement or resort to the Mediation Service were the accepted options.35 
The differences identified within employer and employee groups are also instructive.  
Unionised employees had higher levels of satisfaction with dispute resolution 
processes than their non-union peers and employers of unionised employees (large 
employers) had a more positive view of union involvement in disputes than non-
unionised business employers.  There were clear differences in formality of process 
between large (80+ employees) and small employers. The latter were more reluctant 
to air a dispute outside the workplace and more suspicious of the MS (“as a pseudo 
court process with the employer on ‘trial’ for alleged breaches”).36  Employers with 
experience of the MS were more positive about it than those with none, which, if 
considered with other reported effects of experience on opinions in this jurisdiction, 
highlights a reliance on and repetition of myths and their transformation into 
“employment folklore.”37 
A consistently reported view (across both groups) was that nothing had changed from 
the ECA regime (perceived by employers as ushering in the era of the personal 
grievance). The limited impact of the new statutory environment was confirmed in 
another evaluation of its short-term effects, with 68% of employees, 64% of 
employers and 66% of unions surveyed reporting no change.38  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Comparison of employee satisfaction rates between the UMR 2002 survey and the Waldegrave 
(ERS) 2003 survey: UMR 57% dissatisfied with process and 49% dissatisfied with outcome; ERS 65% 
dissatisfied with actions taken by employer to resolve dispute.	  
34	  UMR Research Ltd, note 31.	  
35	  Ibid; Employer preferences for private mediation were higher in the early years of the Mediation 
Service than later years. They reported that their early reservations about the quality of Mediation 
Service mediators was subsequently addressed: Martin Risak and Ian McAndrew, Who Mediates 
Employment Relationship Problems, (2010) Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 
Conference, Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington.	  	  
36	  Ibid, at 77.	  
37 	  John Hughes, Investigating codes of practice on discipline and dismissal, Part 2 [2010] 3 
Employment Law Bulletin, 25. 
38	  Waldegrave, et al note 30; this was also the view of Andrew Caisley, The law moves in mysterious 
ways, and Ian McAndrew, Julie Morton and Alan Geare, The Employment Institutions, both in 
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Although there were no common views about the outcomes of disciplinary disputes 
(except that reinstatement following dismissal was rare) there was a consistent 
acceptance that the outcome of an employee complaint was that it was either 
withdrawn or the employee resigned.   
Follow-up research focussed on early intervention, the relationship between 
information provision and mediation, via a series of simulated role-plays of a variety 
of interventions (e.g. information + mediation, no information +mediation).39 The 
researcher found that, notwithstanding that mediation was most likely to lead to the 
result attracting the highest satisfaction rates, the provision of information, alone, 
about the subject of a dispute was perceived by managers and employees to be at least 
as desirable as the outcomes from mediation and information combined.  However 
provision of information simpliciter was more likely than mediation to result in a 
request for third party intervention, suggesting to the researcher that there are benefits 
to both parties by early resort to mediation, particularly if it is preceded by the 
provision of information.40 
Views about the Mediation Service 
The above conclusions were later tested in a qualitative survey of employer and 
employee users of the MS:41 their willingness to be involved in earlier mediation was 
a focus of the research.  Previously recorded low awareness of the MS was confirmed, 
with common agreement that this changed when a dispute requiring outside 
intervention arose. Also common to both groups was the status of the employment 
relationship when mediation was sought, it had ended, or was about to end. Neither 
group believed that mediation could occur earlier in the resolution process.42  
An earlier survey of union experience of the MS revealed that about half reported that 
it had improved their ability to resolve problems (collective and individual) 
effectively, some saw it as a useful source of advice (for employers) and momentum, 
and welcomed its less formal and faster approach (confirming earlier employer 
views).43  Concerns focussed on variations of mediator expertise and rising legalism.44 
Use of mediation increased with the size of the worksite and levels of unionisation, 
although the largest sites or those with the highest levels of unionisation did not have 
the highest levels of use (attributed by the report writer to the likelihood of better 
internal problem resolution systems).45 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rasmussen (ed) Employment Relationships: New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act, Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 2004) 60, 99. 	  
39	  Kesten Green for Employment Relations Service, Research paper, The Effect of Mediation and 
Information: A personal grievance, July 2002. 
40	  Ibid, at 2.	  
41	  UMR Research Ltd for Employment Relations Service, Department of Labour Problem Resolution 
Services Research Project: A Qualitative Study amongst Employees and Employers, July 2004.	  
42	  Ibid, at 10; cf analyses of the use of private mediation by employers in: Stephen Hooper, The Use of 
Private Mediation in Organisational Disputes and Personal Grievances – The Experiences of Waikato 
Mediation Services, (1996) Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand Conference, Industrial 
Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 220; Risak and McAndrew note 35; both studies 
showed that private mediations tended to be early workplace interventions. 
43	  UMR Research, note 41.	  
44	  Waldegrave, et al, note 30.	  
45	  Ibid.	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Lawyers who regarded mediation positively believed it worked best where access was 
prompt, the mediator operated as a facilitator rather than a legal advisor or judge, the 
mediation focused on the parties and their interests, a focus on legal issues was 
avoided and the employer expected to write a cheque: 
…mediation often works best where the parties reconcile themselves to the fact that mediation is 
a forum which exists to allow them to strike a deal, rather than as a forum which exists to allow 
determinations to be made about such things as justice and fairness.  … Mediation is a forum 
which encourages commercial common-sense, rather than emotional or moral justice.46  
Policy implications 
There are at least two policy issues suggested by this research.  Firstly, if it is 
accepted that (non contract) disputes arise either from employer or employee 
complaint, that employers were generally satisfied, but employees not, with the means 
by which their complaints were resolved, then workplace remedy systems were 
perceived as a basis for entrenching employer advantage in the employment 
relationship.  Demands for redress by employees were discouraged by guaranteeing 
either certainty of outcome (withdrawal or termination) or a refusal to engage, whilst 
similar demands by employers could be satisfied by a simple adherence to obligations 
of process. 47  Recognition of this result would have underlined the importance of the 
s 3(ii) objective for the new legislation of ‘acknowledging and addressing the 
inherent inequality of power in employment relationships’, given data that indicated 
that 82% of employers and 58% of employees believed bargaining power to be equal 
in their workplaces, 86% of employers and 69% of employees perceived no change to 
their bargaining power in the new regime and 66% of unions considered that the new 
Act had made no difference to their bargaining power.48 
The second policy issue raised by this study concerns the effect of information 
provision.  Whilst the earlier survey revealed that the most common source of 
information for employees about problem resolution in the workplace came from their 
employer (with significant reductions in confidence about its veracity arising from 
involvement in a dispute), this study confirmed that for those whose source of 
information and support was their union, satisfaction rates about workplace remedy 
systems were significantly higher.49  Considered with data about the characteristic of 
employees most likely to experience workplace disputes, trade union membership,50 
and that in chapter 3 which traced a declining presence at the Tribunal by unionised 
employees, this suggests a more complex relationship between provision of 
information and satisfaction with workplace remedy systems.  Mere provision is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Scott-Howman, note 9.	  
47	  It can be argued that this ensured that employers could avoid confronting the implications of mid-
1990s	   analysis of patterns of pre-grievance disputes that certain forms of business structure and 
management practices increase the likelihood of disputes within the workplace: Hooper, note 42. 
48	  Waldegrave, et al note 30.	  
49	  Ibid.	  
50	  AC Nielsen, note 27, at 7: Disputes per 1000 employees (Significant differences only) union 
members: (591 per 1000; non members: 156 per 1000) covered by a site collective contract (480/1000) 
in a large enterprise (+500 employees: 420/1000) in the public sector (394/1000), in the job for at least 
10 years (390/1000) on the median personal income (379/1000); Keith Macky and Peter Boxall, 
Employee Well-Being and Union Membership, (2009) 34(3) New Zealand Journal of Employment 
Relations, 14, found differences in perception between the unionised and non-unionised of work 
overload and pressure, stress and unsatisfactory work/life balance (unionised report higher incidence).   
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clearly insufficient to establish confidence in them. The Department’s view (noted 
above) of the connection between union membership, higher levels of confidence in 
employer remedy systems, written procedures and increased awareness of them51 was 
also a subject on which its mediators had views.52 One of them (likening small 
employers who don’t belong to employer or trade associations to non-unionised 
employees) identified the following factors as important to successful workplace 
remedy systems: acceptance of conflict as a normal part of human interaction, access 
to early intervention processes to stop problems from escalating, and the provision of 
professional, accurate and partial information to parties which reflects and advocates 
their particular interests. Their influence on building trust and confidence helped 
parties to take their share of responsibility for the state of the employment 
relationship.53 
If the above views about the MS are considered alongside concerns about the 
emphasis within mediation on risk management (risk of escalation of dispute) rather 
than genuine settlement, the pressure to settle via compromise over money,54 and the 
lack of authority vested in the mediator,55 a public perception of the Service as an 
unlikely early intervener (particularly for non-unionised workplaces) is established.  
Respondents’ ideas for its improvement included more information about its process 
and outcomes, settlement guidelines (dollar amounts equated to type of dispute), 
banning of legal representatives, and policies for repeat offenders (frequent users), 
thus suggesting that they saw the Service as having a regulatory or judicial, rather 
than an ameliorative or facilitative, function. 
Given the policy emphasis on privileging early facilitation for the purpose of 
supporting employment relationships (in preference to presiding over their end) this 
gap between public and policy perspectives of the Service’s functions called for 
further analysis. The policy issues overlooked then in the search for the connection 
between information provision and dispute resolution, but apparent now, include the 
role that the provision of partial (as distinct from neutral) information plays, and from 
whom and when.  If it is accepted, for instance, that disputants require support and 
advice that is partial, not neutral, in the early stages of a dispute then their failure to 
look to the MS for help may also arise from its need to proffer its independence as 
evidence of its authority.  Thus, status could be regarded as undermining the desired 
function of early intervention.   
This was not necessarily the case, however, for union members.  Their higher levels 
of awareness of, access to and satisfaction with workplace remedy systems appears to 
be replicated in their resort to the MS.  The difference was described in the following 
terms: 
In the case studies, all parties expressed the view that the involvement of lawyers in a dispute 
tended to draw out the process and raised the expense much more than was the case if the 
employer worked with the relevant union. Employers generally reported unions as moving to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Waldegrave, et al note 30.	  
52	  	   Department of Labour, Green Paper on Improvements to the Employment Relationship Problem 
Resolution System: the Department of Labour’s Proposals to Stakeholders, June 2008.	  	  
53	  de Wattignar, note 23. 
54	  Scott-Howman, note 9, characterises as commercial prudence the employer practice of settling 
claims regarded as baseless by money payments that cost less than the price of a hearing.  
55	  UMR Research, note 41.	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resolve disputes more quickly and pragmatically than their lawyers did. Their presumption was 
that unions did so in order to use their resources efficiently.56 
 
This was also the view of the Department and may account for its opposition to a 
Legal Services Agency proposal to approve legal aid for mediation on the grounds 
that it would undermine the policy goal of a low-level, informal, “non-legalistic” 
problem-solving function for the Service.  It made the further point that representation 
there was unnecessary: 
The purpose of mediation is to assist these two parties to resolve the problem themselves, with 
the aid of an expert facilitator who can also make a decision if the parties so ask.  These are not 
legal proceedings, they are fully confidential, and no matter raised in them can subsequently be 
used in any other litigation relating to the employment relationship problem.  In fact the intrusion 
of legal argumentation can act to deflect the parties from reaching a solution to a problem in 
mediation that best suits their own situation.57 
This hope was realised to a limited extent in the MS’s early days, where levels of 
representation were significantly lower there than at the Authority, (49% for 
employees vs 68%; 27% for employers vs 60%)58 or at the Tribunal (84% employees, 
60% employers 1.10.99-30.9.00).59 Five years later 88.8% of employees and 60% of 
employers were recorded as represented at mediation.60 
This suggests that a difference worthy of analysis emerged both in the research 
commissioned by the Department and its own experience, between collectivist and 
individualist views of the MS’s functions (ameliorative/facilitative vs 
regulatory/judicial) and use (early vs late).61 
Focused as the research and evaluation effort at the Department was on disputing and 
its incidence or characteristics and on the performance of the MS, this issue of the 
differences of individualist and collectivist views (and approaches to dispute 
resolution) and their effects was never taken up.  Clues as to why emerge from the 
Department’s attempts to draw together the results of the surveys and studies 
described above.62  It did so by a focus on statistics of prevalence – of types of 
dispute, of employee and employer characteristics, existence of written procedures, 
satisfaction with and barriers to effective mediation, dispute outcomes.   Significance 
was also attached to departures from other statistical norms, so that Maori, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Waldegrave, et al note 30, at 117.	  
57	  Department of Labour to Legal Services Agency, letter, 16 February 2001.  This view is supported 
by a Taiwanese study of 100,000 civil cases that concluded parties are most likely to settle when 
neither is represented: Kuo-Chang Huang, How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcomes: An 
Empirical Perspective from Taiwan (2008) 5(2) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 309; Another 
study across seven jurisdictions (including NZ) of decisions to obtain legal assistance found that 
income had a low relationship to the decision. Those who could afford a lawyer forwent that assistance 
at similar rates to those on low incomes: Herbert Kritzer To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: Is that the 
Question? (2008) 5(4) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 309. 	  
58	  These figures were collected in the quarter ending March 2002. 
59	  Department of Labour (Employment Relations Service), Submission to the Law Commission on 
Preliminary Paper 51: Striking the balance, 9 August 2002. 
60 	  Department of Labour (Workplace Policy Research and Evaluation: Martin & Woodhams), 
Personal Grievance Mediations Conducted at the Department of Labour – a snapshot, June 2007. 
61	  Paul Roth, note 10, anticipated the problem at the outset by noting that although the new legislation 
sought to promote collectivism, individual rights had not been rolled back. 
62	  Department of Labour, Stock Take of Employment Relations Monitoring Systems, 2005.	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instance, were recorded as having higher incidences of disputing and union 
membership, than their numbers in the general population.63  Thus emerged a profile 
of the disputant in the workplace (male, Maori, unionised, full-time, in job for +10 
years, large employer, public sector, earning <$30,000) that bore little resemblance to 
the profile of the grievant seeking mediation (NZ European, gender neutral, aged over 
25, full time in job for 1-4 years, non-unionised).64  This focus on statistical data may 
have obscured evidence of trends or phenomena relevant to the policy issues regarded 
as important by the Department – an early intervention role for the Service, for 
instance – so that the sorts of connection suggested by a comparison of the data 
available appear not to have been made. The result was that it gathered a data rich 
resource about disputing in this jurisdiction that appeared not to be utilised, 
substantively, for policy development. 
Statutory review  
A Phase 3, formal review of statutory problem resolution mechanisms began in early 
2003, at a time when pressures on the MS were said to be growing.  It was coping 
with a higher than anticipated workload, two thirds of which concerned personal 
grievances (the majority being dismissals).65  These required mediators to preside 
over negotiations of relatively small claims (in terms of money and issues) that took 
as long to resolve as higher value or more substantive problems, thus generating a 
perception: 
that mediation is simply a means of distributing money from employers to employees, as 
opposed to a forum where parties to an employment relationship problem come to solve 
problems.66  
This was regarded as potentially jeopardising the MS’s response rates and capacity 
for early intervention in subsisting relationships.67 The behaviour of representatives 
was regarded as the root of the problem: 
Although the use of a representative in mediation is optional, it is estimated that representatives 
are present for 80% of mediations for individual problems. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  AC Nielsen, note 27.	  
64	  This profile comparison is based on the AC Neilson Survey, note 27, and the Martin & Woodhams 
study, note 60.  A more time-congruent comparison is not possible because the profiling of mediation 
users did not occur until 2007; Bernard Walker and R T Hamilton, Grievance Processes: Research, 
Rhetoric and Directions for New Zealand (2009) 34(3), New Zealand Journal of Employment 
Relations, 43, argue that an understanding of decision-making from the employee perspective may be a 
central element in greater knowledge of grievance dynamics.  They call for more research to explain 
why employee behaviours occur, instead of simply observing overall grievance numbers and making 
generalisations based on anecdotal evidence. 
65	  Given that annual request and outcome numbers were stabilising during this period, it is possible 
that the parties, problem type and representation at mediation were imposing demands on the 
Mediation Service that had not been anticipated.  An alternative explanation can be derived from the 
demands of the Department’s advice function: the description of problems tended to be dependent on 
Departmental agendas (vis a vis the Minister) that may have been obvious at the time but which, 
subsequently, are opaque.  
66	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Paper, Problem resolution under the Employment 
Relations Act, 28 February 2003, at 4.	  
67	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Issues Paper, Review of the Employment Relations 
Act – Proposals for Legislative Fine Tuning, 17 March 2003. 	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While many representatives contribute positively to the mediation process, some representatives 
inject a legalistic, structured and adversarial element into mediation, which focuses on producing 
winners and losers, without regard to reaching a mutually beneficial resolution.  Negative 
behaviour also includes representatives limiting their clients opportunity to deal directly and 
reach an agreement with the other party.  Further, representatives at times frustrate the process 
and negatively affect outcomes through having no real understanding of mediation processes or 
through not understanding the law.  The end result is that problems that might otherwise be 
solved at mediation are not, and advance unnecessarily to the Employment Relations Authority.68 
For these reasons, amongst the issues notified to the Minister as relevant to the 
statutory review was whether the participation of lawyers was having an adverse 
impact on access to and the cost of mediation, its processes and outcomes.69 
Amongst the solutions proposed, but ultimately rejected, was a fast-track one-hour 
process requiring agreement to a mediator decision if settlement could not be reached.  
Use of representatives would be discouraged, to streamline its effectiveness, 
encourage direct dealing between disputants, limit unrealistically high claims (to 
cover the cost of representation) and provide for settlements appropriate to the 
circumstances.  Related, but additional proposals that were also rejected, included 
promoting self-representation, setting maximum fees for representation, limiting 
representation to particular types of problem (excluding it for grievances, similar to 
the ban on representation in the Disputes Tribunal), requiring pre-mediation self-
resolution attempts, and promoting desirable representative behaviour via training 
programmes through professional guilds, e.g the Law Society.70  
Perhaps because the Department’s perspective on representatives was not new these 
proposals could be dismissed as an attempt to secure a position previously rejected.  
Additionally, there was no unanimity of view amongst academics and commentators 
about whether the role of representatives had changed in the new institutions.71  Nor 
did the judges of this jurisdiction agree about the role of lawyers: whilst one was 
prepared to pass on lawyer views about the rising costs of process and the effect that 
the promotion of mediation was having on deteriorating levels of expertise in 
litigation,72 another was advancing the view that their costs of representation at 
mediation and the Authority were a significant barrier to access to justice available 
only at the Court: 
…cases are not decided on their merits but simply don’t reach the courts…I think we have a very 
substantial segment of people involved in employment relationships who are practically unable 
to engage in litigation.73   
An academic study of the new institutions and their processes to assess whether the 
policy goal of reducing legalism had been achieved confirmed Department 
commissioned research that the anticipated changes to both the style and the subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Issues Paper, Review of the Employment Relations 
Act (undated, c February 2003).	  
69	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour,	   Issues Paper,	   Employment Relations Service – 
Technical Issues, 1 August 2002. 
70	  Department of Labour, note 66.	  
71	  Morton, note 11.	  
72	  Chief Judge Employment Court to Department of Labour, letter, 24 October 2002. 	  
73	  Colgan, J Speech notes for Industrial Relations Conference, (Department of Labour files), 2002.	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of mediation had yet to occur. 74  Contrasting their effects on adjudication with those 
on mediation, the researcher attributed the introduction of the inquisitorial role to 
perceptions that legalism had reduced in the Authority, indicating, perhaps, that 
signalling of policy goals, by means additional to their mention in legislation, may be 
a necessary precursor to their achievement. 
The policy proposals that were accepted in the Phase 3 review were aimed at 
empowering the MS to work around the problems of representation, by clarifying and 
enhancing its ability to direct and control individual mediations.75 Amongst criticisms 
of its style was that mediators tended to ‘sit on the fence’ and take the middle ground 
regardless of (what employers saw as) the obvious merits or weaknesses of the case.76 
 Thus, s 147 of the Act was amended to address lawyer objections to mediator powers 
by confirming mediator rights to talk to disputants in the absence of their 
representatives about the substance and progress of a mediation, when the problems 
of a party’s position became apparent.77 
Also included was a fast-track time-limited process that allowed for mediator 
decisions in the absence of settlement.78 It was intended to apply to claims for non-
monetary remedies and those below the $3,000-$5000 range (60% of compensation 
settlements were for amounts under $5,000).  The trade-off for a shortened process 
was availability of mediation at short notice:  
Parties would enter the process in a clear expectation that, if they did not reach an agreement 
during a specified time, they would agree to a mediator-made decision by agreement under s 
150.  Parties who did not agree to this, or who did not agree to a concluded settlement at the end 
of the process, would be faced with the prospect of restarting their applications via the ‘normal’ 
more time-intensive process. 
While such a process could be largely implemented administratively, it is desirable that some 
provision is made legislatively in order to clearly signal the place and objectives of the process 
within the current range of mediation services.  A principles-based approach will ensure that 
mediation itself would not be overly regulated in terms of prescribing process.79 
This process required the prior agreement of the parties, however.  Or, more 
accurately, their representatives.  It was consistently not forthcoming. 
The full range of amendments to mediator powers enacted in 2004 were the: 
• recognition that mediators can manage any mediation process actively;80 
• extension of mediation services to contractors and others in work-related 
relationships that are not employment relationships;81 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Morton, note 11.	  
75	  Department of Labour, note 67. 
76	  UMR Research, note 41.	  
77	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 147(3).	  
78	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 147(2)(ab).	  
79	  Department of Labour, note 67, at [54], [55]. 
80	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 143(da).	  
81	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 144A.	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• reinforcement of the ‘horses for courses’ power to determine the kind of 
mediation on offer for fast track mediation;82 
• introduction (by prior consent) of time limited services with mediator decision 
in the absence of agreement;83 
• reinforcement of mediator powers to discuss issues with parties directly and in 
the absence of their representatives;84 
• prohibition on resort to cancellations of terms of settlement under the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979;85 
• introduction of penalties for breaching terms of settlement or mediator 
decision;86 
• introduction of the requirement for payments agreed or decided at mediation 
to be made to be made direct to the party and not their representative, unless 
they were legally aided, or representative costs included.87 
 
Operations: post 2005 
Claim and Use Statistics  
By 2008 private settlements outnumbered those concluded with mediation assistance.  
In that year 5,970 mediations were conducted, of which 58% (3,474) resulted in 
settlement.  However 3,857 private settlements were registered, meaning that of total 
outcomes (mediations and private settlements) private settlements constituted 39% 
and mediated ones 35%. These percentages and proportions were maintained at 41% 
(private) and 37% (mediated) for the following 3 years with settlements consistently 
constituting 62% of mediations for that period.  Also stable were the percentages of 
mediations that were not settled  (18%) and those for which no results were recorded 
(19%).88 
Additional data for this period, although outside the parameters of this analysis, 
suggests a trend about the type of employment relationships subject to mediation 
between 2005-8.  Mediations held within 3 months and between 3 and 6 months of 
request were accorded priority or non-priority, dependent on whether the workplace 
relationship was ongoing or had ended. Ongoing relationships had priority status.  
The data suggests, from the proportions and relationship between priority and early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 145(1).	  
83	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 147(2)(ab).	  
84	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 147(3).	  
85	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 149(3)(ab).	  
86	  Employment Relations Act 2000, ss 149(4), 150(4).	  
87	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 150A.	  
88	  Department of Labour, Mediation Service Completed Applications 1.1.08 – 31.12.11, (undated). 	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mediation and non-priority and later mediation, a declining use of mediation for 
ongoing relationships.89 
If private settlements (their need to be registered with the MS for enforcement 
purposes indicated termination of the employment relationship) are added to non-
priority mediations, and if it is accepted that a proportion of priority mediations were 
settled by termination (given that terminated relationships constitute 75% of 
mediations) then it is clear that a dominant role of the Service was to settle the terms 
of already ended employment relationships. 
Cost and benefits of Mediation Service 
The comparative costs of running the Department’s various dispute resolution 
institutions were calculated at the end of 2004 to reveal that its Infoline (call centre 
information provision) cost $3.11 per enquiry,90 the MS $134 per settlement (or 
partial settlement), the Authority $493 per determination and the EC $2,579 per 
judgment.  However these calculations were based on costs to the Department, so the 
cost of the mediation workforce was included but Authority member and judicial 
salaries excluded.  Their inclusion would have significantly increased the gap 
between the cost of mediation and adjudication, (for the 2007/08 year the combined 
operational and member costs of the Authority were $9,221 per determination)91 thus 
further underlining the conclusion that there were advantages to shifting costs to 
procedures “that are less formal and focused more on providing information”:92 
Comparing the major outputs across each of the activities is difficult, because they vary in their 
impact, cost and nature.  However, analysis of settlement sizes in the mediation, authority and 
court services show that most cases are settled with payments of less than $10,000.  This 
indicates that the severity of cases that all 3 services deal with is comparable.  Although the size 
of potential settlements is higher in the authority and the court rather than mediation, they do not 
increase markedly.93 
A utility analysis, whereby expenditure and economic benefit of the institution at 
issue were calculated, indicated benefits of $59.4m and $58.9m from the Infoline and 
the MS but $3.2m from the Authority and a negative result from the EC of -
$527,107.94 
Costs of resolution to others 
For employers the direct cash cost of disputes arose from legal and advisory fees 
(31% of total cash costs), the payment of compensation (40%) and the cost of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  In 2008 mediations in both time categories were 43% and roughly equivalent by type (52% priority, 
48% non-priority); in 2009 37% of mediations were held within 3 months and 54% between 3 and 6 
months, 43% were accorded priority and 57% not. The following year 33% of mediations were early, 
39% accorded priority; 56% later and 61% non-priority.  Similarly 39% of early mediations in 2011 
were matched by 46% accorded priority and later mediations (50%) matched the 54% accorded non-
priority status.  
90	  Contact centre (Infoline) received 223,317 calls in 2002/03 year; 250,062 in 03/04 and 251,102 
O4/05.	  
91	  Department of Labour, Paper,	  Average cost per Authority case 2007/08 year (undated c 2009).	  
92 	  Dr Geoff Plimmer and Chris Cassels for Department of Labour, Report, Greater strategic 
positioning of service delivery to achieve outcomes (undated, c November 2004).	  
93	  Ibid, at 12.	  
94	  Ibid.	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temporary or replacement staff (29%).  In-house resolution took the least amount of 
time (1-2 months) and incurred the lowest direct cash cost, followed (in ascending 
order of duration and cost) by use of external parties (representatives), the MS, private 
mediation, the Authority and the EC:95 
Duration and cash cost by resolution method 
Type  median  duration  mean median cash costs mean 
In-house  1 month   2.3 300   3000 
External parties 2   3.5 5,800   13,100 
Med Service 5   6.2 7,275   13,600 
Other mediation 2   9.6 3,200   6,800 
Authority 9   9.8 14,000   13,300 
Court  16   15.5 75,000   75,000 
Satisfaction rates were highest for in-house processes (79%) and lowest for reliance 
on third parties (40%).  Large employers (+100 employees) are the most satisfied with 
resolution systems and medium employers (10-19 employees) the least satisfied.96   
 
Policy Development post 2005 
Research Projects  
Dispute incidence rate 
A survey of over 800 employers in 200797 revealed that 13% had experienced a 
dispute (unresolved by an immediate manager) in the previous 12 months, yielding an 
incidence rate of 1.5 per 100 employees, which rose the smaller the employer.  
Employers of fewer than 10 employees had an incidence rate of 2.5-2.9 and 
employers of more than 100 a rate of 1.1.   
Employees aged 25 years or younger experienced 13% of disputes, but for each older 
age group the rate was 28% per decade (until 55, after which the rate was 4%).   
The majority of workplace disputes involved salaried employees. Hourly rate 
employee disputes cost their employers significantly less.  The absolute correlation 
was between payment basis and cost rather than level of remuneration and cost.  The 
greatest incidence of individual disputes occurred with those earning between $21-
39,000 and employed between 1 and 5 years (62%), followed by those employed less 
than a year (23%).  Long serving employees had the lowest incidence of disputes, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Department of Labour, Workplace Strategic Policy Research and Evaluation (McDermott Miller),	  
Social and Economic Costs and Benefits of Employment Disputes,	  12 July 2007.	  
96	  Department of Labour for Cabinet Economic Development Committee, Review of the Employment 
Problem Resolution System, (9 October 2007) (EDC (07) 185), Appendix 1.	  
97	  Department of Labour (McDermott Miller), note 95. 	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the cost and duration of disputes rose as employment lengthened. Duration of dispute 
also increased for younger, mid salary, shorter-term employees.98 
Grievance party characteristics 
Of the types of grievance mediated over a 5-week period in mid 2006, over 75% 
concerned the termination of the employment relationship. Forty-three per cent of 
applicants were in the 40-65 year age group (49% of the workforce) and 37% aged 
between 25 and 40 (32% in workforce) with an almost equal gender balance. The 
majority were NZ European (62%, cf 79% of workforce), followed by Maori (16%, cf 
9% of workforce) other European (10%) and Pacifica (3% cf 4% of workforce). 99 
Small (1-5 employees) and medium (6-19) employers were overrepresented in these 
grievance claims in comparison to their presence in the workforce (14% involved 
small employers who employ 11% of the workforce and 26% involved medium 
employers who employ 19% of workforce).  Employers of 20-100 employees 
matched their grievance and workforce presence (23%) and large employers of +100 
staff were underrepresented (31% cf 47% of workforce). 
The status and length of the employment relationship yielded the most significant 
data: 83% concerned permanent full time jobs and 76% concerned relationships of 
less than 4 years duration: 38.7% of grievants were employed for a year or less, and 
37.4% had been employed between 1-4 years. 
Small and medium employers had a higher proportion of grievances taken against 
them in the first 6 months of employment and were more likely to face unjustifiable 
dismissal claims:  
Small businesses had a markedly more negative view of the impact of ERP provisions than large 
ones. It is likely that small businesses will generally have fewer HR resources and expertise than 
larger businesses (who can afford to employ specialists). Small businesses are also unlikely to be 
experienced in dealing with ERPs as they may have one only every four or five years. As a 
result, their information about ERPs is more likely to come from media reports, or through 
business networks, which may amplify "horror stories". Consequently, small businesses may 
expect the costs of resolution to be high and fear that their processes would be found to be 
inadequate.100 
Employers of +100 employees (where the employment relationship at issue was 
generally longer than a year) were more likely to attract claims of unjustifiable action 
(where the relationship continues): 
Consistent with this finding, claims of unjustifiable action were significantly more likely to be 
made by employees employed for five years or more, and personal grievances of unjustified 
dismissal were more likely to be made by employees employed for nine months or less.101 
Mediation Outcomes 
Representatives were relied on by 88.8% of applicants and 60.7% of respondents, the 
most common for both being lawyers (43.5% applicants; 40.3% respondents). Union 
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  Ibid.	  
99	  Department of Labour (Martin, Woodhams), note 60, at 6.	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  Department of Labour, (Workplace Strategic Policy Research and Evaluation, Bernard Woodhams) 
Employment Relationship Problems: Costs, Benefits and Choices, August 2007, at 11.	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  Department of Labour (Martin, Woodhams), note 60, at [3.11].	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representatives appeared for 22.4% of applicants and employment advocates for 20% 
of applicants and 16% of respondents. 102  The research found no relationship between 
representation and the probability of settlement, but a significant relationship between 
the type of representation and the amounts of monetary compensation agreed. 
Full settlements were achieved in 62% of the mediations and partial settlements in 
5%. There was a financial component of settlement in 51% of all mediations, with the 
most common amount in the $2,000-5,000 range (25% of all mediations): 
Under multi regressional analysis the following factors had the greatest amount of influence on 
the levels of compensation agreed at mediation: 
• Applicants who had a lawyer had higher amounts of compensation agreed at mediation; 
• Respondents who had representation (particularly by an association or union) paid out lower 
amounts of compensation; and 
• Personal grievances related to redundancies resulted in higher amounts of compensation. 
However even combining all of these factors explains less than a fifth of the variation in 
compensation.103 
About a third of the applicants represented by lawyers had included in their terms of 
settlement payments termed legal costs.  The most common amount was between $1-
2,000, but almost as many secured amounts in the $2-5,000 range.  The research did 
not identify whether the differences in compensation agreed between those 
represented by lawyers and those represented by others were also reflected in the net 
amounts retained after the payment of the costs of obtaining it, because the data was 
collected from mediators, not parties.104 
Complaints 
Small employer business association complaints formed the basis of a study in 2007 
about the high costs of resolution, rising numbers of meritless grievances incentivised 
by no-win-no-fee advocates or benefit stand-down requirements, allegations of 
systemic biases in the employment institutions favouring employees and the more 
onerous impact of resolution requirements on them. 105  Research data failed to 
corroborate these concerns: there was a steady number (9,200) of annual applications 
over the previous 7 years, no-win-no-fee advocates were found to be limited in 
number and effect but regarded as offering access to justice to low-paid non unionised 
employees unable to afford legal advice, and statistics from Work and Income 
revealed fewer than 5 benefits per month for the 3 years to 2007 were granted in lieu 
of a stand-down period.  The allegation of systemic bias in favour of employees was 
countered by data that revealed that each group believed the other to be advantaged 
by the resolution system.  
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  Ibid, at 6.	  
103	  Ibid, at [3.13]; cf Kuo-Chang Huang, note 57.	  
104	  The data on which the research relied was compiled from questionnaires completed by mediators, 
not the parties; A study of Labour Courts in Mexico found that on average workers recovered higher 
percentages of their claims in settlements, but that they also recovered on average less than 30% of 
what they sought: David Kaplan, Joyce Sadka, Jorge Silva-Mendez, Litigation and Settlement: New 
Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico (2008) 5(2) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 309.	  
105	  Department of Labour (Woodhams), note 100. 
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The researcher ventured some insights into why some problems escalate.  Noting that 
problems arising from employee misconduct followed a more predictable path than 
performance and inter-personal relationship issues, he identified the search for “more 
objective reasons” to terminate an employment relationship as: 
likely to be destructive of trust and be regarded by employees as showing a lack of good faith.  
Consequently, anything resembling a ‘fishing expedition’ is likely to escalate the issue into a 
major dispute.  Where the employees had not already brought in legal representation, such tactics 
led to their bringing representatives in and representatives took a harder line on experiencing 
such tactics.  It is therefore likely that fishing will extend the process, and therefore the costs.106	  	  
This result was described as dependent on what was at stake.  For employees this 
concerned alternative job prospects, the social, psychological and familial impacts of 
the dispute and the desire to clear their name. The stakes for employers included their 
assessment of the costs of the resolution pathway, the effect of publicity on their 
reputation, and whether a precedent within the workplace was created.107	  	  	  
Costs of representation 
By early 2006 it was apparent to the Department that those of the 2004 amendments 
aimed at resolving the cost of representation at mediation had failed to stem 
complaints from employers about the high costs of participation in the employment 
resolution system.108 Lawyer costs demands within mediation were also a source of 
complaint.109 Interestingly the briefing material on the issue avoided any mention of 
an earlier Cabinet Committee direction to the Department to develop a best practice 
guide for representation fees, work on which could not be found.110   
Amongst the suggestions for policy work (which also included dispensing with 
representation at mediation or the imposition of fee maxima) was gathering evidence 
from the Disputes and Tenancy Tribunals.  That work was not commissioned, but the 
suggestion echoed representations to the Minister three years earlier by a Community 
Law Centre concerned that employees were not well served by the current model: 
This community law centre sees mediation as an effective component of any dispute resolution 
process and strongly supports its inclusion in the current model.  As discussed in previous 
correspondence, the Disputes Tribunal process incorporates mediation as an integral part of the 
hearing and referees are specifically trained in mediation techniques.  It is a particularly effective 
and efficient way of dealing with low level proceedings and it is difficult to see how collapsing 
the current employment process for low level claims and removing solicitors and advocates from 
the process in these cases ‘could result in resourcing and cost issues’… 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Department of Labour (Workplace Strategic Policy Research and Evaluation, Woodhams and 
Howard),	   Economic and Social Costs and Benefits of Employment Relationship Problems and how 
they vary according to mechanisms used for resolution,	  July 2007, at [6.3].	  
107	  Ibid, at [4].	  
108	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Briefing Paper,	   Cost of Representation under the 
Employment Relations Act, 3 February 2006.	  	  
109	  Kenneth Johnston, Some Random Observations Concerning Mediation in the Employment Area, 
[2002] ELB 117: deplores the practice of settling advocacy costs during mediation, noting that 
negotiations about the reasonableness of costs sought can take up a significant proportion of the 
mediation.  
110	  Cabinet Economic Development Committee, Minutes, (6 August 2003) EDC Min (03) 18/4. 
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You highlight that ‘if parties engaged in mediation wish the mediator to make a binding decision 
about the problem, they may agree so in writing’.  I was unaware of this option as it is not well 
publicised by the Mediation Service. 111 
The writer noted that the Disputes Tribunal handled 20,000 cases annually at a direct 
cost of $125 per case. Its average waiting times were 10 weeks which compared 
favourably for those claims requiring determination with the then existing waiting 
times of 6 weeks for mediation and 5 months for investigation by the Authority. The 
response emphasised the delays that a single mediation/adjudication system under the 
Employment Contracts Act had engendered, admitting also the absence of research 
supporting the assertion: 
that separate mediation services are resource-efficient and to collapse the mediation and 
Authority continuum into one step could result in resourcing and cost issues.112 
Discipline and Dismissal Project 
When this policy issue was first mooted in 2006 the Department was asked to address 
two concerns: whether no-win-no-fee advocates were incentivising grievance 
claiming; and whether employers were avoiding the grievance claims process by 
paying out employees in private settlements.113 
The research plan included (another round of) obtaining information from 
stakeholders about the extent of problem resolution outside the institutional 
framework, its characteristics in “highly productive workplaces” and the extent to 
which they replicated or differed from statutory procedures.114  It also sought insights 
into the effects of representatives on settlements in mediation, and the reasons why 
the MS’s imprimatur on ‘recorded settlements’ were sought, by commissioning a 
snapshot study of MS mediations.115  A law firm had earlier been commissioned to 
assist with research into the effect of Authority and EC decisions on employer 
processes via a report on case law about disciplinary and dismissal disputes.116  
The Employment Problem Resolution System Project 
By mid 2007 the representation and discipline projects begun in 2006 were 
incorporated into the Employment Problem Resolution System Project, which was 
initially intended to cover grievance resolution, the cost of representatives and the 
development of a code of employment practice.  Its brief was to propose options for 
change and recommend to Cabinet those that it preferred.117 
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  Whitireia Community Law Centre to Minister of Labour, letter, 29 January 2003.	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  Minister of Labour	  to	  Whitireia Community Law Centre, letter, 3 March 2003.	  
113 	  Department of Labour, Report on findings from focus groups inquiring into experiences in 
resolving employment disputes outside the Employment Relations Act 2000 dispute resolution 
framework, 2007.	  
114	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Briefing Paper,	   Employment Relations Research – 
Dispute Resolution, 13 July 2006.	  	  
115	  Department of Labour (Martin & Woodhams) note 60.	  
116	  The Department commissioned law firm Buddle Findlay to prepare a report on case law about 
disciplinary and dismissal disputes in May 2006. 
117	  Department of Labour for Cabinet Economic Development Committee. Draft paper, Review of the 
Employment Problem Resolution System (undated, c July 2007).	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Understood by then was that most (up to 90%) disputes were solved privately, use of 
third parties was dependent on the specific or specialist skills on offer (legal advice, 
mediation, counselling), many employers knew the likely times and costs of settling 
privately or publicly, the MS was perceived to be the formal, less desirable route to 
settlement (but valued when utilised), private processes were associated with 
repairing and maintaining the relationship and the institutions with legal concerns. 118 
The Department was also aware that: small employers were more concerned than 
large employers about problem resolution; the resolution process incurred social and 
emotional costs for both employers and employees who each believed the formal 
resolution system favoured the other, but who both sought timely resolution; 
employers preferred in-house resolution but employees a process that enabled them to 
be heard; small employers were more likely to pay higher amounts to settle privately 
than larger ones as the result of their inexperience of problem resolution, ignorance of 
settlement options and lower probability of having formal resolution systems in 
place.119 
Union membership was acknowledged as an effective means of internal problem 
resolution where union representatives acted as informal mediators in the workplace.  
They supported employers (in respect of dismissals considered to be justified, where 
for instance, breaches of health and safety policies affected other employees) but had 
a reduced presence in small workplaces most at risk of dispute escalation.120 
The MS was valued for assisting with the settlement process once an employment 
relationship had ended, for ensuring fairness, testing the merits of potential grievances 
and ensuring settlements could be enforced but was also criticised for the variation of 
mediator styles and skill levels, separation of parties, its focus on monetary settlement 
at the expense of problem solving and for its vulnerability to lawyer requirements for 
a quasi-courtroom and their inhibiting effect on the provision of mediator risk 
assessments.   
Unions were described as proceeding directly to the MS.  Lawyers were regarded as 
dominating proceedings, refusing to allow parties to speak for themselves, focused on 
win/loss and monetary outcomes, and responsible for inappropriately formalising the 
mediation process. Other (individualised) employee advocates were also regarded as 
guilty of dominating settlement processes, and escalating disputes. 121  
From these studies and surveys, its own service delivery experience, and consultation 
with employer and union national associations the Department concluded that the 
problem resolution system was meeting its objectives but could improve its 
functioning.  The criteria it suggested against which options for improved functioning 
would be measured concerned whether the system’s credibility would be enhanced, 
its participants better informed, imbalances of power addressed and rights to access to 
justice preserved.  Its preferred options required more work (scoping, problem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 	  Department of Labour, Comment on: Report on findings from focus groups inquiring into 
experiences in resolving employment disputes outside the Employment Relations Act 2000 dispute 
resolution framework, 2 July 2007.	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  Minister of Labour for Cabinet Economic Development Committee. Review of the Employment 
Problem Resolution System. (9 October 2007) (EDC (07) 185), Appendix 1.	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  Ibid.	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  Department of Labour, note 118.	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definition, cost benefit analyses, delivery vehicles, budget bidding).122  The exception, 
development of a code of employment practice,123 began immediately. This work 
triggered consideration of codes of practice for disciplinary processes.  However it 
soon became clear that the Council of Trade Unions opposed the idea.  It was quietly 
dropped.124 
The work that Cabinet agreed should proceed included the means by which use of the 
mediator decision provisions of s 150 could be increased, mediation services 
improved, and the quality of paid representation better assured. 125  Within the 
Department this work project was known as the Green Paper.126 
Use of s 150 powers by mediators 
This was the subject of two surveys conducted in May 2008, an internal one of 
mediators and an externally commissioned survey of employers, employees and 
representatives.  
Analysis of the data from mediators concluded that use of the decision power was 
most often the result of individual mediator choice.127  The policy intention for s 150 - 
that the Service should provide for resolution (whether by agreement or decision) for 
low-value disputes for which a two-stage process in the absence of agreement could 
not be justified – was not fulfilled by the mediator approach, described as more carrot 
and stick.  The survey concluded that there was a significant inconsistency of 
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  Minister of Labour, note 119.	  
123	  Provision for Codes of Employment Practice was established by Employment Relations Act, 2000 
Part 8A, in December 2004.	  
124	  Minister of Labour to Department of Labour, Memo, Code of Employment Practice, 1 April 2008, 
directing the Department to cease work on the Code of Employment Practice following a meeting 
between the Minister, Department officials and the Council of Trade Unions. 	  
125 	  Cabinet Economic Development Committee, Minutes, Review of the Employment Problem 
Resolution System, (24 October 2007) EDC Min (07) 24/6: Cabinet agreed that further work on the 
following 6 options for improving the functioning of the employment relations problem resolution 
system should proceed: 
o increasing educational resources and support for employers, employees and their 
representatives, including improving Department of Labour guidance for 
employers/ees on employment relations problem resolution and termination of 
employment 
o exploring the extent to which the quality of paid representation from employment 
advocates (except lawyers and union/employer association advocates) could be 
improved  
o assessing whether statutory provisions (s 124) for the reduction of compensation for 
contributory conduct are effective  
o assessing how greater use could be made of s 150 powers  
o increasing mediator and Mediation Service capacity and capability  
o exploring options to reduce time taken by Authority members in investigation and 
determination of cases, including consideration of changes to Authority process 
126	  Green Paper on the improvements to the Employment Problem Resolution System. 
127	  Department of Labour, Internal paper, Section 150 Employment Relations Act,	   26 May 2008: 
Mediators (85% of the Department’s mediators responded) were asked about their 5 most recent cases. 
Of 128 mediations, of which 28% generated the offer to have the mediator decide, only 1 resulted in 
use of the power of decision.  The reasons for not offering this option were that it was unnecessary 
because the parties were able to resolve the problem (34%), the problem was too complicated (19%), 
the employment relationship needed to be preserved and the power to make a decision was perceived 
as damaging that prospect (13%), the representatives would have rejected the offer (4%).	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mediator practice in the use of the power.  This resulted in a recommendation for 
additional training of mediators if use of s 150 powers were to increase.128 
The external research revealed high awareness of the power but few offers by 
mediators or requests by parties to exercise it.   Offers tended to be made in the 
middle or near the end of the time allotted for the mediation, and when a party sought 
use of the power it was accepted only when both parties wanted the problem resolved.  
The low rates of offer or request for use of the power were said to be because it was 
unnecessary, parties lacked confidence in the mediator, the employment relationship 
needed to continue, there was no evidence available on which decisions could be 
made.  This last response came from a representative who confirmed that use of the 
power would never be sought or accepted.129 
The policy response to this data was a proposal to present three options to parties to 
an unsettled mediation: mediator decision, mediation termination or mediator 
recommendation (conditional upon there being either one party clearly at fault or 
faults on both sides with a clear compromise solution available and/or low proposed 
remedies).130  
Consideration of this proposal revived the old arguments about the need for purity of 
resolution mode against the expense of a two-stage process. The Department’s 
mediators opposed the proposal:  
I think the hopes that some put in s150 are illusory. Mediators are not arbitrators and there does 
not appear to be a safe, principled and consistent approach to how and when s150 would be 
made available to the parties. Best practice requires both that there be an agreement to mediate 
and there is a clear mediation induction process entered into with the parties prior to the s150 
process. DoL could consult with AMINZ, LEADR and NZLS on what is currently recognised 
and recommended and used as best practice. The recommended approach could then be 
publicised.131 
It was agreed that the Mediation Practice Manager would prepare and circulate to 
mediators a practice note promoting greater use of s 150 and describing the 
circumstances in which mediators should recommend its use to parties.132	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Ibid.	  
129	  UMR Research for Department of Labour, Mediation Survey, May 2008:	  This study on the use of s 
150 relied on 155 respondents (26 employers, 55 employer representatives, 15 employees, 59 employee 
representatives). All were aware that the mediator could make a decision if both parties consented but 
few received offers from mediators to make decisions.  Of those who did, both parties accepted the 
offer.  Offers tended to be made in middle or near end of a hearing.  Where a party requested a decision 
the other party accepted the intervention in a majority of cases because both wanted resolution.   
Among the 81 employers and their representatives 8 had received a mediator offer, 11 had sought a 
mediator decision and 62 had received no offer nor made a request. Among the 74 employees and their 
representatives 8 had received a mediator offer, 9 had sought a decision and 52 had received no offer 
nor made a request;  
Of the 19 employers to whom a decision was offered or requested 4 resulted in a mediator made 
decision and 15 did not result in a decision.  Of 13 employees to whom a decision was offered or 
requested, 6 resulted in a decision and 7 did not.  
130	  Department of Labour, Internal paper (Policy to Mediation Service) Section 150: a possible 
approach, 29 July 2008.	  	  
131 de Wattignar, note 23, at 4.	  
132	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, briefing note, The Employment Relationship Problem 
Resolution System, 21 October 2008. 	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Improving the capacity and capability of the Mediation Service  
In mid 2008, when this issue was the subject of consultation with the Department’s 
stakeholders, the MS employed 39 mediators in 7 regional offices.  Its problems were 
defined as capacity in collective bargaining mediation (noted as restricted to a small 
pool of highly experienced older mediators and no succession planning for their 
replacement), access by Maori, restricted use of modern technology (almost all 
mediations required the presence of all parties in the Department’s premises), and use 
of mediation in workplaces. Better training (in other models, in partnership with other 
institutions), use of online and videoconferencing and establishing a mediator-in-
workplace programme were recommended.133 
At that time there was no formal programme of independent evaluation of mediator 
capability, nor were there any published best practice standards.  This meant that 
mediators were vulnerable to assessment via the views and expectations of 
participants and their representatives. Key to acceptability (for these parties) was an 
understanding of the culture and practices of industrial relations, but this was not 
necessarily the basis on which new mediator appointments were made.134  Political 
support for the view that industrial relations practices should form the basis of the 
mediation services on offer came from the Government’s objectives for the 
Department in its Statement of Intent for the 2007/08 year (which emphasised the 
need for interventions to focus on the underlying causes of poor workplace practice, 
rather than on symptoms) but the policy effort remained firmly fixed on the range of 
techniques of alternative dispute resolution for individual disputes.135 
Regulating Employment Advocates 
The Department was directed to explore the extent to which the quality of paid 
representation by employment advocates could be better assured.136 This was the 
Government’s response to employer complaints of meritless claims against them, 
reliance on no-win-no-fee arrangements and the use of mediation to extort financial 
settlements for these claims on the basis that they were cheaper than the costs of 
proceeding to the Authority.137 The legal profession was specifically excluded from 
the enquiry, notwithstanding the view that their litigation and adversarial focus posed 
greater and more frequent obstacles to progress at mediation than the subjects of these 
complaints.138	  	  	  	  
The policy options agreed by Cabinet in 2007 (requirement for advocates to belong to 
a professional association or promotion of those who belonged to one that had a code 
of professional ethics) were joined by two more: development of an online tool ‘rate 
my advocate’ or limiting free mediation by imposing costs on those that were 
unnecessarily lengthened. Promotion of the use of advocates in professional 
organisations was the recommended option because it did not require legislative 
intervention, avoided the problem of breaching NZ Bill of Rights Act protections of 
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  Department of Labour, (Smith to Workplace Leadership Team), internal paper, 15 May 2008. 
134	  de Wattignar, note 23, at 4.	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  Department of Labour, note 133.  
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  Minister of Labour note 122.	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  Department of Labour, (Workplace Leadership Team), internal paper, 12 May 2008.	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  de Wattignar, note 23.	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freedom of association, and the benefits of raising professional standards and 
simplicity of implementation carried fewer risks than the other options.139  
Green Paper consultation 
By mid August 2008 it was clear to the Department that Green Paper consultation 
with stakeholders had failed to engage them in any substantive way with its issues and 
proposals.  The comment that the consultation document elicited was contradictory 
and confirmed that larger employers and those who belonged to employer 
associations were generally well catered for and that those least served by the problem 
resolution system, non unionised employees and those employers who did not belong 
to employer associations, were unlikely to benefit from any of the proposals under 
consideration.140 The ensuing briefing to the Minister recommended (inter alia) the 
issue of practice notes to mediators promoting the use of s 150 powers of decision, no 
further action on the proposal to require employment advocates to belong to 
professional associations and greater financial investment in the MS.141 The Minister 
accepted the first two and rejected the third of these recommendations.142 
Following the 2008 General Election the incoming Minister was briefed about the 
Employment Relations Problem Resolution System work programme.  She was 
advised that recent research suggested a high level of satisfaction with the MS.  At 
that time the MS employed 35 mediators.143 
 
Conclusions 
Quality of Process 
Informality and flexibility of process, the major policy goals for the MS, were 
perceived as key to the quality of outcome goal of supporting and maintaining 
successful employment relationships.144  Additional measures of quality of process 
were timeliness of expert problem-solving support, information provision and 
assistance.145  Assessment of the extent to which these goals were achieved follows 
(below) by reference to ease of access to the MS (claiming), the timeliness of its 
response, and the range of mediation styles on offer.  It is accompanied by analysis of 
other measures adopted to ensure informality and flexibility – institutional separation 
of mediation from adjudication, and the employment status of mediators.  The effect 
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of maintaining rights of representation for those seeking mediation - the policy issue 
that attracted most contention  – concludes this analysis.    
Claiming 
Access to MS assistance required a phone call or email, either to the Department’s 
Infoline or directly to the MS. The information required of an applicant, obtained by 
prompts from the MS, enabled it to take responsibility for contacting and persuading 
the other party to agree to mediation, and for scheduling.   
Provision of mediation by the MS was at no charge.  For parties reliant on 
representation, costs differed according to choice of representative, from no cost of 
representation for union members to subsidised costs for members of some employer 
associations to success or contingency fees for those using no-win-no-fee advocates to 
full costs, regardless of result for parties reliant on lawyers or employment advocates.  
Thus, the difference in costs to employers of reliance on the MS over private 
mediation (in the costs table above) must be attributable to higher related costs 
(representation, remedies, replacement staff) rather than the cost of the resolution 
process, given the need to pay the cost of a private resolution process. 
By comparison to mediation conducted by the Employment Tribunal the MS: 
• collected no charge or filing fee for provision of mediation services;  
• required no initiating application by claimants;  
• annually received significantly higher numbers of claims;  
• achieved a stability of number of requests within a short time of 
commencement. 
On these measures, cost, application process, use and administration the MS can be 
regarded as achieving the quality of process goal of informality and flexibility of 
access to its mediation services.  
Timeliness 
Whilst the scheduling process appeared to users of the MS to remain consistent over 
the period under review, providing parties with almost immediate certainty of a date 
for potential resolution (and the incentive for self-resolution, consistently by a fifth of 
total requests),146 there was a major difference in timeliness of response between the 
MS’s first five years and the following 3-year period in the point at which mediation 
occurred.  Over 90% of mediations were held within 3 months of request in the early 
period, but that dropped to 43% in 2008.  In the later period over 90% of mediations 
were held within 6 months of request.  The result was that the Department’s measure 
of timeliness increased from three months to six months.  It followed the decision (c 
2007)147 to prioritise the provision of mediation assistance to ongoing employment 
relationships.  The proportional similarity between the priority status of requests and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	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time categories suggests a connection between the administrative classification of a 
request and the time in which it is addressed.  The extent of the connection remains 
unclear.  It is, however, possible to speculate that the classification system introduced 
a measure of administrative formality that affected the time efficiencies that were a 
feature of the earlier unclassified reception and scheduling system.   
It is also possible that timeliness rates declined at the MS because a 3-6 month 
measure was as acceptable to users as a 0-3 month measure, particularly if the 
scheduling process consistently delivered a mediation date close in time to the request 
for assistance. Specificity of date close in time to request can be contrasted with the 
practice of the Tribunal that often required parties to wait for several months before 
acquiring a date. 
Another explanation for declining timeliness of service provision may lie with an 
issue discussed in greater detail below, namely the types of problem requiring 
resolution.  When the MS commenced it was anticipated that it would deal with a 
wide range of employment relationship problems.  It is likely that its mediators 
believed they would be assisting parties to resolve problems in continuing work 
relationships, that the MS would operate more like it had in the 1980s than the 
Tribunal of the 1990s.  By 2005 it must have become clear that the work that was 
anticipated constituted a very small minority of that which was presented.  As at the 
Tribunal, mediators were required to preside over negotiation of the terms of 
terminated relationships, which constituted over three-quarters of the problems 
requiring mediation assistance.  And it was not just the problem that was familiar.  
The nature of the parties was too.  They were likely to have been in the employment 
relationship for less than a year, and certainly not for more than 4 years, the employer 
was likely to have less than 20 employees, and the employee to be permanent, full 
time and salaried. Neither party belonged to a union or employer association and each 
was dependent on advice from lawyers or employment advocates for whom fees were 
derived from ending, rather than maintaining the employment relationship, but who 
were unable or unwilling to negotiate the terms of its dissolution with each other 
directly.148 
These factors suggest that timeliness of mediation provision was influenced by: 
• scheduling on receipt of claim/request; 
• control over scheduling vested in the MS, rather than parties or their 
representatives; 
• the informality of the process by which scheduling occurs (absence of 
initiating documents and applications for hearing), the flexibility to 
immediately accommodate the needs of both parties, and the ability to 
provide a date shortly following request; 
•  singleness or clarity of resolution function. 
Timeliness may have been affected by: 
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  This composite description is drawn from the following sources: Department of Labour, notes 95 
and 99; de Wattignar, note 23. 
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• the introduction of administrative procedures that seek to classify and/ 
or prioritise specified types of request or problem; 
• the passage of time on institutional functioning; 
• service provider disillusion. 
It can thus be concluded that timeliness of response to requests for assistance is a 
quality of process goal that can be accepted as met for the scheduling of mediation.   
Timeliness of mediation provision was also a quality of process goal that was met for 
the first 5 years of the MS’s existence.  The doubling of the period within which most 
mediations were conducted for the following 5 years represented a departure from the 
standard set for meeting this quality of process goal.  The reduced standard of 
timeliness compared favourably, however, with standards of timeliness at the 
Tribunal. 
Range of mediation styles 
In its recognition that the style of mediation on offer had to change (from that offered 
by the Tribunal) if the policy goal of early intervention was to be met, the Department 
proceeded on the basis that separating resolution functions and conferring on 
mediators the power to decide the style and process of individual mediations would be 
sufficient to ensure that its desired change of style occurred.  
Two distinct styles of mediation, facilitative and evaluative, were on offer with 
med/arb available by consent.  It is possible that the expressed policy preference for a 
range of styles, a horses-for-courses approach dictated by mediator assessment of the 
style most suitable for individual parties and problems and the Department’s 
determination to ensure there were no rules of process by which representatives could 
disrupt mediation meant there was no need to discuss the issue of mediation style in 
any depth.  This position would have been confirmed by the Department’s experience 
of mediation as the mode of problem resolution that had consistently yielded the best 
results over the preceding decades.  Its intentions for informality of adjudication at the 
Authority would also have led it to believe that there was a low-cost readily 
accessible adjudicative option for disputes that were incapable of settlement.    
It may be for these reasons that the Department did not consider that any additional 
signalling of the policy desire to change the style of mediation was necessary.  But its 
reliance on some Tribunal members as the first of the MS’s mediators and their 
continued use of the shuttle-style evaluative model may well have signalled that 
nothing much had changed.    This style was initially that of the Mediation Service of 
the 1980s when the parties were union and employer groups who settled grievances 
similarly to collective issues, by way of bargaining.  For the individual representatives 
who came to dominate use of the Tribunal the evaluative model was a function of 
both its status as the precursor to Tribunal adjudication (rather than as a dispute 
resolution mechanism in its own right) and their demands for the risk assessment 
model that this status engendered.149 Thus, the Tribunal mediation function came to 
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  Ian McAndrew, Julie Morton, Alan Geare, The Employment Institutions in Rasmussen (ed) 
Employment Relationships, New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act, (Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 2004) 99; Johnston, note 109, describes, from a mediator’s perspective, the differences in 
counsel approaches to mediation, between those who saw it as a dry-run for adjudication and those 
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serve two purposes and constituencies: as the basis of litigation risk analysis, with 
settlement as an incident, but not necessarily a goal, for legal representatives (in much 
the same way as pre-trial or interlocutory processes preceded settlement in other 
jurisdictions) and as assisted negotiation with the aim of resolution for collective 
advocates.   
The reason for the failure to consider the implications of differing or competing styles 
of mediation is less important than its consequences.     The facilitative style was not 
acceptable to representatives and mediators and lawyers decried the med-arb style, so 
these models never gained the traction that was envisaged for them.  Additionally, the 
dominant problem presented for mediation, the negotiation of the terms of a dissolved 
relationship, favoured use of the evaluative style because participants sought 
assurances about the strengths and weaknesses of the positions they had adopted.   
But these were also positions from which a failure to achieve settlement could form 
the basis of an arbitrated outcome.  The parameters of resolution of this type of 
problem were well understood and were, in most cases, insufficient to justify the cost 
of separate adjudication by the Authority.  They did, however, require that mediators 
had experience and knowledge of the employment jurisdiction.  
By 2003, when the review of the Act began, it was clear that the policy hopes for the 
use of a range of resolution styles had been thwarted.  As the statutory amendments 
concerning it reveal, this was perceived by the Department to be the result of 
(individualised) representative insistence that the process requirements for 
adjudication applied to mediation (e.g formal opening and closing statements, absence 
of contact between parties and referee).   However there is no evidence (apart from 
some regional mediator initiatives to offer representative training) that the 
Department considered measures additional to the amendments necessary to modify 
representative behaviours and expectations.  Lawyers continued to be allowed to read 
aloud lengthy opening submissions, for instance.    
The high proportion of dismissal problems, reliance on the evaluative style and a 
continuing failure to consistently and regularly offer arbitration as the means of 
guaranteeing an outcome, particularly for low-value claims, affected incentives to 
settle.  The cost (of representation) of proceeding to the Authority for adjudication 
became the measuring stick (or, dependent on perspective, threat) by which settlement 
options were assessed. A tariff approach to costs orders at the Authority meant that a 
successful party would be reimbursed only for a small proportion of the costs of 
representation actually incurred. This was a source of complaint, particularly from 
small and medium employers, once representatives recognised its value as the basis of 
securing settlements unachievable by adjudication.  The problem affected both 
employers and employees:  small employers were more likely (than large employers) 
to agree to monetary settlements as the cost of avoiding further action (regardless of a 
claim’s merit); non-unionised employees of larger employers, for similar reasons, 
were more likely to settle for significantly less than their entitlement, or not at all.  
Thus, inequality of bargaining power for these groups of individuals was likely to 
determine their outcomes.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
who gathered information for the purpose of deciding whether to settle.  
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This suggests that dominant use of one style of mediation became a component of 
entrenching bargaining advantage or disadvantage.  Use of the evaluative style as a 
means to achieve fairness in the face of obvious inequalities of bargaining power was 
dependent either on mediator expertise or exercise of the arbitrative power.  However 
the latter was restricted to parties who consented to its use.   Those with superior 
bargaining power had no reason to do so.  Availability of the power was neither 
advertised, nor the subject of any formal guidance about its use.  It is possible to 
argue that the Department’s opposition to its inclusion as a mode of resolution 
affected both its availability and use. 
It can therefore be concluded that  
• the policy desire for use of a range of mediation styles was not 
achieved by the MS; 
• for some participants the evaluative style of mediation in use by the 
MS had the effect of underlining their lack of bargaining power in the 
employment relationship at issue; 
• for these participants, exercise of the s 150 power was a means of 
addressing that problem but this redress was denied them; 
• the Department’s fears about the formalising effects of the exercise of 
the s 150 power ensured it was rarely and inconsistently available. 
Separation of modes of resolution 
There was a major administrative benefit for the Department in separating modes of 
resolution.  The semi-compulsory requirement to have a problem mediated before the 
Authority could investigate removed choice of resolution mode from representatives, 
regarded by the Department as part of the problem of Tribunal functioning.  It thus 
conferred a triage function on the MS that transformed institutional planning and 
resourcing.  Although the ready availability of mediation effectively doubled requests 
for assistance, those numbers stabilised relatively early in the MS’s history (in a way 
that applications to the Tribunal never did), thus achieving for the Service an 
operational stability that was denied the Tribunal. 
In addition administrative processes could be devoted solely to scheduling and 
conducting mediations.  This simplicity of function may account for the efficiencies 
of claiming and timeliness discussed above.   
The rising numbers of privately settled claims registered for enforcement purposes 
(and their eventual replacement of mediation as the dominant mode of settlement, 
similarly to the trend apparent in the Tribunal’s final year) suggests also that, in terms 
of Galanter’s theory about lawyers and “litigotiation” (private resolution by lawyers 
occurring primarily in the shadow of the court), the court embraces any official 
dispute resolution institution to which claimants are obliged to look for assistance.  In 
other words, mode of resolution of institution may be less important than institutional 
status as an initiating venue for claims. Speed of scheduling, and the absence of 
opportunity to prevaricate by resort to process or interlocutory issues are also likely to 
have influenced rising rates of private settlement requiring no institutional 
intervention.  Since mediation affects what representatives can achieve without 
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assistance it follows that ready access to the Service became the prompt by which 
private resolution could be achieved. 
Administrative efficiency was not, however, the policy goal publicly advanced for the 
institutional separation of resolution function.  Rather, separation was promoted as the 
means to achieve an early assistance role for the MS, a sort of marriage guidance 
bureau for employment relationships.  Freed from the need to preside over ended 
relationships, the MS would function as a first port of call for those who sought to 
mend their relationships.  This accounts for the need to offer a range of mediation 
styles and to maintain an informality of process via direct contact between mediator 
and (unrepresented) parties.  The failure to achieve this policy goal appears to arise 
from an inability to consider the implications of servicing two separate and distinct 
constituencies of the employment jurisdiction - collectivised and non-collectivised 
employer and employee parties to disputes.   
The early assistance role sought to replicate for non-collectivised workplaces what 
occurred in their unionised counterparts.  But, in recognising the importance of an 
information function for this role, policy makers proceeded on the basis of an 
assumption about information source that the evidence suggests was wrong. The 
Department’s Infoline was a source of neutral and factual information relevant to the 
workplace.  But provision of this information failed to transform Infoline or the MS to 
trusted assistant, intervener, or adviser because that was not their role.   As 
Department research revealed, preferred sources of information in the early stages of 
a dispute are partial, not neutral, regardless of the constituency to which the disputants 
belong.  It is in the advocacy of a position that results differ according to 
constituency: unionised employees are more likely than the non-unionised to achieve 
early satisfactory resolution that maintains the employment relationship.  Advocacy 
was never a role available to the Department’s institutions, so the policy failure to 
recognise that information without advocacy could not form the basis of an early 
intervention role may be key to understanding why it was unachievable. 
This failure to incorporate an understanding of the differences of advocacy style in 
policy for the institutions had another effect.  It rendered the institutional separation 
of resolution modes a component of the high costs of resolving disputes in this 
jurisdiction.  Since the parameters for settlement (at both the MS and the Authority) 
were, for the majority of disputes, below the threshold for civil claims to be resolved 
by the Disputes Tribunal, it soon became apparent to those familiar with both 
jurisdictions that civil claimants were significantly better served.  They enjoyed a one-
stop-shop, certainty of schedule, time limited resolution, no costs of representation 
and a guaranteed outcome. 
The separate provision of adjudication following failure to achieve mediated 
settlement had two additional effects.  It diminished resort to the s 150 power and it 
institutionalised the evaluative style into the dominant process by which mediation 
services were offered, for the reasons specified above in the discussion of mediation 
style.  This meant that the tropes of Tribunal modes of resolution were confirmed, 
consolidated and maintained. 
Use of the s 150 power was always dependent on an acceptance that certainty of 
outcome was more important than the maintenance of purity of resolution style.  
Resolution rates of 65% suggest that purity of resolution style was maintained at the 
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expense of certainty of outcome.  Once the rate of Authority determinations are 
factored in (10-15% of total mediations) it becomes clear that about 20% of those in 
receipt of mediation services may not have achieved an outcome (the extent to which 
private settlements are reached following a failed mediation is unclear). 
It is possible to argue from this that the overall effect of maintaining the purity of 
resolution styles was either to deny an outcome to a potentially significant proportion 
of those who engaged in mediation, force acceptance of an unfair outcome, or 
significantly raise the costs of obtaining a fairer outcome. 
Separation of modes of resolution, therefore: 
• achieved administrative efficiencies by conferring a triage function on 
the MS and transferring control of use and scheduling from 
representatives to the institutions; 
• increased the recorded incidence and earlier timing of private 
settlements (those requiring no institutional input for the settlement 
process); 
• was accompanied by significantly increased requests for assistance; 
• failed to result in an early assistance role for the MS in employment 
relationship problem solving; 
• rendered certainty of outcome more costly for participants; 
• affected the use to which the s 150 power was put; 
• institutionalised the evaluative style as the dominant means of 
providing mediation services; 
• incentivised postponement of fairness of outcome assessments.  
Mediators as employees 
In addition to obtaining more control over claiming and scheduling the Department 
was empowered to exercise greater control over mediators as the result of the change 
of their employment status from independent statutory officers (warrant holders) to 
employees of the Service.   
As is now becoming clear, administrative measures of the MS’s effectiveness produce 
different results than those of other policy outcomes. Its ability to recruit mediators in 
numbers that satisfied demand ensured that the measure of success suggested in the 
previous chapter, timeliness of response to requests for assistance, can be accepted as 
met.  
The paucity of practice and performance standards or manuals, formal guidelines, or 
accountability measures suggests, however, that the clear administrative direction that 
the Department sought (from this change of status) to implement policy for the MS 
never occurred. 150 It was, furthermore, slow to act on evidence (in the form of widely 
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differing settlement rates between mediators) that its enthusiasm for generic 
mediation skills over employment experience was misplaced.  Users and their 
representatives (both individual and organisational) rated knowledge and experience 
of the employment jurisdiction as significantly more important for mediator 
effectiveness than the facilitation skills of those who lacked this experience.  
Settlement rates confirmed the divide.151 The Department, however, appeared to 
associate experience of the jurisdiction with legal knowledge so the practice of 
preferring those with generic skills persisted.  This may help to explain differences in 
annual outcome rates of mediation between the Tribunal (around 80%) and the MS 
(around 65%), although other differences (e.g ease of access and usage) are also 
relevant.  
If mediators with generic skills had a greater commitment to maintaining the ‘purity’ 
of the mediation function than those with experience of the jurisdiction, it is possible 
to argue that this view was aligned more closely with the Department’s fears about 
use of the arbitrative power.  If greater use of the arbitrative power raised the outcome 
rate then it can be argued that commitment to purity of mediation function was a 
component in both entrenching inequalities of bargaining power and postponing 
resort to fairness as a basis of achieving outcomes.  
The change of employee status for mediators thus: 
• contributed significantly to the policy goal of offering more timely 
provision of mediation services; 
• presented an opportunity for managing a close alignment between 
policy goals and mediation practice that was under-utilised by the 
Department; 
• may be associated with lowered settlement rates by the MS (in 
comparison with the Tribunal); 
• may be a component in a greater commitment to the style than the 
outcome of the provision of mediation services. 
Effect of representation 
Research evidence gathered after 2000 about the influence of representation on 
grievance resolution confirmed what the Department already knew from its 
experience of the Tribunal: significant differences between collective and individual 
representative cultures were reflected in workplace resolution rates and institutional 
functioning.  Unionised grievants and their employers had higher rates of disputing 
and resolving in-house (than their non-unionised counterparts) and employers 
accepted that union advocacy was a component of this effect.  This meant there was 
less need for recourse to institutional dispute resolution.  The opposite was established 
for those reliant on individual representatives.  They experienced lower rates of in-
house disputing and resolving, longer duration and more costly disputes and greater 
need for institutional intervention. 
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From this can be noted a paradox: policy for the MS’s functions was based on a 
collectivist approach but its constituency relied on the individualist approach to 
problem resolution.  This helps to explain the policy effort that went into ameliorating 
the influence of individualised representatives on the MS’s functioning.  The success 
of that effort can be assessed by reference to claiming and scheduling, mediation style 
and separation of resolution functions. 
 The transfer of control over claim initiation and scheduling from representatives to 
the MS establishes its major point of difference from the Tribunal.  Its informality of 
process and active administrative control of these preliminaries limited the influence 
that representatives had on timeliness of institutional response at the Tribunal.  
Interestingly these were the changes that both mediators and union advocates cited 
but lawyers ignored when asked if the MS’s processes were less formal than those of 
the Tribunal.152  
The attempt to introduce a different, less formal mediation style foundered in large 
part on opposition by lawyers to the incidents of facilitation.  These included 
facilitation’s need to elicit from disputants, directly, non-legalised cues about the 
dispute that are regarded as relevant to the means by which resolution occurs.  
Lawyers reacted to these attempts by denying mediators direct access to their clients, 
hence the need to clarify and enhance mediator powers to direct and control 
mediations in the 2004 statutory amendments.153  Lawyers also reacted negatively to 
the absence of any evaluation of the positions they had adopted in particular disputes.  
They sought to avoid facilitation by seeking mediators who relied on the evaluative 
model.154 
Mediators were aware that reversion to litigation risk analysis was incompatible with 
the statutory focus on relationship problem solving. They were also critical of lawyer 
requirements of them to evaluate legal positions, noting that provision and evaluation 
of legal advice was a representative function, not a mediator one.155  But there was no 
unanimity of response to the resulting lawyer insistence on choice of mediator.  Some 
offices condoned the practice and others resisted it, but disparity of mediator 
workloads was the consequence, with ex-Tribunal mediators shouldering considerably 
heavier workloads than recent appointees.156  Thus was imposed on the MS the 
mediation style that met the requirements of lawyer representatives. 
Lawyer reaction to use of the s 150 arbitrative power formed the basis of the 
Department’s fears that it would undermine the policy desire for informality and 
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  Ibid: a higher number of lawyers than union advocates believed there had been no change to 
formality of mediation.  All mediators believed there was less formality at the Mediation Service than 
the Tribunal.	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  This raises the issue of control - who controls a mediation – identified as a problem for commercial 
mediation:  Tony Willis Overlawyering of ADR a major issue, 853 Law Talk, 23 October 2014, 27; “As 
the gatekeepers [lawyers] don’t just want control but they have control at a very early stage.  And once 
they get involved in the process, they are very reluctant to let go…”. 
154	  Morton, note 11.	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  Ibid, citing a mediator interviewee: In reality the person responsible for providing employment law 
advice to party isn’t really us, it’s them.  It’s actually a failing on the lawyers, because they arrive here 
saying they really want you to reality check this person.  The answer is why haven’t you done it?  I’m 
not their adviser, they should be doing this. at 78.	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  Morton, note 11.	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flexibility of mediation style by incentivising resort to legalist or formalist demands 
for rules of process.  The Department took the view that arbitrative modes of problem 
resolution attracted those demands.  It now appears that resolution style is irrelevant.  
The demand for rules of process (or the use of a resolution model that can be defined 
in terms of rules of process) appears to be an incident of the provision of institutional 
problem resolution to which lawyers have rights of representation. 
This proposition is supported by reference to the consequence of separating 
institutional provision of modes of problem resolution.  It explains the effort that went 
into the well-signalled statutory change to the rules of process for the Authority, and 
may also account for the effects of the less well-signalled policy desire for change of 
mediation style. Lawyers accepted that change was intended for the adjudicative 
mode, but not for the mediative mode.157 
Complaints about the reliance on the costs of proceeding to a separate institution to 
extract settlements for otherwise meritless claims focused on no-win-no-fee 
representatives, despite their low numbers and the fact that their activities were 
largely confined to the Auckland region.  In essence they took advantage of the high 
costs of representation that complainant employers incurred to force settlements that 
were lower than the potential cost of proceeding to the Authority.  This practice was 
made possible by separating the modes of resolution by which problems were 
resolved.  But it was not a practice either confined to or begun by no-win-no-fee 
representatives. They followed individualised representatives to the Tribunal and 
adopted practices that were perceived to offer fees for negotiation services provided at 
the MS.  The only cost of providing this service was a telephone and the time spent at 
the mediation.  They differed from other individualised representatives at mediation 
only in matters of presentation and fee structure.  Few of them adopted the dress and 
appearance of lawyer representatives and they were less able to speak the language of 
the law.  It was thus easier to attribute to them responsibility for barely ethical 
practices that were much more widespread. 
These effects of representation on the MS suggest that confronting and mitigating the 
effects of legalism was less a matter of style, process or structure of the institution at 
issue than of the behaviours and expectations of those who operated in accordance 
with its dictates.  It can therefore be concluded that: 
• the transfer of control over administrative procedures from 
representatives to the MS had a positive effect on their informality, 
flexibility and timeliness;  
• the differences of representative culture (between collective and 
individualised representatives) first apparent at the Tribunal were 
confirmed by research about the MS; 
• policy for the MS’s operations was more closely aligned to the 
practices of collective than individualised representatives but the latter 
group dominated use of the MS; 
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• institutional provision of dispute resolution services (providing for 
rights of representation) is more likely to be an incident of 
individualised than collective representation; 
• resolution models dependent on flexibility or informality of process 
that do not meet lawyer requirements of process are more likely to 
change to meet lawyer expectations, than lawyer expectations alter to 
accommodate informality; 
• formalist/legalist requirements of process apply to adjudicative, 
mediative or facilitative modes of problem resolution, where rights of 
representation exist, regardless of institutional form, function or style; 
• separation of modes of resolution incentivised reliance on the costs of 
representation as the means of achieving or denying mediated 
outcomes. 
Quality of Outcome 
The quality of outcome measure of success for the MS was a greater use of mediation 
to support and sustain existing employment relationships.  This required the Service 
to show that a significantly higher proportion of its outcomes resulted in the mending, 
rather than the ending of employment relationships. 
Administrative measures to address the problems (attributed by the Department to 
legalism) of claim receipt and scheduling were in large part successful.  The MS 
coped with higher claim numbers, its service provision was significantly quicker and 
it attracted fewer complaints than did the Tribunal.  However these efficiencies failed 
to influence the policy goals of early intervention, greater informality and flexibility 
of mediation style and reduced involvement in assisting the negotiation of the terms 
of ended employment relationships. A common conclusion, mid-decade, of 
commentators was that the resolution institutions of the ERA had yet to result in any 
fundamental changes to employment relations’ practice or dispute resolution.158 
The dominant form of employment in New Zealand, and overwhelmingly in the private sector, is 
the individualised contract.  The legal nature of the contract of employment is heavily balanced 
in favour of the employer, and the employer’s power to dictate its express terms tips that balance 
even further.  Employee voice in the process of contract formation is typically limited to 
accepting or declining an offer of employment on an employer’s standard terms.  Those terms 
are likely to maximise employer discretions and control, and to maintain maximum employer 
flexibility to dispense with the employee’s services.  The standardisation of employer-dominated 
contracts is further enhanced by the standardised legal and human resource advice received by 
employers.159 
This description of the power dynamic supports Morton’s theory about the reluctance 
to engage mediation assistance early within a current employment relationship. 
Morton regards this reluctance as consistent with theories of the connection between 
social distance and resort to the law.160 She argues that the policy failed to take 
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  McAndrew et al and Caisley, note 38; 	  
159 	  Gordon Anderson, Reconstructing New Zealand’s Labour Law Consensus or Divergence? 
(Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2011) 259. 
160	  Morton, note 11.   
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sufficient account of the effect the ECA had on individualised contractual 
relationships and increases in short term and casualised jobs. 
This analysis fails, however, to account for differences in claiming, disputing and 
resolving between unionised and non-unionised work environments. The policy goal 
of early intervention in workplace disputes sought for the MS adoption of the role of 
advocates in unionised workplaces without recognising that their early intervention in 
workplace problems was an incident of collectivisation.  Non-unionised workplaces, 
suspicious or hostile towards collective forms of problem-solving, and as unlikely to 
allow an institution into the workplace as union organisers, left themselves with the 
alternatives of either managing disputes in ways that avoided the need for outside 
assistance, retaining their membership of employer associations (thereby retaining the 
benefit of collective approaches to disputes) or relying on legalised dispute resolution 
procedures and legal advice about employment matters (which in large part replaced 
resort to employer associations for many employers). 161  Adoption of this last 
alternative increased their chances of requiring institutional intervention and thereby 
the costs (and duration) of dispute resolution.  
These choices had similar consequences for employees.  Those in unionised 
environments with the benefits of higher awareness of problem solving mechanisms 
and earlier access to them were less likely to require institutional assistance to obtain 
a dispute outcome.  Union members who did were saved the cost of representation.  
Annual union membership fees were generally less than the cost of an hour or two of 
a lawyer’s time.  The other consequence of union membership was early access to 
advice about the prospects of success of a dispute position.  Unions and employer 
associations were less likely to utilise resources on the advocacy of untenable 
positions. In terms of the Rau Sherman model of remedy systems,162 that high or low 
use is dependent on certainty of outcome, this suggests a reason for differential 
reliance on the MS: an incident of collective advocacy is the provision of early and 
clear advice about outcomes; advice about outcome had to compete with the business 
opportunity offered by the existence of the dispute for individual advocates.   
Employees in non-unionised workplaces, particularly those operated by small or 
medium sized employers, faced greater risks of disputes requiring outside assistance.  
They were required to pay for that assistance and it was more likely to result in an 
outcome that included the end of the employment relationship.  They were also at 
higher risk of discovering untenability of dispute position after, not before, they 
incurred costs of representation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 	  The AC Neilson, UMR and Waldegrave research reports read together reveal employer 
associations as less likely sources of information and advice for employers than lawyers or human 
resources practitioners; Margaret Wilson, The Employment Relations Act: A framework for a fairer 
way in Rasmussen (ed) Employment Relationships, New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act, 
(Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2004), 9: “Prior to the Employment Contracts Act, employers 
had sought advice from the Employer Associations. [Afterwards] the Employer Associations had 
transformed themselves from primarily service organisations into lobby groups.  The legal profession 
became a major stakeholder in the continuation of the Employment Contracts Act regime.” at 15.   	  
162	  Rau, Sherman, Peppet, Processes of Dispute Resolution: The Role of Lawyers (4th ed, Foundation 
Press, Westbury, New York, 2006). 
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It can thus be concluded that the employment dispute resolution system of the ERA 
was ill suited to the needs of small to medium sized employers and their employees.  
The greatest number of complaints about it came from this group, as did the often 
expressed desire for easier termination procedures. Their individualised, fragmented 
position in the business environment, and fewer resources, rendered them more 
vulnerable than large employers and union members to the costs and other 
disadvantages of an individualised problem solving system.  
These factors in combination indicate that adoption of an early intervention role for 
the MS in working environments run by those dominated by legalised ways of 
thinking about dispute resolution was likely to prove extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.  The result was a higher quality of process for the quality of outcome 
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Chapter 7 
Employment Relations Act Institutions 




The major quality of process goal for the Employment Relations Authority, variously 
described as the promotion of cooperative and consensual over adversarial and 
divisive or pragmatic and realistic over legalist and formalist techniques of problem 
resolution, 1  was not much different from the low-level, speedy and informal 
prescription for the Employment Tribunal.2  Their one point of difference lay in the 
extent to which the problem of legalism and formalism was considered a barrier to 
those goals. As is clear from chapter 2, little - if any - policy thought was devoted to 
the means by which low-level speedy informality would be enforced by the Tribunal.  
This can be contrasted with the months of detailed consideration of the policies 
described in chapter 5 and the resulting belief that quality of process would be better 
guaranteed by separating modes of resolution, transferring control over the 
adjudication process from the litigants to the adjudicator, replacing the adversarial 
mode of adjudication with the investigative, abolishing the Employment Court’s 
powers of review, altering the language of dispute resolution, re-focusing the basis of 
(first instance adjudicative) claims from causes of action to problems of the 
employment relationship and reducing the requirements of decision making in written 
determinations.   
The way that the Authority operated for the first eight years of the ERA will be 
considered in terms of these changes to the rules of institutional functioning.  This 
will be followed by an analysis of policy concerns about the Authority’s functioning.  
The quality of outcome goal, the extent to which employment relationships were 
mended rather than ended as a result of involvement by the Authority, and the extent 
to which quality of process goals were met, will form the basis of the Conclusions 
section. 
Operations 
Separation of resolution modes 
The debate about how the variety of techniques available to public dispute resolution 
institutions should be offered (separately or together), canvassed in chapter 2, 
revealed sharp differences of opinion between the participants and practitioners of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Office of Minister of Labour, Cabinet Submission, Employment Relations Bill – Finalisation of 
Outstanding Elements, Options for Dispute Resolution and Enforcement, 17 February 2000.	  
2	  Paul Roth, The New Institutional Framework [2000] ELB 64: “In its basic aims, therefore, Part 10 of 
the Employment Relations Bill (“Institutions”) does not depart far at all from the aims of the 
Employment Contracts Act, but the new framework will require both greater resourcing by 
Government, and a shift in practice and approach by industrial practitioners.” 
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jurisdiction on the one hand and the judiciary, ECA policymakers and large 
employers on the other.  The Department’s view was that the Labour Relations Act 
reforms that empowered grievance committees to rely on more than one mode of 
resolution had produced efficiencies (reducing to one the hearings required) and were 
approved by participants. The mediators of the then existing Mediation Service 
advocated powerfully for that status quo to be retained.  In 1999 Labour Party interest 
groups who were canvassed about industrial dispute resolution sought a return to that 
position.  It was never seriously considered, in large part as the result of the 
Department’s determination to avoid engaging with the debates about process that a 
suggested return would have engendered. 
The structure that resulted institutionalised and emphasised technique differences by 
providing for mediation to be offered by the Mediation Service, investigative 
adjudication by the Authority and adversarial adjudication by the EC.  This had the 
(unintended) effect of formalising those techniques, which raises the issue whether it 
is possible to institutionalise informality of problem solving by way of a highly 
formalised institutional structure.  The conclusions of chapter 6 about the functioning 
of the Mediation Service suggest it may not. 
It is possible to argue that the requirements to first mediate and then investigate a 
problem, before it can be accepted as requiring an adversarial approach, model the 
resolution stages of a dispute such that it should result in changes to the expectations 
of parties and their representatives.  Preferences for adjudication as the first resolution 
response (the problem of Tribunal functioning) could be modified by repeated 
experiences of the advantages of mediating first.  Separation could also be described 
as an attempt to disrupt the lawyer need to negotiate in the shadow of the court by 
emphasising the need to negotiate before seeking the assistance of arbitration.  
Alternatively, a first resort to the Authority could suggest an absence of agreement to 
mediate, refusals to engage suggestive of power imbalances confirmed by an 
insistence on formality (via directions, rather than agreements to mediate).  
These theories can be tested by reference to Authority referrals to the Mediation 
Service.  A well-understood model would result in declining numbers of referrals 
because the need to first look to the Service (or attempt private settlement) would 
become industry practice.  In its first full year of operation the Authority referred 34% 
of its applications to mediation.3  The following year it referred 54%.4 In 2008 it 
referred 40%.5  By then the Department was able to show that of those referred to 
mediation 22% returned to the Authority for adjudication, 45% appeared to disappear 
without trace (no resolution at mediation was recorded, but neither did they return to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Department of Labour, Industrial Relations Service – Monthly Monitoring Reports for 2001 
4	  Department of Labour, Industrial Relations Service – Monthly Monitoring Reports for 2002	  
5	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, briefing to incoming Minister (undated, c early 2009). 
Two other Department of Labour sources of statistics for 2008 and 2009 form the basis of different 
conclusions: an internal paper, note 6, about referrals to the Mediation Service by the Employment 
Relations Authority, July 2008 – February 2009 reveals that 483 referrals were made from 1391 
Statements of Problem, (yielding a 34% referral rate) and another (Revell to Petrie, 11 May 2009) 
states a 25% rate, but on the basis of application numbers that are different and higher than other 
sources of statistics about applications. 
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the Authority), 4% were withdrawn before mediation, 8% remained unresolved by 
mediation but did not return to the Authority, 20% were settled at mediation.6 
It was also clear by 2009 that early indications of the distribution of the Authority 
workload in 2001 and 2002 remained stable through the intervening period: annual 
applications were reduced by about a third via referral to mediation, a third were 
subject to determination and another third were withdrawn between referral for 
investigation and issue of a determination.7 
The trend suggested by these statistics, in particular the proportion of applications 
directed to mediation (on the basis that mediation had not been first attempted) 
undermine the theories about institutional structure as a model or a basis for 
modifying negotiating behaviour, but tend to confirm continuing first resort to 
adjudicative procedures for over a third of claimants.  It remains unclear whether the 
high numbers of unresolved referrals were the subject of private settlements or non-
notified withdrawals so that it is difficult to determine why the characteristics of this 
group appear to differ so markedly (particularly in mediated resolution rates) from 
those who first seek mediation. 
The combination of referrals and requests to the Mediation Service confirm the 
efficacy of institutional separation as a filter of claims capable of mediated settlement, 
regardless of the assessment of the parties and their representatives of the mode of 
resolution required.  Since referrals tended to precede any significant administrative 
or investigative activity on applications, (by the requirement to specify in a Statement 
of Problem whether mediation had occurred) those claims that could be mediated 
avoided the Tribunal problem of delay (by jettisoning the administrative requirements 
of adjudication for claims capable of settlement).   
Separation of institutions was accompanied by a reduction of the proportion of claims 
requiring adjudication.  In 1992 26% of Tribunal outcomes were adjudicated.  This 
reduced to 12% within 5 years.  A mid-decade review of outcomes of the ERA 
institutions revealed that the proportion of Authority determinations to Mediation 
Service settlements was 7.6%.8  A comparison of completion statistics for both 
institutions for the period 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2005 indicated that 5.5% of total 
outcomes (including withdrawals) were Authority determinations.9 
This reduced requirement for litigation services did not pass unnoticed by the legal 
profession.  Their complaints focused on the cost of mediation and litigation at the 
Authority (sufficiently high to deter clients from wanting to proceed further), the time 
and expense required by Authority litigation, and the promotion of mediation at the 
expense of litigation, which was causing a deterioration of expertise of lawyers at the 
employment bar.10  The complaints prompted a response from the Minister of Labour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Department of Labour, internal paper: Referrals to the Mediation Service by the Employment 
Relations Authority July 2008-February 2009, 16 April 2009.	  
7	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, briefing to incoming Minister, note 5.	  
8	  Geoff	  Plimmer and Chris Cassels for Department of Labour: Greater strategic positioning of service 
delivery to achieve outcomes  (undated, c Nov 2004). 
9	  Department of Labour, Key Messages: Employment Relations The Employment Relations Act is 
working (undated, c late 2005).	  
10	  Chief Judge, Employment Court to Department of Labour, letter, 24 October 2002.	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that emphasised employer and employee rights to quick and low cost problem 
resolution and the resultant policy focus on “decreased legalism” in the Authority.11 
The Chief Judge repeated these concerns some years later.  His focus was on quality 
of justice issues:  
 [T]he legislation now requires in effect all employment related disputes to be dealt with 
completely by the Employment Relations Authority before any party has access to a court of 
justice.  Increasingly stringent privative provisions enacted by Parliament have sought to 
prohibit access to the Court in all circumstances and irrespective of the seriousness of the 
consequences of doing so, until an Authority investigation and determination have been 
completed.  Such a restrictive regime runs the risk of employment litigants having a 2nd class of 
justice available to them.  This process illustrates what I have regretfully concluded is a 
legislative mistrust of courts and court processes in the employment field because of what is 
perceived to be emphasis on technicality and legalism, and of form over substance.  That is not 
a correct analysis of the judicial role but it has become dogma for some. 12 
Change of language 
Central to addressing formalism or legalism in adjudication at the Authority was a 
change to the language of this resolution mode.  Adoption (for the Tribunal) of the 
terminology of the civil courts to describe initiation, interlocutory, hearing and 
decision procedures was a means by which the legal profession asserted its 
dominance in representation and was the basis of union complaints of legalism.  Use 
of this terminology also operated to exclude certain claims from resolution processes, 
and was regarded as divisive.13  Substituting relationship for contract, statement of 
problem for cause of action, statement in reply for notice of defence, investigation 
meeting for hearing, determination for decision, challenge for appeal, represented an 
attempt to establish, by the signals of language, a change of policy and attitude 
towards dispute resolution in this jurisdiction.  
These changes of language were accompanied by other departures from Tribunal 
practice designed to underline the primacy of the goal of informality of process:  
namely, the use of standard forms for initiating and defending claims (statements of 
problem and reply) capable of completion by all comers; telephone conferences for 
administrative arrangements; and no recording requirements for hearings.   
There was, however, an omission in the statutory regime for the investigation process.  
When Departmental officials sought the views of the chairpersons of tribunals with 
similar powers to those mandated for the Authority in August 2000, they recorded 
advice about reliance on submissions from representatives.  It was to refuse to accept 
written submissions and, furthermore,	  to refrain from even using the word submission 
for the purposes of having the new adjudicative processes clear from the outset and to 
emphasise that the Authority would operate in an entirely new way.14  This advice 
was not incorporated into the Act or its Regulations, but appeared to inform the 
wording of a Practice Note about the Authority’s procedure. Indicating that formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Minister of Labour to	  Chief Judge, Employment Court,	  letter,	  9 December 2002.	  
12	  Chief Judge Graeme Colgan, Address to 6th Biennial NZLS Employment Law Conference, 12   
October 2006.	  
13	  Office of Minister of Labour, (on the subject that legal rules tend to be divisive) note 1.	  
14	  Department of Labour, Notes of Interview with Chairperson TranzRail Inquiry, 23 August 2000.	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openings by parties to investigation meetings were not required it also included the 
following reference to closing submissions: 
At the end of an investigation meeting parties or their representatives may sum-up by making 
points about the information gathered by the Authority and may refer to applicable legal 
principles.  A citation of any case law should be given where a copy of the decision is not 
being provided.15 
Early attempts by some Authority members to conform to this prescription and 
dispense with closing submissions following investigation meetings (necessitating 
timetabling orders about the dates by which they were to be filed) were 
unsuccessful. 16  Lawyer representatives insisted on their rights to do so.  Self 
represented parties and those represented by organisational advocates were less likely 
to regard them as necessary.17 
The result amounted to a repetition of one of the problems of delay that beset the 
Tribunal – the time that elapsed between receipt of evidence and issue of the written 
conclusions of the adjudicator.  Complaints about this drew responses from the 
Authority attributing the delay to the necessity for Members to await submissions 
before reaching their determinations.18  It is possible that, for this reason, Authority 
Members agreed to a proposal for oral determinations,19  because (at the same 
meeting) they also supported a review of the role of legal representatives and sought 
adoption of the Disputes Tribunal approach to representation for small matters.20  
Additionally Members would have been conscious of the power to issue oral 
decisions (capable of transformation into determinations by transcript) at the end of 
investigations because that option was included in the Practice Note about procedure 
issued in November 2000.  The statutory amendments enjoining them to deliver oral 
determinations at the conclusion of investigation meetings were not, however, 
formulated until 2013.21 
The point of raising the issue of submissions is that they are markers of the formalist 
or adversarial approaches to dispute resolution that policy for the Authority sought to 
discard. Representative insistence on the provision of submissions can therefore be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Chief of Employment Relations Authority, Practice Note: Employment Relations Authority Steps to 
be taken in proceedings, 6 November 2000, at [5].	  
16 	  Susan Robson, recollection of discussions with other Authority members about accepting 
submissions October 2000 – July 2001. 	  
17	  Susan Robson, recollection of attempts to dispense with written submissions following Authority 
investigation meetings, October 2000 – January 2002.	  
18	  Department of Labour, internal paper,	   Review of the Employment Relations Problem Resolution 
System: exploring options to reduce the time taken in the investigation and determination of cases in 
the Employment Relations Authority, including by considering changes to process, February 2008.	  
19	  Members were recorded as supporting a proposal for oral determinations in the minutes of a meeting 
between them and officials on 29 February 2008 (note 20) but as opposing this proposal in a similar 
meeting on 30 July 2008.  It is possible that the difference in view applies to timing or context, so that 
oral determinations on substantive issues at the conclusion of investigations were less acceptable than 
those for ancillary (e.g on preliminary jurisdictional or costs) issues. 
20	  Department of Labour, Record of discussion of internal paper,	  Review of the Employment Relations 
Problem Resolution System with Authority Members, 29 February 2008.	  	  	  
21	  Employment Relations Amendment Bill 2013 (105-1), CL 61; Employment Relations Act 2000, 
ss174A-E contain the amendments that took effect in March 2015.  They impose 3-month time limits 
on the issue of written determinations that follow oral determinations. 
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regarded as another element that distinguishes dispute focus from resolution 
orientation of representatives described in chapter 3. 
Similarly the collective decision by Authority members in October 200022 to seek 
briefs of evidence prior to investigation meetings as a means of establishing the basic 
facts of a matter (and to reduce the time required to elicit them at the investigation 
meeting) may have constituted another (unintended) marker of formalism, perhaps as 
the result of the use of the litigation label brief of evidence to describe the information 
sought.  The use of the language of litigation was a signal, particularly to 
representatives familiar with the Employment Tribunal, that the changes to the 
adjudicative function for the Authority could be regarded as merely cosmetic.  An 
alternative view is that the need to file briefs of evidence itself established a legalistic 
process because these are the documents of adversarial court processes.23 
Statement of Problem  
The provision of application and defence templates, (the statement of problem and the 
statement in reply) to ensure that the basic facts of the problem were before the 
Authority and couched in everyday language, was also a means by which the 
conversion of workplace problems into legal causes of action could be avoided.  A 
measure of the success of this strategy would be the extent to which filed statements 
conformed to this ideal.  This appears to depend on who drafted them.  Within a short 
time of the Authority’s commencement it was apparent that the self represented were 
able to complete these forms in the way intended but that representatives were less 
likely to do so.24 
Authority members identified legal representatives as more likely to draft statements 
in terms of traditional causes of action.  They attributed to this style of drafting parties 
who became entrenched into perceiving their problems in terms of the legal issues 
identified in the statements, rather than the workplace problem under review.25  
The provision of templates did not operate to alter the type of problem brought to the 
Authority.  Personal grievances (mostly arising from dismissals) remained the 
dominant employment relationship problem, as they were at the Tribunal and at the 
Mediation Service.  They formed 62% of the requests for assistance at the Service, 
79% of the applications to the Authority,26 and 42% of Authority determinations.27  
This last statistic mirrored the proportion of grievances subject to Tribunal decisions.  
Its failure to reflect application percentages arises from the proportion of decisions 
and determinations (for both institutions) required to be devoted to ancillary matters 
(costs and interlocutories): between 33% (Authority) and 38% (Tribunal) in a 2002 
analysis, but, as noted below, subject to subsequent increases.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Susan Robson, recollection of the initial training session of Authority members in October 2000. 
23	  Julie Morton, M.Com Thesis, Reducing Legalism: The impact of the Employment Relations Act 
2000, University of Otago, August 2003.	  
24	  Ibid.	  
25	  Department of Labour, note 20.	  
26	  Department of Labour, Industrial Relations Service – Monthly Monitoring Reports for 2001 and 
2002. 
27	  Kathryn Beck and Ian McAndrew, Paper for NZ Law Society Employment Law Conference 2002, 
Decisions and Damages: An Analysis of Adjudication Outcomes in the Employment Tribunal and the 
Employment Relations Authority, October 2002.	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The second most common claim was of wage arrears, estimated as totalling 25% of 
annual claims.28  As for the Tribunal the Department counted both application 
numbers and the separate claims within each application.  Wage arrears claims often 
accompany grievances, particularly if issues arise about notice periods or holiday pay.  
This explains why the combination of grievances and wage arrears claims exceeded 
100%. This category of claim accounted for 7% of Authority determinations in its 
early days,29 which tends to confirm its status as a consequence more than a cause of 
workplace problems.   
Transfer of control  
Administrative control over the whole process of receiving and adjudicating claims 
was regarded by officials as crucial to avoiding the problems of delay occasioned by 
the behaviour of representatives at the Tribunal.  For this reason Authority staff had 
responsibility for checking and serving documents once they were filed: 
Authority Support Officers will check to see that the wording and contents of the statement of 
problem and statement in reply are such as to fully, fairly and clearly inform all parties and the 
Authority.  If not, either by telephone or other convenient method, a Support Officer will seek 
clarification or any necessary additional information from the author of the statement.30 
Support officers were also responsible for arranging telephone directions conferences, 
the purposes of which were the: 
(a) identification of factual and/or legal issues central to the employment relationship 
problem and its determination, and disposal by agreement of non-contentious matters; 
(b) settling with the parties particular details as to the conduct of the investigation meeting, 
such as persons who are to give information and the supply of documentary information; 
(c) considerations of directions to be issued, either at the request of any party or by the 
Authority of its own initiative; 
(d) setting a timetable for necessary steps to be taken by the parties or anyone required to 
attend before the Authority; 
(e) fixing the date, place and time for a meeting to start the investigation (to be confirmed by 
written notice).31 
These controls over the initiation and processing of claims shared some similarities 
with those instituted by the Mediation Service.  There was, however, one difference in 
what occurred administratively between the three regional Authority offices that 
subsequently assumed some significance to the means by which control of the 
investigation process affects output.  The four original Members at the Wellington 
office agreed that, upon filing, statements of problem would be immediately allocated 
to Members, each of whom assumed responsibility for a particular region (Manawatu, 
Taranaki, Hawkes Bay, Wairarapa) and all of whom received, in strict rotation, 
statements of problem from the Wellington metropolitan area.  The Auckland and 
Christchurch offices allocated files differently – at some time after statements of reply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Briefing Note, Meeting with the Chief Authority 
Member, 31 October 2005.  
29	  Beck and McAndrew, note 27.	  
30	  Chief of Employment Relations Authority, note 15, at [2].	  
31	  Chief of Employment Relations Authority, note 15, at [3]	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were filed. 32  The choice of to whom the files were allocated remained with 
administrators. The Wellington system required Members to actively manage files 
from the outset.33 This retention of control of the whole process had workflow 
consequences.  Within two years it was clear that Wellington was the only office 
consistently matching applications and disposals.  The other two offices failed to do 
so and experienced significant rises of uncompleted applications, of itself an indicator 
of delay.34 During this period Wellington members were additionally allocated files 
from the Auckland office.35 
The other difference of significance between the regional offices concerned the 
issuing of determinations, an indicator of work rate.  The Wellington office 
consistently issued higher numbers of determinations per member than the other two 
offices.36  The rate of variation of determination numbers between members was also 
lowest in this office.37 
The significance of these regional differences of work rate and workflow lies in the 
means by which they were affected by the timing and determinant of file allocation.  
Immediate and automatic file allocation produced efficiencies over the use of 
administrators, so the order from the Chief of the Authority in 2011 to the Wellington 
office to desist from using this procedure resulted in a noticeable reduction of case 
processing efficiency.38  
Use of investigative mode 
Cross-examination 
Conferral of the inquisitorial function was the clearest signal of the policy desire for 
change to entry-level adjudicative resolution.  It formed the basis of perceptions that 
legalism had reduced more significantly at the Authority than at the Mediation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Rosemary Monaghan, The Employment Relations Authority — a Member’s Perspective [2005] 
Employment Law Bulletin, 46. 
33	  This meant that they could schedule directions conferences for investigations upon the expiry of the 
date for filing replies, rather than waiting for these documents to be filed.	  
34	  Department of Labour, Industrial Relations Service – Monthly Monitoring Reports for August 2002: 
Between June 2001 and August 2002 outstanding matters at the Authority rose from 367 to 630. The 
Wellington office maintained a constant difference between claim receipts and disposals of 92. 
Outstanding matters rose from 250 to 400 in the Auckland office and from 70 to 143 in the 
Christchurch office.	  
35	  Susan Robson, recollection, October 2000-January 2002.	  
36 	  Department of Labour, Annual Determinations per member 2003-2007 (undated); Annual 
Determinations per member 2006-2008 (undated). For the 6 years between the beginning of 2003 and 
the end of 2008 three members of the Wellington office issued 22% of the annual number of 
determinations (or just over 7% each).  Member numbers at the Christchurch office rose from 2 to 4 
and their annual output rate varied between 17 and 23% but their average annual rate per member 
varied from 4.8% to 5.9%.  The Auckland membership issued 54-59% and their numbers rose from 9 
to 12 but their average annual rate hovered between 4.5% and 5.8%. 
37	  Ibid; For the 5 years between 2004 and 2008 the variations were between .6 and 2.8% in 
Wellington, 2.3 and 4.3% in Christchurch and 3.9 and 6% in Auckland of the total annual 
determinations issued by the Authority.	  
38	  Paul Stapp, Wellington Authority member, Notes of interview with Susan Robson, 27 April 2012.  
No reason for the instruction was provided, but it was issued by the same Chief Member who lobbied 
the Minister of Labour for more members for the Authority by letter dated 2 May 2001 when 
Wellington members had insufficient work to occupy them fully.	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Service.39  However, as became clear during the select committee consideration of the 
Employment Relations Bill, lawyers regarded this function as negatively affecting the 
Authority’s capacity to act judicially.40  Their objections were framed in terms of the 
principles of natural justice, and they failed to subside when the ERA was passed.41  
This became apparent to the Wellington members of the Authority who agreed to 
describe the new hearing processes to members of the Wellington District Law 
Society in October 2000.  The meeting became very heated when the issue of cross-
examination arose and it grew clear that representatives would no longer have 
unfettered rights to this form of questioning.42 
On 6 November 2000 the Practice Note cited above about Authority process was 
issued.  It was prefaced by a reference to the statutory requirement for resolution on 
substantial merits and without regard to technicalities.43 Investigation meetings would 
commence with a description of the procedure to be adopted, no formal openings 
were required, and evidence in chief would be proffered in written briefs but capable 
of supplementation orally at the investigation meeting.  The Note went on to state, 
about evidence, that the Authority would question witnesses and there would be no 
cross-examination, although parties would be invited to propose additional matters for 
the Authority to inquire into. 
The Practice Note summarised the collective views of the Authority membership 
about the way the investigative function should operate.44 They believed this function 
would offer them a more active role in the resolution process and control over the 
pace and the time required for gathering and testing evidence. For these reasons they 
were keen to ensure its success.45 
Less than six months later the cross-examination issue came before the Employment 
Court, following the circulation of directions by the Authority that the parties to a 
grievance in which credibility was in issue exchange briefs of evidence and lists of 
questions for witnesses prior to an investigation meeting.46  The Authority declined an 
application to remove the proceedings to the Court (about whether the grievant was an 
employee or the beneficiary of a Government run work experience scheme) on the 
basis (inter alia) that Parliament intended the Authority to set its own procedures, 
these had been set and they were consistent with the statutory obligations on the 
Authority.  It considered that the relevant principle of natural justice, the right to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Morton, note 23.	  
40	  T G Goddard, The Only Constant is Change …The Changed Role of the Employment Court under 
the Employment Relations Act 2000 [2000] ELB 115.  
41	  Phillip Green, Viva La Difference? Dispute Resolution under the Employment Relations Act 2000, 
[2000] ELB 119; Kenneth Johnston King John, Runnymede, the Magna Carta, and Other Stuff [2000] 
ELB 158. 	  
42	  Johnston, note 41: “However, Authority members speaking publicly have announced that they 
reserve the right to examine witnesses themselves and will not allow any form of cross-examination of 
witnesses by parties or their representatives.” at 158; Susan Robson, Recollection of the meeting 
between Wellington members of the Employment Relations Authority and employment lawyers at the 
Wellington District Law Society rooms in October 2000. 
43	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 157.	  
44	  Susan Robson, note 22. 
45	  Neville Taylor, Member of the Employment Relations Authority, The Employment Relations 
Authority Investigation Process [2001] ELB 19. 
46	  David v AE Tilley [2001] ERNZ, 93. 
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heard, was accommodated by these procedures and was not synonymous with any 
right to cross-examine. 
The Court was first required to determine whether it should order removal of the 
proceeding.  It considered that it should, for the following reason: 
The Act contains new and quite novel provisions for the handling of judicial business.  Those 
who are used to more traditional methods are opposed to the Authority’s interpretation of what 
the Authority may do in the conduct of investigations.  While it is true that the Court may not 
tell the Authority how to conduct investigations it is also true that the Authority is obliged to 
adhere to the principles of natural justice.  Any failure to do so is an unlawful act and unlawful 
acts have an impact on jurisdiction.  The Court must be free to take cognisance of any 
illegality.47 
The issue was more fully argued four weeks later.  By then the Attorney General and 
the New Zealand Law Society were joined as interveners.48  The Court confirmed its 
earlier expressed view that the right to cross-examine, as a principle of natural justice, 
was binding on the Authority.49  It also made the point that if Parliament intended to 
exclude the right to cross-examine at the Authority it could easily have said so.  
Parliament50 took up this invitation on 14 November 2001 and ss157 and 173 of the 
Act were amended to provide that compliance with the principles of natural justice 
did not require the Authority to allow the cross-examination of a party or person.51  It 
retained discretion to do so.52  
In turn, this raised the fear that absence of a fetter on the discretion of Authority 
members would result in more frequent recourse to superior courts for guidance about 
the manner of exercising the discretion, ensuring that statutory provisions to 
informalise and streamline matters might well have the reverse effect.53 This fear 
proved to be groundless, and by means that were unlikely to have been anticipated:  it 
seems that trust – the trust that participants have in the Authority membership – is 
linked most closely with lawyer perceptions of a proper balance between practical and 
natural justice.54  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Ibid, at [20].	  
48	  Gordon Anderson, David v Employment Relations Authority, Attorney-General and New Zealand 
Law Society, [2001] ELB 99. 
49	  David v Employment Relations Authority [2001] ERNZ 354.	  
50	  Minister of Labour, Media Statement, Law Change Corrects Technicalities, 3 October 2001: 
The Government will also move to clarify the law that the Employment Relations Authority is not 
required to allow cross-examination, but may do so in appropriate cases. This is consistent with the 
policy intent behind the Employment Relations Act which recognises that decision-making at first 
instance should be as informal as possible and not constrained by the legal procedures. Parties will 
not be prevented from pursuing their case in the Employment Court on the basis of a full hearing. 
The Authority’s ability to decide the procedure of an investigation meeting is an important way in 
which flexibility can be maintained and undue length and technicalities avoided. The Authority will 
continue to be required to meet the principles of natural justice. 
51	  Amendment inserted by Employment Relations (Validation of Union Registration and Other 
Matters) Amendment Act 2001, s 10, 14 November 2001.	  
52	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 173(1A):	   Amendment inserted by Employment Relations 
(Validation of Union Registration and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2001, s 11, 14 November 2001 
53	  Charles Chauvel and Alistair Wishart, Recent Comment on Employment Law Reform: Time to “Get 
Real” [2001] ELB 153. 
54	  Suzanne Innes-Kent, A review of the Employment Relations Authority: Balancing the requirements 
of practical justice and natural justice in an informal, inquisitorial process [2007] ELB 120. 
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When Authority members, unions and lawyers were asked about the utility of cross 
examination (after the amendment), their differences of view concerned its bullying 
potential and veracity testing powers.   Authority members familiar with its tropes 
were keen to dispense with “power games and trying to belittle people, or intimidate 
them and going over the same ground already covered in the hope of a different 
answer”55 whilst lawyers were concerned about discharging obligations to clients 
when the test of veracity of the other party’s witnesses was left to the Authority 
member.56  However there was no unanimity of view amongst representatives about 
the effect of the amendment: 43% believed their questioning of witnesses remained 
the same, whilst 54% said it had reduced.  Union advocates were equally divided on 
the issue but more lawyers (65%) asserted reduction.57  
As time passed, and the transfer of control of proceedings from representatives to 
Authority members became more accepted, lawyers (in response to questions about 
natural justice and cross-examination) were recorded as generally happy with the 
Member-controlled approach, accepting the need for relevance and control of 
repetition as the price for efficiency and cost control. 58  Their concerns, individual 
differences between Authority members, boiled down to issues of social skill or 
presentation, if the encomium in the study’s summarised conclusions are a guide:  
Authority Members should be free to assess risk, disclose early thoughts and look for openings 
to invite settlement, but not in such a way that parties feel coerced or feel that the Member has 
pre-determined the outcome before they have told their story.59 
 
During the election campaign of 2008 the National Party signalled its desire to require 
the Authority to act judicially.60  After the election the Minister of Labour explained 
that this included restoring the right of representatives to cross-examine.  Initial 
advice to the Minister suggested that this would limit the ability of Authority 
members to control investigations by transferring more power over the course of a 
proceeding to representatives.61  Informality would be compromised and costs to 
parties increased.  These consequences were described as “at odds” with the original 
policy intention for the Authority -	   to ensure fair resolution processes that privilege 
substantive issues over legal technicalities.62  Officials also invoked the problems 
experienced by the Tribunal (delay and legalism) and research by the Ministry of 
Justice (as part of its Tribunals project) that revealed that users of the Authority were 
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  Morton, note 23, at 113.	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.	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  Innes-Kent, note 54.  
59	  Ibid, at 121. 
60	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Briefing Note, Minister’s meeting with Department of 
Labour officials (undated c December 2008).	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  Ibid. See also Gordon Anderson, David v Employment Relations Authority, Attorney-General and 
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that there is a probability of removing the control over the Authority’s procedures from the members of 
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  Department of Labour, internal paper: Employment Relations Authority – Minister’s Comments, 13 
February 2009.	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significantly more likely to say they thought that one of the best features of 
investigation meetings was that they were less formal than court hearings.63 
On 1 April 2011 ss 157(2A) and 173(1A) were repealed.64 Section 160 was amended 
to provide that the Authority must allow cross-examination to the extent consistent 
with its equity and good conscience jurisdiction.65 
Other aspects of the investigative mode adopted by the Authority that were the subject 
of analysis for their effects on the perceived formality of its procedures included 
information provided by Authority members (particularly to unrepresented parties), 
the effect of representation on outcomes and of party understanding of the reasons for 
the dispute, the cost of representation, and resourcing.66 
Information Provision 
Information provision, a key objective for the employment institutions as a 
component of the expert problem solving support and assistance considered to be 
necessary for prompt dispute resolution,67 appears to be a concept open to different 
interpretations.  Authority members took the obligation seriously, reporting that they 
conducted their investigations differently depending on the amount of information 
about the problem they considered that parties had.68  Unrepresented parties, or those 
with representatives that members believed had not fully explained matters, were 
more likely to receive more information from members than those with representation 
that members trusted.69  Whilst all representatives agreed that their clients/members 
should understand the reasons for the dispute only 60% of them were confident that 
this was frequently the case.  The result for the other 40% was described as the 
“bystander effect” that occurs when the extent to which representatives take over 
responsibility for running a dispute relegates parties to bystander status.70 Authority 
members regarded parties with legal representation as more vulnerable to this 
phenomenon when their lawyers resorted to the language of the law by framing facts 
and behaviours in legal terms (‘legal labels’) as a substitute for ordinary description.71 
Perceptions of the validity of the Authority position on information provision differed 
amongst union advocates and lawyers asked whether they thought unrepresented 
parties were offered legal advice or more assistance as the result of their lack of 
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  Department of Labour, note 60.	  
64	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 157(2A) repealed on 1 April 2011 by Employment Relations 
Amendment Act 2010, s 26; Employment Relations Act 2000 s 173: substituted, on 1 April 2011, by 
Employment Relations Amendment Act 2010, s 33. 
65	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 160(2A): inserted, on 1 April 2011, by Employment Relations 
Amendment Act 2010, s 29(1).	  
66	  Morton, note 23.	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  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 143(c),	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  Morton, note 23.	  
69	  Morton, note 23. A Taiwanese study of 100,000 civil cases that found legal representation had no 
significant bearing on case outcomes at trial reasoned that the continental (inquisitorial) judge’s active 
role in the adjudication process helped to explain why pro se litigants fare reasonably well in formal 
litigation: Kuo-Chang Huang, How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcomes: An Empirical 
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note 27, whose connection of success rates with representation is described overleaf.	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  Morton, note 23, at 33.	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  Ibid, at 128.	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representation.  Fifty-three per cent of union advocates and 32% of lawyers thought 
legal advice was rarely or never proffered to the unrepresented and 34% and 61% 
thought it was occasionally.  Members denied offering legal advice.72  In response to 
the question whether members assist the unrepresented purely because they lack 
representation 53% of union advocates and 19% of lawyers thought not (rarely or 
never), 45% of unionists and 80% of lawyers believed this occurred occasionally or 
frequently.73   
The researcher who posed these questions attributed the differences of response to the 
“fine line” between providing information and offering advice. 74   Additional 
explanations lie in conflicts of view about the function of information provision and 
the role of the investigative arbiter.  Given that information provision in adversarial 
arbitration attracts a plethora of formal exclusionary rules (and interlocutory 
processes) but is regarded as a core (negotiable) resource in the negotiation of 
collective agreements it is not difficult to accept that it is also subject to conflicting 
professional positions between litigators and negotiators.  
This conflict is also apparent in perceptions about the role of the investigative arbiter. 
For lawyers the arbiter, as the decision-making neutral, is required to refrain from 
providing information or advice to parties to avoid compromising neutrality and/or 
suggesting predetermination.  For institutional advocates, for whom information is a 
basis for accurate assessments of negotiating positions, and information exchange the 
means by which disputants work towards resolution, the arbiter performs a facilitative 
function.  Thus exists an apparent replication of conflicting role expectations 
experienced by Mediation Service mediators (who could be either facilitators or 
evaluators, but not both).   
The practice, for instance, of Members proffering a preliminary view of a dispute for 
the purposes of encouraging parties to resolve their differences before an investigation 
concluded was reported as attracting “a fair amount of discussion” amongst 
practitioners: 
On the one hand, many parties may appreciate the preliminary view and the opportunity to 
agree to an outcome without the remaining uncertainty of a determination being imposed on 
them. On the other hand many parties may feel that their “day in Court” has been unfairly 
influenced and perhaps predetermined. In particular, where the parties have unsuccessfully 
attempted mediation and subsequently incurred legal costs in preparing for the proceedings, 
many find it frustrating to then be back, effectively, in mediation. 
In many situations, this approach may be suitable and indeed successful in resolving the 
problem in an appropriate manner. At the same time it may be that it unnecessarily overlaps the 
roles of the Mediation Service and the Authority to a degree that is not appreciated by some 
parties. This practice (and the fact that it is adopted more in some Registries than others) has, 
of course, attracted a fair amount of discussion from practitioners.75 
For Authority members role conflict concerned the extent to which the investigative 
function required them to facilitate and engage in information provision and 
exchange, but only in certain circumstances: in the coincidence of self-representation 
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Perspective [2005] Employment Law Bulletin, 42. 
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and legal representation.  The anxiety (of attracting allegations of predetermination 
and inviting challenge) reported by Members in those circumstances centred on issues 
or evidence that unrepresented parties were unaware of the need to establish.76  Since 
obtaining that information is the essence of the investigative role this is an anxiety 
attributable to the tropes of adversarial litigation.  It suggests that, as for mediators, 
role conflict was an incident of adversarial expectations, rather than of the role itself.  
The outcome, however, affected unrepresented parties as a class: unrepresented 
employers were more likely to lose grievance claims;77 awards of compensation to 
unrepresented grievants were significantly lower than the results achieved by their 
represented counterparts. Apparently counter intuitively, unrepresented grievants at 
the Authority (but not the Tribunal) were more likely than those who are represented 
to win their claims.78  This appears to indicate that the Authority was more accessible 
than the Tribunal to unrepresented grievants.  It furthermore suggests that 
unrepresented grievants were less likely than those with representation to seek 
remedies for meritless claims. 
Representation 
Related to the role-conflict issue is the perceived effect of representation at the 
Authority (67% of grievance parties were represented by lawyers, 21% of employees 
and 16% of employers by advocates)79.  Union and lawyer representatives were 
almost unanimous (92%) about the disadvantages of lack of representation (12% of 
grievants and 7% of employers were self-represented).80  Authority members were 
unanimous in the belief that the unrepresented suffered no disadvantage.  However 
their interlocutor noted that their anecdotal summaries of investigations involving the 
unrepresented established the opposite.  The gap was attributed to a social desirability 
bias arising from the policy expectation for the Authority that the unrepresented 
should not be disadvantaged.81   
Absent from this analysis was the effect of representation cost on outcomes. So whilst 
the views of Authority members about the very high costs of representation by 
individual (as distinct from institutional) advocates were recorded there is an absence 
of data about the degree of financial disadvantage resulting from lack of 
representation.  The $3,000 difference in average compensation awards between the 
represented and the unrepresented failed to account for the cost of obtaining the 
higher awards.82  Since costs awards are accepted as accounting for a small proportion 
only of the total costs of individual representation the issue of disadvantage is more 
complex than the data generated by this research suggests.  Authority members 
reported that hourly rates of lawyer representatives of $300-400 resulted in costs 
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applications of up to $40,000 for a single investigation.  At that time (2003), of the 
124 costs awards recorded 99 (79%) were for awards of  $3,000 or less.83  Of the 
awards to employers 72% were in this range and of those in favour of employees 87% 
were in this range.  In that year 149 awards of compensation for distress and 
humiliation were made, 130 (87%) of which were for less than $9,000 and 96 (64%) 
of which were for less than $6,000. 
This raises the issue whether cost of representation deterred parties from proceeding 
to the Authority.  A Legal Services Agency survey in 2006 suggested a rate of 22%.84  
Asked about this by Morton, union representative responses covered, reasonably 
equally, the full range of responses but 58% of lawyers agreed that this was a frequent 
and 37% an occasional occurrence.85  These differences of response were attributed to 
role differences between union and lawyer representatives.  Unions decide whether to 
fund proceedings (and do so on the basis of strength of case) but that decision reposes 
with the clients of lawyers.  Comparing the costs of preparing for and attending 
investigation meetings with Tribunal hearings the majority (71%) of all 
representatives questioned believed they remained the same, notwithstanding that, at 
the time this question was posed, investigation meetings were slightly shorter than 
Tribunal hearings.86 
Member output 
The average length of investigation meetings increased, however, from 1.09 days in 
2006 to 1.24 in 2008,87 although the significance of this figure is difficult to establish, 
given regional differences for much of the data gathered about the Authority’s 
functioning (e.g the times between filing and investigation meeting varied regionally, 
mirroring the variations arising from case allocation strategies).88  If determinations 
issued are a guide to the number of investigations completed (absent the effect of 
ancillary decisions discussed below) an interesting conclusion about individual work 
rates can be drawn.  In the 2003 and the 2007 years the same number (854) 
determinations were recorded as issued.   The 2003 figure was achieved by 15 
members but by 2007 the membership numbered 18, thus reducing the 2003 average 
of 56 to 47.  A closer examination of individual rates for this period reveals that 6 of 8 
members of the Auckland office, and 2 of 3 members in each of the other 2 offices 
issued fewer determinations in 2007 than 2003. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment website: Costs and Compensation Tables, 2003 
84	  Minister of Labour to Cabinet Economic Development Committee, Review of the Employment 
Relationship Problem Resolution System, 4 November 2007.	  
85	  Morton, note 23: union responses were: 34% frequently, 21% occasionally, 24% rarely, 20% never: 
at 126	  
86	  77% of investigations took no more than a day in the first 18 months of the Authority’s operations, 
cf 68% of Tribunal hearings took this time in its last 18 months of operation, 95% of investigations 
took no more than 2 days and 86% of Tribunal hearings took this time: Beck and McAndrew, note 27; 
see also Paul Latreille, J.A Latreille, K. G Knight Making a Difference? Legal Representation in 
Employment Tribunal Cases: Evidence from a Survey of Representatives, (2005) 34(4) Industrial Law 
Journal, 308, who argue that lawyers may both shorten and lengthen case resolution in British 
employment tribunals by encouraging early withdrawal and late tribunal resolution of cases 
respectively. 
87	  Department of Labour for Minister of Labour, Statistics for officials’ meeting with Minister of 
Labour: Average hearing length and time between hearing and determination, 13 March 2009.	  
88	  In 2003, they averaged 167 days in Auckland, 154 in Wellington and 228 in Christchurch: 
Department of Labour, Monthly Monitoring Reports for 2003. 
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Given the absence of change in the nature of problems put before it, stability in 
application, withdrawal, and referral rates, these statistics suggest that the Authority 
experienced a reduced ability to operate at its original rate or had a reduced 
workload.89  At the outset there was insufficient work for the 13 members initially 
appointed.  However, whilst Wellington members were offering to share the workload 
of the Auckland members,90 the Chief Member was campaigning for the appointment 
of more members.91 He continued to do so, attributing inadequate resourcing of the 
Authority to limitations on its investigative and educative functions, by citing an 
establishment projection of 70 cases per month and application numbers of 200 per 
month.92  This description of the Authority as inundated by claims for which its 
membership was inadequate failed to acknowledge that the establishment target had 
yet to be met or that it was becoming apparent that over two thirds of the applications 
would not require investigation.93 
Reducing output rates and the demands for more members replicate what occurred at 
the Tribunal.  Delay was attributed to scarce adjudicator resource, even after it 
became apparent that increases to the Tribunal membership had no permanent effect 
on the number of unresolved applications, or the size of the delay.     
Richard Abel is alive to this phenomenon, describing the specialised functionaries 
(“to whom law is their occupation”) within informal institutions like the Authority as 
possessing distinctive advantages, including the power to demand and obtain status 
enhancing measures like increasing the numbers of their subordinates.94  
Determinations 
Notwithstanding the Department’s reliance on determination numbers as establishing 
that a third of applications required determination, it is unclear whether as many as 
this were fully investigated and determined.  This is because all determinations issued 
by the Authority were counted as if they each originated from a different Statement of 
Problem.  However the problem (noted in Chapter 2) with the Tribunal’s functioning, 
that as time passed the Tribunal recorded more written decisions per application (11% 
ancillary decisions in the 91/92 year, but 29% in the 98/99 year), was replicated by 
the Authority.  In the 18 months prior to October 2000 38% of Tribunal decisions 
were ancillary and in the 18 months after that time 33% of the Authority’s 
determinations concerned costs and process.95  By 2007 this proportion had risen to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  In 2002 2,267 applications were received and 2,300 applications were completed: Department of 
Labour, Monthly Monitoring Reports for 2002. 
90	  Susan Robson, recollection of repeated offers to the Chief Member to assist and of receipt of 
Auckland files January – August 2001. 
91	  Chief Member to Secretary of Labour, letter, (seeking more members to be appointed to the 
Auckland and Christchurch offices) 2 May 2001; Chief Member to General Manager, Employment 
Relations Service, letter, (complaining about overload of work for Authority members and seeking 
more members for the Auckland and Christchurch offices) 7 January 2003; Chief Member to Secretary 
of Labour, letter, (seeking more resources) 19 August 2003. 
92	  Morton, note 23.	  
93	  The claims were made in late 2002/early 2003: the number of determinations issued in 2002 (738), 
if adjusted for ancillary decisions included in that total (33%) suggest that approximately 500 cases 
were dealt with, significantly fewer than the 800 projected.	  
94	  Richard Abel (ed) The Politics of Informal Justice (Academic Press, New York, 1982). 
95	  Beck and McAndrew, note 27.	  
	   177	  
over 45%, whilst the proportion of grievance determinations reduced from 42% of the 
total issued in 2001 to 34%.96  Compensation and costs awards (on the basis that 
compensation awards are the consequence of substantive determinations and costs of 
ancillary determinations) illustrate this phenomenon.  In the 2002 and 2011 years 
application numbers (2269 and 2297 respectively) were similar, as were the numbers 
of awards of compensation for distress (164 and 173).  In 2002 126 costs awards were 
issued.  In 2011 207 such orders were made.97    
If, as suggested in chapter 3, rising proportions of ancillary decisions indicate a rising 
degree of formality of process then this had implications for the goal of informality of 
process.  It raises the issue of who benefitted from this phenomenon.  The 
compensation tables for 2002 and 2011 reveal that 92% and 86% respectively of 
awards of compensation for non-financial loss were for less than $9,001 (with similar 
distribution curves: 34% and 26% below $3,000, 40% for each between $3-6,000 and 
16%/18% between $6-9,000).98  The costs awards tell a different story.  They are 
categorised according to whether the employer or the employee won the award.  In 
2002 68 awards were made to employers, 10% of which were for more than $4,000. 
Of the 58 awards to employees 8% exceeded $4,000.  In 2011 32% of the 102 awards 
to employers were above $4,000 and 19% of the 105 awards to employees exceeded 
this amount.99  This indicates a significantly lower rise in compensation than costs 
awards and a rising difference of costs awards between those made in favour of 
employers and those for employees. 
Rising numbers of ancillary determinations on stable application, referral, and 
withdrawal rates also suggest a reduced workload for the membership but the 
appearance of an increased one.  The time required for investigation meetings and 
(substantive) determination drafting is generally significantly more than that for 
ancillary matters so that if the issues arising from a claim are the subject of separate 
determinations the fiction is maintained that more than one claim has been resolved, 
and that each required the two or more days that substantive determinations involve. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Department of Labour, Employment Authority Cases 2007-8 (undated c late 2008). 
97	  Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment website: Costs and Compensation Tables, 2002 
and 2011.	  
98	  A downward trend in compensation awards under the Employment Relations Act (in comparison to 
those made under the Employment Contracts Act) was already apparent by 2003:  Michael Leggat, 
Compensatory Payments: Some Observations and Thoughts for Change [2003] ELB 41: “A few 
conclusions can be drawn from these figures. First, after an initially more parsimonious approach, 
there was a significant increase in the level of awards made by the Tribunal from the mid–1990s. Three 
of the four highest annual Tribunal averages are for the years 1995 to 1997. Secondly, while there is, 
as yet, insufficient data to conclude that there is a concerted decrease in dollar terms in the level of 
awards in subsequent years, it is unarguable that there is not a decrease once considerations of 
current value are applied. According to Reserve Bank current value equations, the 1995 average 
Tribunal award of $4,800 made in March of that year would have been $5,559 in March of 2003. 
Thirdly, in considering likely future trends, the eighteen months for which both Authority and Tribunal 
awards are available, the average awards made by the Tribunal were some ten percent higher than the 
corresponding average for the Authority. Before leaving the statistics, it is interesting to note a far 
more discernible tending downwards of average awards in decisions of the Employment Court over the 
same period. Applying the same methodology, in 1996 and 1997 the average awards were $9,400 and 
$10,600 respectively. Averages since then have been $5,600 in 1998, $4,000 in 1999, $8,800 in 2000, 
$9,300 in 2001.” 
99	  Ministry of Business et al, note 97. 	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If it is accepted that member time was intended by policymakers to privilege 
substantive over ancillary dispute resolution (signalled by the proscription on strict 
procedural requirements in s 143(f)) then it becomes apparent that progressively less 
member time was devoted to that primary function. 
It can also be argued that procedural and costs disputes are markers of the inability, or 
unwillingness, of representatives to negotiate and resolve ancillary issues.  They also 
increase the time spent on a problem by representatives.  For time-based charging 
regimes the incentives to privilege adjudication over negotiation of such issues are 
obvious.  Where the number of substantive issues subject to adjudication remained 
stable, as the compensation awards of 2002 and 2011 indicate, then it is difficult to 
attribute rising numbers of ancillary determinations to the type of problem the 
Authority was mandated to resolve. This suggests they may be an incident of 
representation.  
McAndrew and Beck’s analysis of grievance outcomes in 2002 indicated that in terms 
of success rates for grievants there was no difference between the Tribunal and the 
Authority: grievants won 58% and lost 42% of the claims filed.  Further analysis 
revealed differences of outcome dependent on the coincidence of representation and 
adjudicator experience: employers who were represented before Authority members 
who were former Tribunal adjudicators were significantly more likely to win 
(grievant success rate 38%) than those before newly appointed members (grievant 
success rate 66%).  This was a difference also apparent at the Tribunal where 
adjudicators were divided into 4 sub groups, the first of which had a grievant success 
rate of 53%, the second 35%, the third 65% and the fourth 77%.  All of which 
suggests that individual differences amongst decision-making neutrals underline the 
essentially subjective nature of the assessment of fairness implicit in the adjudication 
of grievances, but averaged out those differences had little effect on overall outcomes. 
Cost Benefit 
When the institutions involved in employment dispute resolution were subject to the 
cost benefit or utility analysis in 2005 (described in chapter 6) the researchers were 
aiming to assess expenditure on the institutions against productivity gains to obtain a 
measure of the economic benefit of each institution. Their calculations were based on 
the similarity of settlement/compensation awards (less than $10,000) in all three 
institutions, as the only quantifiable indicator of the overall severity of a case or 
degree of injustice at issue.100  The Authority’s benefit was assessed at $3.2 million, 
but its exclusion of Member salary costs transformed that benefit to a negative on the 
basis of figures available a couple of years later:  in the 2007/08 year operational costs 
for the Authority were $2.23 million (cf  $1.75 million – the amount on which the 
above calculations were based) and member costs were $3.8 million. 101   This 
amounted to between $6,000 and $7,000 per determination (dependent on whether the 
divisor is the 2007 or 2008 total).  If the same calculation was restricted to substantive 
determinations then the cost per case rose to $11,000 - $13,700. 
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  Plimmer and Cassels, note 8. 
101	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Paper, Overview of the Employment Relationship 
Problem Resolution System Work Programme, 23 December 2008.	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Policy Development 
The review of the Act in 2003-4 that ushered in changes to the powers of the 
Mediation Service also resulted in amendments that were intended to strengthen those 
statutory provisions concerned with the Employment Court’s powers of review.102  
There were few direct changes to Authority powers concerning grievances, apart from 
an added power to make recommendations to employers for the purpose of 
minimising the future effects of problematic work practices, and the clarification of 
Member powers in respect of parties or witnesses absent from investigation 
meetings.103   
Employment Code of Practice 
The change to which was attributed increased complexity of investigation104 arose 
from the insertion of the test of justification for grievances, s 103A.105  It imposed an 
objective test (the fair and reasonable employer) for application to the circumstances 
of the grievance at issue.  This formed the basis of a Cabinet decision to develop a 
code of employment practice for disciplinary and dismissal procedures, consideration 
of which would assist in the determination whether an employer’s action or an 
employee’s dismissal was justified.106  It was aimed at mitigating complaints about 
the difficulties for small employers posed by the issue of procedural fairness.107  It is 
not clear what, if any, policy work was devoted to the Code.  The Department’s 
reasons for seeking a deferral in exchange for a project about providing guidance only 
on those procedures was based on feedback from the Mediation Service that indicated 
that notwithstanding the wide range of information and guidance already available 
there was widespread ignorance of these resources by mediation users. It suggested 
that the project could focus on whether existing material was sufficiently accurate, 
appropriate and accessible and the reasons why employers were not accessing it.108  
The lack of support for a Code became apparent when the employer groups that were 
consulted opposed it for conflicting reasons.  Business NZ took the view that it would 
interfere with employer discretion and the Small Business Advisory Group wanted 
less discretion and more certainty.109  
The Department commissioned a Wellington law firm to compile the Employment 
Code of Practice, renamed as Guidelines for Employers, and it was completed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Discussed in chapter 8:  The Employment Court. 
103	  Employment Relations Act, ss 123(1)(ca), 173(2A-C) inserted on 1 December 2004 by the 
Employment Relations Amendment Act (no 2) 2004.	  
104	  Rising complexity and length of investigations following the 2004 amendments was described as 
anecdotal: Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Paper, Employment Relations Authority, 13 
February 2009. 	  
105	  Employment Relations Act, s103A inserted on 1 December 2004 by the Employment Relations 
Amendment Act (no 2) 2004.	  
106	  Cabinet Minutes, CAB Min (04) 23/6.	  
107	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, paper	   Code of employment practice for disciplinary 
and dismissal procedures, 22 December 2004.	   
108	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, paper, Project for providing guidance on disciplinary 
and dismissal procedures, 24 June 2005.	  	  	  
109	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, paper	   Disciplinary and Dismissal procedures – 
Addressing uncertainty and complexity through improved guidance and the use of the right 
communication channels, 11 November 2005.	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2008, but unavailable as a public resource (on the Department’s website) until some 
time in 2009.110 
The amendment to s 103A in 2011 can be regarded as an attempt to incorporate the 
major procedural steps necessary for disciplinary actions or dismissals covered by the 
code or the guidelines into the Act.111 
Cost and Quality of Representation 
The second of the policy projects, the costs of representation, (described in Chapter 6) 
devoted policy effort to concerns about employment consultants and no-win-no-fee 
representatives, when the policy issue was encouraging self-representation: 
It is unclear whether the costs employers and employees incur for representation are value for 
money.  There are perceptions that an emerging ‘employment consultants industry’ can create 
incentives for providers to generate fees and the employer and employee may not actually need 
the services offered.  A representative can be engaged to reduce perceived risks when in fact the 
case is simple, the parties capable and a representative not necessary.  Likewise, if one party has 
a high profile representative, the other may feel compelled to engage a similar representative.  
This type of ‘lawyering-up’ results in increased costs for both parties.112 
There is no evidence that work on a Cabinet direction to develop a best practice guide 
for representative fees occurred. 113 However potential justifications for this failure 
can be discerned in the paper’s acknowledgment that costs concerns were based 
largely on anecdotal evidence and problem perception, non-lawyer employment 
consultants were engaged in only a small number of disputes, and in suggestions for 
research subjects – substantive data on costs of representation, more analysis on types 
of representative, analysis of other Tribunals (Disputes and Tenancy were 
mentioned), consideration of fee maxima or tariffs for representatives.114 
None of these suggestions were taken up.  Issues concerning representation moved 
from fees to the quality of services provided. There were also increasing references to 
the need to balance the benefits that representatives brought to the dispute resolution 
process against concerns about cost and quality.115  
The result was a Ministerial direction to explore the extent to which the quality of 
paid representation by employment advocates (excluding lawyers) could be better 
assured.116  This involved consideration of whether they should be required to belong 
to professional associations but nothing substantive arose from whatever work was 
done as the result of this direction.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Department of Labour, internal email communications between policy and communication officials 
in February 2009, confirming that the Guidelines had been completed (by Peter Chemis of Buddle 
Findlay) and delivered but not posted on the Department’s website.	  
111	  Employment Relations Act, s103A(3) substituted, on 1 April 2011, by Employment Relations 
Amendment Act 2010, s 15.	  
112	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, briefing note, Cost of Representation under the 
Employment Relations Act, 3 February 2006.	  	  
113	  Ibid.	  
114	  Ibid.	  
115	  Ibid.	  	  
116	  Minister of Labour to Cabinet Economic Development Committee, Review of the Employment 
Relationship Problem Resolution System, 4 November 2007.	  
	   181	  
The representation cost project became subsumed by a wider review of the 
employment relationship problem system, which reported in 2007 that the system was 
generally meeting its objectives, but could improve to better reduce its vulnerability to 
negative criticism, and more effectively preserve its integrity.  Of the 14 options 
proposed by officials and the Government’s Small Business Advisory Group there 
were 6 on which the Department was directed to undertake further work, three of 
which concerned the Authority: representation (discussed above), the effectiveness of 
the statutory provisions for reducing remedies for substantive justification and 
contributory conduct and reducing the time taken in the investigation and 
determination of problems.117 
Authority application of s124 (contribution) 
Much of the employment relations research commissioned by the Department from 
2000 onwards (described in Chapter 6) suggested that employment relationship 
problems negatively affected small and medium sized employers to a greater extent 
than larger employers.  This was perceived by the Department to influence their 
assertions that problems of process were privileged over those of substance.  Officials 
regarded the statutory power to reduce remedies for contribution and the discretion to 
take the size of the employer into account in determining remedies as the answer to 
this problem.  To substantiate this view they informally reviewed 33 determinations 
issued over a 5-week period to find that there were two dismissals resulting from 
problematic process for which no remedies were awarded because of the contributory 
behaviour of the employees.  In another 8 determinations remedies were reduced for 
this reason. 118  This was followed by a research project that analysed 300 
determinations.  Of the 196 that found for the employee 74 (37%) included s 124 
orders.119  This appeared to underline concerns expressed by the Small Business 
Advisory Group that the power in s 124 was insufficiently exercised.  It 
recommended an amendment to the provision to require Authority members to 
specifically refer to it when awards of compensation were made. The Department 
took the view that the issue of a Practice Note requiring members to consider 
contributory conduct could achieve the same result.120     This was the subject of 
discussion with Authority members who flatly rejected the suggestion that they were 
not applying s 124 appropriately.121 The issue does not appear to have been taken any 
further. 
Reducing investigation times 
Exploration of the third issue occurred against the background of the Law 
Commission’s review of New Zealand’s tribunal system.122 The Law Commission’s 
criteria for tribunal reform utilised by the Department as a basis for policy to reduce 
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  Ibid.	  
118	  Ibid.	  
119	  Department of Labour, internal paper, Section 124, Employment Relations Act, 8 May 2008. 	  
120	  Ibid.	  
121	  Department of Labour, Minutes, Meeting between the Department of Labour and members of the 
Employment Relations Authority, 30 July 2008.	  	  
122 	  Law Commission to Department of Labour, Advice of planned project, Unified Tribunal 
Framework, 12 October 2006; The Authority was ultimately excluded from the scope of this project 
because of its integration with other employment institutions: Law Commission, Tribunal Reform, 
(NZLC SP 20), October 2008. 
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investigation and determination times included fairness and credibility (specialisation, 
quality decision making, transparency, consistency, independence, rule of law) 
accessibility (availability of information about the Authority, ease of entry, cost to 
users – including the cost of representation, geographic coverage), administrative 
efficiency (minimal delay, best use of resources, innovation) and proportionality 
(relevant to complexity and seriousness of issue).123 
 
Officials working on this project proceeded on the basis that determinations were 
issued between 2 weeks and some months after investigation meetings.  Those that 
took months were regarded as having cost implications for parties, in lost wages, legal 
fees and social costs.124 
 
The resulting proposals included a standardised process and procedure for better 
establishing fairness and credibility.  Suggested were improved induction and training 
programmes for members and staff, a professional development programme, generic 
procedures for member appointments, practice notes and guidelines from the Chief 
Member and better access to reasons for decisions.125  
 
Recommendations to increase speed and efficiency included: the introduction of oral 
and/or same day decisions (the practice in the District Court); dedicated legal research 
support; a review of the balance of full and part time members; better case 
management and compulsory mediation.126  
 
Also proposed, to improve accessibility, was the introduction of new technologies: 
electronic document filing and video/tele conferencing.  Transparency was regarded 
as dependent on a memorandum of understanding between the Authority and the 
Department containing key expectations and a systematic collection of data on 
performance so that the Authority could be measured accurately against expectations 
and required to improve efficiency. Research on user experience and requirements of 
representation, cost, process, outcome and on the effectiveness of informal and 
inquisitorial over adversarial processes was also proposed.127 
	  
Authority members consulted about these proposals supported those that sought to 
enhance the role of support staff (from clerical to case management duties), require 
mediation to be compulsory, improve flexibility of process, provide more staff and 
member training, ensure their determinations were available on the Department’s 
website, introduce dedicated legal research support and increase the Authority’s 
membership.  They suggested that the role of legal representatives could be reviewed, 
noting that these were the representatives that tended to entrench parties to issues by 
their methods of drafting statements of problem.  They further suggested adopting the 
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  Department of Labour, internal paper, Review of the Employment Relationship Problem Resolution 
System exploring options to reduce the time taken in the investigation and determination of cases in the 
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Disputes Tribunal position on banning representation for small matters and wanted 
mediators to be more assertive in their use of s 150 powers of decision.128  
Later, in a similar consultation, the members asserted that their investigations and 
determinations should not be compromised by an emphasis on handling matters more 
quickly, resisted improving case management systems for the reason they were 
already well standardised, opposed the idea of using information technology for 
investigations on the grounds that face to face contact was important, preferred the 
use of independent investigators over technology, resisted the idea of oral decisions, 
but supported research that would show that the investigative or inquisitorial model 
was more efficient than the adversarial model of dispute resolution.129  
The ensuing recommendations focussed on: collection of case statistics; a Practice 
Note about compliance with timetabling directions; the obligations of support staff (to 
refer unmediated problems to mediation or require applications for waiver); further 
consideration of a case management model; greater use of distance technology; and 
compilation of a DVD on the workings of the Authority for parties to investigation 
meetings.130 
The General Election a few weeks later relieved the need to further develop or 
implement the proposals and recommendations.  By December 2008 the new Minister 
of Labour had agreed to defer the report back to Cabinet on the analysis of the six 
preferred options to enhance the employment relations problem resolution system131 
and six months later the report was no longer required.132 
	  
Conclusions 
Quality of Process 
The quality of process measures for the Authority suggested in chapter 5 (balancing 
accessibility and fair process, satisfying the rules of natural justice whilst avoiding the 
traps of excessive legalism and formalism, privileging co-operative and consensual 
over adversarial and divisive problem-solving) raised the issue whether it was 
possible to rely on an inquisitorial function controlled by personnel rooted in 
adversarial traditions to achieve these goals.  The measure therein posed, the degree to 
which the Authority developed and maintained the quick, low-level, informal 
adjudicative culture its policy makers desired, is assessed by reference to ease of 
claiming, timeliness of Authority response, predictability of its outcomes, 
management of the tension between informality and acting judicially and the cost of 
providing a separate adjudicative function. 
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  Department of Labour, note 20.	  
129	  Department of Labour, note 121.	  	  
130	  Department of Labour, internal paper, Draft recommendations, 29 August 2008.	  	  
131	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Overview of the Employment Relationship Problem 
Resolution System Work Programme, 23 December 2008.	  	  
132	  Minister of Labour to Minister of Finance as Chair Cabinet Committee for Economic Growth and 
Infrastructure, letter, 15 May 2009.	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Claiming 
The regulatory provision of templates for seeking and responding to requests for 
Authority assistance underlined the policy desire (also signalled by changes of 
statutory language) for informality of claiming. Members accepted that the self-
represented and those represented by organisational advocates drafted their claims 
and responses in the language and manner signalled by the templates. Members were 
critical of lawyer insistence on the use of the language of the law as a substitute for 
the everyday language that the templates signalled as appropriate for original content. 
They believed that use of legal language constrained the way that parties (on whose 
behalf it was deployed) perceived and engaged with the problem at issue and its 
resolution.  This suggests that the signals intended by the change of language and 
provision of templates were received differently, dependent on the type of 
representation that parties engaged.  
Three conclusions are therefore apparent:  
• choice of statutory language and use of prompts or guides to claiming 
may influence the expectations and behaviour of disputants during any 
subsequent resolution process;  
• the means by which claims are drafted may either facilitate or hinder 
policy intentions for the resolution process; 
• these effects on the process of claiming at the Authority did not attract 
post-statute policy attention. 
The policy decision to refrain from requiring resort to mediation as a compulsory first 
step in the dispute resolution process imposed obligations on claimants and the 
Authority.  Claimants had to pay a filing fee to the Authority to obtain a direction to 
mediation and the Authority had to supply administrative services and Member time 
to make those directions.  This imposed complexity and cost on the process of 
claiming. 
It can therefore be concluded that: 
• the (practical) compulsion to attend mediation imposed additional 
costs on claimants who were either unaware of this requirement or 
unable to secure the attendance of the other party at mediation; 
• this resulted in the existence of two classes of claimant: those who 
were or were not required to pay a filing fee for mediation (i.e 
claimants who opted to commence at mediation paid no filing fee but 
those who commenced at the Authority and were directed to mediation 
had to pay the Authority filing fee); 
• the need for mediation to be a compulsory first step in the dispute 
resolution process was well understood by the Department but not the 
subject of legislative change. 
On the basis of Law Commission criteria for measuring tribunal effectiveness: 
	   185	  
• the Authority was accessible in terms of ease of claiming (provision of 
templates) and availability of information about the workings of the 
Authority; 
• the Authority’s accessibility diminished in terms of cost to users who 
relied on individualised representatives. 
 Timeliness 
Measures of timeliness concern the periods that elapsed between application and 
investigation meeting and between meeting and determination.  They are derived 
from data about applications awaiting hearing and written determination, annual 
determinations issued, rates of determination per member.  For the period under 
review this data confirmed the existence of regional variations in waiting times and 
determination rates, with the most significant and consistent variations being those 
between the Wellington regional office and the other two offices in Auckland and 
Christchurch.  The Wellington office consistently had lower numbers and percentages 
of applications awaiting investigation and/or determination and it issued more 
determinations (on annual and individual measures). The Wellington office operated, 
during this period, a different method of file allocation than the other two offices. 
Membership of the Authority varied during this period from 13 to 18 but the data 
reveals that variations in the numbers of determinations issued annually bore no 
relationship to the size of the Authority membership.  Furthermore, whilst the 
membership was increased for the Auckland and Christchurch offices it decreased in 
Wellington.  
It can thus be concluded that: 
• timeliness of investigation is more closely connected to file allocation 
systems than to the number of adjudicators available to determine 
applications; 
• automatic file allocation systems appear to offer more timely 
adjudicator interventions to disputants than those which are 
discretionary or reliant on administrators;133 
• file allocation systems that transfer responsibility for the management 
of proceedings to adjudicators from the date of application offer more 
timely adjudicator interventions to disputants than those subject to 
administrator management; 
• timeliness is more likely to be an incident of adjudicator work-rate 
than adjudicator numbers;  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  Automatic file allocation systems impose more work obligations on adjudicators by the timing of 
the allocation (when applications are first filed), but potentially save adjudicator time by oversights and 
interventions that undermine representative failures to observe time limit requirements. Representatives 
are less keen to engage with adjudicators than with administrators about delay (perhaps because the 
power/status relationships are different).   
	   186	  
• notwithstanding that the data about regional variation in timeliness 
measures was available to the Department from the outset, it attracted 
no policy attention. 
The timeliness issue with which the 2007 review grappled concerned the period 
between investigation meeting and determination.  This time period appeared to 
attract the most complaints.  This is likely to result from an absence of certainty about 
when determinations would appear.  By contrast the period between application and 
investigation became certain once dates were set for investigation meetings. 
It can be concluded that: 
• waiting times that trigger complaints were more likely to be associated 
with Authority obligations that were not time-limited (or on which no 
dates were set) 
On the basis of Law Commission criteria for measuring tribunal effectiveness:  
• the Authority was less efficient, administratively, than the Mediation 
Service in terms of waiting times   
Predictability 
The question posed in chapter 5, whether the investigative mode of adjudication was 
sufficient on its own to guarantee the efficiencies in case progression associated with 
inquisitorial systems can be assessed by reference to predictability of claim outcome. 
That the jurisdiction was dominated by one cause of dispute, dismissal, and 
guaranteed similarity of remedy (regardless of institution) might indicate that the 
issue of predictability of outcome was straightforward. Kagan’s distinction between 
inquisitorial and adversarial systems, that the maximisation of adjudicative 
predictability is required of inquisitorial but not adversarial systems, suggests the 
issue is more complex than a simple incorporation of the inquisitorial mode into a 
jurisdiction offering other modes of resolution.  
Since predictability of outcome is the means by which disputes are resolved without 
the need for institutional intervention the stability in numbers of requests for 
institutional assistance suggests that it was either absent or exerted a limited influence 
on the process of claiming in respect of dismissal grievances.  
The high resolution, private settlement and withdrawal rates associated with these 
institutions suggest that adjudicative predictability influenced settlement and 
remedies, rather than the process of claiming.  If this is the case then its purpose of 
reducing the need for institutional intervention was defeated, but Galanter’s theory 
about the necessity for settlement by lawyers to occur within, rather than absent 
institutions, can be applied. 
Research showing that the overall average success rate for grievants remained 
unchanged from the Tribunal to the Authority indicates that a changed mode of 
adjudication had no effect on success rates.  The finding that adjudicator identity 
correlated with variations of success rate clarifies why predictability influences 
resolution but not claim rates in this jurisdiction. Predictability is dependent on 
perceptions of uniformity of outcome.  It was likely to be disrupted in this jurisdiction 
by the potential for variation of outcome offered by a range of views about what is 
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fair in dismissal.  Thus the perceived width of discretion arising from the subjectivity 
of dismissal fairness assessments formed a basis for reposing trust in differences 
between individual adjudicators.  This, rather than other assessments of disputant 
position, may also have facilitated resort to the institutions. 
Policy for the ERA assumed rather than debated the issue of adjudicative 
predictability, perhaps as the result of its perceived connection to outcomes 
(particularly from the Court of Appeal) regarded as disadvantageous to the new 
Government’s employee constituency.  It preferred to rely on the provision of 
information (institutional and extra-institutional) for predictability of outcome, and on 
access to justice over adjudicative predictability as a core policy value.   
It is possible that the policy failure to consider the point at which these principles 
intersect explains higher rates of access to the ERA institutions than to the Tribunal, 
and little measurable change to the predictability of institutional outcomes.  Their 
intersection point concerned availability of information, but it was information of a 
specific type.  The policy effort concerned information about employment 
relationships.  This explains the focus on employment rights and dismissal and 
disciplinary procedures.  Information about dispute outcomes - data about claim and 
success rates, remedies sought and awarded, the time and costs of claiming, winning 
and losing – was collected by the Department but was not, or inadequately, publicly 
available.  The data which was available – annual compensation and costs award sizes 
and numbers – was meaningless without the comparator detail of the number of 
problems determined for which such orders were claimed. Anonymised data about 
settlements concluded at the Mediation Service was similarly unavailable.   
This is the information that is as relevant to decisions to make or defend claims as is 
that concerning the reasons and processes for disputing.  The absence of publicly 
available hard data did not, however, prevent the jurisdiction’s practitioners from 
access to or comprehension of the messages that the data provides, because 
experience of its operations delivers the same messages about what positions are 
likely to succeed and what are not.   
Thus its absence from the public domain transformed it into a resource that either had 
to be purchased or regarded as an incident of union membership.  Its influence on 
filtering access to institutions was identified in chapter 3 as contributing to the 
comparatively low use of the grievance committee process when compared to resort 
to the Tribunal. 
It can therefore be concluded that: 
• inclusion of an inquisitorial mode of dispute resolution had no effect 
on the predictability of outcomes for dismissal grievances; 
• predictability of outcome:   
•  is a quality of process measure relevant to use of 
institutional dispute resolution services; 
•  is of value to disputants in the decision whether to rely on the 
assistance of institutional dispute resolution services; 
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•  appears not to influence use of institutional dispute resolution 
services in the employment jurisdiction;  
•   may be dependent on the public availability of information 
collected by the Department but not publicly disclosed.   
Informality 
The major theme that emerges from analysis of the quest for informality concerns the 
struggle for control over the resolution process between lawyers and Authority 
members.  Members embraced the investigative function for the width of powers it 
conferred on them to utilise a range of resolution strategies and control the pace and 
time required for investigations.  As a result investigation meetings took up less time 
(overall) than Tribunal hearings.134  
The struggle for control of the resolution process was not characterised in those terms. 
Lawyers preferred to describe it in terms of their requirements for the Authority to act 
judicially.  If the conclusions of the Employment Court about the natural justice 
implications of refusing representatives ‘rights’ to cross-examine are indicative then 
acting judicially appeared to be regarded as synonymous with adversarial modes of 
adjudication.135  The Court’s decisions in David v Tilley136 and David v Employment 
Relations Authority137 represented an attempt to impose upon the Authority the 
adversarial mode of adjudication legislatively discarded in favour of the investigative 
mode.  The Law Society, granted intervener status for the Full Court hearing of David 
v Employment Relations Authority, supported the Court’s position.  It remains 
unclear whether the Court of Appeal would have upheld this position because the 
legislative amendments confirming cross-examination’s discretionary status were 
passed before it could hear and determine the Crown appeal. 
This was the first major confrontation about the exercise of the Authority’s 
investigative powers.  The second (again arising from the assertion of representative 
rights to cross-examine) concerned an Authority direction requiring parties to file, in 
advance, statements or questions for investigative testing. The absence of a 
requirement to disclose these communications to the other party resulted in a finding 
that the Authority had breached natural justice. 138  The direction was thus outside the 
Authority’s jurisdiction.  It too prompted amendments to the Act excluding the Court 
from jurisdiction over challenges to Authority procedures.139 
It is possible that the speed (or predictability) of the legislative reaction deterred other 
attempts to have the Authority revert to the adversarial status quo via the Employment 
Court.  Resistance to informality took other forms and was, as a result, more 
successful.  Thus in the drafting of statements of problem and reply and in the briefs 
of evidence required for investigations lawyers felt able to revert to the language of 
litigation.  This caused Authority members to associate it with negatively influenced 
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  Beck and McAndrew, note 27.	  
135	  Gordon Anderson, note 48.	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  [2001] ERNZ, 93.	  
137	  [2001] ERNZ, 354.	  
138	  Metargem v Employment Relations Authority [2003] 2 ERNZ, 186 
139	  Employment Relations Act s 179(5) was inserted on 1 December 2004 by Employment Relations 
Amendment Act (No2) 2004, s 60. 
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party expectations of and participation in the problem resolution process.  If this 
association could be established it would confirm that the means by which disputes 
are described or framed influences the means by which they can be resolved.  
Informality of language in the presentation of problems may well form the basis for 
informality of resolution process. 
The incidents of the struggle over informality appeared to be time and categorisation 
(the process of defining and separating issues raised by a problem), the latter arguably 
a constituent of the former.  If, for instance, the battles over cross-examination were 
reframed as struggles over the time required for the hearing or investigation process it 
becomes clearer what might actually have been at stake for the representatives who 
pursued that issue.140  The advice that eliminating cross-examination reduced the 
length of hearings, the complaint that it simply repeated issues already covered and 
the high proportion of lawyers who asserted a reduced capacity to veracity test 
witnesses suggest a connection between the passage of time and unrestricted rights to 
cross-examine.  The measurably higher proportion of lawyers over union advocates 
who noticed the difference (in its absence) might also be explained in terms of time.  
For lawyers time was the basis of the business opportunity offered by hearing or 
investigative processes because time formed the basis of their fees regimes.  Concepts 
of time raised different issues for union advocates engaged with grievances: the more 
time spent on individual matters meant less time available for the collective interests 
of their memberships. 
Similarly, increased proportions of ancillary determinations suggest an increasing 
Authority tendency to submit to lawyer requirements to separate (and separately 
determine) the issues raised by a problem.  Preliminary and post-investigative issues 
requiring separate determination increased the time required for problem resolution.  
Thus is established a connection between formalist drafting (dependent on 
categorisation of facts into separate causes of action) and the passage of time. 
Additionally lawyer insistence on the provision of written submissions following the 
conclusion of investigations increased the time devoted to individual problems and 
deferred the formulation and dissemination of determinations – the time period that 
attracted complaints of delay. 
Increased proportions of ancillary over substantive but relatively stable numbers of 
determinations issued annually suggest that fewer problems required adjudicative 
resolution as time passed but greater institutional input.   
Passive resistance thus proved to be more successful for lawyer representatives than 
direct action in the struggle over informality of process.  Their failure to adopt the 
language mandated for this jurisdiction and their requirements for issues raised by 
claims to be split and separately considered met no effective resistance.  These tactics 
were neither the subject of policy consideration nor of direct Authority reaction (apart 
from complaint).  The increases to costs awards, unmatched by substantive increases 
to compensation awards, tend to confirm lawyer success in imposing a formality of 
process on the Authority that undermined the statutory policy intentions for it.   
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  It should be conceded that few lawyers are likely to accept that cross-examination is a means of 
extending the time taken by a hearing.  They are more likely to characterise it as a means of asserting 
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Lawyer success in evading policy scrutiny can be measured by the policy effort that 
was devoted to the obstacles that representation posed for informality and the 
diversion of this effort to analyses of non-legally qualified advocates, notwithstanding 
this group’s low incidence as representatives at the Authority.  Missed by the policy 
attention devoted to this group was the essentially parasitical nature of the 
representation they offered. Aligned to dispute oriented (as distinct from resolution 
focused) representation they offered representation services at a lower price, thus 
exposing the business opportunity that offering this service provided, but they were 
not involved in advancing the adversarialist agenda. Their strategy (reliance on the 
higher cost of resisting claims requiring adjudication to extract mediated or negotiated 
settlements) was not original, but their failures (no-win-no-fee representatives in 
particular) to camouflage the tactic by resort to the style, culture, dress and language 
of the law, both exposed it and protected from scrutiny the representatives who 
originated the strategy. 
This raises the role of institutional separation in advancing the informality of process 
goal.  It can be argued that separation of institutions inhibited informality at the outset 
because it conceded the adversarialist position of the necessity for separating (thereby 
formalising) the variety of ways by which dispute resolution occurs. This operated to 
inhibit resort to the horses for courses approach (the use of mediative or adjudicatory 
powers, dependent on the individual circumstances of the dispute and the parties) 
favoured by informality’s advocates: it resulted in mediator and lawyer resistance to 
the Service’s use of the adjudicative power in s 150; and it provided a basis for lawyer 
resistance to Authority reliance on a mix of mediative and adjudicative investigative 
powers. Ancillary determinations that record consent orders suggest that Authority 
members who assert powers to facilitate negotiated settlements are both willing and 
able to rely on a mix of resolution techniques.  The absence of consistent data on this 
form of resolution means its extent was unclear. Consent determinations do not record 
whether settlements are privately negotiated or reached with the assistance of the 
Authority.  However, their existence in higher numbers than decisions by the Service 
suggests that the investigative power resulted in a greater reliance on a variety of 
resolution modes than the mediative power.  The types of ancillary determinations 
issued (consent orders, preliminary and post-investigative orders) suggest that use of a 
range of powers depended on the expectations of representatives and parties and the 
extent to which it was apparent that facilitation of settlement was possible.  
Although it remains unclear to what extent institutional separation raised expectations 
about purity of resolution mode, it can be concluded that it undermined policy 
initiatives to institutionalise informality.  Lawyer expectations that a separate 
adjudicative body would operate adversarially influenced their resistance to the 
prompts that changes of language, provision of Problem and Reply templates, transfer 
of control over the progress of proceedings and use of the investigative mode 
signified.  They felt able to ignore the statutory requirements of informality of process 
for the Authority because they had been able to do so with similar goals for the 
Tribunal. 
Although it can be concluded that separating adjudicative from mediative functions 
and the investigative mode from the adversarial failed to advance the goal of 
informality of process, separation did underline the extent to which disputes capable 
of mediated or negotiated resolution can be filtered from those requiring adjudication.  
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Thus the policy goal of informality for Authority process was: 
• both actively and passively resisted by lawyer representatives; 
• undermined by lawyer representatives required to maintain or justify 
the time required for Authority proceedings; 
• also undermined by institutional separation of modes of resolution;  
• further undermined by a failure of policy effort to collect data about 
the workings of the Authority that identified whether and why the 
processes prescribed for it operated as intended. 
It can also be concluded that: 
• reliance on informality of language to reinforce requirements for 
informality of process influenced some disputants but not others; 
• disputants least likely to be influenced by messages about informality 
tended to be represented by lawyers;  
• provision of template originating documents for proceedings can 
reinforce messages about informality of process;   
• use of informal language in the description or presentation of problems 
can influence the informality of the resolution process. 
 
Cost 
Institutional separation of the mediative and adjudicative functions had the effect of 
throwing into sharp relief the differences of cost to the public purse resulting from 
their separate administration and use.  The major cost incurred by each institution was 
in salaries.  The Remuneration Commission set the salaries of Authority members and 
the Department set mediator salaries.  Authority members received higher salaries 
than mediators, thus institutionalising differences of status between the two groups.  It 
is possible that this effect was unintended but differential pay rate/status is another 
means by which adversarial expectations of the adjudicative institution in a separated 
system are raised and the goal of informality undermined.  
But for their use of different resolution functions (and the need for written 
determinations) there was no difference in the types of problem the Service and the 
Authority were required to resolve, or in the remedies that resulted, the most common 
of which involved payments of compensation and costs.  The remedy of reinstatement 
was insufficiently agreed or awarded to warrant publication of its incidence.  Greater 
certainty of result (predictability) was available from the Authority, given that its 
determinations were public, mediated settlements were not and there were 
proportionally fewer adjudicated outcomes than at the Tribunal, but this had no effect 
on applications to the Authority, the basis on which its membership requirements 
were measured.  
There was a major difference in the number of outcomes each institution produced.  
The Authority’s membership constituted 40-50% of the number of mediators but it 
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investigated between 9 and 15% of the annual number of problems mediated by the 
Service.141  
The cost per case of problems investigated by the Authority was higher than the 
majority of its awards of compensation.  This calculation excludes the cost of the 
mediation to which almost all Authority cases were referred, and is further 
complicated by those cases that require more than one determination.  Cost of 
obtaining aggregate results can be calculated by reference to the Authority’s costs and 
compensation tables.  In 2007, 182 compensation orders were made (from 861 
determinations, 14 of which concerned collective issues).  On the basis that individual 
awards were made at the upper limit of their individual categories the maximum total 
amount awarded was $1.383m.  Similarly 148 costs orders amounted to $453,000.  
The cost to the public purse of achieving these money transfers totalled $6.03m.  
It can be concluded, on the basis of Law Commission criteria for measuring tribunal 
effectiveness, that: 
• the administrative efficiency of the Authority (in terms of best use of 
public resources) was undermined by   
•  increases to Authority membership on the basis of application 
numbers rather than workload; 
• reliance on the less efficient of the two file allocation systems 
in operation for its first decade;  
• the problem of proportionality exposed by Authority costs of $6 
for each $1.80 distributed in compensation and costs awards 
(the most common remedies);  
• the payment of higher salaries (to members than mediators) for 
resolving significantly fewer problems and taking longer to do 
so.  
 
Quality of Outcome 
The policy desire to replace the ideological basis of the ECA, economic rationalism, 
with a new ideology of increasing productivity through cooperation, collectivism, and 
the re-building of constructive workplace relationships,142 was premised on the idea 
that a contractual approach to labour (where it was treated like any other commodity) 
had reduced the New Zealand workforce to a low-waged, low-skilled labour market, 
with only small groups of highly paid and highly skilled employees. One way of 
redressing the perceived imbalance would be a return to collectivism, but not at the 
expense of individualism (termed freedom of association).  They would co-exist: 
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  Department of Labour, Key Messages: Employment Relations, The Employment Relations Act is 
working (undated, c late 2005):  These figures are based on number of applications resolved, rather 
than on number of determinations issued.	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  Lorraine Skiffington, Senior Advisor to the Minister of Labour, The Making of the Employment 
Relations Act — a Recipe for Success [2001] Employment Law Bulletin, 37. 
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Balancing the rights of individuals and promoting collectives presented quite a challenge to 
ensure that the legislation catered for both diversity and flexibility while addressing the 
fundamental issue of inequality in the workplace.143 
 
The balance struck relegated collective rights to bargaining for wages and conditions 
whilst individual rights would be enforced by a dispute resolution regime that was 
significantly more accessible.  Disputes about collective rights continued (in this era 
as in its predecessor) to be dwarfed, both in number and effect, by the myriad ways 
that individual grievances, particularly dismissal grievances, could be mediated, 
investigated and litigated. 
 
The material in this and the preceding chapter thus establishes that the effect of the 
belief that collectivism and individualism could co-exist was to ensure that the rights 
guaranteed by individualism undermined any benefits that collectivism could offer 
dispute resolution.  
 
The dominant quality of outcome measure for the Authority, the extent to which 
employment relationships were mended rather than ended, was dependent on the 
extent to which lawyers maintained the influence established over the Tribunal on 
claiming and disputing in this jurisdiction.  The policy intention was that lawyer 
reliance on adversarial tropes of disputing would diminish or alter to conform to the 
goals of supporting employment relationships. 
The major measure of the primary goal, reinstatement, was not publicly recorded, in 
the way that compensation and costs awards were, because the Authority rarely 
ordered it.144  By contrast awards of compensation were published.  Their numbers 
remained relatively stable at 160-190 per annum, confirming that the precedent set by 
the Tribunal – exit from the relationship accompanied by money transfers where 
fairness was in issue – was maintained by the Authority. 
Also stable was the incidence of representation.  Lawyers represented two thirds of 
parties to Authority investigations.  The Authority in large part conceded their 
requirements of process.  The result was a quasi-adversarial resolution process for 
parties with lawyers which combined member control over the pace and timing of 
investigations with lawyer control over the presentation of evidence.  For 
unrepresented parties, or those represented by institutional advocates, the Authority 
was less encumbered by adversarial requirements of process. 
The extent to which lawyers inhibited the development of an inquisitorial culture for 
the Authority remains unclear.  Passivity, or inadequacy of Authority reaction to 
lawyer requirements of process contributed, as did resistance to policy ideas for new 
or innovative ways of improving the resolution process – typified by Member 
reactions to suggestions to reduce determination waiting times. 
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  Ibid.	  
144	  Beck and McAndrew, note 27: Of 624 determinations in its first 18 months of operating the 
Authority ordered 13 reinstatements; Andrew Caisley, The law moves in mysterious ways in 
Rasmussen (ed) Employment Relationships, New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act, (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 2004), 60: “Ironically this would suggest that reinstatement is now being 
ordered less often than in the early years of the Employment Contracts Act when the Chief Judge was 
complaining that it had become endangered as a remedy.  It appears that the legislative cure has 
completely failed to address the perceived problem.” at 66.	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Thus, the conclusion of chapter 6, that the Mediation Service offered a higher quality 
of process for the quality of outcome goal of the ECA, labour market flexibility, 
applied also to the Authority.  The effect, according to one commentator, has been to 
preserve the imbalance of employer and employee interests in the personal grievance 
procedure that followed the ECA, a gradual shift in the test of “unjustifiable” 
behaviour to a standard that essentially reflects the perspective of the employer, not 
that of an impartial observer balancing the interests of both employer and 
employee.145 
The effects on the wider outcome goal, greater labour productivity, followed this 
failure to disrupt flexibility: 
…since the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act there has not been a dramatic 
increase in labour productivity in New Zealand.   Indeed, some have argued that there has been 
a decline in the growth of labour productivity in New Zealand since the early 1990s.  At the 
same time during the course of the 1990s Australia’s labour productivity performance has been 
far superior to that of NZ despite the continued role played by arbitration.  These findings 
suggest either that labour market regulation is not the only factor which determines labour 
productivity or that neo-liberal arguments about the relationship between individual contracting 
and productivity are flawed…. 
Thus, despite their recourse to extra-arbitration protection, most NZ employees suffered badly 
from exposure to the forces of market liberalization during the ECA period.  While the Labour 
government has re-regulated the employment relationship, the ERA has not led to the 
reconstruction of the multi-employer bargaining structure that prevailed during the arbitration 
era.  Neither have substantial renewal and organizing efforts, backed by new statutory support 
mechanisms, served to substantially re-invigorate a union movement demoralized following 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  Gordon Anderson, Incremental Change in Employment Law [2003] Employment Law Bulletin, 17. 
146	  Michael Barry and Nick Wailes: Contrasting Systems? 100 years of Arbitration in Australia and 
New Zealand, (2004) 46(4) Journal of Industrial Relations, 430 at 441, 443	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Chapter 8 
Employment Relations Act Institutions 
Operations and Policy: The Employment Court  
 
Introduction 
The policy desire to incentivise negotiated over adversarialist approaches to dispute 
resolution was reinforced in the ERA by the goal of reducing the need for judicial 
intervention.1 It was hoped that this would facilitate increased rates of maintained 
(over terminated) employment relationships.  The focus of this chapter is on how the 
goal of diminishing the need for judicial intervention influenced the Employment 
Court (EC). 
Predictions during the policy formation process of increased work for the EC2 proved 
to be mistaken. A major theme of the material about its throughput after 2000 was the 
reduction of work either available to or performed by its judges: 
The Employment Relations Act … has altered the character of the Court’s work. At one end, that 
work was extended by the removal of previous restrictions upon the Court’s reconsideration of 
cases decided by the tribunal below it. At the other end, the Act reduced the scope for the 
Court’s work by requiring all disputes to go to mediation at least once. In this way, many cases 
do not reach the Employment Relations Authority at all and, of those that do, reportedly half are 
settled by further mediation or otherwise by consent. The Court has the capacity, as a result, to 
take on additional work but none has so far been supplied. The nature of the Court’s work has 
altered as well. However, personal grievances and disputes about the interpretation or operation 
of employment agreements still form the main diet. 3 
Nonetheless the EC preserved, throughout much of the period under review, its usual 
complement of 5 judges – some under temporary warrants – even as it became clear 
that the work available did not justify that number.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 3(a)(vi).	  
2	  Chief Judge, Employment Court to Minister of Labour, letter, 15 February 2000; Auckland District 
Law Society, Submission to Employment and Accident Insurance Select Committee, Employment 
Relations Bill, (undated), Christopher Toogood, QC, Submission to Employment and Accident 
Insurance Select Committee, Employment Relations Bill (undated), W C Hodge, Submission to 
Employment and Accident Insurance Select Committee, Employment Relations Bill, 1 May 2000.	  
3	  Chief Judge, Employment Court, Farewell from the Chief Judge, Reflection on 15 Years in Office, 
[2005] Employment Law Bulletin, 31. 
4	  When Judge Palmer retired in 2003 the Department took no immediate steps to replace him.  A 
request to the Minister of Labour from the MP for Christchurch Central about a replacement 
appointment resulted in advice to the Minister that a replacement was not warranted because the 
workload of the court in Christchurch could be managed by circuit judges, given that in the year to 
May 2002 a total of 138 applications were filed in the court, nationwide, and in the year to May 2003 
163 applications were filed, 15% of which emanated from Christchurch.  It went on to note that the 
workload of the court under the new legislation was 40% of that under the Employment Contracts Act: 
Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Memorandum, Replacement of Employment Court Judge 
in Christchurch, 19 June 2003.	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Analysis of the EC’s operations will first consider its dispositions – the means by 
which proceedings before it were dealt.  A consideration of its role in reviewing 
Authority processes will follow.  The extent of the EC’s acknowledgement of the 
policy desire in the new legislation to restrict this aspect of its role under the ECA 
will be traced through a series of decisions it made about Authority processes. An 
exploration of the reasons for this approach will consider the relationship between 
policy requirements for informality and judicial expectations of role and status as the 
means by which the policy objective to reduce the need for judicial intervention was 
ignored. 
Operations 
The number of proceedings filed at the EC declined after the ERA took effect,5 but, 
given the variations of data and input (the monthly monitoring reports6 appear to 
count all applications as separate proceedings, so that a proceeding that generated 
interlocutory activity would be counted many times over), turns less on the number of 
proceedings filed than the work that they generated.7  The number of proceedings 
completed (or fully disposed of) in the first 3 full years of the new Act showed a drop 
from 245 (101 of which were judgments) in the 2001/2 (July to June) year to 122 (77 
judgments) the following year and 47 (24) in the 2003/4 year.8   
Comparisons between final and interlocutory (or ancillary) judgments appear not to 
have been made by the Department, although later in the decade data collected about 
the number of judgments (substantive and ancillary) issued by each of the judges 
between 2006 and 2012 revealed an annual average total of 160 but with marked 
variations.9 
The point of analysing the distinction between substantive and ancillary (costs, 
interlocutory, and other procedural decisions that do not resolve the substantive 
claim/s at issue) judgments lies in what it suggests about the type of work the EC 
performed.  Research revealing that as the need for substantive trials reduces, 
ancillary decision-making rises, attributes this to the phenomenon of lawyers 
negotiating in the ‘shadow of the courts’ where the increased likelihood of negotiated 
settlements of proceedings increases the number of interlocutory or process issues 
requiring adjudication. 10 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Department of Labour, Industrial Relations Service – Monthly Monitoring Reports for 2001, 2002: 
277 proceedings were filed in 2001, 249 proceedings were filed in 2002.  	  
6	  Monthly monitoring reports were summaries compiled by the Department of the applications, 
judgments, withdrawals and applications outstanding for the relevant month.	  
7	  See warning against relying on filings or applications as a reliable measure of judicial work:	  Marc 
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts (2004) 1(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 459.	  
8	  Department of Labour to Minister of Labour, Key Messages: Employment Relations: The ERA is 
working  (undated draft c 2006). 
9	  The lowest annual number of judgments for the period 2006-12, was in 2008 (117), and the highest 
was in 2012  (216)	  	  
10	  Galanter, note 7.	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The proportion of ancillary decisions can be calculated by reference to the number of 
applications outstanding to show that in its first two full years of operation under the 
ERA the proportion of ancillary to substantive decisions rose significantly between 
2001 and 2002.11  Separating out ancillary decisions also affected apparent disposition 
rates.  The Department’s Monitoring Reports treated all judgments as dispositive, 
suggesting that for this period there was an even split between judgments and 
withdrawals.12  Separating ancillary from substantive decisions reveals that a higher 
proportion of proceedings were disposed of by withdrawal.13 
The EC’s judgment website14 showed a steadily rising rate of ancillary decision 
making: for the last half of 2006 44% of the decisions published were ancillary; in the 
2007 year they constituted 55% rising to 66% in 2008.  By then the number of 
substantive judgments issued annually was between 41 and 62, except for 2007 (79).   
Process Reviews 
2000 - 2004 
The David decisions 
The two EC judgments on the cross-examination issue described in chapter 7, David v 
A.E Tilley15 and David v Employment Relations Authority16 were amongst the first to 
consider procedural issues following the commencement of the new statute.  
Just as submissions from the legal profession on the Employment Relations Bill 
focused on potential problems for natural justice of the Authority’s investigative role, 
rights to cross-examination were raised as an issue of natural justice.  The issue was 
litigated within months of the publication of judicial and practitioner concerns about 
the Authority’s intention to restrict cross-examination in its investigations.17   
In what appears, with the benefit of hindsight, as a rehearsal for the David decisions 
the Chief Judge in September 2000 (in an article acknowledging that the EC’s 
workload would be dependent on the extent to which the processes of the Authority 
and the Mediation Service were accepted)18 set out the case for asserting rights of 
review, in the face of the privative provisions of s 184. Section 27(2) Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (BORA) was cited as the yardstick for assessment whether rights to justice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Department of Labour, note 5:  in 2001 the proportion of ancillary to substantive judgments was 
14%, in 2002 it was 29%.	  
12	  Ibid: in 2001 the proportions were 52% judgments, 48% withdrawals; in 2002 they were 51% and 
49% respectively. 
13	  The adjusted disposition rates are: 44% judgments, 56% withdrawals for 2001 and 35% judgments 
65% withdrawals for 200.2	  
14	  www.justice.govt.nz/courts/employment-court/judgments-of-the-court	  
15	  David v A.E Tilley [2001] ERNZ, 93.	  
16	  David v Employment Relations Authority [2001] ERNZ, 354.	  
17	  The Employment Law Bulletin (Lexis Nexis) carried a number of articles in 2000 and 2001 about 
the natural justice implications of the Employment Relations Authority investigative process, cited 
below. 
18	  T.G. Goddard, Chief Judge, Employment Court, The Only Constant is Change…The Changed Role 
of the Employment Court under the Employment Relations Act 2000, [2000] Employment Law 
Bulletin, 115. 
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would be compromised by the Authority, and as a basis for confronting the problem 
of restricted powers of review. 
The right to test an opponent’s case by cross examination, held to be a principle of 
natural justice by the High Court in Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-
General,19 was the subject of commentary by employment lawyers about the new Act 
published shortly after that of the Chief Judge.20  Like him they focused on the ‘right 
to judicial review’ guaranteed by s 27(2) BORA and the audi alterem partem rule (the 
arguments heavily relied on by David).21  One expressed concern about the indication 
from Authority members that cross-examination was incompatible with the 
investigative process mandated by the Act.  He concluded by opining that:   
…there is every prospect that the procedure which the Employment Relations Authority seems 
likely to adopt in exercising its adjudicative role may be the subject of challenge.22 
 
The issue for the Authority in David’s claim against A.E Tilley was whether he was an 
employee or a participant in a Work and Income work experience scheme. Included in 
the list of witnesses for the employer was a Work and Income official.  David, 
however, was relying on a conversation with another employee to assert a job offer.  
This was sufficient for him to claim that an issue of credibility arose (potential 
conflicting versions of the conversation) such that he had a right to cross-examine the 
employer’s witnesses.  The Authority did not accept that cross-examination was the 
only means by which conflicts in the evidence could be resolved. The parties were 
directed to file briefs of evidence and lists of questions they wanted the Authority to 
consider in its investigation.   
The Authority declined an application to remove the matter to the EC.  The 
application for removal relied on s 178(2)(a), that an important point of law was in 
issue: whether parties to Authority investigations had unfettered rights to cross-
examine, or should be advised how that right would be granted; whether they could be 
ordered to provide lists of questions for the Authority, and if it could exclude 
witnesses and order briefs of evidence to be filed prior to an investigation meeting.  
Since these questions all concerned procedural matters the Authority considered that 
it was required to balance two competing interests – compliance with the rules of 
natural justice and its power to set its own investigative procedure.  It determined that 
natural justice includes a right to be heard but that this was not synonymous with 
unfettered rights to cross-examination.  It did not accept that rights to be heard were 
compromised by the directions concerning the way the investigation would be 
conducted.  
David’s response was to file two applications to the EC – for removal23 and review.24  
Accepting at face value David’s allegation that an unfettered right to cross-examine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General, [1999] 2 NZLR 452.	  
20	  Phillip Green, Viva La Difference? Dispute Resolution under the Employment Relations Act 2000 
[2000] Employment Law Bulletin, 137; Kenneth Johnstone, King John, Runnymede, the Magna Carta, 
and Other Stuff [2000] Employment Law Bulletin, 158. 
21	  Tim Flaherty, To Cross or not to Cross: that is the Authority’s Decision? [2001] Employment Law 
Bulletin, 67.   
22	  Johnstone, note 20. 
23	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 178(3).	  
24	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 194.	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was a breach of the principles of natural justice and that this was a question of law 
applicable to all those who “take exception to the Authority following the process that 
has been described in the practice note issued by the Chief of the Authority”25 the EC 
ordered removal of the proceeding and the application for review to be heard by a Full 
Court. 
The Authority Practice Note26 and the reasons the Full Court attributed to its existence 
became a major focus of the EC’s criticism.  It was first described as:  
…a statement of the Authority’s policy and is indicative of a mind-set or attitude against cross-
examination.  As such it is of questionable validity because it precludes the proper 
acknowledgement of litigants’ rights on a case-by-case basis.27 
This was an aspect of the connection the EC made between rights to individual 
treatment and its view of the Authority’s function as essentially judicial and 
adversarial.28  To make that connection it was required to ignore almost all of the 
statutory provisions that described the Authority’s functions as investigative, or 
inquisitorial.  The EC position can be contrasted with that of the Court of Appeal 
(CA) the following year, in Claydon v Attorney-General,29 that described employment 
tribunals like the Authority as having procedures directed at dispensing informal, 
practical, speedy, and inexpensive administrative justice: 
In summary the nature of the justice that tribunals dispense reflects the fact that they are 
discharging a role that is different from that of a Court.30 
Additionally the CA held that the statutory substitution of rights of appeal for the 
right to a fresh hearing by the EC underlined the administrative nature of Authority 
decisions: 
It is clearly a protection mechanism, the protection being that offered by a judicial process.31   
A Full EC accorded itself the power to review the Authority’s decision by effectively 
holding that s 194 overrode s 188(4).  The latter stated at that time (it was one of the 
provisions amended in 2004 to reinforce the message) that the EC did not have the 
power to advise or direct the Authority on the exercise of its investigative role. This 
was circumvented by reference to the EC’s status as a court of record:  if the 
Authority acted unlawfully then the EC had the power to direct it how to proceed 
lawfully.  At this point it was required to confront s 184 which restricts rights of 
review under s 194 to bad faith and proceedings upon which the Authority had no 
jurisdiction whatsoever (e.g determining disputes covered by other statutes).  It did so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  David note 15, at [20].  	  
26	  Chief of Employment Relations Authority, Practice Note, Employment Relations Authority 
Investigations, 6 November 2000.   
27	  David note 16, at [4]. This was elucidated, later in the judgment, by reference to the evidence of the 
Chief of the Authority whose experience of cross-examination at the Employment Tribunal was that it 
was unproductive, time wasting and of no assistance to a decision maker.  This was regarded as 
responsible for tainting the Practice Note. 
28	  The Court relied on Employment Relations Act 2000, s 143(f) – judicial intervention at the lowest 
level needs to be that of a specialist decision-making body that is not inhibited by procedural 
requirements – to confirm that the Authority is judicial in character:  David note 16, at [58]. 
29	  Claydon v Attorney-General [2002] 1 ERNZ 281.	  
30	  Ibid, at [94]. 	  
31	  Ibid, at [69].	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by holding that s 184 could not protect the Authority from review if its determination 
was tainted by a breach of a principle of natural justice.   
Cited in support of this proposition was NZ Rail v Employment Court, 32 
notwithstanding the submission from proponents of the power of review that it be 
distinguished.33  The CA in that decision construed the ECA equivalent of s 184 as 
meaning that no review was possible if the claim before the court was within its 
statutory powers to decide, the orders made were also within the court’s powers, and 
there was no bad faith.  The CA regarded the application for review as an attempt to 
get around the statutory exclusion of appeals concerning construction of employment 
contracts.  The CA also explained why the statutory predecessors to s 184 were 
considered necessary – a decision of the House of Lords was being argued in NZ 
courts as preferring a concept of jurisdictional error having the effect of considerably 
restricting the protection afforded by standard privative clauses:   
Patently the statutory change was intended to protect the Arbitration Court’s decisions from 
challenge by review except on narrow jurisdictional grounds.  Some of the wider grounds of 
jurisdictional challenge of which Lord Reid spoke…were obviously meant to be ruled out.  
These would include misinterpretations of the kind held to have occurred in Anisminic itself 
which resulted in a conclusion that the tribunal had failed to consider the right question and had 
rejected a claim on a ground which they were not entitled to take into account…. In all the 
circumstances the suggestion that the Employment Court lacked jurisdiction in Lord Reid’s and 
the NZ Parliament’s narrow and original sense of the term jurisdiction is untenable.34 
 Had the EC in David applied this reasoning it could not have accepted that it had the 
power to review the extent of the Authority’s compliance with the principles of 
natural justice on a claim (an employment relationship problem) for which the 
Authority undoubtedly had jurisdiction. 
The EC’s subsequent reasoning about rights to cross-examination considered its 
exclusion in the Resource Management Act 1991 (prohibited in local authority 
hearings) and the Health and Disability Act 2000 (power to prohibit in Ministerial 
Inquiries) to mean that: 
…if Parliament had intended to allow the exclusion of the right to cross-examination by the 
Authority, it could easily have said so. Yet, far from saying so it introduced not once but twice 
requirements of adherence to the principles of natural justice and also required the Authority to 
follow a reasonably fair procedure…35   
This finding overlooked the open-textured nature of the statutory provisions for the 
institutions when the legislation was first enacted.  The objects provisions of ss 
3(a)(vi) and 143(f) – “reducing the need for judicial intervention and judicial 
intervention…that is not inhibited by strict procedural requirements” suggest a 
Parliamentary intention to privilege the substance of employment relationship 
problems over the processes required to resolve them. Specific provisions reinforce 
this intention:  s 160 describes the Authority’s investigative powers as including the 
power to “follow whatever procedure the Authority considers appropriate;” s 174 
describes what must and what may be recorded in determinations – discretionary are 
descriptions of the evidence, submissions, findings of credibility and the investigative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  NZ Rail v Employment Court [1995] 1 ERNZ 603.	  
33	  Flaherty, note 21. 
34	  NZ Rail, note 32, at 607.	  
35	  David note 16, at [72].	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process; s 188(4) prohibited36 the EC from advising or directing the Authority about 
the exercise of its investigative role.  If they are read together the clear message is that 
Parliament wanted the Authority to be free to set its own procedures and did not 
anticipate it could be directed to include, against its will, unfettered rights of cross-
examination at investigations. 
The decision managed to achieve what few other employment initiatives did - accord 
amongst union and employer associations:  
It is rare, if not unique, in these times for a press release from the Employer and Manufacturers’ 
Association to be headed “EMA in Accord With CTU” but this case has resulted in just this 
occurrence. A cynic might also take the view that this case is a clear illustration of a third “social 
partner” in modern industrial relations — the legal fraternity — represented in this case by their 
union the NZ Law Society.37 
 
Although leave to appeal was granted by the CA,38 the substantive appeal was never 
heard:  Parliament opted, instead, to amend the Act39 to clarify that Authority 
compliance with the principles of natural justice40 did not require it to allow cross-
examination, although it retained a discretion to do so.  The need to intervene was 
questioned on the basis that the result would have been the same had the CA decided 
the issue,41 although the opposite position, that the Minister had little choice but to 
proceed with a statutory amendment, was also aired.42  The debate, in other words, 
pitted collectivised users of the employment institutions (union and employer 
associations), employment law academics and Authority members against 
employment lawyers.   
At the heart of this episode (which began in May and ended in December 2001) lay 
the struggle between negotiated and adversarialist approaches to dispute resolution 
that the new statute sought to resolve.  By these decisions, it can be argued that the 
EC exposed its inability to adopt a neutral position in that struggle:43 
In late 2004 Parliament enacted a number of amendments to the Employment Relations Act 2000 
for a variety of reasons including to address some decided cases that it perceived were not 
consonant with the spirit of the legislation and, in particular, the unique investigative problem 
resolution methods of the Employment Relations Authority.  An earlier amendment to the 2000 
Act had addressed specifically the consequences of a judgment of a full Court of the 
Employment Court in David v Employment Relations Authority that determined that a right of 
cross-examination of witnesses in the Employment Relations Authority was a natural justice 
right of which parties could not be deprived by a blanket Authority practice.  This amendment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  This provision was amongst those amended in December 2004 to strengthen the prohibition against 
directing the Authority on the exercise of its investigative function. 
37	  Gordon Anderson, David v Employment Relations Authority, Attorney-General and New Zealand 
Law Society, [2001] Employment Law Bulletin, 99. 
38	  Employment Relations Authority v David [2001] ERNZ 294.	  
39	  Employment Relations (Validation of Union Registration and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2001, 
s 11.	  
40	  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 173(1).	  
41	  Graeme Taylor, An ERA of Cross-Examination [2001] Employment Law Bulletin, 136. 
42	  Anderson, note 37. 
43	  For an alternative explanation, the EC preference for common law over statute, see Anderson, note 
81 below.	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was in the nature of an emergency or running legislative repair carried out even before the Court 
of Appeal was able to decide an appeal from this Court’s judgment.44 
The Metargem decision 
The amendments might have emphasised for the EC a Parliamentary intention to limit 
EC powers to intervene in procedural matters at the Authority.  But they did not.  In a 
reprise of the situation that saw David removed to the EC, the grievant in Metargem v 
Employment Relations Authority45 sought declarations and orders from the EC about 
pre-investigation meeting directions.  These were directions aimed at ameliorating 
concerns about the absence of the right to cross-examine. Notifying the Authority of 
credibility issues potentially confers an advantage on the other party because it alerts 
them and undermines the element of surprise.  The direction empowered the parties to 
list all their issues and to choose whether to exchange this list.  The plaintiff objected, 
alleging that the directions raised serious issues of natural justice.  The Authority 
sought the views of the other party who could not accept that any natural justice issue 
was at stake (because the right to be heard remained) but in any event was intending 
to exchange its list.  The Chief Judge quashed the direction and made a declaration 
that the Authority’s direction permitting or requiring a party to communicate with the 
Authority privately, in the absence of the other party breached natural justice and was 
therefore outside the Authority’s jurisdiction. 46 
The EC’s description of the plaintiff’s case included the following:   
Mr McBride began by telling me that the issues were touched upon but not determined by the 
Full Bench of this Court which decided David v Employment Relations Authority.  Nor was the 
issue answered by the legislative change that followed David.47   
By this time the CA decision in Claydon was available for the guidance of the EC.  
The plaintiff sought to distinguish what the Court of Appeal held about the nature of 
employment tribunals:  
…the procedures of which were suited to dispensing informal, practical, speedy and inexpensive 
administrative justice.  The nature of such bodies is that they generally have wide discretions and 
ample scope for value judgments based on their perceptions of criteria such as reasonableness, 
equity and merit of a case…48 
Apart from recording the submission that Claydon should be distinguished, the EC 
made no further reference to it insisting that it retained a power of review, 
notwithstanding: 
…it is not possible readily to reconcile the privative provisions of the Employment Relations Act 
2000 with the liberal remedial provisions of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972.  In the 
absence of any attempt to repeal the review jurisdiction of the Court I take it I am free (and 
bound) to exercise it but at the same time I must respect the statutory boundaries especially of s 
188(4).  I see nothing there or in s 184 preventing the Court from declaring …that the Authority 
has acted without jurisdiction and informing it how it may proceed in order to stay within 
permissible bounds.  That would not amount to advising it how to proceed when it is acting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Clerk of the House of Representatives v Witcombe [2006] ERNZ 196, at [22].   	  
45	  Metargem v Employment Relations Authority [2003] 2 ERNZ 186.	  
46	  Ibid. 
47	  Ibid, at [14]	  
48	  Claydon v Attorney-General, note 29 at [94].	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within its jurisdiction.  That is what s 188(4) is directed to.  Nor can s 184 avail if the Authority 
has exceeded its powers.49 
Having decided that it had the power to review the issue of the direction, the EC then 
proceeded on the basis that the other party would not exchange its list (when it 
specifically stated that it intended to do so).  It dealt with that problem of the evidence 
by saying: 
I am satisfied that it is only natural and to be expected that the plaintiff should feel apprehensive 
about private communications from his former employer to the Authority for which no pressing 
reason exists.50  
The EC focused on the absence of an obligation to exchange the list as the natural 
justice problem.  It restricted remedies to quashing the Authority’s direction, 
declining to declare that the requirement to provide questions in advance was 
unreasonable.  By this means the Authority attempt to accommodate concerns about 
the absence of a right to cross-examine was overridden. 
This decision was amongst the last that asserted the power to advise and direct the 
Authority about procedural issues via use of the s 194 power of review.  It was 
followed in 2004 by a decision acknowledging that such supervisory powers as the 
EC had were restricted to applications for review. Acknowledging that it was “unable 
to direct the Employment Relations Authority as to its processes” it made no orders 
but treated the Authority decision to adjourn an investigation as a determination 
susceptible to challenge.51  
 
Post-2004 decisions 
In succeeding amending legislation52 passed in December 2004, limitations on EC 
powers of removal and review were imposed.53  These amendments were a reaction to 
the David and Metargem judgments54 but in describing them one of the judges said 
that their effect awaited “judicial interpretation”.55   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Metargem, note 46. 	  
50	  Ibid, at [68].	  
51	  Munro v Village Care New Plymouth Ltd [2004] 2 ERNZ 40. 
52	  Employment Relations Amendment Act (No 2) 2004.	  
53	  Those amendments of provisions concerning the Authority (ss 173-184) were aimed at emphasising 
that procedural issues arising from its investigations could not be the subject of challenge and reviews 
could not occur until a matter was concluded by the Authority.  They were reinforced by amendments 
to Employment Relations Act, 2000, ss 188  (Court’s jurisdiction) and 194 (Court’s powers of review). 	  
54	  Minister of Labour to Cabinet, paper, Review of the Employment Relations Act 2000: Outstanding 
Matters, 21 July 2003 at [31]:  The Court has…twice exercised its review jurisdiction over the 
Authority and declared that initial procedural directions made by the Authority were invalid.  Neither 
decision considered the possibility that any defect in initial procedural directions might subsequently 
have been cured during the actual investigation, nor even that the right to challenge the matter in the 
Court de novo caters for any need to correct procedural defects.  Judicial review at the stage of 
preliminary directions, before the Authority has issued its determination, means that the significance of 
any potential breach is being assessed in isolation from the overall natural justice of the whole 
investigation process.  It has been a long standing principle that apparent breaches of natural justice 
can be cured by subsequent actions.  Judicial review at this early stage also fails to adequately 
recognise the availability of a de novo hearing as a superior remedy for any breach of natural justice.   
55	  Judge Barrie Travis, Employment Court, Procedure is Power — Procedures in the Employment 
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Perhaps for this reason the amendments were considered a few months later in Keys v 
Flight Centre.56  The gap between what the parties and what the EC thought were the 
issues was described thus: 
On an academic note, one would be justified in becoming somewhat dazzled by the line of legal 
arguments submitted by the parties on what they believed to be the issue, as compared with the 
reasoning actually employed by the Court, for there seems to be little in common between the 
two.   … 
Here, Keys submitted that the issue turned on whether the Authority had jurisdiction to grant 
Anton Pillar orders. Counsel for the plaintiff and respondents made submissions accordingly. 
The Court, however, formulated the issue as concerning whether the Authority’s determination 
as to whether it had jurisdiction to grant the order was a matter of procedure. Deciding that it was 
not, the Court concluded that the right to challenge the determination was available to Keys, and 
that she would have to exhaust that avenue before judicial review proceedings would become 
available to her. 57 
The application for review of an Authority decision to issue an Anton Pillar order was 
struck out because the EC accepted there was an unexercised right of challenge to that 
decision and ss 143(fa), 184(1A)(b) and (c) and 194(3) (all newly amended 
provisions) required rights of challenge to be exhausted before reviews could be 
undertaken. However the EC could see no reason why the plaintiff could not 
immediately file a challenge – its concluding comments invited one by indicating that 
an application for leave to challenge out of time would be granted. 
At this point the Authority investigation had not yet begun.  Recorded in the EC 
judgment are submissions about its powers to intervene in uncompleted 
investigations, in which the s 3(a)(vi) objective of reducing the need for judicial 
intervention, and the policy behind the 2004 amendments were cited: 
…the Bill improves the ability of the Employment Relations Authority to deliver speedy, 
effective, and non-legalistic problem resolution services by restricting the ability of the 
Employment Court to intervene during Authority investigations.  This will ensure that the focus 
remains on the immediate employment relationship problem itself, rather than on how the 
institutions deal with it.…[T]he Court may not intervene in Employment Relations Authority 
investigations on procedural grounds until the Authority has concluded its investigation and 
issued a determination.58 
The EC response was to ignore the larger point about not disrupting unfinished 
investigations in favour of holding that the Authority decision to issue the Anton 
Pillar order was a final determination about a jurisdictional (not a procedural) issue so 
that, but for the requirement to hear challenges before reviews, it retained a power of 
review. By emphasising the distinction between procedural and jurisdictional or 
substantive issues the Court retained its powers of review.59 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Court [2005] ELB 47. 
56	  Keys v Flight Centre [2005] ERNZ 471.	  
57	  Gordon Anderson, Case Comment, Keys v Flight Centre [2005] Employment Law Bulletin, 126, 
127. 
58	  Keys v Flight Centre, note 56 at [32].	  
59	  Alternative motivations for the EC should be conceded, given the irrevocability of an Anton Pillar 
order once issued and implemented.	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The EC also chose to ignore the same submission in Oldco PTI (NZ) v Houston60 
from the respondent to a challenge based on Keys of an Authority refusal to issue a 
non-publication order and close its investigation to the public.  This application was a 
reasonably transparent device to delay the investigation (there was a peculiar and 
remarked-upon absence of any evidence of the need for such orders)61 and could have 
been treated as such, given the clear procedural status of the issue.  However the EC 
took the opportunity to expand on the point that consumed its attention in Keys:  a 
definitive interpretation of s 179(5): 
It is important to emphasise that the scope of s 179(5) does not depend on the nature of the 
power being exercised by the Authority in its determination but rather on the effect of the 
determination itself.  That effect must be analysed in order to decide whether or not the 
determination falls within the restriction imposed by the s 179(5) on the right of challenge.   
…the application of s 179(5) will always depend on the effects of the particular determination 
sought to be challenged.62   
This meant that procedural decisions could be distinguished from substantive and 
jurisdictional decisions - those to which s 179(5) did not apply.  Maintained in this 
judgment was an EC silence on the requirement to abstain from intervening in 
Authority investigations until they were concluded. 
Obiter discussion about the effect of s 179(5) in X v Bay of Plenty District Health 
Board 63 was based on the idea that procedural rulings that affected outcomes could 
be regarded as capable of challenge, “notwithstanding the provisions of s 179(5)”.64 
The EC based its discussion on the practice of the CA, which declines to hear appeals 
of interlocutory rulings by the High Court, unless they affect substantive outcomes.  
This enabled the EC to conclude:  
These Court of Appeal decisions are on all fours with the approach adopted by Judge Couch in 
Oldco. It is the consequences that flow, from what might be regarded as an interlocutory 
determination by the Authority, that will determine whether or not it is a determination about 
procedure or whether it is a determination that has affected substantive rights. 
Clearly procedural means may be taken by the Authority to make a determination which may 
have substantive results. The circumstances of Rawlings are a clear example. If a determination 
has such substantive effects then s179(5) will not operate as a bar. 65 
The CA in Employment Relations Authority v Rawlings66 issued a definitive judgment 
on EC powers to hear reviews and challenges concerning Authority procedure: 
 
We are satisfied that ss 179(5) and 184(1A) are intended to prevent challenge or review 
processes disrupting unfinished Authority investigations.  But once the investigation is over and 
a determination has been made, there is no reason for limiting the challenge and review 
jurisdictions of the Employment Court.  If the procedure adopted by the Authority had had a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  OldcoPTI (NZ) v Houston [2006] ERNZ 221.	  
61	  Suggesting that the likelihood of damage arising from the irrevocability of the Authority decision 
was low to non-existent. 
62	  OldcoPTI (NZ) note 60, at [46]. 
63	  X v Bay of Plenty District Health Board, 10 December 2007, ARC 78/07.	  
64	  Ibid, at [19]. 
65	  Ibid, at [33], [34].	  
66	  Employment Relations Authority v Rawlings [2008] ERNZ 26.	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decisive influence on result (eg by refusing an adjournment and proceeding in the absence of a 
witness), the affected party, in the course of questioning that result, will be entitled to put in 
issue procedure. 67 
However the CA failed to persuade the EC that the main issue, on challenges or 
reviews of Authority decisions on procedure, was whether the Authority had 
concluded its investigation.  The EC continued to insist on an analysis of the effects 
of a decision in order to classify it as procedural, substantive or jurisdictional. 
Although coming after the timeframe of this thesis the following decisions illustrate 
the judicial tropes under analysis.  
An Authority ruling that its recommendation to the parties (under the then recently 
amended s173A) was rejected so that the matter required a full investigation was 
treated as a jurisdictional rather than a procedural determination.68  The EC held that 
the distinction between whether or how the Authority is empowered to act describes 
the difference between jurisdictional and procedural decisions for the purposes of ss 
179(5) and 188(4).  If jurisdictional then those privative provisions do not apply.  This 
enabled the EC to determine the substantive issue of the challenge – whether the 
Authority was correct that the recommendation was not accepted.  The EC found that 
it was – thus reaching the same result as if it had treated the challenge as barred by s 
179(5).   
This suggests that it was more important to the EC to take the opportunity to reinforce 
its position on the privative provisions than to reduce the need for judicial 
intervention, or ensure Authority investigations are concluded before it intervenes.  
An Authority Minute about evidence that would be accepted at an upcoming 
investigation was challenged.69  The Authority intended to reject, as inadmissible, 
evidence about settlement discussions. 
After holding that the Minute was a Determination (notwithstanding that it described 
itself as “a preliminary procedural matter for resolution prior to the Authority 
investigating the substantive employment relationship problem”)70 the EC held: 
…the Court’s role is to ensure the Authority’s compliance with applicable legal principles and if 
this requires the Court to determine whether evidence ought to be admitted or excluded from the 
Authority’s investigation under its broad statutory powers to admit or exclude evidence, then that 
is the Court’s function.71 
This was held to be more important than the Parliamentary intention to ensure the 
Authority developed its own investigative processes into employment relationship 
problems without undue interference by the Court.72  
Much of what followed in this judgment re-stated the EC position about its powers of 
review described above, from the natural justice and NZBORA issues in David and 
the categorisation of effect in Keys, OldCo and X to the CA’s judgment in Rawlings.  
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  Ibid, at [26].	  
68	  Grant v University of Otago [2011] NZEmpC 172. 
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  Ibid, at [20].	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  Ibid, at [26].	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However, a subsequent judgment issued a few weeks later, conceded the error of the 
EC position.  In McConnell v Board of Trustees Mt Roskill Grammar School73 a 
grievant challenged an Authority direction about the admissibility of evidence about 
what occurred during mediation of the employment problem.  The (relatively new) 
EC Judge had been counsel for the Crown at the Court of Appeal hearing of 
Rawlings. 
Relying substantially on that decision she began her consideration of the issue 
whether the EC had jurisdiction to hear the challenge by reference to the need for 
Authority investigations to conclude before challenges could be entertained.  
Referring to the objects in s 143 she held that the narrow approach in Morgan to what 
constitutes a procedural determination was inconsistent with those objectives: 
It would likely encourage challenges at a pre-investigative stage, increase costs and the incidence 
of judicial intervention, place an enhanced focus on technicalities, and cause (as this case 
demonstrates) significant delays.74 
Observations about the Court’s approach  
In addition to acknowledging the policy position about intervention in Authority 
investigations the McConnell decision also identified the problem of the EC’s 
approach to the issue: 
In my view a narrow reading of s 179(5), subjecting a broad range of rulings made by the 
Authority prior to the conclusion of the investigative process to challenge in this Court, is not 
consistent with the clear legislative intent of the provision and the statutory scheme more 
generally.75 
That this coincided with commentary about the issue may be coincidental,76 but it 
highlighted concerns about the EC’s approach to statutory interpretation and its 
tolerance of nonsensical litigation positions.  The circumstances that precipitated the 
Rawlings appeal are illustrative.  
The EC’s interpretation of the phrase in s 184(1A) any matter before the Authority 
underlined its practice of ignoring contextual statutory messages about the limits of its 
powers of review in favour of minute analyses of individual provisions that enabled it 
to claim expanded powers.  The EC held (in Rawlings) that this phrase confined s 
184(1A) to matters that were still before the Authority (in order to avoid striking out 
an application for review where no challenge had first been sought). As the CA 
pointed out this would result in redundancy of the whole provision.  That result was 
easily avoided by regarding the phrase as including proceedings that are or were 
before the Authority. 
The CA raised the role of Rawlings’ representative in this proceeding.  It questioned 
the tactical advantage of seeking a review when a range of alternative actions would 
have better achieved his objectives. The whole proceeding in fact turned on the 
behaviour of the representative.  It was precipitated by a claim to the Authority that 
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  McConnell v Board of Trustees Mt Roskill Grammar School [2013] NZEmpC 150. 
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  Ibid, at [37].	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  Ibid, at [40].	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  Susan Robson, Case Comment, Morgan v Whanganui College Board of Trustees, [2013] 
Employment Law Bulletin, 65. 
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contained sufficient vituperative comment about the Authority membership to warrant 
a minute directing the filing of a fresh statement of problem, with a warning that the 
proceeding would be regarded as withdrawn if the fresh statement was not filed 
within a specified time.  When that period elapsed without a fresh claim the 
representative was notified that the proceeding was treated as withdrawn.  His 
response was to file a claim at the EC that also contained irrelevant but vituperative 
comment about individuals associated with it.  The EC ignored this material in favour 
of providing the public forum that the representative said he was seeking, thus 
requiring of the Crown the expense of defending (and then appealing) a clearly 
vexatious proceeding.  The EC furthermore overlooked another crucial issue: there 
was no prospect of success of the substantive issue.77  
Prospects of success and the folly of seeking a narrower oversight (by choosing 
review over challenge) of an employment relationship problem were similarly never 
considered in the David and Metargem decisions.   Nor did the EC question the effect 
of these litigation tactics, whose interests were being served, or why those who sought 
Authority assistance78 were so keen to disrupt its investigation of their problems.  Put 
alongside the ministerial complaint79 that the EC failed to consider the potential of 
either an investigation or subsequent challenge for curing any defects of process these 
decisions suggest that the EC privileged representatives’ needs (to focus on process 
when there were few, if any substantive arguments available) over both client 
interests and legislative intentions for problem resolution in this jurisdiction. 
Although it can be argued that the EC incentivised resort to process in the absence of 
prospects of success as suggested by the way the plaintiffs in Metargem, Oldco, and 
McConnell structured their challenges and submissions to conform to the judgments 
in David, Keys and Morgan, it is also clear that the EC had its own agenda.  David, it 
can now be argued, was the product of concerns articulated throughout the select 
committee process and after the ERA was passed about the investigatory process for 
the Authority.  Less apparent were concerns about its reduced powers.  Although the 
David judgments purported to concern rights to justice and cross-examination they 
can more accurately be described as focused on EC powers over the Authority.  Those 
decisions sought either to reinstate what was thought to have been lost in the new 
statute, or to enhance EC powers over the Authority in the new environment.  It 
matters not which, the point being that the EC was unable to accept the legislative 
intention against its oversight of the Authority.  So, it fought hard against it, whenever 
the opportunity presented itself.  On some occasions this occurred at the instigation of 
representatives, and on others (e.g. Keys and Morgan) by the EC itself. 
An explanation for what appears to be an insistence on retention of traditional judicial 
processes lies in Richard Abel’s80 ideas about status anxiety and informal institutions 
and Gordon Anderson’s views about how the judicial perception of the common law 
and “statutory intervention” affects the regulation of labour relations: 
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  Rawlings (note 66) sought reinstatement or a redundancy payment from an employer whose 
business had been transferred to the most recent employer some years earlier.  The parties’ 
employment agreement precluded redundancy in that circumstance. 
78	  The applicants in all cases but Oldco (note 62) were grievant employees.	  
79 	  Minister of Labour to Cabinet Economic Development Committee, Paper, Review of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000: Outstanding Matters, 21 July 2003. 
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At the heart of much common law legal education and legal philosophy is an underlying belief 
that the common law is ‘real law’ and that statutory ‘intervention’ is not only an inferior sort of 
law but one that should be regarded with considerable suspicion as ‘interfering’ with 
‘fundamental common law rights’. 81	  	     
Abel argues that the use of informal institutions to replace dispute resolution by the 
courts both attracts professionals in other disciplines (e.g mediators) and affects 
lawyer and judicial perceptions of their social status.  Increased caseloads and 
expanded jurisdictions operate to raise perceptions of status, as does the power to off 
load trivial matters.  But what happens when informal institutions cut off or reduce 
the supply of work for the courts, instead of merely alleviating heavy caseloads? 
It can be argued that there were signs of the judiciary’s anxiety about issues of status 
when preparations for review of the ERA began in 2002.82  The Chief’s Judge’s 
contribution canvassed a number of issues.  They included a suggestion for the 
exclusivity of the employment institutions to be expressed more plainly in the Act.  If 
it is accepted that demarcation concerns suggest worries about competition for work 
(in this case from the High Court a higher status forum than the Employment Court 
for the resolution of commercial disputes involving employees) then this suggestion 
could be interpreted as articulating anxiety about status. 
The Chief Judge also believed there was a need for proper ethical standards for 
mediators.  He suggested a code of ethics.  Additionally he was concerned about 
directions to mediation.  At that time the practice in both the Authority and the EC 
when proceedings were filed was that the clerks receiving them would check whether 
mediation had occurred.  If not they would either arrange for mediation (by contacting 
the Mediation Service directly) or indicate that the direction to mediation was 
probable, before payment of a filing fee was made.  This was the sort of informality 
that the Department’s institutional administrators encouraged.83 The Chief Judge, 
however, was concerned about the absence of uniformity of practice about directions 
to mediation by court registry staff.  He wanted s 188 “tightened up”.84 
If Abel is correct that lawyer and judicial perceptions of status are affected by the 
status of those who first deal with matters in their jurisdiction then this desire for 
formalising requirements of mediators and the means by which work is directed to 
them supports that contention. 
Another concern raised by the Chief Judge, the issue of equitable remedies, illustrates 
Anderson’s point about the EC’s preference for the common law over statute.  Anton 
Pillar orders and Mareva injunctions were characterised as requiring “the special 
skills of a Judge used to the techniques of equity.  This point has been raised with the 
Judges with some emphasis by practitioners.”85 The concern was based on Authority 
resort to these remedies.  It was the subject of consideration four years later, in Axiom 
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Rolle PRP Valuation Services Ltd v Kapadia.86  The Full EC held that neither it nor 
the Authority had the power to make Anton Pillar orders.  Its concession that similar 
powers could be exercised by resort to the High Court Rules, (“available in this 
Court, although not in the Authority”)87 an aside at the end of a 29 page judgment, 
underlined its preference for a focus on common law powers it lacked over statutory 
powers it could exercise.  Its eagerness to differentiate the powers it had from those 
held by the Authority, arising from what McAndrew describes as a discontent about 
the powers and deference extended to the Authority by Parliament, was characterised 
as a concern about its “inappropriate emasculation”. 88 
 
Parliament intended to make it difficult for parties to avoid the unique investigative problem-
solving approach of the Authority at first instance.  It wished to emphasise to parties unfamiliar 
and uncomfortable with a radically different process of litigation to traditional adversarial and 
arguably formulaic process of the Employment Court, that it would become difficult to leap-frog 
the Authority’s process simply for the purpose of avoiding application of these new 
procedures.89 
This passage suggests another way of interpreting the EC reaction to the statutory 
diminution of its powers of process review.  In essence the legislature wanted the EC 
to treat challenges as originating proceedings.  This raised a practical problem for 
those trained in legal method.  Originating proceedings require a different approach 
than appeals.   The accepted basis of the appeal procedure is the assessment of the 
means by which issues were treated in the originating jurisdiction.  This assessment is 
both procedural and substantive.  Limiting it to a substantive inquiry eliminated a 
basis for reasoning about the decision below.  The effect was the conceptual 
equivalent to losing an arm or a leg.  The re-adjustment required of the bench was a 
revised perception of judicial role that it was reluctant to accept. 
By contrast the Authority membership reacted differently to its new role.  It was 
enthusiastic about the investigative process, in large part because it afforded the 
membership wider powers than the Tribunal had.90  Its decision to explain, in public 
meetings, how it intended that process to operate not only raised the ire of 
practitioners,91 it ultimately triggered the David decision.  Through that lens it is 
possible to characterise David as Goliath’s initial reaction to the first arrow, and the 
EC decisions of the 12-year period between David and McConnell as reiterating that 
reaction.    
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Axiom Rolle PRP Valuation Services Ltd v Kapadia [2006] NZEmpC 43.	  
87	  Ibid, at [99]. 
88 	  Ian McAndrew The Employment institutions in Rasmussen (ed) Employment Relationships, 
Workers, unions and employers in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2010) at 90: 
this was a reference to the ECs expressed discontent about the powers and deference extended to the 
Authority 
89	  Clerk of the House of Representatives v Witcombe note 44, at [22],  [23] 
90	  Julie Morton, M.Com Thesis, Reducing Legalism: The Impact of the Employment Relations Act 
2000, University of Otago, August 2003:  Morton’s accounts of her interviews with Authority members 
reveal this enthusiasm, notwithstanding that she chose to prefer the accounts of others of members 
roles in the investigation process.	  
91	  Johnstone, note 20.	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Conclusions 
It remains unclear whether there was any connection between the reduction of work 
for the EC, judicial concerns that this affected its relevance to the jurisdiction, and its 
response to policy about process.  Its determination to retain powers of process review 
over the Authority, and to elevate the importance and number of its own procedural or 
ancillary decisions suggest a difficulty accepting the policy desire to reduce the need 
for judicial intervention in employment relationship problems. 
More interesting was its method of response.  It chose to fight the desire to rid the 
jurisdiction of legalist and adversarialist approaches to dispute resolution by resort to 
legalism and adversarialism.  This suggests both a paucity of alternatives and a 
judicial confidence about the absence of effective sanction.  Statutory amendment – 
the only sanction available to the legislature – failed as a deterrent, although it did 
result in ever more strained (or ridiculous) interpretations of statutory language.  It 
can be argued that this tendency, rather than the amendments, was the EC’s ultimate 
undoing. Its judgments in Rawlings and Morgan were unsustainable in large part 
because they exposed a judicial agenda set against plain statutory language. 
In turn this reveals the problem of policy desires for informality of process in 
traditional court systems.  It suggests that a focus on process (by higher of lower 
status institutions) is such a central and basic judicial function that legislative attempts 
to tinker with it (or intervene) will be met by strenuous and sustained judicial 
opposition. 
The effects of this response on dispute resolution in this jurisdiction are, however, 
arguable.  The determination to retain the power of process review was limited in its 
effect to the decisions cited above.  Fewer than 10 proceedings over a 12-year period 
addressed the issue.  This suggests a minimal effect, or a limited appetite amongst 
employers and employees for the type of inquiry that process reviews require. 
Of greater significance is the trend identified by Galanter of managerial judging.92   
He attributes high settlement rates, rising costs, public perceptions of trials as 
expensive and risky and changing ideologies as the reasons why judges in the 21st 
century are required to make more procedural, evidentiary and management decisions 
than substantive judgments.  Galanter’s lawyers devote more time to settlement than 
litigation processes, so that the complementary relationship between litigation and 
negotiation results in litigation as a tactic of negotiation, rather than the other way 
round.   Rising rates of ancillary decision-making by the EC set against relatively 
stable numbers of substantive judgments suggest the existence of this trend in N.Z.  
The policy emphasis on negotiated resolution in this jurisdiction, and high settlement 
rates following mediation tend to confirm its existence. 
Thus if litigation is a tactic of negotiation and managerial judging a means of 
promoting settlements, the goal of privileging negotiated resolution of problems could 
be regarded as met, if the related goal of a rise of mended over ended employment 
relationships is ignored. 
This raises the central difficulty of policies focused on incentivising relational over 
contractual, or negotiated over adjudicated, problem solving that rely on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Galanter, note 7. 
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institutions of the law.  The evidence of the preoccupations and practices of the EC 
over the ERA period under review undermines the belief that collectivist dispute 
resolution values can be enforced via rules for informality. 
Over both periods under review the EC took seriously the constitutional role of the 
courts of independence from the Executive.  Specialty of (and the statutory basis of 
its) jurisdiction failed to affect EC attachment to the common law traditions of the 
civil courts.  This became the source of tensions with the Executive in both eras: 
procedural fairness (a common law principle apparently overlooked in 1990 by the 
radical lobby in its preference for the civil courts) appeared to undermine 
employment-at-will, and appellate powers of review undermined procedural 
informality.  These tensions had opposing effects on policy outcomes.  The EC focus 
on procedural fairness failed to inhibit achievement of the employment-at-will policy 
goal, perhaps because it facilitated reliance on legalised principles of process.  The 
ERA policy desire to informalise problem resolution was a more direct attack on 
judicial procedural values.   The speed with which the EC asserted powers of review 
that it lacked may well have been sufficient (absent high numbers of decisions) to 
assure the legal profession that little, if anything, had changed (procedurally) with the 
enactment of the ERA.  This signalled that the EC, not the legislature, would be the 
arbiter of procedural issues, thus establishing a basis for ensuring frustration of the 













This chapter aims to establish the connection between selection of dispute resolution 
system and success in meeting employment policy objectives.  It argues that choice of 
institutional structure determined the type of advocacy culture likely to dominate the 
jurisdiction that, in turn, had implications for policy goals. 
A theme of the ECA policy process, the role of desired policy outcomes in choice of 
conflict resolution delivery mechanisms, meant that greater labour market flexibility 
was achieved in part as the result of its alignment with the dispute resolution system 
that was selected for the jurisdiction in 1991.   
Key to its success were decisions made by National Government moderates about 
institutional structure, the basis of claim, and personnel (representatives and decision-
makers/facilitators).  By retaining a separate specialised dispute resolution system, 
universalising access to the personal grievance, and welcoming the legal profession 
into a jurisdiction previously (all but) denied it, all measures bitterly opposed by the 
radical lobby, the moderates lay the groundwork for tipping the balance of labour 
market power that the radical agenda sought.  
Initial clarity of ideological purpose for the ECA meant that its policy makers 
perceived no need for clarification or amendment of its intentions for the employment 
institutions, at least until after 1996.1  Nor did the problems experienced by the 
Tribunal and its users affect achievement of the flexibility goal.  They evidenced its 
success.   
The policy decision to modify rather than replace this system during the formulation 
of the ERA reinforced the ECA policy goal and undermined its own, apparently 
different, aims.  Left intact was the institutional structure, claim-type and personnel of 
the ECA.  This had two major effects.  It underscored the dependence of the 
flexibility goal on this triumvirate and emphasised flexibility’s domination of ERA 
policy, research and legislative amendment, successfully diverting policy attention 
from outcomes to process.  
The ERA failure to associate advocacy cultures and the institutions to which they 
were aligned with employment policy objectives, and its reliance on institutional 
neutrals as a substitute for a return to collectivist and protectionist approaches to 
labour issues ensured its core policy goal, a rise of mended over ended employment 
relationships, never occurred. 
The following account of policy themes common to both eras (individualism and 
collectivism, remedies and protections, contract and relationship) and the quest for 
access to justice: the ERA era’s contribution to a dispute resolution system antithetical 
to its aims; help establish these conclusions.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The move against the Employment Court was by those in the Coalition Cabinet who identified with 
the radical lobby in 1990.  They were undermined and outmanoeuvred in 1999 in the same ways that 
they were in 1991.	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Policy Goal Setting 
Individualism and Collectivism 
The major outcome sought for the ECA was an individualised workforce.  Flexibility 
was perceived as only possible if the workforce was de-collectivised. An anticipated 
rise in dismissal rates, an important element of flexibility, explains why the means of 
resolving dismissal disputes was so hotly contested within the National Government 
Cabinet.  The radical desire to limit claims to the common law action in the civil 
courts was intended to raise barriers to access to relief.  This cut across moderate 
beliefs that union members required incentives to abandon collectivism.  Since a key 
reason for union membership was perceived to be access to personal grievance rights, 
universalising this right (ensuring access to justice for all) would incentivise de-
collectivisation.  Since this is what occurred it can be argued that the decision to adopt 
the latter option helped to achieve that result. The subsequent decision to opt for a 
specialised, informal dispute resolution system over the civil courts reinforced public 
perceptions of ease of access to relief (justice) whilst facilitating the desired outcome 
(labour market flexibility).  In this jurisdiction informality and accessibility of dispute 
resolution system did not alter outcomes associated (by the radicals) with civil courts.  
The use of arbitrative neutrals ensured that the power imbalances required of the 
flexibility outcome were facilitated, as they would have been by the civil courts. 
It can therefore be argued that universal rights to claim in an apparently accessible 
resolution system were crucial to public acceptance of an individualised workforce.   
The belief of policymakers for the ERA that individualism and collectivism in the 
workforce could co-exist was undermined by the failure to achieve the rise sought in 
mended over ended employment relationships and a reduction in contested dismissals. 
The absence of evidence of internal political debate about this belief suggests a failure 
to recognise which of the tropes of collectivism and their interaction (relevant to 
dispute resolution) was unique or exclusive to collectives and unable to be replicated 
by alternatives.  The policy hope that the Mediation Service would operate as the 
source of information about workplace disputing and become a trusted early 
intervener so that dismissal rates were reduced never materialised because the policy 
goal failed to account for the dependence of protections from dismissal on 
collectivised approaches to workplace resolution mechanisms. 
Remedies and Protection 
The National Government moderates who favoured ease of (over barriers to) access to 
relief for contested dismissals correctly perceived that protection against dismissal, a 
trope of collectivism, had to be replaced with a tangible alternative if an 
individualised workforce was to replace a collectivised one. Disconnected from union 
membership the ECA personal grievance claim, if successful, was remedied by 
compensation not reinstatement.  Retention of job, the outcome sought by union 
advocates of personal grievances for the period after which the claim was created in 
1973, served as a protection against unjustified dismissal so the substitution of 
protection for remedy was significant to the facilitation of flexibility.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  It should be conceded, however, that by the mid 1980s the incidence of reinstatement under the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 was reducing; in 1987 - 25% of remedies, decreasing to 12% in 1991.  In 
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ERA positioning of reinstatement as the primary remedy failed to replicate the 
success of compensation for the ECA policy outcome. Damages, the remedy aligned 
to legal method, are the consequence of what Abel describes as its fundamental trope  
– the severing of relationships.  This suggests a fundamental marker of the difference 
between individualist and collectivist advocacy cultures: repair or severance, the 
precursors of protection or remedy. 
 By 2000 the delays of the ECA era had established severance and compensation as 
the sole remedial option for contested dismissals. An unforeseen but logical 
consequence was the transformation of compensation into an incentive to claim, 
morphing a remedy into (an individualised) protection.  The EC focus on procedural 
fairness during the ECA era ensured that employers with the resources to do so 
developed their own rules and practices to guarantee compliance with process 
requirements only to find that no matter how carefully crafted the rules, they 
nevertheless remained the subject of intense legal and judicial examination.  The cost 
of a contested dismissal was in this examination.  Mediated or private settlements 
were incentivised if the compensation sought or accepted was lower than this cost. 
The early availability of mediation after 2000 became a risk-free means of asserting a 
claim in the hope that the cost of proceeding further would yield a settlement. 
A secondary effect of ECA procedural fairness was that it reinforced public 
perceptions of a responsive dispute resolution system, whilst the labour market 
became increasingly flexible.  For the radical lobby the persistence of the dominance 
of dismissal grievances in the EC should have functioned as a source of assurance that 
employment-at-will was being established.  The radical lobby focus on the costs of 
achieving that outcome failed to alert those more directly affected by employment-at-
will to the cost of relying on remedies as a substitute for protection: roughly equal 
chances of success for employers and employees arising from grievance claims; 
repetition of claim matched by repetition of (individual) outcome in the consistency of 
compensation awards over the whole period under review; liability for costs if 
unsuccessful; costs of representation matching or exceeding compensation and costs 
awards.   
Repetition of claim and remedy in this jurisdiction did not result in calls for 
protections from dismissal during the period under review, although small employers 
made calls for protections from advocates of rogue employees.3  The dominant 
practice of confidential (mediated or private) resolution of contested dismissals 
shielded from the public gaze the implications of simple repetition over a long period, 
a problem for researchers4 and thus for those sectors of the population negatively 
affected by the status quo.    This phenomenon, attributed as an explanation for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the first 3 years of the Employment Contracts Act 2000 a total of 9 reinstatements were ordered: 
Bronwyn Boon, Remedies for Unjustifiable Dismissal under the Labour Relations Act 1987 (1992) 17 
(1) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 101; Caroline Morris, An Investigation into Gender 
Bias in the Employment Institutions (1996) 21(1) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 67.   
3 Department of Labour, Review of the Employment Problem Resolution System 2007, submissions 
from employers:  their focus was on no-win-no-fee advocates as responsible for meritless claims. 
4	  Morris, note 2, noted the problem for her research in the confidentiality of mediated settlements 
meant that a considerable proportion of all matters brought before the employment institutions were 
unavailable for research scrutiny; Bernard Walker and R T Hamilton, Grievance Processes: Research, 
Rhetoric and Directions for New Zealand, (2009) 34(3), New Zealand Journal of Employment 
Relations, 43 note that ‘private’ justice inhibits the task of evaluating issues of justice and equity in the 
New Zealand context. 
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sexual abuse by clergy of children within the Roman Catholic Church and the 2015 
Baltimore riots, 5  echoes Fiss’s concerns about private resolution: it facilitates 
repetition of abusive, detrimental or unlawful behavior by the exchange of money 
(compensation) in return for silence.  Wrongdoers remain free to repeat the behavior 
that through absence of real consequence has the potential to become institutionalised.  
Adjudication produces similar outcomes, as is argued of British employment tribunals 
described as providing limited protection to employees as a result of their sole focus 
on the rights of the claimant, the wrong already committed and the formal legalistic 
environment in which they operate.6  These outcomes of a system of individualised 
claimants suggest that substantive redress may lie “outside the law”.7  
The extent to which this outcome was subsidised by the state became apparent during 
the ECA era.  Cost to the state increased under the ERA.  Significantly higher claim 
numbers, more institutions and personnel contributed to this increase so that the (mid-
decade) cost to the state of each dollar transferred (between parties) by the institutions 
in compensation and costs was over $6.  The counter argument, that the institutions 
set the precedent for private resolution (the cost of which was borne by the parties), is 
undermined by repetition of outcome, given that the remedy amounts of 2008 were set 
during the 1990s.  
Contract and relationship 
Choice of statutory language was recognised by both sets of policymakers as an 
important component of communicating desired outcome.  Use of the word contract 
was intended to convey a more direct, individual and formal relationship between 
employer and employee, more akin to a business relationship, with the suggestion of 
equal bargaining power:  parties would negotiate the terms of their contract similarly 
to the ways they negotiated contracts to buy and sell property or (other) services.   
Incorporation of the word contract also signalled the type of dispute resolution system 
that would enforce the statute’s provisions:  modelled on traditional court systems 
with availability of adjudication at entry level, it would resolve contractual issues 
more quickly and less formally, but otherwise similarly to traditional courts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Tom McCarthy (dir) Spotlight, Universal Studios, 2015, portrayed the repetitious confidential 
settlement of abuse complaints within the Roman Catholic Church in Boston, United States of America 
as contributing to the failure to address and stop the abuse; Matt Taibbi, Why Baltimore Blew Up, 
Rolling Stone, 26 May 2015: “A bad thing happens, but somehow nobody is guilty of anything – 
money just changes hands. … The game is set up so the only real end for the victim of police abuse to 
pursue is a check from the government… For all the hundreds of millions of dollars paid out by cities 
to abuse victims, very little is actually done to discipline rogue police officers…. The problem – of 
police almost never facing consequences – was the obvious subtext of the Baltimore riots.” 
6 David Renton, Struck Out: Why Employment Tribunals Fail Workers and What Can Be Done, (Pluto 
Press, London, 2012) 
7 Ibid at vii; Renton’s prescription is for strengthened trade unions and rights to strike, cf Nicole 
Busby and Morag McDermont, Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: 
Some Preliminary Findings (2012) 41(2) Industrial Law Journal, 166, who conclude that the barriers to 
justice for vulnerable employees at British employment tribunals could be alleviated by resort to 
Citizens Advice Bureaux which they regard as critical to reclaiming labour law’s public law function of 
translating private disputes into matters of public concern. 
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The emphasis in the ERA on the relational foundation of the connection between 
employer and employee by use of the descriptor employment relationship was an 
attempt to broaden the conception of what it encompassed.  This language, reflective 
of earlier statutory usage (labour relations, industrial relations) was intended to 
convey a return to pre-ECA values for employment issues and a kinder, more 
respectful basis for the relationship.  However, use of the word relationship, with its 
connotation of a more intimate or domestic connection, may have operated to 
reinforce an older descriptor, master and servant, that more accurately encapsulates 
the power relationships of the employment jurisdiction of both eras, in that it suggests 
who were the active and the passive parties of the relationship.  It furthermore 
underlined the connection as individual, privileging individualist over collectivist 
approaches to employment relations.  
Availability of facilitation at entry-level, intended to reinforce the relational over the 
contractual elements of employment, also suffered from an inadequate or confused 
policy understanding of cause and effect.  Whilst it attracted large numbers 
(suggesting barriers to access to the system it replaced) failure to utilise its 
connections with collectivism and to exclude individualist advocates ensured its 
dominant function was to preside over the terms of ended relationships.  
 
Policy About Process 
Specialty of jurisdiction 
Since specialty of the industrial, labour or employment jurisdiction was its feature for 
the 98 years prior to the ECA, specialty of jurisdiction per se was nothing new in 
1991.  At that point the jurisdiction was dependent on different personnel, and the 
regulation of bargaining for employment terms and conditions. Stakeholder 
representatives dominated advocacy and decision-maker roles in the resolution of 
personal grievances, a claim available only to collectivised employees. This resulted 
in different outcomes from those after 1991: reinstatement for the successful grievant 
(if sought and practicable); low and consistent claim numbers arising from 
stakeholder sifting (assessments of prospects of success) functions; more informal 
dispute resolution activity in the workplace; and preferences for a focus on the 
substance of a dispute. 
These elements of the pre-1991 grievance resolution system help to explain why the 
pre-institutional statutory grievance procedures of the LRA could not be transplanted 
into the ECA without retention of the collectivist resolution culture on which they 
were dependent. 
Specialty of jurisdiction from 1991 onwards replicated outcomes obtainable in the 
general civil court jurisdiction because advocates and decision-makers (operating as 
single neutrals in place of the stakeholder committee system) were more likely to 
come from the same pool of practicing lawyers as those for the civil courts.  The 
dominance of legally trained personnel ensured that claim process, regardless of 
statutory policy for it, replicated that of the civil courts.  This included reliance on 
process to defer assessments of prospects of success that required a higher (than 
previously) dependence on institutional over informal dispute resolution. 
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The grievants after 1991 also differed from their predecessors: they were less likely to 
be collectivised; more likely to rely on lawyers as representatives; more likely to 
come from workplaces whose complaint and remedy systems were inaccessible, or 
not well understood; more likely to have an imperfect understanding of their rights 
and obligations; more likely to have restricted access to informed partial advice; and 
more likely to lack the power to initiate problem resolution processes.8  
These outcomes conformed to the political and economic environment sought in 
1991, a decentralised and deregulated labour market, that in turn is associated with 
dependency on lawyers, litigation and adversarial legalism to resolve (or suppress) 
conflict. 
If lawyers, litigation and adversarial legalism were perceived to be necessary to help 
facilitate flexibility of the labour market it can be argued that specialty of jurisdiction 
helped to mask this connection.  Specialty’s initial benefit to the Government arose 
from the public perception of it as an acceptable alternative to the courts.  The lack of 
political concern about process effects on the Tribunal suggests that the speedy and 
informal prescription for it was an essentially meaningless compromise necessary to 
ensure acceptance of a different resolution model.  By contrast, political reaction to 
the EC position on issues of dismissal process tends to confirm that such issues 
attracted attention only if they threatened to disrupt the flexibility outcome.   
The other policy benefit of the jurisdiction’s special status lay in its ability to attract 
the administrative resource and co-ordination required to alleviate the effects of 
adversarial process.  This ensured that concerns about the jurisdiction’s functioning 
kept the focus inward, on issues of process, thus diverting attention away from 
outcomes, in particular the effects of individualism and flexibility on some parts of 
the workforce.  
These connections between specialty of jurisdiction, the legal profession and the 
flexibility outcome were problematic for ERA policy ostensibly directed at different 
outcomes.  Retention of the institutions of legal method precipitated a power struggle 
with the profession and judiciary about process issues ensuring that alleviation of 
problems of process dominated policy for the jurisdiction, and maintained the 
diversion of attention away from substantive labour issues at the expense of analysis 
of alternatives.   
This forfeiture of the advantage to policy makers of special jurisdictions, the ability to 
legislate for the institutions, personnel and other factors likely to facilitate desired 
policy outcomes, formed the basis of the ERA’s failure to deliver the employment 
outcomes sought for it in 2000.   
The one outcome for which the ERA can take credit concerns access to justice, if that 
concept is interpreted as widening public access to institutional dispute resolution 
based on legal method.  The following section on modes of resolution draws some 
conclusions about how policies about process affected issues of access.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  This helps to explain why the transplantation of LRA pre-institutional grievance procedures into the 
ECA failed to yield similar outcomes.  The earlier procedures were dependent on collectivised 
advocates and employees, but the later on individualised advocates and employees.	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Modes of resolution 
Separation 
Separated resolution modes, a function of reliance on legal method, were a feature of 
both eras.  The difference between them, choice of mode at entry level under the 
ECA, was effectively eliminated by the ERA.  It is unclear whether or how this 
affected public perceptions of accessibility, but the difference in early use of the 
Tribunal and the Mediation Service suggest the latter was regarded as the more 
accessible. That it was free may have contributed to perceptions of its accessibility.  It 
is also possible that the names of these institutions infer particular and different 
modes of resolution suggesting mediation as a public preference for entry-level 
resolution. 
Similarity of outcome from use of the mediative mode for both eras, settlements 
involving money transfers, suggests that a function of separated modes of resolution 
was negotiation-persuasive.  The trend during the ECA era, increased reliance on the 
Tribunal’s mediative mode followed by rising rates of private settlement, can also be 
discerned in the ERA period.   
This suggests that the mediative mode performed, in terms of establishing precedent 
or guides to settlement, the same function as adjudicative modes are said to have.  It 
did so by different means.  Mediation modelled the behavioural tropes that facilitate 
resolution, whilst adjudication established precedent for legal issues.  In a jurisdiction 
with a persistently dominant claim type, usage data indicates there was less need for a 
focus on legal issues than behavioural modelling.  Thus were the expectations (about 
institutional dispute resolution) of individualised advocates shaped.  
A second effect of the relationship between advocacy function and institutions 
concerned risk (prospects of success) assessment.  Separation of resolution modes was 
a structural way of minimising the impact of risk assessment deferral that affected 
individualised disputants, and was a cause of the delays that beset the Tribunal. 
Deferral preserved the (advocate’s) business opportunity of asserting or resisting a 
claim. The mediative mode reduced the business risk in the presence of incentives to 
settle to avoid further advocacy costs and the absence of constraints like the power of 
adjudication in mediation. 
Institutional separation thus ensured that mode accessibility was dependent on choice 
of advocate.  Collectivised parties could access all three institutions at no personal 
cost, but only if they had appropriate prospects of success.  Individualised parties 
could access them if they had the financial resources to meet the costs of 
representation, or dispensed with representation altogether.  This establishes another 
perspective on the 1991 debate about mode purity and fairness/justice. 
Informality   
Usage data for both eras suggest a connection between public perception of 
institutional accessibility and the apparent informality of resolution process under the 
ERA.  If this is accepted, however, repetition of claim and consequence tend to 
establish that increased access (to justice) was an end in itself.  If the aim of 
informality of resolution process was to contribute to different and better outcomes 
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for employees at risk of dismissal and this failed to materialise then it can be accepted 
that process informality per se was not a contributing factor. 
Comparative informality of process did, however, contribute to better outcomes for 
institutional administration.  It was facilitated by two factors:  significantly higher 
resourcing of the jurisdiction under the ERA than the ECA; and the transfer of control 
over claim process from advocates to resolution personnel under the ERA.  This also 
became an end in itself.  It reduced the administrative chaos that delay and choice of 
the adjudicative mode produced under the ECA but it failed to result in administrative 
efficiencies that could have accompanied this success of outcome.  There was no 
change, in other words, to the passivity or inertia of the ECA era resolution personnel 
under the ERA.  Mediators failed to make use of the wide powers to facilitate and 
adjudicate that were conferred on them.  Authority membership increased whilst 
investigation numbers remained stable or diminished, a more efficient file allocation 
system utilised by one region was never adopted for the others, and, over time, 
resolution work rates fell under the ERA, as they did at the Tribunal. 
Information provision 
The point already made, that information for disputants from partial sources is more 
highly valued or useful than that from neutral sources, is relevant not only to policy 
about source, but also to policy about timing of provision and type of information that 
can be classified as useful.  It furthermore clarifies why resolution accessibility and 
informality of process, tropes of collective advocacy, could not be effectively 
transplanted into a neutral, individualist resolution environment for the purpose of 
facilitating collectivism’s dispute resolution outcomes.   
Acceptance of the interdependence of these factors is key.  Identifying them as policy 
facets of the institutions in the hope they would facilitate or replicate collectivism’s 
outcomes failed to acknowledge the connection between information provision, the 
timing of problem resolution and the need for recourse to resolution institutions:  
regularised, accessible workplace remedy systems, an informed collective 
membership with early access to partial advice and assistance to resolve issues as they 
arise, can be contrasted with the conditions that best facilitate labour market 
flexibility - workplace remedy systems that are inaccessible, or not well understood, 
employees with an imperfect understanding of their rights and obligations, restricted 
access to informed partial advice and no power to initiate problem resolution 
processes, and reliance on advocacy dependent on their ignorance of problem 
resolution processes as its business opportunity.   
A higher reliance by individualised grievants on institutional dispute resolution arose 
from factors that that could not be influenced by the institutions, no matter how they 
were structured, because outcomes dependent on early information provision and 
intervention were incidents of collectivised representation, in that they occurred prior 
to the crystallising of grievances, not afterwards.   
Neutrality 
If information about employment rights and obligations was best provided before any 
necessity for it was apparent, if its effectiveness relied on a variety of ways of 
providing it – formally (training and education) and informally (via membership of a 
common-purpose community) and if it had to come from partial and trustworthy 
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sources to facilitate the dispute outcomes sought for the ERA it becomes apparent that 
institutional neutrals could not function as a substitute for collective sources (in 
information and advice provision) because they could not establish the relationships 
of trust with those requiring their assistance. 
It can furthermore be argued that neutrality itself is associated with one set of 
outcome goals but not the other.  The data for the period under review suggests that 
the neutral arbiter helped facilitate flexible labour markets, but was antithetical to the 
goals sought for the ERA.  Abel’s thesis about informal institutions and their civil 
court hostility to values that prioritise maintenance over termination of relationships 
encapsulates the employment jurisdiction post 1991. 
This dichotomy had implications for access to justice, particularly for non-union 
employees.  It confined the object of accessibility to claimants who required help to 
settle the terms of ended employment relationships.  Accessibility was of limited use 
to those who sought relationship repair.   
Lower barriers of access to the institutions were therefore not associated with 
increased levels of mended over ended employment relationships.  Increased 
institutional accessibility and use may be associated with greater public acceptance of 
flexible labour markets.  If this is the case the moderate decision to factor in public 
acceptability to policy choices in 1991 and the 2000 decision to retain (and tweak) the 
ECA model ensured the earlier goals endured. 
 
Cost 
The major cost of public provision of dispute resolution services during both eras was 
the labour cost of its personnel – administrators, mediators, Tribunal and Authority 
members and EC judges.  Within that expense, cost varied according to mode of 
resolution and personnel status.  Mediation in the ECA era cost significantly less than 
adjudication in the Tribunal, not because personnel costs differed but as the result of 
their significantly different calls on (personnel) time and (scheduling) certainty.   
The doubling of resolution personnel in 2000 and the need for separate facilities for 
the Mediation Service and the Authority did not raise the cost, per dispute, of 
resolution services because those accessing the services increased at a higher rate,  
non-judicial resolution personnel were paid at different rates and most resolution 
services were provided by mediators, the lowest-paid.  Cost saving resulting from the 
quasi-compulsory use of mediation was replicated for the adjudicative mode by 
stabilising its personnel time and scheduling requirements (notwithstanding the failure 
or refusal of the Authority leadership to acknowledge this). 
The consistent dominance of the dismissal grievance and the unchanging nature of its 
remedies were not matched in the costs of representation, which rose. The result was a 
more efficient, accessible dispute resolution system that offered the same results as 
before, albeit faster, but at an increased personal cost.  
By the end of the period under review the institutionalisation of a culture (or rituals) 
of exchange triggered by dismissal, was apparent.  The transfer of money from 
employer to employee was its object even though its preliminary rituals (dominated 
by representatives) included demands for reinstatement.  Resort to the employment 
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institutions, Galanter’s bargaining tactic, depended on the relationship of the 
representatives (independent of the parties) and the intensity of disputant commitment 
to initial negotiating positions.   
The employment institutions were both responsible for, and hostage to, this concept of 
exchange, as the result of the justice trope preference for the severing over the 
maintenance of relationships and its requirement for the monetising of damage 
thereby sustained.  Because settling the terms of the exchange comprised the bulk of 
their work it was responsible for much of their operating costs.  
It is thus possible to account for much of the cost of the institutions by reference to 




The value of having two distinct, antithetical cultures of representation or advocacy in 
a study of two apparently different policy goals for the resolution of employment 
grievances lies in establishing a connection between advocacy culture, dispute 
resolution structure and wider policy goals via analysis of the structure of both eras 
and the concepts of time and control in policy about dispute resolution. 
Structure  
The structure’s dependence on a dominant individualist culture was essential to the 
flexibility goal.  Resort to the competing culture’s resolution mode (mediation) to 
cure its defects did nothing to undermine this partnership. It was another source of 
strength, particularly when mediation was institutionalised. Individualist advocates 
were associated with its advantages, collective, researcher and administrator views, 
notwithstanding. 
By contrast, when policy no longer appeared to favour flexibility, the collectivist 
(stakeholder) advocacy culture failed to regain the advocacy position it held prior to 
1991.  Of a number of reasons for this, that relevant to grievance resolution concerns 
the dependence of justice’s institutional structure on individualism’s unacknowledged 
disadvantages for disputants.  An advocacy culture derived from a collective 
membership educated about employment rights and obligations, the advantages of 
early, informal dispute resolution and the preservation of employment relationships, 
with a reluctance to advance or contest grievances where prospects of success were 
low was always likely to have a lower presence in institutions created for disputants 
lacking those characteristics. The success, therefore, of both the dominant culture and 
the institutions created for it, was to mask this reality. 
Thus, if structural and operational adjustments failed to influence the changes to 
grievance resolution practices sought for the ERA, and alleviation of the inefficiencies 
of the ECA regime entrenched the dominance of the individualist advocacy culture, it 
can be argued that the advocacy culture that an institutional structure attracts 
determines the success or failure of policy for dispute resolution in this jurisdiction. 
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Time 
Aside from the differences in time when advocacy is engaged, there are different 
approaches to the valuation of time by each culture.  This had implications for the 
institutions of both eras. The commercial value of time for the individualist culture 
helped to incentivise preferences for adjudication, the mode of resolution that 
promised the highest use of time, both in preparation and hearing, but also in the 
opportunities it offered for resolution deferral.9  Priorities on the use of time for 
collectivist advocates are collective, not individual issues, so their incentives were for 
quicker, shorter modes of resolution.  Quicker, shorter process formed the basis of 
lawyer opposition to those new institutional powers that threatened to reduce the time 
that could be devoted to billable advocacy tasks (mediator powers of adjudication, 
cross-examination, submission drafting). 
Control 
Transfers of control over the passage of the resolution process from advocates to 
administrators/resolution personnel quickened routes to institutional grievance 
resolution, as intended.  Those that didn’t interfere with advocacy tasks met with 
greatest success. There was thus no recorded opposition to the speed of mediation 
availability, nor to its imposition of time maxima, because mediation became the 
substitute institution to which lawyers could resort as part of a negotiation strategy.  
However lawyer resistance to the use of mediator powers to engage directly with 
disputants and to decide the fate of a dispute in the face of stalemate ensured their 
atrophy. 
The Authority’s investigative powers, welcomed by collective advocates, provoked 
the greatest resistance from lawyers.  Their concerns, that adjudicative powers for 
mediators and investigative powers for the Authority undermined justice suggest that 
these powers challenged their attachments to adversarial advocacy and their beliefs 
about the effects of this type of advocacy on adjudicators.  The evidence, that the 
Authority’s investigative powers had little, if any, effect on outcomes, failed to 
ameliorate these views – reinstatement of powers to cross-examine were amongst the 
first changes legislated by the incoming National Government in 2009.  
Resolution Personnel 
The EC judiciary was divided by status and attitudes to adversarialism from the 
mediators and members of the Tribunal and Authority, and this difference was 
maintained over both eras.  Whilst the Tribunal membership generally welcomed the 
policy changes of the ERA (and were keen to ensure they were implemented) the 
judiciary was more closely associated with the views of the legal profession who 
opposed them.   
The EC’s approaches to the cross-examination issue and the loss of its powers of 
review were furthermore not confined in their influence to the grievances in which 
they arose.  They sent an unequivocal message that the (ECA) status quo on issues of 
process should be maintained, notwithstanding clear statutory provision to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Deferral has the advantage of increasing the time an advocate ultimately spends on a dispute, and for 
employers may result in the eventual withdrawal of a claim by an employee who has found new 
employment and lost the initial commitment to extract money for the loss of a job.	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contrary.  This appears to have influenced lawyer advocates associated with 
undermining mediator and Authority member confidence and commitment to the new 
regime.   
The position was exacerbated by the Department’s failure to recognise that the 
success of policy initiatives to transfer control of proceedings from advocate to 
mediator/member was likely to depend on the experience and authority of initial 
appointments to those roles.  The Department’s priority was a more compliant 
resolution workforce.  Its decision to engage mediators with mixed or limited 
experience of the employment jurisdiction meant that the Mediation Service was 
variably equipped to withstand the demands of adversarial advocacy, and ill-equipped 
to adopt a consistent approach to decision-making in the face of mediation failure.  
Mediator use of powers to utilise a range of mediative approaches therefore atrophied. 
Lawyer preferences for the shuttle style prevailed.  
Thus were policy goals about process in the restructured institutions undermined:  the 
dominant advocacy culture was subtly encouraged by the judiciary to resist change 
and inadequate attention was paid to the characteristics of a resolution workforce 
capable of managing that resistance. 
 
Conclusion 
Replacement of a stakeholder dominated dispute resolution institutional structure by 
one dependent on legal method helped facilitate the policy goal of flexible labour 
markets.  Attempts by the ERA to mitigate detriments perceived to arise from labour 
market flexibility were undermined by retention of dispute resolution structures 
reliant on legal method and the belief that collectivist and individualist approaches to 
labour relations could co-exist.   This suggests that reform of institutional structure is 
unlikely to facilitate policy change without consideration of the advocacy culture 
aligned to that institutional structure.  It is possible that advocacy culture is a more 
powerful determinant of policy goals than structure, but their interdependence is key 
to understanding their effect.   
Further research might elucidate differences of outcome from reliance on neutrals 
versus reliance on stakeholder representatives for the resolution of individual (as 
distinct from collective) employment issues. Interesting questions remain. Would 
stakeholder control provide for different outcomes?  Would privately negotiated or 
mediated outcomes align more closely with protective policy goals under stakeholder 
control?  Would the need for resolution outside the workplace reduce? 
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